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Board Characteristics, Ownership Structure and 
Agency Costs: UK Evidence 
Bahaaeldin Samir Allam 
ABSTRACT 
The term “Corporate Governance” always proliferates after large accounting 
scandals and crises; practitioners claim that governance mechanisms are the cause of 
these failures, and worldwide reforms take place after each failure; however, these 
reforms did not succeed in preventing the subsequent falls down. Although corporate 
governance mechanisms are introduced to monitor and control the managerial 
opportunistic behaviour in order to reduce the agency costs; most of the prior studies 
were directed towards investigating the role of governance mechanisms in enhancing 
firm performance as an indirect proxy of lower agency conflicts, and hence, lower 
agency costs. This study adds to the debate around the usefulness and the 
effectiveness of the corporate governance mechanisms in controlling the managerial 
opportunistic behaviour and reducing agency costs. 
This study contributes to the governance literature by investigating and comparing 
the impact of a comprehensive set of governance mechanisms reflecting a wide 
spectrum of board characteristics and ownership structure on agency costs over the 
period 2005-2011; in addition to providing a comparison of before and after the 
financial crisis periods using a large sample of firms listed in FTSE All-Share index. 
In doing so, two different agency costs proxies are utilised; asset utilisation which 
reflects the managerial efficiency; and the interaction of free cash flow with growth 
opportunities which reflects investment decisions agency costs. This comparative 
analysis extends the governance literature that investigated the pre and during the 
crisis periods by adding the pre and post the 2008 financial crisis comparison. Lastly, 
this study considers more than one theoretical paradigm; the empirical evidence 
lends the support to the agency and resource dependence perspectives and provides 
partial support to the stewardship view.  
The results clearly show that not all governance mechanisms lead to lower agency 
costs; thus, one prescribed structure does not fit all. Moreover, the efficiency of the 
governance mechanisms is directly affected by surrounding economic conditions 
(e.g., steady and abnormal conditions); in other words, governance mechanisms 
which help in reducing agency costs during the normal economic condition could 
turn out to be useless, inefficient and in some cases detrimental to the managerial 
effectiveness after the financial crisis. Moreover, the reported results support the 
claim that interrelation between the different governance mechanisms should be 
considered in future governance studies.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
The concept of corporate governance is the focus of attention for investors, 
practitioners and regulators; however, this concept always flourishes after large 
accounting scandals and crises. In the early 1990’s Polly Peck and Maxwell in the 
UK, after the new millennium Xerox 2000, Enron 2001 and WorldCom 2002 in the 
U.S., Parmalat in Italy 2003 and Lehman Brothers 2008 in U.S., Olympus 
Corporation in Japan 2011 and the list goes on; are examples of large and well 
known corporations that shaped the progression of corporate governance reforms, 
codes and regulations. After every scandal, investors as well as practitioners call for 
stricter regulations to protect shareholders’ wealth as they argue that the existing 
regulations –before the scandals– did not provide the sufficient protection from the 
opportunistic management and their fraudulent practices; which led to the global 
financial crisis and the global recession followed this crisis. Baker (2010), Spiegel 
(2011) and Brandtner and D’Ecclesia (2012) mention that the U.S. subprime 
mortgage crisis led to the global recession, which impacted on the financial as well 
as non-financial institutions. 
In response to these calls, regulatory bodies revise those existing regulations and 
enact stricter codes. Brandtner and D’Ecclesia (2012) mention that one of the 
immediate responses to the financial crisis was setting new rules that are stricter and 
require the market players with more transparency. Ferrero-Ferrero, Fernández-
Izquierdo and Muñoz-Torres (2012) suggest that the roots of the financial crisis are 
related to the weakness of the governance systems. In November 2008, the 
International Corporate Governance Network issued a statement on the 2008 
financial crisis. They mention that corporate governance is the cause and the solution 
of the crisis at the same time, suggesting an agenda that includes a number of issues 
to work on to avoid any future crises. Likewise, Kirkpatrick (2009) concludes in a 
report published by The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) about the corporate governance lessons from the financial crisis; he 
‎Chapter 1: Introduction 
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concludes that the OECD corporate governance principles should be revised in order 
to determine whether there is a need for more guidelines and/or clarifications or not.  
Having said that, the scandals of, the above mentioned, well-known companies 
show that stricter regulations did not stop the later scandals and provide a clear 
evidence that corporate governance practices failed to perform their desired goals 
concerning the protection of shareholders’ interests and wealth. Thus, this raises 
questions about the effectiveness and usefulness of corporate governance codes; the 
calls for reforms with more strict regulations and codes of practices, and the 
usefulness of forcing firms to follow predetermined governance structure. The past 
scandals, crises and codes revisions, clearly, demonstrate that, although, the concept 
of corporate governance is aged more than three decades, but it is still under 
progression, and there are more changes will happen to this concept and its 
associated mechanisms and practices in the near future. 
Corporate governance as a concept, mechanisms and codes of practice were 
introduced to help in mitigating the undesirable consequences of the separation 
between ownership and control which is known as the agency problem. The agency 
problem refers to the misalignment between managers’ interests and those of 
shareholders. Managers are responsible for managing shareholders’ wealth; however, 
they are aware that they exert the full effort, but have a minor share of the output; 
this share could take the form of their compensation package and return on their 
investments in case of having an ownership stake. Consequently, managers start to 
exploit their delegated authority to extract private benefits from their control.  This 
exploitation could take more than one form like work shirking, managerial 
entrenchment, perquisite consumptions and other forms; resulting in agency costs 
represented in more monitoring costs and reflected in lower returns on shareholders’ 
investments, all are incurred by the shareholders.  
According to the agency theory, the implementation of good corporate 
governance practices should help in mitigating the agency problem and reducing 
agency costs (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Singh and Davidson III, 2003; Renders, 
Gaeremynck and Sercu, 2010; Andreou, Louca and Panayides, 2014). Ang, Cole and 
Lin (2000), Fleming, Heaney and McCosker (2005) among other researchers 
demonstrate that much of the literature since the seminal work of Jensen and 
‎Chapter 1: Introduction 
3 
 
Meckling (1976) claim that agency costs have an important and strong impact on 
firm’s main decision; e.g., the contracting, financial and managerial decisions 
represented in executive compensation, capital structure, dividend policy, accounting 
policy choice. All of these decisions have a direct impact on the shareholders’ wealth. 
Consequently, good governance practices should help in curtailing the suboptimal 
behaviour of managers regarding these decisions (Renders, Gaeremynck and Sercu, 
2010), and control the managers’ costly incentives; all of this should lead to an 
improvement in the firms’ performance (Florackis and Ozkan, 2009). Prior literature 
(e.g., Jensen and Meckling (1976); Fama and Jensen (1983b), among others) 
mentions that poor performance results from poor management, this reflects the need 
of more monitoring (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988). Thus, from an agency 
perspective, corporate governance mechanisms should control management’s 
behaviour and mitigate the agency conflicts between managers and shareholders; 
which should reduce the agency costs and would be reflected on better performance. 
1.2 MOTIVATION 
 Having said that, corporate governance mechanisms are introduced to mitigate 
the consequences of the agency problem, in the corporate governance literature, a 
major concern was directed towards examining the efficiency of ownership structure 
(in terms of board ownership and block holding); and the characteristics of the board 
of directors (in terms of size, composition and leadership structure) in aligning 
managers’ interests with those of shareholders to enhance firm performance and 
increase firm value. However, this stream of research failed in providing consistent 
results confirming the role of governance mechanisms in enhancing firm 
performance. Larcker, Richardson and Tuna (2007) mention that the empirical 
studies investigating the association between corporate governance attributes and 
various accounting and economic measures have provided inconsistent and mixed 
results. These mixed results fail to provide an imagination about the optimal 
governance structure that firms should follow (Core, Holthausen and Larcker, 1999). 
Many plausible reasons could be behind these mixed results: First, a large 
number of the prior studies concentrate on investigating the impact of a single or a 
limited number of corporate governance mechanisms e.g., Bhagat and Black (1996); 
McConnell and Servaes (1990); Yermack (1996) and Cui and Mak (2002). 
‎Chapter 1: Introduction 
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Examining the impact of a single governance mechanism ignores two vital issues; 
first, firms use more than one mechanism to control and monitor management’s 
behaviour; second, the interrelationship between the examined mechanisms and 
other non-examined mechanisms. Similarly, this argument applies for using limited 
number of mechanisms.  
Consistent with these arguments, Bathala and Rao (1995) argue that firms rely on 
more than one mechanism to manage the agency conflicts between managers and 
shareholders; each mechanism helps in controlling different aspects of agency 
conflicts. Ward, Brown and Rodriguez (2009) assert that by arguing that corporate 
governance is a set of mechanisms that work together to protect shareholders’ 
interests and wealth; a common problem in the prior studies that researchers have 
examined different corporate governance mechanisms in isolation from each other 
and with limited contingencies of firm performance and external monitoring. Zattoni 
and Van Ees (2012) support this argument by underscoring the need to examine a 
comprehensive set of complementary governance mechanisms; they conclude that it 
is difficult to examine the impact of a single mechanism in isolation from other 
mechanisms. Likewise, Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) argue that examining 
the impact of single governance attribute in isolation ignores the fact that corporate 
governance attributes can complement or substitute each other, thus, the unmeasured 
attributes could affect the efficiency of the measured attribute. For instance, firms 
could have the same degree of board independence; however, the presence of main 
blockholders could lead to different monitoring outcomes (Desender et al., 2013). 
The empirical analysis of Henry (2010) lends the support for this argument. He 
provides evidence that implementing the individual governance mechanisms in 
isolation from other mechanisms does not reduce agency costs. Grove et al. (2011) 
find evidence that support the argument that the governance attributes should be 
examined simultaneously. Besides, some researchers ignore the fact that firm 
characteristics and the relationship with the external environment have a significant 
impact on shaping the firm’s governance structure. Thus, the absence of a 
comprehensive measure of corporate governance or neglecting the interdependence 
between different governance mechanisms and/or not considering the surrounding 
environment that may affect corporate governance practices is a key problem, and 
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results in different results. Moreover, Bathala and Rao (1995) add that the uncertain 
relationship between governance mechanisms and different agency costs proxies and 
firm performance measures could be explained by the offsetting changes in  other 
mechanisms and the omission of other mechanisms from the employed models. 
These arguments clearly support the necessity of examining and considering the 
contingencies and the interrelations among the different governance mechanisms.    
Second, prior studies that tried to investigate the impact of corporate governance 
practices as a comprehensive set of practices used different sets, different proxies 
and indices to measure the quality level of corporate governance and its impact on 
mitigating agency problems and improving firm performance; Brown, Beekesc and 
Verhoeven (2011, p.102) state that “the plethora of corporate governance measures 
can make it well-nigh impossible to explain conflicting results.” 
One more reason for these mixed and different results may be due to the 
problem of endogeneity or that each firm chooses its own practices, which are 
consistent with its environment and circumstances to achieve its goal of shareholders’ 
wealth maximization. Ward, Brown and Rodriguez (2009) state that firm’s 
governance bundle is a function of firm performance, and what determines whether 
the mechanism within the bundle act as substitutes or complements is the firm’s 
performance. Renders, Gaeremynck and Sercu (2010) argue that econometric 
problems and/or each firm chooses the governance practices that maximize the 
shareholders’ wealth based on its characteristics may be the reason(s) behind the 
mixed results. Similarly, Brown, Beekesc and Verhoeven (2011) mention that prior 
studies ignored the endogeneity problem and used the estimated parameters from the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) to consent that the movement towards better corporate 
governance practices should lead to better performance or/and value, ignoring the 
unobserved heterogeneity; as there are some unobservable factors that could impact 
the investigated relations. Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) endorse this 
argument and mention that ignoring the unobserved heterogeneity issue leads to 
model misspecification.  
Thus, this study aims at integrating a comprehensive set of corporate governance 
mechanisms and considering the endogeneity problem as well as the unobserved 
heterogeneity in an attempt to investigate the impact of corporate governance 
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mechanisms on agency costs and provide more accurate associations. The study 
results shed the light that for future research, researchers should consider that 
utilising limited number of governance mechanisms or examining these mechanisms 
in isolation will bring out inconsistent and incomparable results, which could 
mislead the future researchers and policy makers as well. 
Corporate governance mechanisms are introduced to monitor the management 
behaviour in order to reduce the agency costs. However, there is no direct test that 
can investigate the role of governance mechanisms in mitigating agency conflicts, 
thus, in prior literature, researchers assume that an effective mechanism should 
enhance firm performance leading to higher value (Bathala and Rao, 1995). 
Consequently, prior studies examine the relationship between governance 
mechanisms and different performance variables assuming that high performance is 
an indirect reflection of lower agency conflicts, or in other words, better performance 
or high value are indirect proxies for lower agency costs. A limited number of 
studies
1
 has been directed and focused on investigating, quantifying, and promoting 
various proxies to measure agency costs and examine the impact of the different 
governance mechanisms on the magnitude of agency costs. Even these studies were 
suffering from either concentrating over one mechanism (e.g., Ang, Cole and Lin 
(2000); Fleming, Heaney and McCosker (2005); Wellalage and Locke (2011)) or 
including a limited number of corporate governance mechanisms ( e.g., Singh and 
Davidson III (2003); McKnight and Weir (2009); Ibrahim and Samad (2011)). 
Moreover, these prior studies do not consider many of the firm characteristics that 
could shape the firm’s governance structure and other econometrics problems as 
mentioned earlier.  
Thus, in this study, the researcher adopts Desender et al. (2013)’s view that rather 
than examining the effectiveness of governance mechanisms by assessing their 
impact on firm performance measures, a more accurate assessment could be obtained 
by  accessing managements decisions related to potential conflicts between managers 
and shareholders. Consequently, in this study, the researcher investigates the 
effectiveness of the governance mechanisms by examining their impact on agency 
                                                          
1
 These studies are reviewed in details in chapter 4. 
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cost proxies that are related to management efficiency and investment decisions of 
the free cash flow. 
It is widely argued in the governance literature that institutional settings and 
regulatory framework have a significant impact on the governance structure chosen 
by the firm. Considering that the UK system is a “comply or explain” system, which 
means that all listed firms should provide evidence that they are either complying 
with the governance code or provide explanations for their noncompliance; it should 
be expected that following this code would lead to lower agency conflicts and hence 
lower agency costs. Having said that, Belghitar and Clark (2014) mention that UK 
studies failed to provide solid evidence that corporate governance mechanisms 
reduce agency costs. 
Given that the surrounding environment affects the impact and the shape of the 
firm’s governance structure; the financial crisis and the comparison between the 
influence of different mechanisms before and after the crisis do help in analysing the 
roles of these mechanisms in different conditions, identify which mechanisms are 
efficient and in what conditions, helps in understating how firms react to adapt after 
such crises and which mechanisms help to recover from the crisis and survive during 
the recession period followed the crisis; such analysis could be useful for future 
planning. Ferrero-Ferrero, Fernández-Izquierdo and Muñoz-Torres (2012) and Van 
Essen, Engelen and Carney (2013) provide evidence that the role of the corporate 
governance mechanisms is affected by the surrounding economic circumstances; 
what is more, they find evidence that during the crisis some of the governance 
mechanisms are useless and others are harmful for the firm performance. 
This study examines the above mentioned points in many ways. First, the study 
examines the role of a comprehensive set of governance mechanism on three 
different agency costs proxies which have been introduced by the prior literature to 
identify which of these mechanisms have a significant role in reducing agency costs. 
Then the researcher compares between the role of these mechanisms on two different 
economic circumstances; before and after the financial crisis. By reviewing the prior 
literature, it was found that prior literature investigated the influence of financial 
crisis on the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanism e.g., Ferrero-Ferrero, 
Fernández-Izquierdo and Muñoz-Torres (2012); Van Essen, Engelen and Carney 
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(2013) have the following limitations. They compare the effectiveness of the 
different governance mechanisms before and during the financial crisis, besides, 
their dependent variables are firm performance rather than agency costs proxies. 
Consequently, this study contributes to the governance literature by extending the 
scope of these studies by  including the post crisis analysis and using different 
proxies of  agency costs. The results provide clear evidence that different economic 
circumstances should lead to different governance structure for mitigating agency 
costs.  
To conclude, the main motives of this study are, first, most of the prior studies 
were directed towards investigating the impact of corporate governance on financial 
performance or firm value, these studies failed to provide consistent results that can 
help in driving a model of the efficient governance structure. Second, limited number 
of studies has examined the relation between corporate governance and agency costs. 
Third, this study examines whether the impact of corporate governance mechanisms 
is contingent on the economic conditions or not, and if yes, what are the mechanisms 
that were efficient during the steady conditions and which mechanisms are more 
efficient after abnormal economic conditions. Fourth, this study considers a 
comprehensive set of governance mechanisms and utilises new measures compared 
to prior studies as well as firm characteristics. Fifth, the lack of studies that 
investigate the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and agency 
costs in the UK context. Sixth, the lack of recent study in the UK context, prior UK 
studies utilise short time horizon for old data sets.  
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The aim of this study is to empirically investigate the impact of corporate 
governance mechanisms, and the compliance with the UK corporate governance 
code on the agency costs of the UK firms. Besides, this study aims at comparing the 
role of the utilised governance mechanisms before and after the 2008 financial crisis. 
These aims are reflected on the following research questions:  
“To what extent, do corporate governance mechanisms help in reducing the 
agency costs of the UK firms?” 
‎Chapter 1: Introduction 
9 
 
“To what extent, does the compliance with the UK corporate governance code 
help in reducing the agency costs of the UK firms?”  
“To what extent, does the impact of the corporate governance mechanisms 
change during the recession period follow the 2008 financial crisis?” 
“Does ownership identity affect the impact of ownership on agency costs?” 
Table 1 Summary of the research questions, objectives and the methods utilised to answer 
these questions 
Research question Objective How answered 
To what extent, do 
corporate governance 
mechanisms help in 
reducing the agency costs 
of the UK firms?” 
To examine the overall 
impact of corporate 
governance mechanisms 
on equity agency costs  
A comprehensive set of 
corporate governance 
mechanisms were 
regressed against equity 
agency cost measures 
To what extent, does the 
compliance with the UK 
corporate governance 
code help in reducing the 
agency costs of the UK 
firms?”  
To examine the impact of 
the compliance with the 
UK corporate 
governance code on 
reducing equity agency 
costs 
Four composite measures 
to capture the 
recommended 
characteristics of board 
composition as well as 
board subcommittees 
were constructed. 
Hypotheses 4a,4b,4c and 
the board composition 
was examined in 
section  6.5.4 
To what extent, does the 
impact of the corporate 
governance mechanisms 
change during the 
recession period follow 
the 2008 financial 
crisis?” 
To capture the change of 
the impact of corporate 
governance mechanisms 
before and after the 
global recession followed 
the financial crisis. 
Two subsamples were 
constructed to capture the 
pre-crisis period (2005-
2007); and during the 
recession period (2009-
2011) 
Does ownership identity 
affect the impact of 
ownership on agency 
costs?” 
To examine whether the 
identity of shareholders 
in terms of being 
institutional or individual 
blockholders and being 
the CEO or executive or 
nonexecutive director 
affects equity agency 
costs. 
The researcher split the 
board ownership ratio 
was split according to the 
identity of the director 
(CEO, executive and non-
executive) hypotheses 
6a,6b,6c; likewise, the 
block holding ratio based 
on the identity of the 
block holder (individual 
or institution) hypotheses 
7a,7b,7c. 
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To answer the above-mentioned research questions, the researcher developed the 
following hypotheses, these hypotheses consider a wide range of corporate 
governance mechanisms, ownership structure; moreover, they are grounded in the 
theoretical arguments and the empirical evidence provided by the prior literature. In 
the empirical investigation, the researcher controls for a number of firm 
characteristics that could have a potential impact on agency costs and the firm’s 
governance structure; and considered the econometric problems that prior studies 
were suffering from. In doing so, baseline model and 3 different sub models were 
developed to examine the main hypotheses and the sub hypotheses. 
H1: There is a negative association between board size and agency costs. 
H2: There is a negative association between the percentage of independent board 
members and agency costs. 
H3: There is a positive association between duality and agency costs. 
H4: Board subcommittees are negatively associated with agency costs. 
 H4a: An effective audit committee is positively associated with lower agency 
costs. 
 H4b: An effective remuneration committee is positively associated with lower 
agency costs. 
 H4c: An effective nomination committee is positively associated with lower 
agency costs. 
H5: There is a negative association between board ownership percentage and 
agency costs. 
H6: The identity of  the owner director has a significant impact on agency costs. 
 H6a: There is a negative association between CEO ownership percentage 
and agency costs. 
 H6b: There is a negative association between executive directors’ ownership 
percentage and agency costs. 
 H6c: There is a negative association between non-executive
2
 directors’ 
ownership percentage and agency costs. 
                                                          
2
 Non-executive director as a term in this hypothesis includes both independent and non-independent 
directors. 
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H7: There is a negative association between block holding percentage and agency 
costs. 
H8: The identity of the blockholders has a significant impact on agency costs. 
 H8a: There is a negative association between institutional block holding 
percentage and agency costs. 
 H8b: There is a negative association between individual block holding 
percentage and agency costs. 
 
1.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2009) describe the process of conducting research 
as an onion, with many layers; it starts with an outer layer of research philosophy 
and ends with techniques and procedures the researcher follows to conduct his 
research. By applying this view to this study, the researcher can claim that this study 
has a positive philosophy, with a deductive approach, and it is an archival research 
study. 
Figure 1 The Positivist Approach  
                                              
 
 
Problem 
Literature Review 
Hypothesis Development 
Method 
Results 
Source: Smith (2003a, p.19) 
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In this study, the researcher follows the traditional positivist approach as 
described by House (1970). Smith (2003a) illustrates that the traditional positivist 
approach starts with identifying a research problem, formulating the study’s 
hypotheses grounded in theory and prior literature; besides, researchers should 
ensure the acceptability of the hypotheses. House (1970) argues that the accuracy in 
measuring the hypotheses and identifying the variables correctly will enhance the 
researchers’ ability in evaluating the results, stating and comparing results more 
precisely. After that, the researcher identifies the suitable methods to examine the 
research hypotheses and report the results and the findings of this research (Smith, 
2003a). 
This study utilises a large sample (1431 firm–year observations) of the UK 
nonfinancial firms incorporated in the FTSE ALL-Share index over the period 2005–
2011 inclusive. The data set of this study is panel data set, thus it takes the 
advantages of the cross section and time series nature of the data set, considers the 
unobserved heterogeneity and requires utilising panel data regression models. 
Moreover, this study considers the endogeneity problem in the robustness check 
section. 
1.5 STUDY CONTRIBUTIONS AND IMPORTANCE. 
This study contributes to the current corporate governance literature and the 
debate around the usefulness and effectiveness of the corporate governance 
mechanisms in protecting shareholders’ wealth in many aspects. These contributions 
evolve from the difference between the current study and prior studies. 
First, this is the first study that investigates the impact of a comprehensive set of 
corporate governance mechanisms on the agency costs in the UK context; after 
considering that comprehensive set, the study results demonstrate that not all 
governance mechanisms lead to lower agency costs, what’s more, it was found that 
some mechanisms increase firm’s agency costs.   
Second, this study is the first study that compares between the impact of the 
corporate governance mechanisms before and after the financial crisis. Prior studies 
were limited to investigating the role of corporate governance before and during the 
financial crisis and in different contexts from the UK context. The study results show 
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that the role of the governance mechanisms changes with the changes of the 
surrounding environment.  
Third, this study utilises a set of new measures of different corporate governance 
mechanisms that never been used in similar studies. These new measures include 
composite measures for every board subcommittee, utilising the industry adjusted 
measures to control for the variations across the different industries, differentiate 
between blockholders in terms of institutional and individual blockholders instead of 
generalising that blockholders are effective or not, the evidence provided in this 
study shows that the identity of the blockholder has a role; and finally the split of the 
board ownership into three categories which are the CEO, executive and non-
executive directors’ ownership. 
Last but not least, along with these points; this study utilises a large (1431 firm 
year observations) and recent data set data (2005-2011) of the UK firms compared to 
prior studies in the UK context, e.g., Florackis (2008) utilised total observations of 
897 over the period 1999-2003; McKnight and Weir (2009) used data set covering 
the period 1996-2000 with a total of 534 observations; Belghitar and Clark (2014)’s 
study covers the period 2000:2004, and they mainly examine the compensation 
structure as agency costs mitigating mechanism. The current UK corporate 
governance code (2014) is the fifth amendment after these studies. Furthermore, this 
study utilises a longer time horizon of seven years compared to these studies.    
1.6 THESIS STRUCTURE 
This thesis comprises seven chapters. This chapter provides an introduction to this 
study. The researcher started this chapter by providing the reader with a brief 
introduction about this study, followed by the motivations of this study, then the 
research questions that reflect the motivations and the aims of this research. After 
that, the researcher summarises the research methodology of the study followed by a 
view of how this study contributes to the current literature; the researcher ends this 
chapter by providing a brief summary about the structure of this study. 
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows: 
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Chapter two provides a detailed discussion of theoretical perspectives that have 
shaped the corporate governance research and helped in the development of the 
corporate governance concept, mechanisms and practices; and have been employed 
in this study throughout the hypotheses development and results discussion. 
Chapters three and four provide a summary of the relevant literature review for 
this study. Chapter three starts with introducing the corporate governance concept 
followed by the theoretical argument and the empirical evidence from the prior 
literature that has been used to develop the study hypotheses for each of the 
corporate governance mechanisms utilised in this study. Besides, this chapter 
provides the theoretical argument for the agency costs proxies utilised in this study. 
Chapter four complements this litreture review by providing a critical review for 
prior empirical studies that investigated the association between the corporate 
governance mechanism and agency costs. 
Chapter five covers the methodological approach of this study. This chapter starts 
with a brief review of the research philosophy and approaches; then it introduces the 
operationalization of the dependent, independent variables. Then the theoretical 
argument, the empirical evidence and the operationalization of the control variables 
utilised in the empirical models  of this study. After that the analytical procedures 
and the rationale behind using panel data regression models are provided; then, the 
researcher introduces the empirical models and explores the sample and data 
collection process.  
The first part of chapter six reports the descriptive statistics of the sample and the 
correlations among the study variables. The second section includes the empirical 
investigations of the research questions, and the findings and discussion of these 
findings. Through the third section, the research reports a number of tests to check 
the robustness of the reported results. 
This thesis ends with chapter seven which provides the summary and the 
conclusions drawn from this study, restating the contributions along with the 
implications of the study. Chapter seven ends with stating the limitations of this 
study, and providing potential avenues for future research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, the researcher explores a number of theories and different schools 
of thought that discuss the concept of corporate governance from different views and 
angles. These theories, in addition to other theories, have contributed to the evolution 
of the corporate governance literature and shaped this literature. All of these theories 
are pursuing the efficacy of the firm performance by increasing the effectiveness of 
the management and protecting shareholders’ wealth; however, these different 
theories provide different and sometimes contradictory views toward the 
management, their behaviours and the motives behind these behaviours.  
It has been argued that the development of the corporate governance concept as 
well as the different areas incorporated under this concept have been developed from 
a variety of disciplines, including finance, management, economics, accounting and 
law (Mallin, 2013). Thus, in this chapter, the researcher shows and discusses the 
main theories that directly touch and related to this study in terms of developing the 
study hypotheses and explaining the empirical findings. The structure of this chapter 
proceeds as follows. The researcher will first explore the most dominant theory that 
explains the agency relationship which is the agency theory, followed by stewardship 
theory and ends with the resource dependence theory.  
2.2 AGENCY THEORY 
Many theories have been applied to investigate the principal-agent  relationship, 
and provide the theoretical foundation of corporate governance mechanisms; 
however, there is a common agreement among researchers (e.g., Davis, Schoorman 
and Donaldson (1997); Daily, Dalton and Cannella (2003); Judge (2012); Krause, 
Semadeni and Cannella (2014), among others) that agency theory has been the most 
dominant theoretical framework in the corporate governance literature. Daily, Dalton 
and Cannella (2003) justify this popularity of the agency theory for two main 
reasons; first, agency theory reduces the complex relationships within firms to a 
simple, clear and logical conflict of interests between the principals and managers at 
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which both are utility maximizers; second, the pervasive belief that humans are 
individualistic, self-serving, and they only seek their own interests. Fleming, Heaney 
and McCosker (2005) mention that agency theory helps in the evolution of the 
corporate governance literature by introducing the need, the rationale and the role of 
different governance mechanisms in disciplining managers’ irrational and self-
interested behaviours. 
In the following sections, the researcher briefly reviews the theoretical foundation 
of the principal-agent problem, the different forms of agency problems and the 
agency costs. 
2.2.1 The Agency Problem 
A major advantage of large corporation that it enables investors to reap the 
benefits of producing in large scale with reduced costs.  However, large corporations 
require financial resources that go beyond the ability of a single investor. This entails 
the need of collecting more resources from more than one investor and spread the 
ownership among a large number of owners.  Taking into consideration that not all 
investors have the managerial abilities, and time, or even the ownership stake that 
qualifies them to take the right of managing and controlling their firms; they have to 
delegate such responsibility to a professional management. Park and Jang (2010) 
argue that the separation of ownership and control could be advantageous for the 
shareholders as it brings investors with capital and managers with experience to 
create an investment entity; such situation is expected to be a win-win situation for 
both parties. However, different argument has been proposed in the finance 
literature.  
Agency problem starts to evolve once owners decide to leave their wealth and 
business affairs to managers who should take care of shareholders’ wealth and 
interests (Nordberg, 2010). In such case, the control of the firm becomes separate 
from ownership. This separation results in the principal-agent relationship. Muth and 
Donaldson (1998) state that a cornerstone in the agency theory argument is that as 
firms grow in size, the power of control over the firm move from the shareholders to 
the professional managers who are in charge of running the day to day activities, and 
they might use their delegated power in achieving their own goals at the expense of 
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shareholders. Without control, self-serving agents can easily compensate themselves 
with more than what they actually deserve, extract private benefits, consume more 
perquisites, and in some cases to steal owner’s wealth. 
The agency problem can be traced back to Adam Smith, in his book “The wealth 
of nations.” He noted that company managers would not be expected to be worried 
and vigilant with shareholders’ money as with their own (Letza, Sun and Kirkbride, 
2004; Wearing, 2005). Smith (1776) points out this problem by stating that managers 
are not vigilance watchers of the owner’s wealth; moreover, they might expropriate 
owner’s wealth.      
“The directors of such companies, however, being the managers rather of other 
people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch 
over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private 
copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they 
are apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their master’s honour, and 
very easily give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion, 
therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such 
a company” (Smith, 1776, p. 606). 
In 1932, Berle and Means claimed that as a result of separation of ownership and 
control in modern corporations, managers became unbounded to pursue their own 
goals rather than the shareholders’ goals (Letza, Sun and Kirkbride, 2004). Given 
that managers gain the full benefit of being opportunistic and pursuing their own 
goals, while they only bear part of the costs which is equivalent to the proportion of 
their ownership stake, if they have (Bathala and Rao, 1995); and no cost if they don’t 
hold any ownership stake. 
Inspired by the original papers by Spence and Zeckhauser (1971) and Ross 
(1973), substantial attention has been given to the development of the theory of the 
agency relationship (Jensen, 1983, p. 334). A theory that articulates the relationship 
between the owners of the firm and the controllers of the firm. Agency theory is 
grounded on a number of assumptions about the agent that explain his behaviour 
(Wright, Mukherji and Kroll, 2001); a basic assumption of the agency theory is  that 
principals and agents, both, are rational actors; they will choose to maximize their 
own utility (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997) 
with the minimum cost and effort. This opportunistic behaviour is the commonly 
mentioned assumption by agency theorists (Wright, Mukherji and Kroll, 2001). Thus, 
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it was normal that, the researchers’ attentions were directed towards the analyse of 
aligning the interest of managers with those of principals by using compensation 
structures, and the potential problems associated with these structures (Jensen and 
Smith, 1984).  
In 1976, Jensen and Meckling proposed the first definition of the agency 
relationship as “a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) 
engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which 
involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent” (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976, p. 308).  
Brennan (1995) mentions that Jensen and Meckling (1976) were the first 
researchers who emphasise the role of contracts in mitigating principal-agent  
conflicts. According to the agency relationship, and based on the established contract 
between the shareholders and management, managers (agents) are required to 
provide some services represented in managing principals’ wealth in exchange for a 
predetermined compensation package. This requires the agents to take some 
decisions, and work for the best interest of the shareholders putting their 
own/personal interests aside. Considering that managers control firm’s affairs and 
resources, and they take decisions on behalf of the principles that affect the welfare 
of both parties (Brennan, 1995); managers could recognise the private benefits they 
can extract from this control (Clacher, Hillier and McColgan, 2010). Accordingly, a 
conflict of interest between managers and shareholders is something possible. Once 
the divergence between the principals and agents’ interests starts to appear, a number 
of problems will surface, which are known as “The Agency problems." The 
conventional agency problem between the principals and agents arises because of the 
separation between the decision making process which is carried by the managers 
and the resulting risk from such decisions which is borne by the shareholders 
(Clacher, Hillier and McColgan, 2010). However, managers, as well, bear the 
consequences of their bad decisions in many ways like being dismissed and lose their 
jobs, besides losing their reputation on the labour market.  In early studies, it has 
been argued that the desired alignment between managers’ interests with those of 
shareholders can be influenced and achieved by using two means, the compensation 
motives and/or the replacement threat (Brennan, 1995). 
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Under the agency theory, managers are expected to be opportunistic, seeking only 
their own goals and interests, using the delegated decision making authority to 
maximize their own utility, and often failing to act in the best interests of 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983b; Eisenhardt, 
1989; Letza, Sun and Kirkbride, 2004; Ward, Brown and Rodriguez, 2009), this will 
be translated into a reduction in  the firm’s profits (Fama and Jensen, 1983b), and 
affecting the wealth of the principals (Wright, Mukherji and Kroll, 2001; Letza, Sun 
and Kirkbride, 2004). Such assumptions are plausible if both parties (principals and 
agents), as mentioned by Jensen and Meckling (1976), are utility maximizers seeking 
high utility with lower effort. 
Hart (1995) argues that in addition to the separation of ownership and control, the 
lack of monitoring could cause the danger that managers will pursue their own goals 
at the expense of the shareholders (e.g., managers may overpay themselves and give 
themselves extravagant perks, carry out unprofitable but power enhancing 
investments, and entrench themselves). This lack of monitoring activities and the free 
ride of monitoring duties (results from the lack of incentives by the dispersed 
shareholders) will lead to the emergence of the problem of how to monitor the 
managers’ activities and ensure that they are working with the best of shareholders’ 
interests. Consistent with this, Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) state that non-monitoring 
shareholders do not incur any monitoring costs; however, they get the full benefits of 
the monitoring activities of other shareholders, thus, shareholders become less  
enthusiastic to perform their monitoring role as their ownership stake decreases.  
Another problem arises from the agency relationship is the risk sharing problem, 
which results from the difference of preferences and attitudes towards risk between 
managers and shareholders (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
The research on the agency relationship has created two main streams that aim to 
address the principal-agent  relationship (Jensen, 1983). The positive (or positivism) 
agency approach and the principal-agent approach; both streams focus on 
formulating the contracts that frame the principal-agent relationship considering that 
both parties are self-interest and utility maximizers; besides, each stream seeks the 
minimization of the agency costs associated with the agency relationship (Jensen, 
1983). 
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For the positive approach, the governance mechanisms are the main concern; as 
these mechanisms can help in monitoring and curtail the opportunistic behaviour of 
the management in such situations that there is a conflict of interests between 
managers and shareholders (Eisenhardt, 1989); whereas, the principal-agent  
approach, which is mathematical and non-empirical in nature, has focused on risk 
sharing and the form of the optimal contract between the principal and the agent 
(Jensen, 1983). 
These two approaches complement each other; the positive approach proposes 
different contacting alternatives, while, the principal-agent approach considers many 
aspects like outcome uncertainty, information availability, risk aversion and other 
variables to identify the most efficient contract (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Wright, Mukherji and Kroll (2001) argue that formal contracts that organise the 
economic exchanges between principals and agents can mitigate the agency costs. 
Consistent with this, Denis (2001) mentions that a proper contract is one of the tools 
that can bond managers and align their interests with those of shareholders. 
Eisenhardt (1989) suggests that an outcome based contract could mitigate the 
management’s opportunistic behaviour. Optimal contracts should clearly describe the 
courses of action that managers should follow, thus, perfect or complete contact is 
something difficult to write and infeasible as it is related to future circumstances that 
can’t be predicted; moreover, in case of unexpected events that are not mentioned in 
the contract, managers have to get back to the principal to get their opinion which is 
infeasible as well for many reasons, such as sudden circumstances that require 
prompt action; besides, principals are not well informed about the surrounding 
circumstance and they lack the required qualifications to manage their wealth and 
that why they hired professional managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Thus, as the 
complete or perfect contracts are something infeasible in real world, firm’s 
governance structure becomes important as it provides a way to deal with the future 
actions that have not been stated in the contracts (Hart, 1995). 
Fama and Jensen (1983b) propose another control mechanism for the 
management’s opportunistic behavior. They argue that assigning the different 
decision making procedures (managing and monitoring of the decisions) to different 
agents (the management and the board of directors) with providing the proper 
incentives that encourage the mutual control between the different agents. In support 
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of this proposal, Muth and Donaldson (1998) mention that this separation enhances 
board’s independent control; however, it is complicated because enforcing this 
separation needs independent board.  
The agency relationship results in a number of conflicts of interests between 
shareholders and other parties. Problems result from agency relationship can be 
classified into first, the divergence of interests between the managers and the 
shareholders “Principal–Agent problem”; second, the divergence of interests 
between the major blockholders and the minority of shareholders “Principal-
Principal Problem”; and third, the divergence of interests between the shareholders 
and the bondholders (Denis, 2001; Kim and Lee, 2003; Ibrahim and Samad, 2011). 
Managers and shareholders might have their incentives to shift the risk from the 
shareholders to the debt-holders; they might choose projects with higher risk rather 
than the agreed risk level at debt issuing negotiations; as they will gain the full 
profits in case of project success, and the debt holder will incur the loss in case of 
project failure. Recently, Ertugrul and Hegde (2008) mention the outside director-
shareholder conflict, which appears as a result of the lack of incentives of the outside 
directors to act in the best interest of shareholders. This study, however, is limited to 
the principal-agent problem and thus, the equity agency costs, and partially 
investigates the impact of directors’ ownership on equity agency costs. 
The conflict of interests between managers and shareholders cause several agency 
problems like work shirking, excessive perquisite consumption, entrenchment, 
overinvestment (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986; Ertugrul, 2005; Fleming, 
Heaney and McCosker, 2005; Ertugrul and Hegde, 2008; Mustapha and Ahmad, 
2011), and Risk sharing (Eisenhardt, 1989; Denis, 2001; Ward, Brown and 
Rodriguez, 2009). A brief discussion of these problems is provided in the following 
subsections; however, it worth mentioning that this study is limited to agency costs 
related to work shirking and overinvestment. 
2.2.1.1  Work shirking 
Work Shirking is considered as one of the most important consequences of the 
agency problem. Shirking refers to the lack of effort of the agent, which means that 
the agent doesn’t exert the contracted upon effort or the requisite efforts (Eisenhardt, 
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1989; Romano, Bhagat and Bolton, 2008); as a result of their limited ownership stake 
(Fleming, Heaney and McCosker, 2005). Jensen and Meckling (1976) state that as 
the manager’s ownership claim falls, their incentive to devote appropriate effort to 
creative activities falls, and they might avoid such project because it requires much 
trouble or effort to manage or to learn about technology. In other words as mentioned 
by Dühnfort, Klein and Lampenius (2008), as the managers’ ownership stake 
decreases, they become more inclined to misuse and consume firm’s resources and 
exert less effort until they reach the equilibrium point at which the marginal utility of 
his extra consumption and less involvement in firm’s affair is equal to the marginal 
utility of their profit reduction (the difference between their profit before and after 
selling part of their ownership stake).  
According to agency theory, managers have their incentive for shrinking and 
consuming excessive (Fleming, Heaney and McCosker, 2005). Managers appreciate 
that they are the only ones who bear the entire costs of their works, whereas the 
output of their efforts represented in the increase in profits and firm’s value is shared 
with the shareholders (Romano, Bhagat and Bolton, 2008) or most of their efforts 
outcomes go to the shareholders. Moreover, managers realise that the cost of their 
shirking is incurred by the shareholders and they gain all the benefits of this shirking 
(Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). Thus, effort shirking could be the way that managers 
reach the balance between their exerted efforts and the return they get (Wright, 
Mukherji and Kroll, 2001). 
2.2.1.2  Perquisite Consumption 
Perquisite consumption presents a portion of the management utility (Bryan, Nash 
and Patel, 2006). Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that managers, apart from being 
owners or not, take decisions that maximize their total utility including pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary benefits. However, the decrease of managers’ ownership stake 
influences their behaviour toward the excessive consumption. Managers get the full 
benefit of their perquisite consumptions, but they bear only part of its cost equivalent 
to their ownership stake (if they have ownership stake), thus, managers with no 
ownership stake get the full utility of their perquisite consumptions without incurring 
any cost, and even if they have any ownership stake less than 100%, they will incur 
costs lower than the benefits they get.  
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2.2.1.3  Entrenchment 
Managerial Entrenchment is the extent to which managers have the ability and 
incentives to pursue their self-interest and expropriate wealth from shareholders 
(Florackis and Ozkan, 2009, p. 498) without the fear of shareholders’ reactions 
towards this expropriation. Managerial entrenchment is defined as the actions (by 
managers) that reduce the effectiveness of control mechanisms designed to regulate 
the management behaviours (Ward, Brown and Rodriguez, 2009, p. 654), this 
definition has concentrated on the managerial ability to overcome the control 
mechanisms set up by the shareholders to regulate their actions and activities. 
The agency theory is based on the opportunism assumption. Considering that 
managers have their own interests that contradict with the shareholders’ interests, 
and they aim to achieve these interests at the expense of the shareholders; but at the 
same time, shareholders are aware with the consequences of the separation of 
ownership and control; and thus, they set a number of controlling mechanisms that 
aim at minimising the opportunistic behaviour of managers. However, managers 
have their own ways and tools to entrench themselves and nullify the control 
mechanisms. Ertugrul (2005) states that managers having substantial voting power 
could be entrenched, and this allows them to pursue their own interests rather than 
the value maximizing policy. For instance, Florackis, Kostakis and Ozkan (2009) 
mention that entrenched managers prefer lower than optimal leverage, choose 
leverage with longer maturities, keep large amounts of cash under their control, pay 
lower dividends and overinvest. 
2.2.1.4  Over Investment 
Jensen (1986) argues that firm which generates large free cash flow, but having 
low growth prospects is more prone to agency problems than other firms. The 
diversion of interests between managers and shareholders, in addition to the 
availability of cash flows under the managers’ control that exceed the available 
investment opportunities and the required funds to maintain firm’s current asset base, 
initiates the potential of unwise investment of these cash flows in suboptimal 
investments (Richardson, 2006). Normally, managers might choose to keep and 
retain cash under their control, while, shareholders prefer more dividends, this 
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conflict of interests is aggravated if the firm has free cash flows more than their 
growth prospects. Managers of these firms have their incentives to make their firms 
grow beyond the optimal size (overinvestment) and waste the free cash flow on non-
profitable projects, such incentives are the increase in the managers’ power, the 
tendency of firms to reward middle managers through promotion rather than year-to-
year bonuses (Jensen, 1986), job security are more related to the firm size rather than 
the performance (Weir, Laing and McKnight, 2002); and compensation is much 
related to firm size as well; Clacher, Hillier and McColgan (2010) mention that many 
compensation studies provide evidence that firm size is primal determinant for 
executive remuneration. Stulz (1990) argues that managers with no ownership stake 
gain their utility from managing larger firms, thus, they have the incentive to increase 
firm size. Adding to this, McConnell and Servaes (1995) mention that coupled with 
having their own incentive (getting rewarded for expanding and increasing firm 
size), managers have the opportunity represented in cash flows under their control.  
2.2.1.5  Risk Sharing 
Risk sharing is another form of divergence of interest between managers and the 
owners, as they both have different perceptions and preferences toward risk, and 
every one of them has his own way to mitigate risk. Fama (1980) argues that 
managers invest their human capital in the firms they work for; the return on this 
investment is represented in the compensation amounts they get from the firm; their 
compensation package is determined based on firm’s success or failure under their 
management. Thus, managers are expected to be risk averse as they can’t diverse 
their employment, and they don’t have the option to diversify their risks (livelihood 
& wealth) as a large portion of their wealth is tied in their company’s performance. 
Managers receive direct cash flows from the firm in the form of salary, bonus and 
other incentives; moreover, their future employment prospects and livelihood are 
dependent on the survival of the firm; this divergence of risk preferences between 
managers and shareholders creates the potential conflicts of interest in regard to the 
investment policy (Denis, 2001; Ward, Brown and Rodriguez, 2009). 
Ward, Brown and Rodriguez (2009) also state that managers could be risk averse as a 
result of the use of excessive ownership, as the managers’ ownership increase, a 
large portion of their wealth become tied up in the firm. Thus, managers could be 
risk averse in decisions regarding the firm, in order to lower their personal wealth 
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risk (Wright, Mukherji and Kroll, 2001); and this could lead to sub-optimal 
utilisation of the resources under the control of risk averse managers or foregoing 
profitable investment opportunities because of these opportunities’ risk levels do not 
match with managers’ preferences (Belghitar and Clark, 2014). Such argument could 
imply that managers are not opportunistic; they are just trying to mitigate their own 
risks. 
 Contrariwise, shareholders could be risk neutral or risk seeker as they can diverse 
their investment portfolio. They can diversify their portfolios to eliminate the 
unsystematic risk (risks of the underperformance at a particular firm) (Wright, 
Mukherji and Kroll, 2001; Farinha, 2003a; Ward, Brown and Rodriguez, 2009), so 
their main concern is the market risk, or on other words the risk associated with 
market-wide fluctuations of stock returns so in the case of the project failure, this 
failure will have a relatively small negative impact on their total wealth (Farinha, 
2003a). 
2.2.2 The Agency Costs 
As mentioned early in this chapter, the agency problem results from the 
divergence of interests between managers and shareholders. This misalignment of 
interests results in agency costs. Jensen and Meckling (1976, p.308) define the 
agency costs as “The sum of the monitoring expenditures by principals, the bonding 
expenditures by the agent, and the residual loss." 
Monitoring costs were described by Jensen and Meckling (1976) as the costs 
related to the creation of proper incentive plans for the agents to ensure the alignment 
of their interests with those of shareholders. In addition to these costs incorporate the 
expenses associated with the process of observing, measuring and controlling agents’ 
behaviours (Clacher, Hillier and McColgan, 2010). Bonding expenditures are the 
second component of agency costs. Jensen and Meckling (1976) mention that 
bonding expenditures represent the incurred costs by the agents to reassure the 
principals that all decisions are directed towards the maximizing shareholders’ 
wealth, and that they are working for the principals’ best interest. The efforts of 
providing accurate and timely information to shareholders is a clear example of 
bonding costs (Clacher, Hillier and McColgan, 2010). Residual loss is the third 
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component of agency costs as mentioned by Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
Monitoring costs and bonding costs are not sufficient to completely align the 
interests of managers with those of shareholders (Clacher, Hillier and McColgan, 
2010). Thus, there is a possibility of a divergence between the outcome of agent’s 
decisions and the value maximizing decisions, such divergence causes a reduction of 
shareholder wealth (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
In an agency relationship, both principals and agents are expected to incur agency 
costs; principals bear the monitoring cost, and the agent bears the bonding costs as 
well (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency costs include all costs related to the 
process of structuring, monitoring, and bonding a set of contracts among agents with 
conflicting interests, in addition to the residual loss incurred due to a) the cost of full 
implementation of contracts exceeds the benefits (Fama and Jensen, 1983a; Jensen, 
1983) or b) the returns and firm value become lower than what they should be if the 
principals are controlling the firm and managing their wealth (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Hence, agency costs are incurred when 
shareholders introduce mechanisms to monitor and align managers’ interests with 
their own interests (Weir, Laing and McKnight, 2002), and to ensure that managers 
are working with the shareholders’ best interests; and it also includes the bonding 
costs incurred by the agent to reassure principals that he is working for principal’s 
best interest. The magnitude of agency costs depends on the owners’ and other 
monitoring parties abilities in monitoring and controlling the managers’ behaviours 
(Ang, Cole and Lin, 2000). Wright, Mukherji and Kroll (2001) argue that agency 
cost can’t be totally eliminated unless the principal and the agents become the same 
person. This clearly shows that as long as there is an agency relationship, there are 
agency costs, the monitoring mechanisms aim, only, to reduce these costs as the 
elimination of these costs is difficult if not impossible. 
Principals bear all of these costs either directly as the monitoring costs and the 
residual loss, or indirectly in the form compensation for the managers who are 
working with the best interest and maximize shareholders' wealth instead of 
decreasing it (Peebles, 2007); nonetheless, Fama and Jensen (1983b) argue that 
agents bear the monitoring costs as their compensation plans are adjusted in respond 
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to the monitoring costs incurred by the principals (Clacher, Hillier and McColgan, 
2010). 
By reviewing the literature of agency theory, agency costs can be classified 
according to their source to: equity agency costs, and debt agency costs. The equity 
agency costs result from the problems associated with the conflict of interests 
between the managers and shareholders (e.g., work shirking, excessive perquisite 
consumption, and other problems mentioned in the previous section); however, the 
debt agency costs result from the problems associated with the conflict of interests 
between the bondholders and shareholders which are the underinvestment and assets 
substitution (Bryan, Nash and Patel, 2006; Manso, 2008). Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) state that the agency costs associated with debt consist of: the effect of debt 
on the firm investment decisions and its consequences on firm value, monitoring and 
bonding expenditures by the bondholders and the owner-manager, and the 
bankruptcy and reorganization costs. It is worth mentioning that this study is limited 
to the equity agency costs that results from the conflict of interests between managers 
and shareholders. 
To conclude, agency theory is the dominant theoretical perspective in the 
corporate governance literature. However, there is a need to use other theoretical 
perspectives that complement the agency view (Eisenhardt, 1989); consistent with 
this recommendation, many researchers use different theoretical perspectives as 
complements rather than substitutes for agency theory; using a multi-theoretical 
approach will enrich the corporate governance research, propose a number of 
mechanisms and structures that can enhance both managerial and financial 
performance (Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003). Lasfer (2006) supports this idea; he 
gives an example for deploying different frameworks on the board of directors; from 
an agency theory perspective, the board should be small, independent with a majority 
of independent non-executive directors and clear division of responsibilities between 
the CEO and chairman; on the other hand, by deploying organizational and 
managerial framework, board should perform their advisory roles to achieve superior 
performance and the CEO should be given the needed authority that matches with his 
responsibilities. 
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 In the previous section, the researcher reviewed the agency relationship, the 
different agency problems and the costs associated with the agency relationship, in 
the following two sections provide a brief discussion about other theoretical 
approaches have been used in corporate governance literature, and been utilised 
throughout this study in terms of developing the study hypotheses and discussing the 
results. 
2.3 STEWARDSHIP THEORY 
Wright, Mukherji and Kroll (2001) argue that two main paradigms could be 
employed in order to understand the agents’ behaviour in reality; which are the 
economic and the managerial perspectives. The economic perspective underscores 
the rationality and utility maximization of both agency relation parties; while the 
managerial perspective is interested in understanding the manager’s behaviour and 
the motives behind these behaviours (Wright, Mukherji and Kroll, 2001). Both 
perspectives consider the rationality of the manager and his intention to maximize his 
utility, but applying different perspectives.  
The stewardship theory was first introduced by Donaldson and Davis during the 
meeting of the Academy of Management 1989
3
 (Donaldson, 1990), they propose it 
as a counterweight to the agency theory as it deals with some of the reductionist 
assumptions of the agency theory (Pastoriza and Ariño, 2008). Many researchers and 
practitioners as well view the agency perspective as being completely biased against 
managers, assuming that money is the only incentive for managers (Nordberg, 2010) 
and they call for applying a more positive view towards managers and what 
motivates them. For instance, Donaldson (2005) and Ghoshal (2005) argue that 
agency theory, as economic based theory, proposes managers from a self-interested 
view, which is a negative view, thus they call for more positive theories that view 
managers as positive contributors to the firm. Stewardship theory provides this view, 
as it considers managers as good stewards rather than opportunistic agents 
(Donaldson, 1990).  
 
                                                          
3
 Their presented paper during this meeting has been published in 1991.  
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Recalling from the agency theory, managers are agents who have their own 
interests that might deviate from the interests of shareholders, managers with 
deviated interests will seek their personal goals at the expense of shareholders, and 
hence, there is a need for tools that could align their interests and control 
management’s behaviour as well.  
Stewardship theory has psychological and sociological roots and provides an 
opposite view compared to the economic model of man that underpins the agency 
theory. Stewardship is grounded in managers’ benign intentions and incentives 
(Donaldson, 2005). It provides a behavioural perspective of how managers’ interests 
can be aligned with shareholders’ interests and the reasons behind this alignment. 
The central thesis of this theory is that managers are not opportunistic as they are 
described by the agency perspective. Managers are inspired to be good stewards and 
responsibly utilise firm’s assets for the best interest of shareholders (Donaldson and 
Davis, 1991). Managers and shareholders share the same goal which is to efficiently 
utilise the firm resources to achieve the highest possible performance which should 
be reflected positively in shareholders’ wealth. Consequently, stewardship theory 
assumes that there is no conflict of interests between managers and shareholders 
(Muth and Donaldson, 1998). Moreover, stewardship theory views governance 
structures as empowering mechanisms rather than controlling mechanisms (Davis, 
Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997).  
Stewardship theory assumes that managers are not self-interested agents 
motivated by financial motives only; there are other motives (intrinsic motives) that 
influence, direct and control managers’ behaviours. Intrinsic motives like 
responsibility, need for achievement, satisfaction of successful performance, 
recognition, following the business ethics and getting the respect of others 
(Donaldson, 1990; Muth and Donaldson, 1998; Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2004) 
influence managers’ behaviours. Considering these motives instead of the self-
interested goals, make the conflict of interest results from the separation of 
ownership and control is invalid or at least not applicable for all managers (Muth and 
Donaldson, 1998). Managers may exert more than the required effort and enjoy 
performing responsibly for the sake of personal need of achievement and self-
actualization; this kind of agents over evaluate the utility of their achievement than 
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the exerted efforts, and it is noteworthy that this kind of agents may not consume 
prerequisite in their employment (Wright, Mukherji and Kroll, 2001). 
Such assumptions, clearly contradict with the self-serving motives and behaviour 
proposed by the agency scholars, this contradiction in assumptions results from the 
roots of each theory; the economic roots of the agency theory and the psychological 
and sociological roots of stewardship theory. Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson 
(1997) claim that stewardship theory explains the behavioural causes that lead to the 
alignment of interests between managers and owners. They argue that there are 
limitations – physiological limitations- to the managerial opportunism assumption of 
the agency theory, so this assumption of the divergence of interests is not applicable 
for all managers. Besides, the variation of the executive managers’ performance can 
be referred to whether the organisational structure facilitates and allows executive 
managers to take the proper and effective actions or not (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; 
Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997). Daily, Dalton and Cannella (2003) support 
this argument, they consider stewardship theory as a complement and contrast at the 
same time to agency theory; they indicate that, in many situations, there is a 
convergence of interests between managers and shareholders’ interests, for instance, 
prospered financial performance matches with shareholders’ interests and enhances 
the managers' high reputations in the labour market as professional managers. 
Thus, it can be concluded that stewardship theory is based on rationality but from 
an entirely different perspective; managers, as stewards for the principals, find their 
utility in achieving the performance goals set for them, and by improving this 
performance they are serving most of the stakeholders. Consistent with this, Davis, 
Schoorman and Donaldson (1997) state that stewards perceive more utility from 
cooperative behaviour rather than self-dealing behaviour, so they choose the 
alternative that maximizes their utility, which can be considered rationality but from 
a different perspective.  
Agency theory assumes that shareholders lost their control over their firms by 
hiring a professional management (Muth and Donaldson, 1998). However, 
stewardship theory argues that the transfer of control from the shareholders to 
professional managers benefits rather than harming shareholders’ wealth and 
required for the development of large and complex firms. Managers who are 
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identified with the firm and its values, involved in its daily activities and more 
attached to its success are more likely to act as stewards rather than agents (Muth and 
Donaldson, 1998; Nordberg, 2010).  
Nordberg (2010) mentions that the stewardship theory does not ignore the 
possibility that managers could be opportunistic and seek their own interests rather 
than shareholders' interests. Thus, Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson (1997) 
recommend that both perspectives (the economic agency and the psychological 
stewardship) should be utilised according to each case and firm circumstances, as it 
is a principal-manager choice. The perceptions and attitudes of both parties shape the 
principal-agent relationship and direct it to be either agency or stewardship 
relationship. Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson (1997) argue that managers’ choice is 
contingent to their psychological motivation and the way they perceive the situation, 
likewise the principal. However, Nordberg (2010) mentions that poor results could 
happen if the shareholders wrongly identify and treat stewards as agents and 
establish strict control mechanisms, or the shareholders assume that their managers 
are stewards while they are unfettered agents seeking their own goals; thus, there is a 
need for governance mechanism that differentiates between stewards and agents. 
To summarize, according to stewardship theory, managers are expected to be 
stewards rather than opportunistic agents, they have that same interests and goals as 
the shareholders. Thus, the call for monitoring and controlling managers’ behaviour 
is not totally correct; firms should recognise the suitable monitoring scheme based on 
whether the manager is an agent or a steward. The application of this theory could 
have a number of implications for the design of the corporate governance 
mechanisms and the corporate governance research as well. This stewardship view 
calls for employing a different view towards managers and appreciate them as 
experts and consider their specific firm knowledge about the firm, generally apply a 
positive view towards managers. Also, this theory calls for more executive 
presentation on the board of directors; the combination of the CEO and chairman 
post is not detrimental as proposed by the agency theory, and finally, the increase on 
the managerial ownership will lead to more convergence of interests rather than 
managerial entrenchment. 
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2.4 RESOURCE DEPENDENCE THEORY 
The resource dependence theory was first introduced by Pfeffer (1972), and later 
developments were done by Aldrich and Pfeffer (1976) and Pfeffer and Salancik 
(1978). They provide a view of the organisation from an external perspective and 
show how firms interact with their external environment. Bearing in mind that 
external environment has a significant impact on the firm’s businesses and its current 
and future affairs; it is reasonable to expect that firm’s management will start to take 
actions that respond to and mitigate the impact of the environmental conditions to the 
least in an endeavour to assure firm’s success and enhance firm’s performance 
(Pfeffer, 1972).  
Aldrich and Pfeffer (1976) mention that the resource dependence model is 
grounded in an indisputable notion that, for firm’s survival and competitiveness, 
there is a need for resources and professional services that, definitely, can’t be 
entirely generated internally, and hence, there is a need for creating connections and 
transacting with external environment to get the required resources and services. 
Such argument is consistent with Pfeffer (1972) claim that organisational 
interdependence reduces firm’s autonomy and increases uncertainty.  
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argue that organization in broad term of activities, 
inputs and outputs is part of the environment at which it works in, thus the firm 
affects and get affected by this environment; the firm controls resources that might 
be needed by other firms; and also, other firms might control their needed resources. 
Later, the resource dependence theory becomes an influential theory that was 
utilised, in organisation research and strategic management, to explain how firms 
adapt and deal with environmental uncertainty and interdependence (Hillman, 
Withers and Collins, 2009). Uncertainty constrains the firm’s ability in controlling 
their resources, directs firm’s strategies and even the firm’s daily activities (Hillman, 
Cannella and Paetzold, 2000). Building connections with organizations and directors 
outside the firm provide more sources of information and environmental awareness 
and allow firms to reduce uncertainty regarding the availability of resources (Muth 
and Donaldson, 1998). One more advantage of linking the firm with its external 
environment is reducing firm’s transaction costs; recruiting outside directors who are 
aware of the best ways to deal with different parties of external environment could 
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reduce the effort exerted by the management, and reduce the transaction costs 
(Hillman, Cannella and Paetzold, 2000).   
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argue that the most appropriate way to manage the 
environmental interdependence is to control the sources of this dependence, thus, 
they suggest a number of mechanisms that the firm can utilise to minimise firm’s 
environmental dependency; board of directors and mergers are examples of these 
mechanisms. Pfeffer (1972); Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand (1996) and Hillman, 
Shropshire and Cannella (2007)  assert this by mentioning that board of directors is a 
crucial bonding mechanism between the firm and its external environment. In spite 
of the fact that agency theory is the cornerstone that has been employed in the board 
of directors literature, the resource dependence theory has a great influence in this 
area; moreover, reviewing the board of directors literature reveals that resource 
dependence theory is supported more than other perspectives including the agency 
theory itself; furthermore, resource dependence theory is more helpful and successful 
in understanding board’s dynamics (Hillman, Withers and Collins, 2009). In a 
reflection of the argument that the environment has a great influence over the firm, 
Hillman, Cannella and Paetzold (2000) and Hillman, Shropshire and Cannella 
(2007), among others, mention that board composition and membership could 
change in response to environmental changes; such changes might propose new 
resources to be acquires, thus new linkages should be established; and hence, new 
directors are required. Similar argument was early proposed by Pfeffer (1972); he 
argues that board is shaped in response to the external links in which the firm needs 
to construct; firms with more capital needs are more likely to recruit more bank 
representatives to their boards. 
Under this theory, one of the major responsibilities of the board members is to act 
as boundary spanners. They have their personal connections, relations and 
communications with external parties that should be utilised to secure the required 
resources of the firm. These resources are essential for the firm’s daily activities, 
help it to survive, enhance firm’s performance and in some cases like rare resources, 
it might be a competitive advantage for the firm. Hillman, Shropshire and Cannella 
(2007) mention that the resource dependence theory focuses on the matching 
between the directors’ skills, experiences, capabilities and connections with external 
environment and the firm’s necessities. In other words, the value that the director 
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will add to the firm and to what extend this value matches with the firm’s needs. In 
support of this argument, Dalton et al. (1999) mention that evidence from the prior 
literature (e.g., Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), among others,) reveals that, consistent 
with the resource dependence theory, large boards reflect firm’s ability to build more 
connections with the external environment; helping in better management of the 
environmental interdependence and uncertainty, which enhances firm performance. 
Daily, Dalton and Cannella (2003) give some instances of boundary spanning roles, 
which could be legal advices from the outside director who is solicitor or partner in a 
law firm, financial advices about the available sources of fund or getting the support 
of a board member who works at a financial institution to get the required finances.  
Board interlock is a clear application of the resource dependence theory (Johnson, 
Daily and Ellstrand, 1996). The resource dependence theory, also, argue that 
interlocking directorates is one of the practices that can be employed to manage 
environmental interdependency (Zajac, 1988). Interlocking enables firms, through 
the shared board members, to create bonds between firms and create a common 
interest network (Davis, 1996). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) mention that interlocking 
is a flexible and easy way to employ and enhance firm’s ability to manage the 
environmental uncertainty and interdependence; by appointing external members to 
the board, the firm establishes connections with the external environment; and hence, 
firms gain many advantages like access to resources, information exchange and 
gaining legitimacy.  
In addition to these benefits, the advice and counsel service the external board 
members provide, as it is a kind of information that firms can gain from those 
members; empirical research provides evidence that supports these proposed benefits 
(Hillman, Withers and Collins, 2009). Another advantageous information the firm 
can gain from external directors is their nominations of new directors the firm can 
recruit (Davis, 1996). Davis and Cobb (2010) state that appointing executives of 
suppliers, customers, former parliament members, politicians, and cabinets, and 
venture capitalist to sit on the board could help in gaining their supports, contacts, 
open new channels in front of the firm and more financing sources. Davis (1996) 
states that the decisions which are taken by one board, within the same network, 
become the raw information for the decisions taken by other boards. The interlocked 
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directors could be the CEOs of other firms rather than other directors. Johnson, Daily 
and Ellstrand (1996); Dalton et al. (1999) and Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach 
(2010), among others, argue that CEOs of other firms are expected to have a relevant 
and practical experience of how to deal with the complex business environment; thus 
appointing CEOs as outside directors should provide the board with valuable advice 
and counsel.  
To sum up, the resource dependence theory views the firm as an open system that 
interacts with the surrounding environment. By considering the scarcity of both 
tangible and intangible resources coupled with the strong competition between firms 
to secure their needed resources, the firm has, continuously, to open connections and 
bridges with the external environment; which is one of the board of director vital 
roles. Grounded in this perspective, many arguments in the governance literature 
mention that firms could move to large boards with more interlocked directorships to 
build the required connections that can help in securing the needed resources. 
2.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter shows that there are many theoretical perspectives that can be 
utilised to understand managers’ behaviours; these different perspectives have a 
different impact on practitioners, policy makers and researchers. Zattoni and Van Ees 
(2012) propose a number of suggestions for developing the corporate governance 
research, one of them was to employ other theoretical perspectives as complements 
or alternatives to the agency theory. Adoption of one perspective could lead to 
incomplete understanding of the role of corporate governance; and limits the 
researcher’s ability in interpreting the study results. Thus, researchers should employ 
different perspectives during the hypotheses development stage, and the results 
interpretation stage. Likewise, policy makers should understand that firm 
characteristics and the environment surrounding the firm could lead to adapting 
certain governance structure to cope with the surrounding environment; in other 
words, one structure does not fit different firms with different circumstances. 
This chapter, also, highlights the contradiction and collisions among the different 
theories, and demonstrates how the same practice could be correct from a certain 
perspective, and totally wrong from the other perspective. For instance, board size, 
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more executive directors sitting on the board, duality of CEO roles, all of these 
examples could be beneficial or detrimental according to the theory employed. 
Another example, on the one hand, researchers could see interlocking directorate as a 
threat as it reduces board independence from an agency perspective, but on the other 
hand, the resource dependence theory considers interlocking as a prerequisite to 
allocate and securing the needed resources for the firm (Dalton et al., 2007). 
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter, the researcher reviewed the main theories that have 
shaped the corporate governance research. Bearing in mind that this study aims at 
investigating the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on reducing the 
agency costs; in addition to comparing the impact of those mechanisms during two 
different economic contexts (pre and post the 2008 financial crisis). The researcher, 
in this chapter, aims at providing a review of the corporate governance literature 
which is related to the study and has been utilised, along with the theoretical 
framework provided in the previous chapter, in developing the study hypotheses. 
This chapter includes three main sections; in the next section, the researcher reviews 
the concept of corporate governance; followed by a review of the different 
mechanisms introduced in the literature to mitigate the agency conflicts and have 
been utilised in the empirical analysis. Finally, the last section of this chapter 
provides a review of the agency costs proxies utilised in the prior literature. 
3.2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEFINITIONS 
Corporate governance as a field of study evolves from the potential problems 
result from the conflict of interests that are associated with the separation of 
ownership and control (Hart, 1995; Denis, 2001; Gillan, 2006); with the presence of 
fundamental conditions that inspire principal-agent relationship basically goal 
conflicts, information asymmetry (Ward, Brown and Rodriguez, 2009), and the 
difficulty of managing these conflicts through a perfect or complete contract; Fama 
and Jensen (1983b) mention that such contracts have costs related to structuring and 
enforcing them. Moreover, it is impossible to completely contract all the principals’ 
actions (Brennan, 1995; Clacher, Hillier and McColgan, 2010).  
Thus, there is a need for some mechanisms that can control the principal-agent 
relationship and protect principals from agents’ opportunistic behaviour and 
discipline managers; and ensure the efficacy of these mechanisms. Consistent with 
this, Daily, Dalton and Cannella (2003), among others, claim that a main concern of 
‎Chapter 3: Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
-38- 
 
one corporate governance research stream was examining the role and efficacy of the 
different corporate governance mechanisms on dealing with these conflicts and 
protecting shareholders’ interests from the self–interested managers. This research 
stream, as mentioned in the previous chapter, is known as the positive approach. 
 The term corporate governance has many definitions in the literature, but there is 
no generally agreed definition for it. However, there are some common points 
between these definitions. Letza, Sun and Kirkbride (2004) and Brickley and 
Zimmerman (2010), among others, state that the literature shows two common 
objectives for corporate governance, the first objective is concerned mainly with how 
to satisfy the narrow shareholders’ interests through maximizing their wealth, the 
second and the more broader one is concerned with how to satisfy the social 
expectations and to take a social perspective. Brickley and Zimmerman (2010), also, 
mention that every researcher should be cautious while he defines this term as it 
affects the research focus, direction, structure, and results interpretation. 
Many definitions were proposed for the term corporate governance, Cadbury 
Report (1992, p.15) defines corporate governance as “The system by which 
companies are directed and controlled.” A similar but more detailed definition was 
provided by The OECD; as they define corporate governance as “Procedures and 
processes according to which an organisation is directed and controlled. The 
corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and 
responsibilities among the different participants in the organisation – such as the 
board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders – and lays down the rules and 
procedures for decision-making" (OECD, 2005). Compared to Cadbury’s definition, 
this definition provides more details about how firms should be directed and 
controlled and the role of the governance structure in organising the relations 
between the different parties dealing with the firm.  
Chris, Theodoros and Vasilios (2014) replicate the OECD definition by 
highlighting the importance of efficiency in corporate governance; they define it as 
“a network of principles and practices based on which a company is organised and 
governed so that the long term needs of shareholders and stakeholders will be 
preserved in the best possible manner” (Chris, Theodoros and Vasilios, 2014, 
p.370). Daily, Dalton and Cannella (2003) provide a different angle of corporate 
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governance and its role in increasing the utility from firm’s resources. They define 
corporate governance as “The determination of the broad uses to which 
organisational recourses will be deployed and the resolution of conflicts among the 
myriad participants in organisation." (Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003, p.371). 
Thus, corporate governance, as a broad concept is concerned with both the efficiency 
and the effectiveness of the firms, as defined by Van den Berghe and Levrau (2004, 
p.64) “corporate governance is about doing things right and doing the right things; 
twofold condition [that] often neglected." 
A comprehensive definition is given by Bloomfield (2013); he provides a 
definition that reflects the Cadbury definition, other definitions in the literature and 
enfolds brief explanation of the alternative theories that contributed to the evolution 
of the corporate governance research and practices. He defines corporate governance 
as 
 “The governing structure and processes in an organisation [nexus of contracts] 
that exit to oversee the means by which limited resources are efficiently directed to 
competing purposes [transaction cost theory] for the use of the organisation and its 
stakeholders, including the maintenance of the organisation and its long run 
sustainability [stewardship theory], set against a background of managerial and 
shareholder behaviour implicitly measured against a framework of ethics and 
backed by regulation and laws [agency theory]” (Bloomfield, 2013, p.25). 
Based on the researcher’s motives and objectives, the researcher agrees with the 
definition provided by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) which is: 
“Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment” (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997, p.737). 
From the previous survey of the different corporate governance definitions, the 
researcher can conclude that there is no agreed definition for the term corporate 
governance. Yet, there are some common points between all definitions; for instance, 
corporate governance is set of mechanisms and regulations, which are introduced to 
control the relationship between managers and shareholders in addition to other 
stakeholders, protect the shareholders from managers’ detrimental acts; ensure the 
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maximum utilisation of the firm resources on the way that serves stakeholders’ goals 
and to clarify the rights and distribute the responsibilities among the different parties 
dealing with the firm. In the following section, the researcher demonstrates corporate 
governance mechanisms that have been introduced in the prior literature and utilised 
in this study.     
3.3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS 
The literature provides many corporate governance mechanisms that can be used 
to solve the agency problem and mitigate its costs. Agency theory introduced many 
governance mechanisms that aim to monitor managers’ behaviour and ensure that 
they are working for the best interest of shareholders. Another possible way to align 
the interest of management with those of shareholders is the use of incentives that are 
linked with the firm performance and shareholders’ welfare (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Eisenhardt, 1989; Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Ward, Brown and Rodriguez, 
2009). The early work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) mentions a number of tools 
that can be used to align the managers’ interests with those of shareholders such as 
proper compensation plans, auditing, establishment of control systems and so forth. 
The introduced mechanisms by Jensen and Meckling (1976) reflect the two 
perspectives for disciplining managers’ behaviour which are the use of incentives 
and the controlling perspectives. 
 Generally, corporate governance mechanisms can be classified into internal and 
external governance mechanism. Jensen (1993) states that the role of the internal 
mechanisms is to give an early warrning about the firm performance, in order to get 
the firm back to its correct track before the problem turn to be a crisis. However, the 
long list of accounting scandals and crises put question marks against the effeciency 
of the governance mechanisms. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) classify corporate 
governance mechanism into internal and external mechanisms according to the 
parties at which each mechanism relies on to monitor (the source of monitoring) and 
motivate the managers. Denis and McConnell (2003) classify the internal governance 
mechanisms into: board of directors and ownership structure; and the external 
governance mechanisms into: the legal system and the market for corporate control. 
Jensen (1993), Gillan (2006), among others, provide other classifications for 
corporate governance mechanisms. All of these mechanisms aim at protecting the 
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shareholders’ wealth and the affairs of other parties who deal with the firm from the 
opportunistic behaviours of the management. However, it may be worth mentioning 
that as mentioned in the Cadbury (1992) report that there is no governance system 
can totally prevent fraud and incompetence. 
In this study, the researcher is concerned with the internal corporate governance 
mechanisms, mainly the board of director’s characteristics and the ownership 
structure. The following sections are organised as follows. First, the researcher 
introduces board responsibilities, then board characteristics in terms of size, 
independence (composition and separation of CEO and chairman duties), board 
committees; then ownership structure in terms of board ownership and block holding 
ownership. 
3.3.1 Board of directors 
The lion share of researchers’ and practitioners’ interest has been devoted to the 
board of directors. Prior literature of board of directors includes a massive number of 
studies that examine the different characteristics of board of directors and the role of 
these characteristics in enhancing board effectiveness. Ibrahim and Samad (2011) 
mention that such characteristics like board size, board composition and duality are 
governance mechanisms that aim at monitoring and reducing agency costs result 
from the conflict of interests of shareholders and managers. Similarly, Van den 
Berghe and Levrau (2004) mention that such interest can be observed through the 
growing interest of governance rating companies in including a score of board 
effectiveness in their rating indices. This growing interest reflects the demand of the 
market parties for these scores to rate and evaluate board performance. 
According to agency theory, board of directors is a vital control mechanism. The 
board can be described as the only elected mechanism (Bebchuk and Weisbach, 
2010). Board members are elected and authorised by the shareholders to monitor and 
control over the management (Bathala and Rao, 1995); thus, they should thoroughly 
represent the shareholder’s interests. Shareholders delegate the role of the internal 
control to the board of directors; however, they keep for themselves such vital 
decisions like the new board appointment, the external auditor and other critical 
decisions (Fama and Jensen, 1983b). 
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 Board of directors represents the head of the internal control mechanisms that can 
curtail the undesired self-interested behaviours and actions of managers (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983b; Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Jensen, 1993). Among its 
responsibilities, board is responsible for recruiting, monitoring, assessing, 
compensating the CEO and fire him in such cases, and deciding for the CEO 
successor (Raheja, 2005) in addition to providing advice for the top management 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983b; Jensen, 1993; Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999) and to 
ratify and monitor important decisions (Fama and Jensen, 1983b) (e.g., firm’s future 
projects (Raheja, 2005)) that are supposed to maximize shareholders’ wealth (Denis 
and McConnell, 2003).  
Hence, board of directors is the first control mechanism that can be employed to 
monitor and control managers, and to be sure that the management is considering 
shareholders’ interests in their decisions. However, It may be worth mentioning that 
board’s role is to direct the firm, not to manage it (Van den Berghe and Levrau, 
2004). Besides, the board of directors has other roles in addition to the monitoring 
role. Board members are expected to provide the board with valuable services that 
should enhance firm’s performance (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). In line with that, Van 
Essen, Engelen and Carney (2013) mention that board of directors has different roles 
to perform; however, in the literature, there is a consensus among the researchers that 
monitoring the executive managers is the primary task and role for the board. 
The different roles of the board can be simply classified into: the traditional role 
which is to represent shareholders’ interests, evaluating the CEO performance and 
approving changes in the firm’s bylaw; and the strategic role that related to setting 
the firm’s mission and goals, and evaluating and approving important decisions like 
acquisitions and divestments (Pearce and Zahra, 1991). Hillman, Cannella and 
Paetzold (2000) mention that the board of directors has two main roles; the agency 
role which is related to the process of ratifying management’s decisions and 
strategies and monitoring the implementation of these strategies. The second role, 
grounded in the resource dependence theory, is the resource provision role which 
incorporates all activities that link the firm with the external environment to reduce 
environment uncertainty and bring resources to the firm in terms of information, 
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skills, tangible resources among other critical resources (Hillman, Withers and 
Collins, 2009). 
Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand (1996), Lasfer (2006) categorize board roles to the 
control (agency) role in which the board is responsible for monitoring the executive 
management, strategic and policy making role which can be seen as the advisory 
role; such role requires the board members to have the experience, insight, 
knowledge and information to guide and direct the management towards the right 
strategic direction and decisions that can avoid conflict of interests between 
managers and shareholders, and finally, resources acquiring role, part of board 
members' responsibilities is to recognize and attain the needed resources for the firm. 
Similarly, Stanwick and Stanwick (2002) classify board roles to three integrated 
roles. The first role is agency responsibility, as stewards for the shareholders; a board 
member should represent and protect shareholders’ interests. The second role is a 
fiduciary responsibility. This role overlaps with the agency responsibility; Stanwick 
and Stanwick (2002) argue that the board has a legal responsibility towards the 
shareholders to ensure that shareholders’ interests are fully represented and to take 
all required actions (e.g. selecting, evaluating the CEO, monitoring firm's 
management, evaluating its performance and firing the CEO in some cases) to 
perform this role. The third role is to help the firm to acquire the needed resources 
using their relationships with the external parties, and this could help in reducing the 
uncertainty related to this issue.  
To conclude, as mentioned by Zahra and Pearce (1989), the roles of the board of 
directors can be classified into control, strategy and service roles. Each researcher 
prioritises these roles according to the theoretical perspective they adopt (e.g., from 
the agency theory perspective board roles are ordered control, service and strategy; 
whereas, resource dependence views the order as service, strategy and control). 
Regardless of the employed theoretical perspective, these roles are integrated and 
constitute board’s duty; effective boards are expected to consider and exercise all of 
these roles. 
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Executing these different roles is a challenge to the board members and requires 
them to maintain the proper balance between performing the monitoring and the 
other supportive roles. This is coupled with the importance of building good 
relationships with executives and gain their trust but keeping some distance at the 
same time (Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003); and understand that managers resent 
the monitoring role performed by the board as its objective is to observe them and 
suppress their self–interested decisions (Lasfer, 2006). 
In an early study by Mace (1979); it was found that a huge gap between the 
mentioned roles of boards in the academia and reality is present. Mace (1979) 
mentions that, in reality, board of directors advises and counsels the top management, 
but they are not decision makers; board can discipline the CEO and top management; 
but select the CEO, only, in the case of crisis like sudden death of the CEO or 
terribly poor performance, apart from that, they don’t select the CEO, as in many 
cases the CEO designate is being nominated by the former CEO. Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1988) mention that both the academic and the business evidence show 
that the CEO dominates over the choice of their successor. Moreover, Shivdasani and 
Yermack (1999) endorse this argument by adding that board members, themselves, 
in most cases are nominated and selected by the CEO and executive management, 
who they are supposed to monitor after being appointed. Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1991) refer that to the free-riding problem that prevents shareholders from selecting 
new board members. 
While we study the different roles and responsibilities of the board, we have to 
recall that in order to understand and study the board and its different roles; we need 
to deploy different theoretical perspectives. Daily, Dalton and Cannella (2003) 
support this idea by claiming that the control role can be conceptualized well by 
deploying the agency theory, bearing in mind that monitoring the management is a 
central component of the agency theory and according to this theory, the separation 
of ownership and control gives the opportunity for the managers to work at their own 
goals at the expense of shareholders; but agency theory fails to explain the resources 
acquiring and strategic roles of the board which are critical responsibility of the 
directors. From the sense that, the counsel and advice, the resources acquiring and 
the strategic roles are kind of information sharing between the board member and the 
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firm; the resource dependence theory is more relevant to explain these roles 
(Hillman, Cannella and Paetzold, 2000; Hillman, Withers and Collins, 2009). Dalton 
et al. (1999) mention that, on the one hand, from an agency theory perspective, the 
control role is a vital role of the board and only maintained with a board with a 
majority of independent board members; on the other hand, board has other 
indispensable responsibilities like securing the needed resources and providing the 
needed counsel and advice for the top management, such roles cannot be substituted 
by the control role. Having said that, Zahra and Pearce (1989) argue that agency 
theory provides a comprehensive definition of board responsibilities and emphasis on 
how the board should perform their different duties and monitoring executive 
management to protect shareholders. Such arguments endorse the need of employing 
different theoretical perspectives while studying board responsibilities. 
It has been argued in the prior literature that board characteristics like board size, 
composition, the separation between the CEO and the chairman roles and board 
subcommittees have a significant impact on board effectiveness. Usually, most of the 
governance codes or reforms following crises or large scandals include 
recommendation for these factors. Van den Berghe and Levrau (2004) argue that the 
disclosure of these structural elements enables the market to evaluate the board 
effectiveness. In the following sections, the researcher reviews the theoretical bases, 
and the empirical evidence reported in the prior literature for these board 
characteristics in terms of enhancing firm performance. 
3.3.1.1  Board size 
Board size refers to the number of directors sitting on the firm’s board. The 
number of board members gives an indication of the potential performance of the 
board and hence, firm performance. However, in the board literature, there is a 
debate around the optimal board size. Jensen (1993) argues that an effective board 
should not be more than eight members to enhance and improve firm’s performance, 
and make it difficult for the CEO to control over and inspire the board. Lipton and 
Lorsch (1992) suggest that the optimal size should not go beyond ten members. 
However, other researchers, e.g., Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008); Linck, Netter 
and Yang (2008); Lehn, Patro and Zhao (2009), among others, provide empirical 
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evidence that the optimal board size depends of firm characteristics as well as the 
environment surrounding the firm.  
 By reviewing the board literature, the researcher can claim that there are three 
main streams that provide different views towards the optimal size of the board, each 
stream has its own justification, advocates, and supported with empirical evidence; in 
this section, the researcher will review the arguments that frame every stream and the 
empirical evidence provided by each stream. 
The first stream argues that large boards are more beneficial to the firm and 
enhance firm performance. Advocates of this stream argue that large boards enable 
the firm to recruit and acquire more experts from different industries, business 
background, with diversified capabilities, expertise, education and knowledge, which 
should help in performing both the monitoring and advising roles of the board, in 
addition to helping the firm in securing the needed resources by using the 
connections of the different board members; moreover, large boards are more 
powerful than small one in front of the CEO, and thus, it is difficult for the CEO to 
control over large boards. In large boards, the CEO influencing ability is diluted, and 
it is more difficult for the CEO to dominate over the board (Muth and Donaldson, 
1998). Besides, large boards reflect more monitoring activity, as it enables the firm 
to add more monitors to the board, and facilitates board activities because of the 
possibility of sharing the work load among the board members (Larmou and Vafeas, 
2010). 
In support of this perspective, Florackis (2008) argues that large boards are 
necessary for the organizational effectiveness, as they are more powerful than small 
boards. Furthermore, large board limits the desire and the ability of the CEO to 
dominate over the board and the decision making process (Muth and Donaldson, 
1998; Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 2006). Cheng (2008) advocates large boards 
by claiming that the decision making literature provides evidence, which supports 
this notion. He argues that although large groups suffer from coordination and 
communication problems within the group, however, this problem can lead to 
positive results, as it will take more efforts and discussions from large boards – as a 
large group– to reach consensus, this will be reflected into more compromised and 
less extreme decisions, and more stable performance. In addition, large boards are 
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expected to be more independent compared to small ones; large groups take more 
effort and time from the CEO build and reach consensus on critical and important 
decisions, thus the CEO influence is diluted (Muth and Donaldson, 1998) and it 
becomes more difficult for the CEO to dominate over the board (Muth and 
Donaldson, 1998; Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2012). Which is consistent with the 
above-mentioned claim by Cheng (2008). 
Dalton et al. (1999) summarized the main advantages listed in the literature 
regarding the board size. Their listed advantages are based on the resource 
dependence view and present a clear reflection of the impact the environment could 
have on the firm. Dalton et al. (1999) mention that large boards might reflect more 
abilities to secure the required and needed resources for the firm. Board size also 
could be affected by the environmental uncertainty, which means that the more 
uncertain environment the larger board we should expect; large board increases the 
possibility of interlocking and this should benefit the firm in securing the critical 
resources; large board facilitate performing different roles of the board; finally, large 
boards can offer the board the ability to add more experts which can be translated to 
high level of quality advice and counsel to the CEO; such advice is not obtainable 
from the insiders.  
Lehn, Patro and Zhao (2009) state that a major advantage of a large board is the 
amount of information they bring to the board. Such information about the external 
environment and the factors affecting firm performance like product market, 
technology, regulations, competitors etc. is essential for the board to perform their 
monitoring and advisory role (Lehn, Patro and Zhao, 2009) and help in performing 
the resource acquiring role as well. Moreover, Dalton et al. (1999) argue that 
recruiting outside directors who are CEOs of other firms is expected to provide well 
advice and counsel to the CEO as they have relevant experience required for dealing 
with the complex business environment, this can be magnified by increasing the 
board size and recruiting more CEOs to the board. Klein (2002b) argues that limiting 
the board size to a certain limit, constrains the number of directors who can serve in 
different board subcommittees, and hence, the firm has to rely on executive directors 
to comply with the committees’ structure requirements. 
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However, advocates of a small board argue that large boards could suffer from 
many problems like, coordination and communication problems, directors’ free-
riding among other problems related to large groups. Many researchers (e.g., Jensen 
(1993), Yermack (1996), among others) argue that large board means slower 
decision making, less coordination and more communication problems; large boards 
are less effective and easy to be controlled by the CEO, above this, there is a 
possibility for the free-riding problem.  
Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells (1998) endorse these claims and mention that 
communication and coordination problems, losing the ability to control over the 
management and the board composition are the main factors that make large boards 
are ineffective. Likewise, Ahmed, Hossain and Adams (2006) argue that large boards 
are more subject to the bureaucratic problems and slower decision making. Besides, 
Lehn, Patro and Zhao (2009) argue that coordination costs significantly influence 
board effectiveness. John and Senbet (1998) mention that large boards could enhance 
the monitoring abilities of the board; yet, this benefit could be offsetted by the cost 
associated with poor communications and slow decision making, which is a common 
theme of large groups.  
 Furthermore, it is difficult in large boards to reach consensus on important 
decisions and limits the board’s ability to control over the management (Van den 
Berghe and Levrau, 2004). Dalton et al. (1999) and Van den Berghe and Levrau 
(2004), among others, mention that much research argues that large boards are more 
subject to coalitions and frictions that lead to more conflicts inside the board, and 
hinder the board’s ability to reach consensus. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) argue that in 
large boards directors are not able to involve in more discussions and express their 
opinions; therefore, the assumed value of adding more experts is no longer present. 
This promotes that small boards grant the firm more chances to discover and utilise 
the board members’ talents and get the most from them (Muth and Donaldson, 1998). 
Lehn, Patro and Zhao (2009) mention that the free-rider problem associated with 
large board stems from the observation that the average influence of the board 
member varies inversely with board size. Ahmed, Hossain and Adams (2006) 
endorse this argument and mention that in large boards, the board’s different 
responsibilities become diffused. This will lead to the domination of certain members 
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over the board (Muth and Donaldson, 1998); which give a good chance for the CEO 
and insiders to control the board and direct the board’s decision in the way that 
serves their own goals. Alexander, Fennell and Halpern (1993) argue that CEO can 
easily control over large boards; when the board is comprised of members with 
different experiences and different business backgrounds, and when there is a 
disagreement among them towards a certain issue, this situation gives the CEO an 
advantage to influence the board and control over it. Moreover, in that case, the CEO 
can use different techniques like coalition building; control the information flow and 
the information content and dividing and conquering to gain from this disagreement, 
and fully control the board (Alexander, Fennell and Halpern, 1993; Dalton et al., 
1999). Another factor that allows the CEO and insiders to dominate over the board, 
is that the directors, themselves, have no incentive to invest in information and hence, 
they can’t monitor the management effectively (Lehn, Patro and Zhao, 2009). 
However, small boards could affect negatively the effectiveness of the board in 
performing their other roles.  
To sum up, advocates of small boards argue that large boards are subject to a 
number of problems, which are social loafing, free-riding, lack of cohesiveness, poor 
communication, difficulty for reaching consensus, slow decision making, and subject 
to large groups’ frictions and conflicts; all of these problems combined together lead 
to the CEO domination over the board and could affect the board performance and 
effectiveness. 
In the corporate governance literature, it is argued that small board overcome the 
large boards’ problems; so, we should expect that small boards do not suffer from 
such problems like communication and coordination problems, and there is no 
chance for the members of small boards to free ride from their duties and 
responsibilities, and hence, small boards are expected to perform their monitoring 
role more efficient than large boards. It might be argued that large board enhance 
boards in terms of more monitors, more expertise and diversified knowledge; 
however, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) argue that five or six well selected independent 
directors can provide the firm the required diversity in terms of knowledge and 
perspectives. Small boards are more effective in deciding the incentive plans for the 
CEO and its relation to his performance, and dismissing the CEO for poor 
performance (Yermack, 1996). Small boards reflect more social cohesion, more 
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opportunities for in-depth discussions and participation of all members, and should 
make the board more effective (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Muth and Donaldson, 1998; 
Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2004). In line with this stream, Van den Berghe and 
Levrau (2004) mention that most of the corporate governance rating systems do 
prefer small boards and overweight small board than large ones. 
The third stream argues that the board of directors has many different roles, firm 
specific characteristics shape the need of each role, and which role is more important 
than other, which is reflected on the board size. This view has two different but 
integrated arguments. The first argument (e.g., Pfeffer (1972); Pfeffer and Salancik 
(1978); Hillman, Cannella and Paetzold (2000); Hillman, Withers and Collins 
(2009), among others) mentions that the external environment, the firm’s needs and 
the need to build connections with external parties, also, have a direct influence over 
the board structure in terms of size and proportion of outside directors. Grounded in 
resource dependence theory, Pfeffer (1972) and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argue 
that board size is a function of the firm’s need to integrate with the external 
environment and to manage interdependence. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978, p.172) 
state that “The greater the need for effective external linkage, the larger the board 
should be." The second argues that firm specific characteristics like size, the need to 
advise and other characteristics have a direct impact on board (e.g., Boone et al. 
(2007); Guest (2008); Linck, Netter and Yang (2008), among others). Pfeffer (1972) 
argues that board size is affected by rather the firm is in a need for outside capital, 
firm size, and the industry at which the firm is affiliated with. Pearce and Zahra 
(1992) mention that environmental uncertainty and other firm characteristics have 
direct influence over the board structure. Hillman, Cannella and Paetzold (2000) 
argue that changes on board reflect the changes happen in the external environment 
and the firm’s attempts to cope with these changes. Denis and Sarin (1999) find that 
firms change their board structure in respond to the changes in the business 
environment. 
Guest (2008) state that as the need of the advisory role increases, there is a need 
for more experts to be added to the board; thus a large board is beneficial in such 
case. In line with this argument, Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008) mention 
complexity as one of the characteristics that can affect board size; they mention that 
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for complex firms, there is a need for a large board compared to simple firms, this 
large board enhances the firm’s value. Lehn, Patro and Zhao (2009) propose other 
characteristics like firm size, growth prospects, geographical expansion, and mergers 
that have a direct impact on board size; they argue that for large firms, geographical 
expanding firms and firms with new mergers, there is a need for large boards; 
whereas, for firms with high growth prospects, the environment changes rapidly, 
which requires fast respond from the board and quick decisions which make small 
boards are more efficient.  
However, there are occasional circumstances that could lead to an increase in 
board size. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) justify the appointment of new insiders 
could be because of the need of firm specific knowledge or the new appointed 
member is going to be the CEO designate. Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) mention 
that the CEO succession could lead to the increase of the number of the insiders in 
the board, and this number decreases after the CEO change. The researcher has 
noticed such incident during the data collection stage, for one year the number of the 
board members increases to offset the decrease the number after the retirement of the 
CEO or the chairman. Adding potential CEO or chairman candidates to the board 
exposes them to more firm affairs, which adds to their experience and at the same 
time, gives the chance for other board members to evaluate these candidates and 
choose among them (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988). Larmou and Vafeas (2010) 
report that poor performing firms tend to increase the board size; that increase is 
associated with better value; however, after a certain point, the increase in board size 
reduces firm’s value; what is more, the market reacts positively for adding new 
members and negatively for decreasing large boards. 
Lehn, Patro and Zhao (2009) argue that the trade-off between the benefits of 
appointing a new member to the board and the coordination costs as well as the 
possibility for free-riding problem that results from this new appointment are what 
control the board size. Furthermore, the theoretical perspective, also, has an impact 
on the firm decision about board size (Dalton et al., 1999). Yermack (1996) mentions 
that the predominant trend is to reduce the board size, especially in the cases of 
failure and crisis; such action is supported by institutional investors. this action is 
consistent with the agency perspective; however, the resource dependence theory 
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induces an opposite strategy, which is to expand the board in the interest of securing 
the continuous follow of critical resources.  
It is argued that large boards suffer from the coordination and communication 
problems that make it difficult for the board to reach consensus on critical issues; 
however, Cheng (2008) finds evidence show that the board size is inversely 
associated variability of stock returns and accounting performance measures like 
ROA, Tobin’s Q and other measures. Using a sample of Italian non-financial firms, 
Di Pietra et al. (2008) find no evidence that board size has a significant role in 
enhancing firm performance. However, they find evidence that industry affiliation 
affects this result and for some industries, large board is more effective. Dalton et al. 
(1999) conduct a meta–analysis using 131 samples composed of 20620 firms from 
27 different studies, they find a positive association between board size and firm 
performance measured by many accounting and market based measures; this relation 
stands for both large and small firms, but with greater effect for small firms. Dalton 
et al. (1999) mention that the meta–analysis technique can show the presence of the 
investigated relationship without explaining the roots for these relationships, they 
state that although the findings show this positive relationship between board size 
and performance indicators, the meta–analysis cannot help in identifying which of 
the board roles that influence this relation, or it is a result of the different roles of the 
board. Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells (1998) find evidence that small boards suffer 
from communication and coordination problems as well as large boards.  
Yermack (1996) finds that small boards enhance firm value for the U.S. firms; 
however, he reports that diversified firms tend to have larger boards than less 
diversified firms. This implies that firm size is one of the determinants of board size. 
Conversely, Lehn, Patro and Zhao (2009) find evidence that board size does not 
appear to have any significant impact on firm performance; they utilised a large 
sample of the U.S. firms over the period 1935-2000.   
Based on interviews with 60 board directors from Belgian, Van den Berghe and 
Levrau (2004) state that high quality discussion is one of the frequent elements raised 
by the directors, and reflects how such element is important for the board 
effectiveness; each director should have the opportunity to discuss and represent their 
ideas; critical, in-depth and open discussions most probably should lead to better 
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decisions. By considering the coordination, communication and free-riding problems 
that are expected to take place in large boards, this finding indirectly supports the 
claim that small boards are more effective. 
Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008) find that the relationship between board size and 
firm value is an inverted U shaped relation; suggesting that neither very small nor 
very large boards are optimal; similarly, Dalton et al. (1999), among others, conclude 
that the case with the board size is not about being large or small; it is a matter of 
having the board that is able to perform the board’s different roles effectively. Dalton 
et al. (1999) added that the board has to be compromised to reach the appropriate 
size and include the right mix that fills all different board roles. Hillman, Withers and 
Collins (2009) assert that the type of director, and the value added by appointing this 
director should be considered in deciding firm’s board structure. Pearce and Zahra 
(1992) find that such characteristics like leverage, growth prospects, environmental 
uncertainty and past performance do influence board structure in terms of size and 
structure. Guest (2008) reports that board size is positively associated with the need 
of the advisory roles, and there is evidence of association between board size and 
monitoring benefits.  
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) find that small boards are more efficient for firms 
with high growth prospects, while for large firms, large boards are more appropriate. 
Similar to these findings, Lehn, Patro and Zhao (2009) find that firm characteristics 
have a direct impact on board size; the board size tends to increase with the increase 
in firm size, and decrease with the increase of growth opportunities. Eisenberg, 
Sundgren and Wells (1998) find evidence supporting the argument that small boards 
are more effective in reducing the agency problems. They find a negative association 
between board size and industry adjusted return on assets for a large sample of Finish 
small and medium sized firms. 
Prior literature provides three different views toward the optimal board size. 
Advocates of large boards argue that large boards are more effective in terms of 
performing the controlling and strategic roles of the boards; besides, large boards 
enhance the firm ability to build more connections with the external environment to 
secure the required resources. Conversely, advocates of small boards argue that small 
boards are more efficient than large boards, in terms of less coordination and 
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communication problems, thus the CEO can’t easily dominate over the board and 
control the decision making process, and because of the small number, there is no 
chance for directors to free ride from their responsibilities. The third stream argues 
that board size is determined according to firm’s needs, characteristics and 
surrounding environment. As mentioned early, each stream has the empirical 
evidence that supports their argument. In this study, the researcher adopts the view 
that large boards are more efficient and required especially during the abnormal 
economic circumstances (post crisis recession period); thus the researcher aims at 
investigating the relationship between board size and agency costs by testing the 
following hypothesis: 
H1: There is a negative association between board size and agency costs. 
3.3.1.2  Board independence. 
In the corporate governance literature, the term board independence denotes to the 
independence of the board from the CEO and executive management control. Such 
independence is affected by two main factors, which are board composition and 
board leadership structure. The subsequent two sections show the arguments around 
the optimal board composition and the separation between CEO and chairman 
responsibilities. 
3.3.1.2.1 Board composition 
The researcher has mentioned in the previous section that board of directors has 
many roles and responsibilities towards shareholders as being their elected stewards, 
these roles can be summarized into the control role, the strategic support role and the 
resource acquiring role. 
In corporate governance literature, It has been argued that performing these roles 
effectively, particularly the monitoring role, is subject to board composition and 
affected by presence of independent board members; assuming that independent 
directors are more likely to perform their different roles (especially the monitoring 
role) effectively compared to executive board members. In the literature on board of 
directors, it is argued that board composition signals the degree of board 
independence from the CEO and the executive management (Dalton et al., 1999).  
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Board composition refers to the identity of the board members, and which 
category dominates over the board. Muth and Donaldson (1998) mention that 
normally the term board composition denotes to the proportion on non-executive 
directors sitting on the board. Predominantly, board members can be classified into 
executives (insiders) and non-executives board members. Executive directors are 
those directors with a current employment connection with the firm. Non-executive 
directors are classified into affiliated (grey) directors and independent non-executive 
directors. Affiliated directors are those who have a current or former connection with 
the firm, but after their appointment, they do not hold any executive positions within 
the firm. Independent non-executive directors are those who are free from any 
present or past personal or business connections with the firm. The UK corporate 
governance code lists a number of criteria that should be present in the board 
member in order to be considered as an independent board member. 
Dalton et al. (2007) referred that there is a – as they named it -“Novel way” that 
can categorize and assess board members according to their independence, which is 
known as “Interdependence”. According to this criterion, regardless of being 
affiliated or independent director, if the board member was appointed by the CEO or 
during his service period, so this member can be classified as interdependent; while, 
if the board member was appointed before the current CEO, it is plausible to assume 
that this board member will be more independent and less loyal to the CEO. Dalton 
et al. (2007) , also, mentioned that this variable has not get the expected researchers’ 
attention. All of these categories are based on the agency role and aim to capture the 
director’s ability to represent shareholders’ interests and ensure that managers are 
working for the best interest of shareholders; however, the overstress on the 
independence issue and controlling over the management could negatively affect the 
firm performance (Hillman, Cannella and Paetzold, 2000). 
Although there is a consensus on the way of classifying board members, the 
empirical literature provide many variables to measure board composition. Daily, 
Johnson and Dalton (1999) find that by reviewing the corporate governance 
literature, many variables were proposed to reflect board composition, these 
variables are centred on classifying director to insiders, outsiders (non–executive), 
affiliated directors, independent non–executive, interdependent directors, what is 
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more, based on this categorization, each variable is calculated using different 
formulas, they share the same denominator which is the total number of board 
members, but with a different numerator.  
Such classification matches with the agency perspective that underscores the 
monitoring role over board’s other roles. Hillman, Cannella and Paetzold (2000) 
provide a different taxonomy for board directors relying on the board’s resource 
dependence roles and the type of information the director provides to the board. They 
mention that board members can be classified into insiders who mainly provide firm 
specific information (internally focused); business experts are those directors provide 
external information about the market, competition, and generally link the 
organisation with the external environment; support specialists are those directors 
with specific knowledge and expertise (e.g., law, finance); they also serve as a hub 
with the external environment; and finally, community influential, those directors 
provide non-business information that directly affects firm’s relation with the 
external environment. Hillman, Cannella and Paetzold (2000) add that the insider – 
outsider classification is appropriate for studying the board control role, whereas, 
their taxonomy is appropriate for studying the resource dependence roles. 
From an agency theory perspective, the board of directors should be dominated by 
independent outside directors. Dealing with the agency problems requires objective 
and totally independent directors, in terms of employment, business connections and 
other gains (Hillman, Cannella and Paetzold, 2000). This enhances their ability to 
carry out their monitoring role and ensure board’s independence from the CEO. 
Dalton et al. (1999)  assert this by mentioning that an independent board is a major 
prescription of agency theory, effective boards are those boards that are largely 
comprised of independent outside directors. According to the agency assumptions, 
managers are not fully entrusted, and hence; the board of directors should be present 
to monitor and control their actions and decisions (Muth and Donaldson, 1998) and 
take the corrective actions in such cases.  
However, from a stewardship perspective, executive directors can act for the best 
interest of shareholders as they have other incentives that motive their behaviour 
rather than the self-dealing behaviour proposed by agency theory. Thus, the presence 
of executive board members is preferred and required for superior performance; 
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considering their technical and firm specific knowledge, their easy access for the 
needed information and above this their responsibility towards the firm and their 
intrinsic motives (Muth and Donaldson, 1998). This perspective argues that 
nominating executive directors as board members could be considered as a reward, 
and encourage them to perform their responsibilities toward the shareholders 
(Donaldson, 1990). Building on the assumptions of stewardship theory about 
managers and their motives; the control role and the importance of independent 
board members is no longer required and thus, inside dominated boards are more 
efficient and perquisite for superior performance. 
Resource dependence theory provides a different view with regard to board 
composition. Directors are bridges that connect the firm with the external 
environment, and help the firm in securing the necessary resources to survive and 
deal with environmental uncertainty; outside directors could help in securing the 
required resources, linking the firm with the external environment and could be 
considered as a relevant source of timely information for insiders (Muth and 
Donaldson, 1998). Pfeffer (1972) argues that in some cases, management does not 
seek the advising and counselling services from the outside board members; 
management uses them as instruments to build connections with the external 
environment to acquire information and guarantee the needed resources. 
Interlocking directorate could serve this purpose and connect the firm with its 
external environment and maintain required resources (Muth and Donaldson, 1998; 
Dalton et al., 2007). Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand (1996), Dalton et al. (1999) and 
Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach (2010), among others, argue that recruiting outside 
directors who are CEOs of other firms is expected to provide well advice and counsel 
to the CEO and top management as they have relevant experience required for 
dealing with the complex business environment, this can be magnified by increasing 
the board size and recruiting more CEOs to the board.  
However, advocates of agency theory consider that interlocking as a direct threat 
for board independence as it neutralizes the role of outside directors (interlocked 
CEOs) as external monitors (Dalton et al., 2007). Some scholars (e.g., Fahlenbrach, 
Low and Stulz (2010), among others) find evidence that supports this argument and 
shows that interlocking has negative impacts on firm performance as the interlocked 
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directors might not act as active monitors over their colleague CEOs. Such example 
highlights the expected conflict between the agency theory, on the one hand, and 
resource dependence theory on the other hand. From an agency theory perspective, 
interlocking is considered as a threat and could reduce board independence, 
conversely, from resource dependence theory, it can be seen as a prerequisite for 
allocating and securing the needed resources, and for firm survival (Dalton et al., 
2007). Such collision could be solved by enacting some rules that govern the board 
membership and prevent harmful interlocking; also, by considering that there is a 
direct interlock which occurs when two firms exchange their directors and indirect 
interlock that occurs when there is an exchange of directors between firms; indirect 
interlocking should be promoted and not considered as a threat. Briefly, the agency 
perspective calls for more independent directors to ensure board independence, while 
the stewardship theory calls for more executives and resource dependence theory 
calls for more outsiders to enhance firm connectivity with the external environment.  
The real market practices provide evidence that the domination of outside board 
members over the board did not either enhance the performance or prevent the 
scandals; Bhagat and Black (2002) state that the case of Enron is an obvious 
example; Enron’s board had 11 independent members out of total size of 14 board 
members. This could imply that fully independent board is not the solution, or the 
grantee for the alignment between the management’s interests with shareholders’ 
interests. Muth and Donaldson (1998) argue that an executive who is identified with 
the firm and involved in firm’s daily activities may be more committed towards the 
firm and its long term performance than non-executive directors. Baysinger and 
Butler (1985) mention that adding executive directors to the board could be 
considered as a kind of strategic manoeuvre; the CEO nominates his favoured 
subordinates to the board as a kind of reward, and introduces them to the board as 
potential senior managers. Furthermore, Dalton et al. (1999) added that executive 
directors can provide the technical advice and counsel to the independent board 
members and other board members as well using their own experience and specific 
knowledge about the firm and its daily activities, likewise, affiliated directors can 
help in securing the needed resources; however, the main criticize is that they might 
not be fully independent from the CEO. 
‎Chapter 3: Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
-59- 
 
Therefore, adding insiders to the board brings many advantages. Insiders are 
expected to be more influential in the board meetings; they have access to more firm 
specific information, and they know more about the firm activities, compared to 
outside directors, such information and knowledge qualify them to evaluate the 
management performance effectively (Fama and Jensen, 1983b). Muth and 
Donaldson (1998) claim that board performance can be enhanced be having board 
with a majority of executive directors, this can be justified by fast communication 
between them and the more technical information they do have about the firm and its 
operations. Klein (1998) mentions that based on their firm specific knowledge, 
insiders are more valuable for the board in terms of reviewing the long term 
investment plans and projects, the dividend policy and the potential sources of funds. 
Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan (2008) argue that, based on the CEO’s private 
information about the firm; independent directors might perform worse than 
dependent members on the CEO. Baysinger and Butler (1985) and Dalton et al. 
(1999) , among others, argue that executive director can provide the board with 
relevant firm specific information. Such information about the firm, its competitive 
environment, current strategies and future plans (Hillman, Cannella and Paetzold, 
2000) and help them in evaluating the management (Fama and Jensen, 1983b; 
Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2004); as they are more 
informed about firm’s present projects, upcoming investments plans, and the quality 
of these investments (Raheja, 2005).  
However, this information and the evaluation criteria are questionable and could 
be misleading if the CEO is dominating over the inside directors and controlling the 
flow of information to outsiders. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1997) argue that the 
presence of insiders in that the board raise the question of how the board can evaluate 
the management’s performance effectively and independently. They argue that for 
board with a majority of insiders, they have the voting power that enables them to 
control over the board’s decisions. 
It is unlikely to find that the uniform increase in outside directors will lead to 
uniform impact on firm performance, firms might decrease the outsider 
representation on the board to minimise the outsiders monitoring over the board; but 
in other cases, the domination of outsiders over the board could be detrimental to 
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firm performance (Duchin, Matsusaka and Ozbas, 2010). Thus, Increasing the 
number of non-executive directors does not mean that the board will be more 
effective (Chris, Theodoros and Vasilios, 2014). Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells 
(1998) mention an important threat of outside directors domination; they argue that 
outside directors could be risk averse, they care about their reputation on the market 
as expert monitors; thus, they might reject a potentially profitable project because of 
the risk associated with that project is higher than their preferences; they think that 
their gain is limited in the case of the project success, whereas, they will incur the 
full loss from their reputation in the market in the case of the failure of the project; 
this could have a negative impact on their performance and affect the firm value. 
Moreover, non-executive directors are expected to serve on many boards, thus they 
might not have the time to acquire the required information about the firm (Lipton 
and Lorsch, 1992; Hart, 1995), go over the details (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Bathala 
and Rao, 1995; Hart, 1995), and understand firm’s affairs to provide sound 
judgements, thus, their effectiveness is questionable (Bathala and Rao, 1995).  
Having said that, Bebchuk and Weisbach (2010) argue that the empirical work 
shows that board independence is clearly and positively reflected on various 
decisions like executive compensation, CEO succession, controlling the time of 
granting options and other decisions. In the same vein, Van den Berghe and Levrau 
(2004) argue that board independence controls such debatable and conflicting issues 
that are related, for example, to the nomination of new members, remuneration of top 
management. Daily et al. (1998) mention that the directors who are under the 
influence of the management are more likely to align themselves with the 
management rather than the shareholders. Thus, insiders and dependent non-
executive directors are expected to work for the interest of the management not the 
shareholders.  
Non-executive directors can be considered as the control instrument over both of 
the board of directors and the top management. Many researchers (e.g., Fama and 
Jensen (1983a), Daily, Johnson and Dalton (1999), Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008), 
Krause, Semadeni and Cannella (2014), among others, claim that non-executive 
board member's primary occupation is independent from the firm’s management, this 
independence enables them to monitor effectively the CEO and the executive 
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management, critically evaluate their performance and to determine the appropriate 
compensation levels for the executives. The merit of independent directors comes 
from their ability to judge firm performance objectively compared to inside directors; 
this point originates the importance of the independent directors and limits the 
insiders’ effectiveness (Ahmed, Hossain and Adams, 2006). Also, effective 
independent directors can help in protecting the shareholders and mitigating the 
consequences of duality (Fama and Jensen, 1983b; Brickley, Coles and Jarrell, 
1997). However, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) claim that the role of the outsiders in 
judging the management’s performance is questionable, by considering that 
management has an influential role in appointing new directors to the board. 
Nonetheless, given that most companies have nomination committees that are 
expected to be independent from the CEO; this claim does not stand anymore. 
Gordon (2007) mentions that independent board members are not constrained with 
the management vision, and this is one of their advantages; moreover, they can 
identify the available information in the market about the firm performance, e.g. 
stock prices in a different manner than executive board members. Furthermore, 
outside directors could be considered as a relevant source for timely information for 
insiders (Muth and Donaldson, 1998). 
Non-executive directors have many advantages that could benefit the board and 
serve shareholders’ interests. Non-executive directors give the chance to enrich the 
board with different experiences from different and diversified fields (Pearce and 
Zahra, 1991; Florackis, 2008), assure that executive management is working in line 
with the shareholders’ interests (Weir, Laing and McKnight, 2002), enhance board 
objectivity (Pearce and Zahra, 1991) and prevent managerial entrenchment (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983a; Eisenhardt, 1989; Krause, Semadeni and Cannella, 2014). Also, 
connections with organizations and directors outside the firm provide more sources 
of information and environmental awareness and allow firms to reduce uncertainty 
about the availability of resources (Muth and Donaldson, 1998). Moreover, non-
executive directors are expected to add to the board performance taking into account 
the knowledge and experience gained during their employment progress (Ahmed, 
Hossain and Adams, 2006). 
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Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach (2010) mention that by reviewing the board 
members, we could find that outside directors are CEOs of other firms; as they are 
supposed to have the managerial skills and the aware of the business practises and 
problems that face the firms. Dalton et al. (1999) endorse this by demonstrating that 
recruiting CEOs of other firms as outside directors is expected to enhance the advice 
and counsel provided by the board to the top management, given that they have de-
facto experience of the complex business environment. Moreover, this helps in 
building and extending the environmental connections as proposed by resource 
dependence scholars. Moreover, Fahlenbrach, Low and Stulz (2010) find that market 
reacts positively to the appointment of a CEO to the board as an outside director; 
however, the operating performance decreases as a result of the appointment of an 
interlocked CEO. They also report that the appointment of CEOs as outsiders do not 
affect the operating performance of the recruiting firm and do not affect other 
decisions like the CEO compensation. 
In addition to having the required experience and qualification that add to the 
board and qualify them as expert monitors, non-executive directors are required to be 
independent from the CEO (Pearce and Zahra, 1991; Weir, Laing and McKnight, 
2002; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003), the more independent board, the less influence 
of the management over the board (Muth and Donaldson, 1998). Also, non-executive 
directors should care about their good reputation in the labour market (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983b; Weir, Laing and McKnight, 2002; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003) as 
good monitors taking into account that the labour market prices them according to 
their performance as an expert monitor (Fama, 1980). 
It is must also be noted that in order to perform their roles effectively non-
executive directors need to have access to the relevant information. Non-executive 
directors are not supposed to be as shareholders their evaluation for the management 
is based on the public information (Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010). Getting the right 
and accurate information is a critical problem that faces outside directors (Van den 
Berghe and Levrau, 2004). Lack or limited information significantly shapes the 
effectiveness of the independent directors and limits their value to the firm (Gordon, 
2007; Ravina and Sapienza, 2010); independent directors might have the necessary 
requirements to be good monitors but without the relevant information, it will be 
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difficult to imagine that they can perform their roles effectively (Ravina and 
Sapienza, 2010). Duchin, Matsusaka and Ozbas (2010) find that the cost of 
information is a determinant of outside directors effectiveness; they find that the cost 
of getting information about the firm is inversely associated with performance; 
moreover, they report that for firms with high information acquiring costs, adding 
outside directors worsens firm performance. Van den Berghe and Levrau (2004) 
mention that poor communication between non-executive and executive directors; 
slow information flow from the firm to the directors, or that the non-executive 
directors themselves are not interested to get the information; all of these factors 
affects independent directors’ effectiveness. 
Thus, Non-executive directors may not do their job properly as a result of being 
less informed about the firm’s strategy (Florackis, 2008; Brickley and Zimmerman, 
2010) or the lack of the required skills to do this job (Florackis, 2008); or they may 
prefer to align themselves with the interests of the top management because they 
don’t hold an important portion of the firms’ stocks (Jensen, 1993; Ibrahim and 
Samad, 2011) or because of the management’s big role in their nomination (Ibrahim 
and Samad, 2011). Ravina and Sapienza (2010), among others, show that the 
independent director is like other directors, they are influenced by their motives and 
the environment they work within, which means that we should not assume that they 
will work only to maximize shareholders’ wealth; they might also pursue their own 
goals. 
Many suggestions were introduced in the literature about the optimal board 
composition. Jensen (1993) provides an extreme suggestion as he suggests that the 
CEO should be the only executive member of the board, and the rest of the board 
should be independent members, he also suggests that independent directors can 
arrange regular meeting with other executives in an ex–officio manner in order to 
expand their knowledge about the firm, check for the future CEO candidates, and 
transfer their knowledge to the top management about the board and its processes. 
This suggestion could raise the board independence to its highest level; however, it 
requires the outside directors to spend more time and exert more efforts to get and 
understand the required information and discuss firm’s affairs with executive 
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directors, which could be very difficult, especially if those outside directors work on 
other boards. 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) provide a reasonable suggestion that two third of the 
board should be independent directors. Mace (1979) suggests that based on the board 
size, the majority of board members should be independent directors with two or 
maximum three insiders. He also recommends that boards should not comprise bank 
representatives or any other representatives of professional service providers to 
ensure board independence. This could indicate that the director’s affiliation to 
certain institutions could affect the performance of the board. Eisenberg, Sundgren 
and Wells (1998) mention that bank representatives express the interest of their 
employers; thus, they might be risk averse and refuse profitable projects because of 
the risk associated that project, this could be reflected in lower returns. However, 
Dalton et al. (1999) mention that the case with the board composition is not about the 
domination of certain category (independent non-executive, non-executive or 
executive) over the board, it is a matter of having the board that is able to perform 
the board’s different roles effectively. They added that the board has to be 
compromised to reach the appropriate structure and include the right mix that fills all 
different board roles. 
Independent directors are perceived by some commenters and institutional 
investors as a critical mechanism to monitor the management, the more independent 
board, the more monitoring activities, and this means good corporate governance 
practices (Bhagat and Black, 2002; Romano, Bhagat and Bolton, 2008). Likewise, 
board independence is a cornerstone in all rating systems, Van den Berghe and 
Levrau (2004) report that almost all corporate governance rating systems include a 
criterion about board independence; this inclusion reflects the importance of such 
criterion in corporate governance debate. Gordon (2007) states that the call of more 
independent directors is related to the increase attention towards the monitoring role 
of the board rather than other roles; because of considering maximizing shareholders’ 
wealth as a crucial objective for the management.    
Ravina and Sapienza (2010) state that most of the recommendations for more 
independent boards rest on an assumption that if the director has business relations 
with the firm, or personal relations with the top management, this will affect his 
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independence, and he might do his roles ineffectively particularly the monitoring 
role. Consequently, to ensure board effectiveness and exceptional performance, the 
board should comprise a majority of independent directors. Such assumption is 
consistent with the agency perspective. Corporate governance rating systems have 
followed that assumption; board independence is underscored in almost all 
governance rating systems (Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2004). However, according 
to Dalton et al. (2007) some researchers suggest that irrespective to board 
composition; boards are not totally independent; and even if the board members were 
independent during their appointment, by time they become less independent or 
become naturalized. 
The presumed relationship between board independence and superior firm 
performance has motivated large investors and policy makers to call for and support 
any initiatives for board changes for the sake of protecting their investments and 
getting high returns. Bebchuk and Weisbach (2010) add governance scandals and 
financial crises as additional reasons for the call of reforms pursuing more 
independent boards and committees. 
Consequently, policy makers in most countries have followed this alleged 
relationship between board independence and firm performance; they enacted a 
number of rules that force firms to limit the number of insiders and directing the 
board composition to be more independent; for instance, The UK Corporate 
Governance code (2010) states that at least half of the board excluding the chairman 
should be independent directors, the same recommendation was stated by New York 
Stock Exchange “NYSE”, as they mention that the majority of the board should be 
independent directors according to the listed the criteria of independent directors. 
Fogel and Geier (2007) commented on this ruling by claiming that there are no either 
logical or practical experiences that endorse the idea that independent board is the 
pledge for better corporate governance practices or provide shareholders with a 
superior financial performance. Outside dominated board could give an indication 
that the board is more independent from the CEO and top management, and thus, the 
board can provide the guidance and monitor the CEO and executive management 
effectively, but it does not mean that the CEO will follow or comply with the board’s 
‎Chapter 3: Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
-66- 
 
opinion (Dalton et al., 1999). However, in such case, the board is responsible to take 
such actions to ensure that the CEO will comply or get dismissed. 
Given that the empirical evidence of the relationship between board composition 
and firm performance is mixed, inconsistent and failed to confirm such proposed 
relationship;  Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) and Daily, Johnson and Dalton (1999) 
argue that setting regulations that force for a certain board structure could be 
counterproductive. There is much empirical work which provides evidence that 
board is endogenously selected according to firm characteristics (e.g.,Coles, Daniel 
and Naveen, 2008; Guest, 2008; Lehn, Patro and Zhao, 2009). Nevertheless, 
Bebchuk and Weisbach (2010) defended for the opposite view which is regulators 
have to prevent the managerial opportunism behaviour by executive directors that 
could destroy shareholders’ wealth, also, without such regulations executives might 
dominate the board, and this will lead to less independent boards. 
The above-mentioned recommendations and suggestions are grounded in the 
agency perspective, which assumes that the board has to be more independent, in 
order to perform their roles in an effective way, and this should be positively 
reflected on the firm performance. However, corporate governance literature 
provides no clear or systematic relationship either between board composition and 
financial performance, or between board composition and agency costs.  
Dalton and Dalton (2011) describe the literature of the relationship between board 
composition and firm financial performance by “astonishingly inclusive." Daily, 
Johnson and Dalton (1999) show that there are more than two dozen of variables that 
have been used in the literature to capture board composition as a variable; these 
different forms have been related to multiple financial performance indicators. Using 
structural equations confirmatory factor analysis, they find that these different 
measures of board composition don’t reflect or measure the board independence. 
Accordingly, Harris and Raviv (2008) and Lehn, Patro and Zhao (2009) suggest that 
researcher should carefully interpret the results of the relationship between board 
structure and firm performance. 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) demonstrate a model for comparing between 
endogenously determined and exogenously imposed boards; they find that 
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endogenously selected is more effective than the imposed one in terms of board’s 
independence. They argue that specifying a certain proportion of outsiders, certainly, 
will lead to an outside dominated board; however, this does not necessarily mean that 
the board becomes more independent as the CEO and other board members can 
direct the nomination and selection of new board members in the way that serves 
their own goals. Pfeffer (1972) argues that in most instances, the new board members 
are nominated, and even, selected by the management. This implies that the 
management controls the board; thus board independence is a questionable issue. 
Managers can nominate directors who are independent according to the regulator’s 
definition, but, in reality, they are not independent from the management (Duchin, 
Matsusaka and Ozbas, 2010). 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) argue that board size affects the 
effectiveness of independent directors. They argue that in large boards, because of 
the communication problems; independent directors don’t have the chance to express 
their ideas and discuss firms’ affairs in more details. Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells 
(1998) endorse this argument but from different perception, they argue that the 
proportion of independent directors is a function of the board size, as the board size 
increase; more outside members could be added to the board. Outside directors who 
care about their reputation in the market could be risk averse, and hence they might 
refuse positive net present value project because the risk associated with such project 
is higher than their preferences; given that their gain in the case of the project success 
is limited, while in the case of the failure of the project, they will incur the total loss 
from their reputation in the market; all of this affect the overall performance of the 
board and affect the firm value (Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells, 1998).  
Similar to board size, it is argued that firm characteristics have a great influence 
on board composition. Pfeffer (1972) argues that there are many factors that shape 
the board and its composition, among these factors are the need for external capital, 
firms that require large capital and more access to capital markets are expected to 
have more representatives from financial institutions are sitting on their board with 
less presence of insiders; the industry at which the firm operates in, for regulated 
industries, boards are expected to have more outsiders; and the professional services 
the firm needs. 
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Furthermore,  the firm’s past performance could affect the board structure.  
Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) and Pearce and Zahra (1992) find evidence that 
board composition changes in response to firm performance; more outside directors 
replace the inside directors after the poor performance. Following the same logic, 
after the crisis, based on the agency theory perspective, the crisis is a clear reflection 
of poor performance, practises and poor management, thus, the reform calls seek 
more monitoring over the management, such monitoring achieved by the increase of 
the number of independent directors, but by considering that adding more directors to 
the board will increase the board size, the only way to accommodate more outsiders 
without inflating the board is to decrease the number of insiders.  
Bathala and Rao (1995) argue that for high growth firms that operate in turbulent 
environments, the need for insiders’ specific knowledge about the firm and their 
advantages surpass the monitoring role, for such firms, there is a severe demand for 
faster, more innovative decision makers with more knowledge about the firm to deal 
with the fast changes in the environment; thus, insider dominated boards are more 
necessary and important than outside dominated ones. Lending the support to this 
argument, Chancharat, Krishnamurti and Tian (2012) find evidence that for high 
growth firms where the cost of acquiring information for outsiders is high, insiders 
can complement the role of outsiders and enhance the effectiveness of the board.   
The empirical evidence shows another factor that can influence the board 
composition and the role of the independent directors which is ownership structure 
and the type of ownership. For example, Ibrahim and Samad (2011) find that the 
impact of independent directors on reducing agency costs differs with the ownership 
type; independent directors have a significant role in reducing agency costs for non-
family controlled firms, and no impact for family controlled firms. This result 
suggests that the controlling family could neutralise independent directors, or family 
members are dominating over the board and the decision making process. As they 
have more access to internal family information compared to other board members 
(Haniffa and Cooke, 2002), which can influence the board’s decisions and the firm’s 
strategic vision; moreover, Ibrahim and Samad (2011) argue that for family 
controlled firms, independent directors are less informed about the family’s specific 
interests, thus, independent directors most probably will deviate from these unknown 
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interests. This lack of specific information could encourage the controlling family to 
either marginalise the independent directors’ role or increase the number of family 
members on the board in order to dominate over the board and control the decision 
making process; thus the independent directors become useless. However, as there 
are other shareholders who have interests that should be considered, policy makers 
should consider that conflict of interest between owners, and set a certain rule for 
firms that have a controlling shareholder (institution, individual or family) who owes 
over 50% of the outstanding shares. Bhagat and Black (1996) argue that the role of 
directors and the choice of being active or passive monitors are subject to their 
ownership stake as well as the CEO ownership stake. They argue that the role of the 
independent directors is affected by the CEO ownership, as they assume that the 
interest of the CEO who has a substantial ownership stake is aligned with the 
interests of shareholders, and hence there is no need for monitoring efforts.  
Bujaki and McConomy (2002) find evidence supports the argument that 
independent boards members are more likely to be independent of the management, 
and perform their monitoring role. Besides, there is evidence in the literature that 
poor performing CEOs are more likely to be substituted if the firm has board of 
directors dominated by independent directors; Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) report 
that independent boards are more likely to substitute CEOs after poor performance. 
Hussainey and Al-Najjar (2012) find evidence that independent boards are able and 
more likely to perform their monitoring roles. Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2009) report 
that outside dominated boards pay less dividends, such results suggest that firms with 
low governance tend to pay more dividends in order to build market reputation. 
Ibrahim and Samad (2011) find empirical evidence that independent directors 
provide the required counsel, advice, enriches the board experiences, and provides 
more control over the firms’ management, consequently; this helps in reducing the 
conflict between managers and shareholders and hence reduces agency costs.  
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) find evidence that market receives the appointment 
of a new independent director as a good signal from the firms; this signal is reflected 
on higher stock returns and higher firm value, even though that the board was already 
dominated by independent directors before that new appointment(s), this new 
appointment could be understood by the market that the firm is about to start new 
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investments, and hence specific knowledge is needed to be added to the board. 
Conversely, Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) find that the market reaction is lower if 
the CEO is involved in the selection process. Likewise, the market reaction to the 
appointment of a new inside director to the board is totally different; Rosenstein 
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1997) find evidence that the market does not react to the 
appointment of new insider as it reacts to the appointment of outside directors. This 
could imply that the market perceives the appointment of an executive director as a 
normal or required procedure that will not either benefit or harm firm performance. 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) find that there is no association between board 
composition and firm performance; they argue that no relation could imply that firms 
have reached their optimal board composition; besides insiders and outsiders, both, 
can represent shareholders’ interests. Lehn, Patro and Zhao (2009) find evidence that 
there is no significant association between board independence and firm performance 
for a sample of 81 U.S. firms survived during the period 1935-2000. Moreover, they 
find that for some firms (e.g., high growth firms) there is a need to have an inside 
dominated board. Larmou and Vafeas (2010) find that independent directors do not 
enhance the value of poor performing firms. Likewise, Duchin, Matsusaka and 
Ozbas (2010) find that adding more outsiders to the board neither benefit nor harm 
firm’s performance for a sample of 1054 U.S. firms during the period 2000–2005; 
generally, outsiders do benefit the firm, but actually their performance is affected by 
the costs they incur to acquire the required information about the firm. Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996) find a negative association between board independence and firm 
performance measured by Tobin’s Q for a sample of 383 U.S. firms. 
In an examination of the notion that board independence is expected to be an 
indicator of good governance, Bhagat and Black (2002) used a large sample of 934 
U.S. firms over the period 1985-1995. They find that low performance firms move 
toward more independent boards, but at the same time their findings do not provide 
any evidence that the increase of board independence improves their performance; 
above that, they find no evidence that firms with more independent boards 
outperform firms with less independent board, and the relationship between board 
size and firm performance is inconsistent. 
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Challenging the fact that independent directors cannot get the required 
information to monitor the management; Ravina and Sapienza (2010) employed an 
innovative and indirect way to assess shared information between the independent 
and executive directors to check if this information is adequate to monitor the 
executive team. They used a sample from the U.S. market during the period 1986: 
2003 to analyse and compare the trading behaviour in the companies’ stock. Their 
results were interesting as they find that both executive and independent directors 
make abnormal returns compared to the market, with a relatively small difference in 
the returns between the executive and independent directors during the study period. 
Apart from the fact that they used private information to gain these returns, their 
reported results show that the independent directors can get the needed information 
to assess and monitor the management performance, and they can help in 
maximizing shareholders’ wealth. What is more, when they added the Gompers, 
Ishii, and Metrick (2003) Governance Index (G–index) score as a variable, their 
findings show that for well governed firms, there is no difference between the 
abnormal returns for both executive and independent directors, while firms with low 
G–index score, there is a difference in the returns, which means that independent 
directors working at well governed firms are more informed than independent 
directors working at poor governed firms. These findings endorse the argument that 
governance structures can play a critical role in enhancing shareholders’ wealth 
subject to the directors’ behaviour and personal incentives. 
To sum up, as mentioned by Pfeffer (1972), the basic argument about board 
composition rests on two main issues, first, the board’s knowledge about the firm and 
its affairs; second, the advantages and experiences the board members bring to the 
firm; but simultaneously, board size and composition are reflections of the firm’s 
responds to the external environment. By considering that each category of board 
members has its own duties, board composition reflects the trade-off between two 
different needs, the need for the monitoring, advisory and strategic support roles 
provided by the independent directors and the need of firm specific information 
provided by executive directors (Klein, 2002b); in order to perform effectively and 
take the right decisions. 
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Considering the theoretical arguments around board composition, from an agency 
perspective, an independent board is more efficient than the insider dominated one in 
terms of performing their monitoring role, which should lead to less agency conflicts 
and lower agency costs. Resource dependence theory argues that adding more 
outsiders, especially CEOs of other firms, will enhance the firm’s ability in building 
their own network and secure the required resources. Taking both theories together, 
both seek the efficiency of the board of directors, but from different views; agency 
theory underscores the montoring role and board independence issue; resource 
dependence is interested in bringing more outside directors to take the advantage of 
their experience and connections with the external enviroment. Moreover, the UK 
corporate governance code endorses the importance of having a board with a 
majority of independent directors; thus, in this study, the researcher examines the 
following hypothesis. 
H2: There is a negative association between the percentage of independent 
board members and agency costs 
3.3.1.2.2 Leadership structure  
Unitary leadership structure (Brickley, Coles and Jarrell, 1997) or Duality means 
that the CEO chairs the board of directors. In other words, as Krause, Semadeni and 
Cannella (2014, p.256) define CEO duality, “[duality is] the practice of a single 
individual serving as both CEO and board chair”  
The literature provides two contradictory standpoints regarding the separation 
between the CEO and chairman posts. The first argument is based on the agency 
theory and supports the separation between the role of CEO and the chairman; this 
separation supports board independence, and enables the board to perform their 
monitoring role effectively. The second perspective is grounded in the stewardship 
theory, which argues that combining both roles together enhances board performance 
and reduces the conflict of views. 
The chairman –with the help of the board– has many responsibilities. He is 
responsible to head the board meetings, direct and ensure that the board are 
performing their roles effectively. Such roles are to provide the needed advice to the 
CEO and top management, monitor the performance of the executives, selecting, 
‎Chapter 3: Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
-73- 
 
hiring, evaluating and setting the compensation plans for the CEO and top 
management; and to take such corrective decisions, like, dismissing the CEO or any 
member of the top management in such situations of poor performance. These 
mentioned roles show that there might be a conflict of interest if the same person is 
performing the same roles; however, this conflict of interest is manageable if the 
board is independent of the CEO, and the board has independent subcommittees that 
have the responsibilities of setting the suitable remuneration, nominating the new 
board members and monitoring firm’s financial aspects. Fama and Jensen (1983a) 
mention that one of the ways to manage the agency problem is to separate between 
the management and the control of decisions. Thus, this can imply that the separation 
between the CEO and chairman posts is one of the tools that can be utilised to 
mitigate the agency problem.  
The board is responsible to assess and monitor the performance of the CEO and 
the executive management; as mentioned early in this chapter. From an agency 
theory perspective, performing this critical role is subject to the board independence. 
Thus, there is an imperative need for the board leader to be totally independent of the 
CEO and the executive management to enable the board to perform their monitoring 
function (Jensen, 1993); as a result, it is a prerequisite to separate between the CEO 
and chairman posts (Dalton and Dalton, 2011), in addition to having a board with a 
majority of independent directors to maintain board independence. Prior literature 
puts the duality as the first reason behind the failure of the board to perform their 
monitoring roles over the CEO and top management (Brickley, Coles and Jarrell, 
1997).  
Dalton et al. (2007), among others, consider the separation between the CEO and 
the chairman as the second element of board independence. Duality has been argued 
as an obstacle for the board to perform their monitoring role. Taking into 
consideration that the board has a monitoring role over the CEO and the executive 
management, Jensen (1993) asserts that it is impossible for the CEO as a chair of the 
board to monitor himself objectively without being biased toward his personal 
interests and utilities. Besides, the presence of the CEO as the board chairman 
hinders the ability of the executive board members to perform their monitoring role 
effectively. Several reasons could stand behind this shortage, like they work under 
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the patronage of the CEO, and/or they are selected and nominated by the CEO to be 
board members, and/or being financial dependent on the firm.  
Duality implies that one person has a great influence over the firm’s decision 
making process (Adams, Almeida and Ferreira, 2005); and it gives the CEO the 
chance of taking decisions that serve their personal interests (Dey, Engel and Liu, 
2011). This domination over the decision making process contradicts with Fama and 
Jensen (1983a)’s suggestion of separating the management of the important decisions 
at all levels within the organization form the control of these decisions. Decision 
management is concerned with the initiation and implementation of such decisions 
that are related to the allocation of firm’s different resources; the top management is 
responsible for this phase, while the decision control refers to the ratification and 
monitoring the implementation; which enters under the responsibility of the board 
(Brickley, Coles and Jarrell, 1997). Such separation is required to control managerial 
discretion. However, Brickley, Coles and Jarrell (1997) argue that duality does not 
violate in any form the proposed separation of decision management and control. 
They argue that the board has different committees that are responsible to take 
important decisions; besides, even with the CEO dual role; the board retains the right 
of hiring and dismissing the top management. Combining the roles of the CEO and 
the chairman roles is expected to be detrimental to the firm and shareholders’ wealth, 
this negative effect is expected to be aggravated if the CEO is the main (or one of the 
main) shareholder (Chris, Theodoros and Vasilios, 2014).  
Given that one of the roles of the board is to protect the shareholders from the 
managerial opportunism and entrenchment, the chairman should be independent of 
the executive management; duality is expected to compromise the board’s ability to 
monitor the CEO and the executive management (Fama and Jensen, 1983a; 1983b; 
Donaldson and Davis, 1991) and make it difficult for the board to replace poorly 
performing CEOs (Brickley, Coles and Jarrell, 1997; Goyal and Park, 2002). Adams, 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2010) mention that duality gives the CEO more power and 
control over the other parties sitting on the board, including the independent 
directors. This implies that duality dilutes the board’s power in monitoring and 
controlling the executive management performance. The separation between the two 
posts, aims at constraining and diluting the CEO’s authority (Muth and Donaldson, 
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1998; Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2004; Van Essen, Engelen and Carney, 2013) and 
curtails his ability to control over the board, which should enhance the board’s ability 
to perform their monitoring role (Muth and Donaldson, 1998; Van den Berghe and 
Levrau, 2004). It could be said that the consequences of the duality can be mitigated 
by independent board and and other control mechanisms; however, Shivdasani and 
Yermack (1999) argue that the CEO is a key player in shaping the firm’s governance 
system; and affects the performance of other governance mechanisms.  
Consistent with this, Mace (1979) mentions that in the case of dispersed 
ownership among thousands of owners, the CEO has the power to control over the 
board and draw the board’s role in the way that serves his own interests. 
Accordingly, the separation between the CEO and chairman positions is a 
prerequisite for the board to be effective. Chairman should be fully independent to 
perform his responsibilities effectively. Consequently, this separation should lead to 
less agency conflicts and better performance (Florackis, 2008). Wearing (2005) 
mentions that the combination of both roles accumulates too much authority in the 
hands of the CEO, thus, it becomes a difficult task to stand against that dual CEO. In 
line with this argument, Muth and Donaldson (1998) mention that the separation 
between the roles of CEO and the chairman make the board more free to judge the 
CEO and management performance independently and critically. Jensen (1993) adds 
to this by stating that the CEO almost decides the board meeting agenda, and the 
information provided to other board members. So, if the same person is occupying 
both posts, the CEO can easily control the flow of information and manipulate the 
provided information to control and restrain the ability of the board members to do 
their monitoring role (Jensen, 1993; Van Essen, Engelen and Carney, 2013).  
Consistent with that perspective that stresses over the importance of separating 
between the CEO and chairman posts, the successive corporate governance codes 
starting from the Cadbury (1992) report ending with The UK Corporate Governance 
Code (2014) view that this division of responsibilities is vital to prevent the 
concentration of authority and decision making in the hands of one person, hence, 
these codes recommend separating between these responsibilities, otherwise firms 
have to explain the reason of their nonconformity with the code. Besides, the code 
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mentions that the chairman on his appointment should be independent according to 
the code mentioned criteria.  
Stewardship theory provides a totally opposite viewpoint; combining the roles of 
CEO and chairman is a motive rather than a threat. Duality and working under the 
vision of a single leader has its advantage. Duality leads to a unified follow of 
commands with no doubt about the roles and responsibility of each role and 
eliminates the problems of shared power and control (Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson 
and Davis, 1991). Besides, if the same person occupies both positions, they will be 
more informed about the firm’s operating environment and the firm’s strategy (Weir, 
Laing and McKnight, 2002; Brickley and Zimmerman, 2010). Furthermore, duality 
combines strategy formulation stage with the implementation stage (Muth and 
Donaldson, 1998); the separation between these two posts causes confusion to the 
different parties dealing with the firm regard who is in charge and who is responsible 
about bad performance (Brickley, Coles and Jarrell, 1997).   
Moreover, Donaldson and Davis (1991) and Muth and Donaldson (1998) claim 
that duality empowers the CEO and motivates him to work hard and act as a 
responsible leader of the firm; also, the long term employment relationship bounds 
the CEO with the firm. Consistent with this, Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach (2010) 
mention that the chairman position could be awarded for the well performing CEO as 
a kind of appreciation and motivation. Van Essen, Engelen and Carney (2013) argue 
that duality is advantageous during the conditions of the crisis and uncertainty; it 
enhances the management team’s ability to respond quickly to the rapid changes 
during the crisis periods, taking quicker decisions, working under single leader and 
single vision, which limit the conflict between CEO and chairman.  
Adams, Almeida and Ferreira (2005) agree that the separation of the CEO and 
chairman posts dilutes the CEO power, but at the same time it reduces the probability 
of extraordinary performance. Additionally, the CEO’s interests can be aligned with 
the shareholders’ interest by the use of long term compensation plans (Donaldson 
and Davis, 1991), and other incentives like stock ownership, and reputational 
concerns can motivate him to be more interested in doing his job effectively and 
maximizing shareholder’s wealth (Brickley and Zimmerman, 2010) such argument is 
consistent with the agency theory view towards those situations at which duality is 
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inevitable (Donaldson and Davis, 1991).  Brickley, Coles and Jarrell (1997) argue 
that although the advocates of unitary leadership structure argue that this separation 
reduces the agency costs related to the monitoring of the CEO behaviour; 
nonetheless, this separation leads to another form of agency costs related to 
monitoring the behaviour of the independent chairman (monitoring the monitor); 
furthermore, there are costs associated with sharing the information between the 
CEO and chairman and the incompleteness of transferred information; add to this, 
the costs related to the change in the succession process and the need to hire the old 
CEO as chairman during the new CEO probation period, and finally, the extra 
compensation paid for the chairman.  
Brickley, Coles and Jarrell (1997) provide a rational argument around the costs 
associated with the separation between the CEO and the chairman posts; however, 
the researcher can claim that all of these costs could be incurred by the firm even in 
the case of duality. In the case of duality, the firm will incur the costs of monitoring 
the CEO behaviour. The information transfer costs could be incurred by the firm as 
well in the case of duality as there is a need to share information with all board 
members not only between the CEO and the chairman; moreover, in case of duality 
the CEO has the power and the opportunity to control the information flow to the 
outside directors; during the handing over period, if there is a need to appoint the 
retied CEO in the board during this period for the sake of knowledge transfer, this 
could be case regardless there is duality or not; lastly, the same amount which is 
called as extra compensation for the chairman could be paid to the CEO for his extra 
role as chairman of the board.  
In spite of this argument around duality, (Dalton and Dalton, 2011), Dey, Engel 
and Liu (2011), among others, state that the empirical literature failed to provide a 
systematic relationship between the separation between the CEO and chairman 
positions and the financial performance; as it fails to provide a clear conclusion 
towards the consequences of CEO duality. Brickley, Coles and Jarrell (1997) argue 
that the calls for the separation between these two posts don’t consider the costs 
associated with this separation, and neglect the fact that each argument has its own 
theoretical foundation, it is not clear which argument is correct, and even the 
empirical evidence is mixed. Dey, Engel and Liu (2011) argue that firms choose their 
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leadership structure based on their business environment and according to the 
tradeoff between the benefits and costs of both leadership structures. 
Goyal and Park (2002) find evidence that the turnover rate of CEOs is lower for 
firms combining the two posts. This could confirm the proposed argument that 
duality grants the CEO more power over the board and CEOs can entrench 
themselves for being replaced. Adams, Almeida and Ferreira (2005) find evidence 
that combining the CEO and chairman posts leads to the concentration of power of 
decision making in the hands of the CEO which leads to more performance 
variability regardless the performance measure used e.g., stock performance, ROA or 
Tobin’s Q; however, they could not find evidence that duality leads to lower 
performance. 
Conversely, Donaldson and Davis (1991) find evidence that U.S. firms that do not 
separate between the CEO and chairman roles outperform other firms with no 
duality. Dey, Engel and Liu (2011) find evidence that the subsequent performance of 
the U.S. firms that responded to investor calls or pressures to split the CEO and 
chairman posts is significantly low. They mention that the decision or either combine 
or split these posts differs from firm to another and is subject to firm circumstance 
that direct the firm towards the combine or the split, thus the calls for a general 
regulation to force firm to split the CEO and chairman require careful consideration. 
Brickley, Coles and Jarrell (1997) provide empirical evidence that the costs of the 
separation between the CEO and chairman posts exceed the benefits of the 
separation; nonetheless, they mention that benefits and costs associated with the 
leadership structure vary across firms; consequently, the optimal leadership structure 
will vary as well. 
However, Boyd (1995) finds evidence that CEO duality could have a positive 
impact under certain industrial conditions; the change of these conditions changes 
this impact to be negative; for instance, their findings suggest that duality could be 
advantageous for complex firms and resource scarcity conditions. Faleye (2007) 
finds evidence that firm characteristics are key determinants of the occurrence of the 
duality or not, what is more, he reports evidence that firm characteristics as well as 
CEO characteristics do affect the relationship between duality and firm performance; 
thus, the calls for separating the CEO and chairman responsibilities ignore such 
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relationships, and hence these calls might be counterproductive. Likewise, Elsayed 
(2007) argues that the relationship between duality and performance is non–
monotonic; it is dynamic relation that varies according to the firm characteristics 
and/ or industry context. In his investigation of the UK context, he finds no evidence 
that CEO duality can be blamed for poor performance; moreover, he finds that there 
is no optimal leadership structure; both duality and separation have associated costs 
and benefits. 
 Prior empirical studies provide mixed and inconsistent results even within the one 
context; however, most of the governance recommendations all over the world do 
support the separation between the CEO and chairman posts. The incidence of 
duality is rare in the UK, this because the successive governance codes in the UK 
prohibit duality, and firms with dual leadership structure should explain the reasons 
behind choosing this structure. In the U.S. context, over 80% of the U.S. firms 
combine the role of the CEO and the chairman posts during the period 1970’s to the 
early 1990’s (Yang and Zhao, 2014); as the regulations in the U.S. that do not 
obligate firms to separate between these two posts. However, from March 2010 the 
U.S. security and exchange commission (SEC) requires firms to disclose their 
leadership structure and justify their chose in accordance to the company’s 
circumstance (Dey, Engel and Liu, 2011); during 2010, the figure of CEO duality fell 
to reach around 54% (Yang and Zhao, 2014). 
 To sum up, two arguments were proposed for the duality issue. The first 
argument, which is based on the agency theory, claims that duality is detrimental for 
board independence and affects firm performance; moreover, by considering that the 
inside directors could be inefficient monitors, and they are not expected to 
aggressively criticise the CEO’s practices and the top management performance; the 
board of directors as a monitoring tool becomes useless and ineffective governance 
mechanism. Contrary to this argument, stewardship theory proposes an opposite 
view, the CEO and other managers are stewards rather than agents; they share the 
same goal with the shareholders; thus, there is no conflict of interests and no 
opportunistic behaviours should be expected from the CEO and other managers, and 
hence, the combination of the CEO and chairman roles is non-hazardous; moreover, 
this combination allows for the unity of the formulation and implementation of the 
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firm’s strategies and long term plans. It is worth mentioning that the points raised by 
the agency theory as obstacles and weakness points of duality are the same points 
used by the stewardship theory to raise the importance, and the advantages which 
duality brings to the firm; it is all about how the researcher’s view towards the 
manager and his motives. 
 As argued by Brickley, Coles and Jarrell (1997) separating the CEO and 
chairman posts is efficient if it leads to reduce the agency costs incurred by 
shareholders and increases the benefits of the separation, thus in this study, the 
researcher investigates the following hypothesis: 
H3: There is a positive association between duality and agency costs. 
3.3.1.3  Board's committees  
Academics, practitioner and regulators agree and underscore the importance of the 
board subcommittees and their independence. The presence of independent board 
committees enhances board independence. Besides, board subcommittees’ primary 
role is to act as independent monitors over the management (Klein, 1998) and their 
presence withdraws some of the CEO power (Mace, 1979), moreover, board 
subcommittees can be considered as tools that can be used to mitigate the agency 
problem (Chris, Theodoros and Vasilios, 2014).  
 Such committees are composed of members with certain qualifications, and they 
have certain responsibilities, thus, they are expected to handle their responsibilities 
more efficiently than the diversified board (Klein, 1998). John and Senbet (1998) 
report evidence that independent committees enhance the monitoring abilities of 
these committees. Independent audit committees, a nomination committee that 
nominates directors directly to shareholders are the additional layers that cover the 
board deficiency and control management behaviours (Nordberg, 2010) and enhance 
board effectiveness. Anderson and Reeb (2004) mention that shareholders delegate 
the responsibility of preparing a list of nominees to choose among them to the 
nomination committee. Thus, the nomination committee should consider the firm’s 
specific needs and nominate those directors who will add to the firm and have the 
experiences needed by the firm.    
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Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) mention that the literature is full of evidence that 
CEO uses his authority in the selection of new directors, what is more, the literature 
also provides evidence that outside director might not be nominated for re-election 
because they were criticising the top management strategies and performance. In line 
with these claims, Anderson and Reeb (2004) report that the independence of the 
nomination committee has a significant impact on the board composition in terms of 
the percentage of the independent directors serving on the board. Klein (1998) finds 
evidence that presence of the CEO as a member of the nomination committee affects 
the independence of the audit, nomination and remuneration committees. Likewise, 
Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) find that the involvement of the CEO in the 
nomination committee is detrimental for board independence, as it reduces the 
number of the directors who are likely to monitor the CEO and top management. 
However, Adams, Almeida and Ferreira (2005) could find no evidence that the CEO 
involvement in directors selection has significant impact on firm performance. 
One of the audit committee responsibilities is to ensure and support the 
independence of the external auditor (Carcello and Neal, 2003) as external auditors 
need this support to perform their vital role (Carcello and Neal, 2000); besides, the 
audit committee is responsible to monitor the financial reporting process, the internal 
and external audit process; reduce the conflict between the management and the 
external auditor to the minimum (Klein, 2002a) and to ensure that the disclosed 
information to outsiders (shareholders, debt holders, potential investors) is timely 
and unbiased. In other words, reduce the information asymmetry between 
management and external parties dealing with the firm (Klein, 1998). Carcello and 
Neal (2000) provide evidence that the audit committee composition affects the 
independency of the external auditor’s report. Carcello and Neal (2003) find that the 
characteristics of the audit committee affect the committee’s ability and effectiveness 
in performing their roles. They find that independent, expert and less dominated by 
shareholders committees protect the external auditors from being dismissed after 
issuing critical and disapproving reports. Klein (2002b) finds that the independence 
of the audit committee is affected by a number of factors; among these factors are the 
board size, compositions and the firm’s growth prospects. She mentions that firms 
incur costs to expand the board and add more independent directors, also, the 
complexity and uncertainty associated with high growth firms require inside 
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dominated boards, which is reflected in the committee composition. However, the 
UK follows that comply or explain principle, thus most of the companies follow the 
code recommendations it terms of having an independent audit committee. 
Turning now to the remuneration committee, one of the primary roles of the board 
of directors is to set the appropriate compensation package for the CEO and the 
executive management (Jensen, 1993); remuneration committee can help in reducing 
the agency conflict between managers and shareholders by helping in offering the 
executive management with the compensation packages that help in aligning the 
interests of management with those of shareholders (Klein, 1998). Prior literature 
argues that such function is affected by board composition; however, Daily et al. 
(1998) argue that the composition of the remuneration committee is the determinant 
of the CEO compensation rather than the board composition. For example, they 
mention that if the remuneration committee is comprised of CEOs of other firms, 
they are more likely to pay more for the CEO, same argument was proposed for the 
affiliated directors and interdependent directors, the more affiliated and/or 
interdependent director the more compensation paid for the CEO. Nonetheless, 
Fahlenbrach, Low and Stulz (2010) find no evidence that the appointment of CEOs 
as outsiders affect the CEO compensation, CEO turnover, or other critical decisions, 
including the investment ones; however, for interlocked CEO the impact is negative.  
In the UK corporate governance codes (2010, 2014), nomination, audit, and 
remuneration committees must be present. These board committees are required to 
ensure that the board of directors is working in line with the shareholders’ interests. 
The code mentions the roles and the structure of these committees. Nomination 
committee is responsible for recommending and checking the eligibility of the 
nominated board members who could be appointed. Remuneration committee should 
decide the suitable remuneration level to attract, retain and motivate managers for 
better performance. Finally, the audit committee is to monitor and review the internal 
and external auditors, and monitors the integrity of the firm’s financial statements. 
The presence of board subcommittees gains the same importance and considered in 
almost all corporate governance rating systems; this inclusion is grounded in the 
proposition that board subcommittees enhance board operations (Van den Berghe 
and Levrau, 2004).   
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Much research in the prior literature has investigated the impact of the 
characteristics of board subcommittees in different performance measures and 
earning management. In this study, the researcher investigates the role of these 
committees in mitigating the agency conflicts and reducing agency costs. Following 
Zaman, Hudaib and Haniffa (2011) the researcher applies a composite measure for 
the characteristics of an effective audit committee, and extends this technique to the 
nomination and remuneration committees. These composite measures are based on 
the recommendations of UK corporate governance code for the remuneration 
committees; and Smith Report (2003) for the audit committee. With respect to audit 
committee, Smith Report (2003) and other reports published in 2010, 2012 by the 
Financial Reporting Council state that each firm should have an audit committee 
with at least three members, all of them should be independent, with at least a 
member has recent and relevant financial experience, and the committee meetings 
should not be less than three meetings per year. In regard to the remuneration 
committees, the UK corporate governance code recommends that this committee 
should have at least three members, with a majority of independent members. 
Likewise, the code recommends that nomination committee should  have a majority 
of independent directors. 
Following these recommendations, the researcher examines the impact of the 
compliance with these recommendations on agency costs by examining the following 
hypotheses: 
H4: Board subcommittees are negatively associated with agency costs. 
 H4a: An effective audit committee is positively associated with lower agency 
costs. 
 H4b: An effective remuneration committee is positively associated with lower 
agency costs. 
 H4c: An effective nomination committee is positively associated with lower 
agency costs. 
3.3.2 Ownership structure 
Equity ownership provides holders with certain rights to the cash flows of the 
firms (Denis and McConnell, 2003), and this provides them with the rights and 
incentives to monitor and control firm’s management. Moreover, there is some 
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evidence in the corporate governance empirical literature, e.g., Ibrahim and Samad 
(2011), among others show that the ownership structure and the ownership type 
affect the role of other governance mechanisms on reducing the negative impacts of 
agency conflicts and hence mitigating agency costs. In this study, the researcher 
investigates the impact of board ownership, block holding and owner’s identity on 
agency costs.  
3.3.2.1  Board ownership 
Agency problems arise as a result of the separation between ownership and 
control. Managers are not the owners, they have their own interests, and there is a 
possibility that they might work to achieve these interests at the expense of 
shareholders. Thus, prior literature proposes managerial ownership as one of the 
tools that can be used to align the management’s interests with the shareholders’ 
interests and motivate them to take actions and decisions that maximize the firm 
value (Jensen, 1993; Weir, Laing and McKnight, 2002; Denis and McConnell, 2003; 
Brickley and Zimmerman, 2010). Similar argument could be could be made in regard 
to outsider directors. Outside directors have no incentive to exert the required effort 
to monitor the management effectively (Lehn, Patro and Zhao, 2009) as they don’t 
have a significant share of the firms’ stocks (Jensen, 1993; Ibrahim and Samad, 
2011). Thus, outside directors are more likely to free-ride from their monitoring role 
and align themselves with the management. 
In the literature, there are two main hypotheses in regard to the managerial 
ownership, which are the convergence of interest hypothesis and the entrenchment 
hypothesis. It has been argued that as the managerial ownership increases, the 
interest of the management becomes more aligned with those of the shareholders, 
and this should lead to better decisions and higher firm value. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) mention that the managerial ownership is a critical instrument to assure the 
alignment of interests between managers and shareholders; they argue that the more 
managerial ownership the less agency costs. Fleming, Heaney and McCosker (2005) 
state that, managers start to shirk work and exert less effort and sometimes do not 
seek out good investment opportunities as a result of their low ownerships stakes. 
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 Singh and Davidson III (2003) claim that the extent of managerial ownership 
reflects the degree of alignment of interest between shareholders and managers. 
Similarly, Bhagat and Black (1996) mention that directors’ ownership stake  
influences their role as well as their choice of being active or passive monitors, 
besides, they argue that the role of the independent directors is affected by the CEO 
ownership, as they assume that the interests of the CEO who has a substantial 
ownership stake is aligned with the interests of shareholders, and hence the 
independent directors’ monitoring role become no longer required.  
Similar view was proposed by Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997a), they mention that 
as managers’ ownership stake increases, they become less likely to get involved or 
take decisions that reduce shareholders’ wealth, as such decisions will be reflected on 
their personal wealth as well. Muth and Donaldson (1998) endorse that argument by 
mentioning that the increase in the managerial ownership links the managers’ future 
risk with their decisions and the impact of these decisions on firm’s value. Likewise, 
Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells (1998) argues that outside directors are expected to 
be risk averse if they have no ownership stake, and they care about their reputation in 
the market; consequently, they might refuse valuable projects because of the risks 
associated with such project, as their gains are limited in the case of success, whereas, 
in the case of failure, their reputation will be dramatically affected; however, this 
attitude will change completely if those directors have a substantial ownership stake; 
they will shift from risk averse directors to risk takers.  
Jensen (1993) supports this idea and refers that the conflict of interests between 
managers and owners, and the resulting problems of this conflict arise because board 
members do not have ownership stake on the firms that they work for, he claims that 
if board members have ownership stake and this stake increases by time they spend 
on the firm; we can expect more alignment between the interests of management and 
owners, because this ownership stake will bind the managers’ wealth with the 
shareholders' wealth which will be affected by their decisions. In support of this 
argument, Crutchley and Hansen (1989) mention that managerial ownership is a 
relevant tool which can be used to reduce the costs of agency conflicts. Likewise, 
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1997) find evidence that managerial ownership dominates 
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over the board composition in aligning the interests of the management with those of 
shareholders. 
Based on the previous mentioned arguments, and Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
prediction regarding the separation of ownership and control, a linear relationship 
between managerial ownership and lower agency costs should be expected. 
However, the empirical results provide mixed results. Himmelberg, Hubbard and 
Palia (1999) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) provide evidence that managerial 
ownership has no significant role in improving firm performance. Whereas, Andreou, 
Louca and Panayides (2014) find managerial ownership is associated with better 
performance for a sample of U.S. maritime transport firms over the period 1999-
2010. Ang, Cole and Lin (2000), Singh and Davidson III (2003), Fleming, Heaney 
and McCosker (2005), Florackis (2008), among others, find that the increase in 
managerial ownership helps in reducing the agency costs. Holderness, Kroszner and 
Sheehan (1999) find evidence that the managerial ownership is positively associated 
with better performance until it reaches a certain point, beyond this point, the 
proposed assumption between managerial ownership and performance is 
insignificant.  
Turning now to the entrenchment hypothesis, this hypothesis argues that 
managers will use their ownership stake to entrench themselves and pursue their own 
goals at the expense of other shareholders. Brickley and Zimmerman (2010) argue 
that the impact of managerial ownership on firm value depends on the trade–off 
between the alignment and entrenchment effects. Consistent with this argument, 
Lasfer (2006) argues that the increase of the managerial ownership will make the 
managers more powerful, and will have a negative impact on the other corporate 
governance mechanism, by the increase of their ownership stake, they will be able to 
control the board composition, appointing a chairman who is unlikely to monitor, 
increasing the number of the board members to create and increase the impact of 
communication problems among the board members and so on. Likewise, Denis, 
Denis and Sarin (1997b) argue that high managerial ownership shields the top 
management from being disciplined for their poor performance, they report evidence 
showing that for firms with high managerial ownership, the turnover of top 
executives is weakly associated to performance.   
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Many studies show that managers’ interests are aligned with outside shareholders 
at extremely low and extremely high ownership levels, between these extremes 
managers become entrenched and act to pursue their own goals and extract the 
private benefits of control (Pergola and Joseph, 2011). Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1988) find evidence that the relationship between managerial ownership and 
performance is a nonlinear relationship; they find that firm value increases as the 
managerial ownership increases from 0% to 5%, and slightly increases after the 25%, 
between the 5% and 25% firm value decreases; which implies that U.S. managers are 
entrenched within the 5%-25% range. McConnell and Servaes (1990) and 
McConnell and Servaes (1995) report a nonlinear relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm value for the U.S. firms; similar results were reported for the UK 
context by Short and Keasey (1999) and for the Spanish context by De Miguel, 
Pindado and De la Torre (2004); however, McConnell and Servaes (1990) mention 
that although there is a negative association between managerial ownership and firm 
value after a certain point, but the firm value is higher than the 0% managerial 
ownership. Short and Keasey (1999) find that UK managers are entrenched at higher 
ownership levels compared to their U.S. counterparts. Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1991) find that CEO ownership has a significant impact on firm performance; they 
report evidence that for the ranges 0%-1% and 5%-20% CEO ownership enhances 
firm performance, whereas, between 1%-5% and beyond 20% the impact turns to be 
negative. Bhagat and Black (1996) find that directors’ ownership is related with the 
performance of their monitoring role; likewise, they argue that as the CEO ownership 
increases, the CEO interests become more aligned with those of shareholders, 
therefore, there is no need for external monitoring by independent directors.     
Park and Jang (2010) find evidence supports the non-monotonic relationship 
between managerial ownership and performance. They find that the convergence of 
interest hypothesis is valid for as the managerial ownership is between 5% and 40%, 
over this level, the entrenchment hypothesis becomes valid, and the performance 
starts to decline. This indicates that the optimal point of managerial ownership is 
between 5% and 40%, below the 5% and beyond the 40% levels, managers start to 
expropriate firm resources and extract private benefits, which is reflected on bad 
performance. Wellalage and Locke (2011) find evidence supports the U–shaped 
relationship between managerial ownership and agency costs. They find that high 
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agency costs occur at very low and high managerial ownership. This result supports 
the notion that managers with no or limited ownership stake have the incentive to 
expropriate firm resources and consume more perquisites. On the other hand, when 
managerial ownership increase and exceed the optimal limit, managers start to 
entrench themselves and cause more agency costs. Chen, Hou and Lee (2012) find an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between managerial and directors’ ownership and the 
performance of Taiwanese hotels over the period 1997-2009.   
In this study, the researcher aims at investigating the impact of managerial 
ownership on agency costs by examining the following main and subhypotheses; 
moreover, the possibility of nonlinear association is examined in the further analyses 
section. 
H5: There is a negative association between board ownership percentage and 
agency costs. 
H6: The identity of  the owner director has a significant impact on agency costs. 
 H6a: There is a negative association between CEO ownership percentage 
and agency costs. 
 H6b: There is a negative association between executive directors’ ownership 
percentage and agency costs. 
 H6c: There is a negative association between non-executive directors’ 
ownership percentage and agency costs. 
 
3.3.2.2  Large shareholders 
Blockholders, or large shareholders (individuals or institutions) are introduced, in 
the literature, as a tool to monitor firm’s management and mitigate the agency 
problems between managers and shareholders. Shareholders with a small ownership 
stake do not have the incentive and/or the resources to monitor the management. 
Desender et al. (2013) add that it is difficult for dispersed owners to coordinate their 
monitoring efforts. Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) argue that small shareholders are 
less like to choose the firm’s new board members. Thus, large shareholders because 
of their large ownership stake, they are motivated to do the monitoring role over 
firm’s management; furthermore, they have the resources, capabilities and the 
experience to do that role; additionally, it is easier to coordinate their monitoring 
efforts. Moreover, Desender et al. (2013) maintain that ownership concentration can 
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substitute the monitoring role of the board; besides, the role of ownership 
concentration varies with the identity of the blockholder. Nordberg (2010) mentions 
that owners who have substantial investments in a business entity can perform the 
monitoring and controlling tasks over the management and perhaps the outcome of 
such monitoring tasks exceeds monitoring costs they have incurred. In the same way, 
Brown, Beekesc and Verhoeven (2011) mention that blockholders might target poor 
performing firms, as they expect and aim at recovering their investment costs 
through enhancing targeted firm’s performance.  
The corporate governance literature considers blockholders as one of the 
corporate governance mechanisms (Romano, Bhagat and Bolton, 2008); as the 
substantial shareholding can motivate the shareholders to exercise their monitoring 
role. Blockholders as monitors are expected to have an influential role in improving 
accounting and market performance (Singh and Davidson III, 2003). Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997), Denis and McConnell (2003), Romano, Bhagat and Bolton (2008), 
among others, argue that because of their large ownership stake, blockholders gain 
the enough power and motive that make them more likely to do their monitoring role 
and avoid the free-rider problem of monitoring duties that occurs between the small 
shareholders and to influence management in such cases.  
Florackis (2008) mentions that the monitoring benefits are related to the 
proportion of equity hold, thus the large ownership stake, the more incentive to 
monitor management compared to small shareholders. Likewise, Singh and Davidson 
III (2003) argues that the proportion of block holding reflects to what extent there 
external monitoring exercised over the management. Large blockholders can help in 
aligning the interests of the CEO with those of shareholders in general and 
particularly in case of duality (Brickley, Coles and Jarrell, 1997). Institutional 
blockholders can exercise their monitoring role more effectively; thus, institutional 
block holding helps in resolving the monitoring free-riding problem that results from 
the dispersed ownership (Jensen, 1993). Khan (2006) mentions that institutional 
blockholders are more likely to perform their monitoring role compared to other 
owners. An effective monitor is expected to have the expertise and the financial 
incentive to monitor firm management and limits the management’s control over the 
firm (Clacher, Hillier and McColgan, 2010); such conditions and incentives are 
present in institutional blockholders or large blockholders in general. Moreover, 
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institutional investors can pressure incompetent directors and influence board 
practices in response to poor performance (Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2004) and 
help in reducing the agency costs of the excess cash flows under the control of 
management (Khan, 2006).  
Large blockholders might have substantial proportion of their wealth invested in 
one firm; this is sufficient motivator to keeping an eye, and to get involved in the 
firm’s affair to protect their investments (Van Essen, Engelen and Carney, 2013). 
Bathala and Rao (1995) and Crutchley et al. (1999) mention another possible 
influencer, they argue that institutional investors recognize that the efficacious 
monitoring of managers’ actions leads to better performance, which is reflected on 
high stock prices, the alternative for not performing such role is to sell their large 
potions with loss, which is unreasonable. Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) argue that large 
shareholders are effective monitors. They find evidence suggests that the 
concentration of ownership in the hands of one main blockholder or one family with 
a controlling ownership stake reduces agency costs. 
Nevertheless, the empirical work shows that this mechanism is a double edged 
sword as the blockholders have the discretion and the incentives to extract private 
benefits of control as they bear only a fraction of the costs, but gain the full benefits 
(Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2003); and this causes another form of conflict of interests 
between the blockholders and the minority of shareholders; this problem is known as 
principal–principal problem. 
With a controlling shareholder, the fundamental governance problem is not the 
opportunism by executives and directors at the expenses of public shareholders; it 
could be the opportunism by controlling shareholder at the expense of minority of 
shareholders (Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010); once the large shareholders gain close 
to full control, they will start to expropriate the minority of shareholders which will 
lead to a reduction in the firm value (Brown, Beekesc and Verhoeven, 2011) by 
generating private benefits of control that are not shared with minority of 
shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Brown, Beekesc and Verhoeven, 2011) like 
transfer of assets and profits out of the firm for the benefit of those who control it 
(tunnelling), and choosing the management which helps them to achieve their private 
goals.(Denis and McConnell, 2003). Much research supports this argument that large 
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blockholders have incentives to expropriate the wealth of minorities and extract 
private benefits; e.g., Wellalage and Locke (2011) find evidence that this problem is 
aggravated when the main blockholder is one of the managers. However, Henry 
(2010) expects that large shareholders interest in mitigating the agency conflicts will 
exaggerate at high levels of ownership.  
The empirical evidence on the association between block holding and 
performance is mixed. McConnell and Servaes (1990) find no association between 
block holding ownership and firm value; however, they find that the presence of 
blockholders enhances the role of managerial ownership in increasing firm value; 
besides they find that institutional ownership enhances the value of the U.S. firms. 
Short and Keasey (1999) found no significant association between block holding and 
performance for a sample of UK firms. While, De Miguel, Pindado and De la Torre 
(2004) find that the association between block holding and firm performance is 
nonlinear for a sample of Spanish firms over the period 1990-1999. Van Essen, 
Engelen and Carney (2013) find that the impact of large blockholders on enhancing 
firm performance is subject to the identity of the blockholder for a sample of 
European countries during the financial crisis period 2008-2009. Andreou, Louca 
and Panayides (2014) find that block holding is associated with better performance in 
the U.S. context. Singh and Davidson III (2003), Chen and Yur-Austin (2007), 
Ibrahim and Samad (2011) report evidence that block holding helps in reducing the 
agency cost for the U.S. and Malaysian contexts respectively; whereas, Weir, Laing 
and McKnight (2002) report that block holding does not influence firm performance 
of the UK firms; and McKnight and Weir (2009) report the same for the association 
between block holding and agency costs.  
To sum up, prior literature provides two different hypotheses in regard to block 
ownership. The monitoring hypothesis assumes that blockholders have the incentive 
and the capabilities to monitor and control management’s behaviour on behalf of the 
dispersed shareholders. However, according to the expropriation hypothesis, 
blockholders have the opportunity to misuse their controlling power, extract private 
benefits and achieve their own interests at the expense of the minority of 
shareholders.  
In this study, considering the limited evidence in the prior literature about the role 
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of blockholders as a governance mechanism in the UK context, the researcher aims 
at, first, to investigate the impact of block holding on agency costs, and then 
investigate whether the identity of blockholders affects the relationship between 
block holding and agency costs by examined the following hypothese. The 
possibility of nonlinear association as well as the possibile impact of the number of  
blockholders are examined in the further analyses section. 
H7: There is a negative association between block holding percentage and agency 
costs. 
H8: The identity of the blockholders has a significant impact on agency costs. 
 H8a: There is a negative association between institutional block holding 
percentage and agency costs. 
 H8b: There is a negative association between individual block holding 
percentage and agency costs. 
3.4 MEASURING AGENCY COSTS 
The corporate governance literature provides a number of agency costs proxies 
that have been utilised in the prior studies, in the following section the researcher 
starts with the utilised proxies in this study, then, reviews the different proxies 
utilised in this prior literature. 
3.4.1 Asset utilisation 
The seminal work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) brought the attention to the 
agency problem and its associated costs. Their work can be considered as the first 
successful attempt to operationalize the agency relationship, the costs associated with 
that relationship and the different sources of these costs. To do so, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) compared the manager’s behaviour in two different states. The first 
state is that the manager is the sole owner; the second state is that the manager’s 
ownership portion decreases. They assumed that in the first case where the manager 
owns 100% of his firm, his decisions will be directed toward maximizing his 
pecuniary utility as well as non-pecuniary one. Conversely, as the owner-manager’s 
ownership stake starts to decrease, divergence between his interests and the new 
owner(s)’ interests will start to emerge resulting in agency costs, given that the 
manager will not bear the full costs of his non-pecuniary benefits, but he will get the 
full benefit (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). They articulated this relationship by 
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estimating the firm value as a function of owner-manager’s ownership stake; they 
argue that firm’s value will decrease by the decrease of manager’s ownership portion. 
To the best of my knowledge, the work of Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) can be 
considered as the first study that quantifies and introduces quantitative measures that 
can capture the agency costs and gained the most attention. They operationalized this 
proposed theoretical framework of Jensen and Meckling (1976) by introducing the 
operating costs to sales ratio
4
, and the asset utilisation ratio
5
 as proxies for agency 
costs. The rationale behind using these measures as proxies for agency costs was that 
agency costs result from managers’ irrational decisions that maximize their utility at 
the expense of shareholders. These decisions represent inefficient behaviour and the 
deviation from their supposed and contracted behaviour as agents. This deviation can 
be best captured by using management efficiency measures based on the assumption 
that agency costs reflect the managerial inefficiency resulting from the separation of 
ownership and control. Moreover, these measures have been frequently used as 
efficiency appraises in the accounting literature (Ang, Cole and Lin, 2000).     
With the purpose of validating these measures as agency costs proxies and to 
demonstrate their ability in reflecting agency costs, they had to have a base case of 
zero agency costs as a benchmark to compare and capture any changes in agency 
costs with the changes in the management type and ownership structure.  
They conducted their study using a sample of small firms. The rationale for 
choosing small firms as a population of their study is that according to Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) a zero agency costs case could be only observed in firms with 100 % 
managerial ownership. This implies that a zero agency costs case requires two 
conditions, which are the full ownership concentration ratio (100%) under the control 
of one person, and this person should be the manager. Clearly, it is very difficult to 
find such case among large listed firms.   
To operationalize their argument, they applied multidimensional categorizing 
technique by splitting their sample into two main groups reflecting whether the 
manager is the owner or not. Under each group, there are subcategories reflecting 
                                                          
4
 They argue that operating costs to sales ratio captures the perquisite consumption. 
5
 They argue that asset utilisation ratio reflects work shirking and poor investment decisions, exert less 
efforts, and perquisite consumption. 
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four different ownership structures varying from 100% owned by a primary owner to 
no single owner or family owning more than 50%. This applied methodology enables 
them to compare between the groups and capture the changes that happen to the 
proposed measures as the ownership structure changes. Then, they did difference of 
mean and median comparisons of the agency costs for every subgroup across the two 
main management groups. After that, they investigated these relations using multiple 
regression (OLS). The regression results endorsed the primary results. 
 Their findings provide evidence that there is a strong difference (1% significance 
level for some groups) between the agency costs between the two main groups 
(management type) across the different ownership structures subgroups. In 
conclusion, they provide evidence that the changes in these measures can be 
attributed to the degree of the separation between ownership and control. 
Based on these findings, many researchers in the literature (e.g., Singh and 
Davidson III (2003); Fleming, Heaney and McCosker (2005); Ang and Ding (2006); 
Florackis (2008); McKnight and Weir (2009); Henry (2010); Ibrahim and Samad 
(2011), among others) have used these measures as proxies for agency cost in 
different countries with different governance environments and institutional settings. 
These measures were utilised either in its basic form or with slight modification, but 
these measures still the main foundation for the different agency costs proxies used 
in the literature. This study was a good initiative to shed the light on the need for 
developing measures for agency costs, and it was the starting point to conduct 
research in this area and to develop other measures that could capture agency costs 
from different views.  
In support of the validity of these efficiency measures as agency costs proxies, 
Ibrahim and Samad (2011) find evidence that family controlled firms experience 
lower agency costs proxied by asset utilisation and operating expenses to sales ratio. 
These results add to the existing evidence that agency costs increase by the 
separation of ownership and control; moreover, this supports the claim that these 
proxies provide a good reflection of agency costs. 
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3.4.2 The interaction of growth prospects with free cash flow.  
This measure was employed in many studies it the literature, e.g., Doukas, Kim 
and Pantzalis (2000), Doukas, McKnight and Pantzalis (2005), McKnight and Weir 
(2009), Henry (2010) and Belghitar and Clark (2014) as a proxy of agency costs. 
Their postulate of this measure is based on Jensen (1986)’s argument that  firms with 
high free cash flow and limited growth opportunities are more prone to agency 
problems, and thus, incur more agency costs. Managers of such firms have incentives 
to expropriate free cash in many ways, e.g., excess perquisite consumption, and 
suboptimal investment projects.  
3.4.3 Other agency costs measures used in the literature  
Corporate governance literature provides several attempts to capture agency costs. 
These attempts were inspired by Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) work. In this section, the 
researcher will provide the other agency costs proxies that have been used in the 
prior literature. 
3.4.3.1  Selling, general and administrative (SG&A) expenses to sales ratio. 
This measure was developed by Singh and Davidson III (2003) derived from Ang, 
Cole and Lin (2000) operating costs to sales ratio proxy, and then employed in a 
number of studies (e.g, Florackis (2008); Ibrahim and Samad (2011), among others). 
Singh and Davidson III (2003) argue that this proxy is more suitable to capture 
agency induced managerial expropriation of firm’s resources. Excessive 
compensation and perquisite consumption are the common managerial expropriation 
forms. Singh and Davidson III (2003) argue that SG&A includes the compensation 
paid, other expenses related to the nonmonetary benefits (e.g., offices, furniture, cars, 
and so on) and other expenses items that can be used to cover-up perquisites 
expenditure (e.g., selling and advertising expenses). Such expenses that are under the 
discretionary authority of the management could be a good proxy of agency costs 
(Singh and Davidson III, 2003; Florackis, 2008; Henry, 2010). 
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3.4.3.2  Number of firms acquired by a firm. 
There are many motivations that can explain managers’ desire to go beyond the 
optimal size of their firms. Jensen (1986) demonstrates that growing beyond the 
optimal size grants them more power as they have more resources under their control, 
besides, they can get extra compensation given that link between firm size and 
compensation. Denis and McConnell (2003) claim that acquisitions could be one of 
the tools that managers can use to maximize their managerial utility of growing 
beyond the optimal size instead of maximizing shareholders’ wealth. 
By considering this argument and the findings of prior literature that there is a 
negative association between acquisitions and shareholders’ wealth; McKnight and 
Weir (2009) claim that the number of acquisitions can be used as an agency cost 
proxy that reflects wasting shareholders’ wealth in unprofitable investment projects. 
3.4.3.3  Tobin’s Q 
This measure was employed in Henry (2010)’s analysis. He claims that although 
this measure has been used in the prior literature as performance proxy, but it can 
reflect the impact of managerial decisions related to agency problems and hence 
agency costs propensity. He argues that dealing with the agency problem requires 
taking such decision that improves and enhances firm value, thus, high Q ratio 
indicates good managerial performance, better dealing with agency problems and 
lower agency costs. 
This argument is the same argument that has been used in the prior literature that 
good performance is an indication of lower agency costs; as a result few studies have 
been directed towards developing robust measures of agency costs as the main 
concern of the agency conflicts. Corporations scandals and financial crises are 
examples of that good performance is not the proper reflection of less agency 
conflicts, low levels of expropriation of shareholders’ wealth and thus lower agency 
costs. 
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3.5 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the researcher reviewed the concept of corporate governance, the 
different internal mechanisms that have been introduced in the prior literature as 
means of motoring and controlling the opportunistic behaviour of the management; 
highlighting the basic arguments around each mechanism and then provides the study 
hypotheses. After that the researcher reviewed the different agency costs proxies that 
have been utilised in the prior literature. None of the above-mentioned measures that 
have been employed in the prior literature can capture and represent an exact figure 
for the agency costs incurred by the firm because of the divergence of interests 
between managers and shareholders, or as it well known the consequences of the 
separation between ownership and control. However, these employed measures help 
in expressing the existence of agency costs, the level of agency costs and to 
operationalize the consequences of managerial deficiency. In the next chapter, the 
researcher extends this literature review by providing a critical review of the 
empirical studies that have investigated the relationship between different corporate 
governance mechanisms and different agency costs proxies. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND AGENCY COSTS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, the researcher completes what he has started in the previous 
chapter in terms of reviewing the corporate governance literature. The literature of 
corporate governance is full of a massive number of studies that have investigated 
the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms on the one side, and firm 
performance, firm value, or other financial and accounting aspects on the other side. 
By considering that the study’s aim is to investigate the association between 
governance mechanisms and agency costs, the main concern of the researcher in this 
chapter is to concentrate on the studies that directly investigate the relationship 
between corporate governance and different proxies of agency costs. These studies 
are explored in the next section for the aim of presenting that prior studies have 
provided mixed results in terms of the impact of corporate governance on agency 
cost and highlighting the limitations of these studies that have inspired this study. 
The researcher ends this chapter with Table 2, which provides a brief summary of 
these studies mentioning the main variables, the context and study period, the 
analysis techniques and the key findings. 
4.2 THE IMPACT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS 
ON AGENCY COSTS: A SURVEY OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) proposed the first endeavour of providing quantitative 
measures for agency costs. They investigate the impact of the managerial ownership 
and external monitoring exercised by banks on the operating expenses to sales ratio 
and asset utilisation ratio as proxies for agency costs after controlling for a number 
of firm characteristics, viz. firm age, firm size measured by sales volume and debt to 
asset ratio, which might influence the magnitude of agency costs. 
 In doing so, they use a sample of 1708 U.S. small firms from the National Survey 
of Small Business Finances (NSSBF) for the financial year 1992. They start their 
analysis by investigating the presence of significant differences between the two 
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management structures (owner–manager and outside–manager) using mean and 
median comparison. These analyses provide preliminary evidence that high agency 
costs are associated with the separation between ownership and control. Ang, Cole 
and Lin (2000) find that firms managed by outsiders rather than owners suffer from 
high operating expenses to sales ratio; also, their evidence suggests that operating to 
sales ratio increase by the decrease in the ownership concentration ratio. Consistent 
with these findings, firms managed by outsiders rather than owners suffer from low 
asset utilisation ratio, asset utilisation ratio decreases by the decrease in the 
ownership concentration ratio. 
Afterward, they employ multiple regression (OLS) to investigate these relations. 
By doing so, they provide the first quantitative evidence that supports the predictions 
of Jensen and Meckling (1976). Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) find evidence that the 
separation of ownership and control is associated with high agency costs. Their 
evidence suggests that firms managed by their owners incur lower agency costs 
compared to other firms managed by non–owner managers. Moreover, they find that 
agency costs increase as the manager’s ownership stake decreases. 
In more details, they find an inverse relationship between managerial ownership 
and agency costs. High agency costs for firms that are not totally owned by the 
management compared to the base case (firms managed by their owners); moreover, 
they find evidence suggests that agency costs increase by the increase of the number 
of non–managing shareholders. Besides, they find that agency costs increase when 
the manager has no ownership stake. Their evidence also suggests that banks play an 
important monitoring role that helps in reducing agency costs in the U.S. context. 
These results confirm and provide evidence supporting the notion that as the 
manager’s ownership portion declines, the possibility of agency conflicts increases 
and thus, agency costs increase.  
This influential paper by Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) can be considered as the 
building block for the empirical literature of agency costs; several researchers (e.g, 
Singh and Davidson III (2003); Fleming, Heaney and McCosker (2005); Florackis 
(2008); McKnight and Weir (2009); Henry (2010); Ibrahim and Samad (2011), 
among others) have employed either the proposed proxies by Ang, Cole and Lin 
(2000) or derived other proxies from their proxies.  
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Nevertheless, this influential paper is not without limitations. First, the different 
ownership structures were captured by using dummy variables rather than employing 
ownership concentration ratios as continuous variables. It may be more beneficial to 
use continuous variables as they can capture the trend, the changes, the impact of the 
different ownership structures, and the different ownership percentages on agency 
costs compared to the use of dummy variables that only reflects the presence of 
different ownership structures. Second, they investigate these relationships using 
data for only one year. Third, they did not check for the correlation between the 
employed variables. 
Standing on Jensen and Meckling (1976) predictions and the findings of Ang, 
Cole and Lin (2000); Fleming, Heaney and McCosker (2005) examined empirically 
the impact of the separation between ownership and control in the Australian small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SME) context. In their replication of Ang, Cole and 
Lin (2000) work; Fleming, Heaney and McCosker (2005) used a sample of 7613 
firm–year observations over a two-year period (1997 and 1998). They employed the 
operating expenses to sales ratio and asset utilisation ratio as proxies for agency 
costs. However, Fleming, Heaney and McCosker (2005) extended Ang, Cole and Lin 
(2000) analysis by utilising more variables in their model to reflect other dimensions 
of ownership structure that investigate in more details the predictions of Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and provide more evidence supporting these predictions. Moreover, 
Fleming, Heaney and McCosker (2005) control for more variables that could affect 
the magnitude of the agency costs (bank debt to total assets, return on assets, 
research and development expenditures to sales, firm size, industry, and Firm age); 
and utilised a larger sample of SMEs – compared to Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) – for 
two years as a check of stability for their results.  
Fleming, Heaney and McCosker (2005) followed the same methodology as Ang, 
Cole and Lin (2000), by creating a base case (100% owner managed case) of no 
agency costs, and compared its agency costs proxies with other levels of separation 
between ownership and control using t–tests and Mann–Whitney U–tests. Afterward, 
they employed the OLS regression method. 
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 Fleming, Heaney and McCosker (2005) find evidence that, to some extent, 
supports both the predictions of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and the findings of 
Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) in the Australian context. The findings show that the 
separation between ownership and control leads to more agency costs. Fleming, 
Heaney and McCosker (2005) report a significant negative association between 
managerial ownership and agency costs; similar association between ownership 
concentration and agency costs. Agency costs decrease as the managerial ownership 
and the ownership concentration increases, their evidence reveals that as the main 
blockholder (individual or family) ownership stake falls below 50%, the agency 
costs increase significantly. Moreover, their findings suggest that agency costs vary 
across the industries, this finding makes them recommend for controlling for 
industry in agency costs studies. Contrary to Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) results, there 
is no evidence that supports the argument that debt helps in reducing agency costs in 
the Australian context; this non consistency or results can be attributed to the use of 
different measures of debt. 
Moving from the SMEs context to large corporations context, Singh and 
Davidson III (2003) extend the work of Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) to the context 
large U.S. corporations by investigating the impact of the ownership structure on the 
agency costs using two time series observations of 118 cross-section units for two 
non-consecutive fiscal years (1992–1994). Their first proxy for agency costs is asset 
utilisation, as it was proposed by Ang, Cole and Lin (2000). However, they 
marginally modify the expenses to sales ratio (the second measure of Ang, Cole and 
Lin (2000)) to be the Selling, General & Administrative (SG&A) expenses to sales 
ratio. They argue that their modified proxy can capture the managerial discretionary 
expenses related to perquisite consumption and excess managerial remuneration; 
thus this proxy can be considered as a robust representation of agency costs. 
Singh and Davidson III (2003) employed different ownership variables in that aim 
of representing different ownership structures. These variables are the managerial 
ownership and outsider block holding (non–managing owners holding 5% or more of 
the outstanding shares). Grounded in the proposition that corporate governance 
mechanisms can complement and/or substitute each other, they control for board 
size, board independence, percentage of executive board members, firm size and 
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leverage; however, board variables were employed in different models not in the 
same model. 
Univariate median comparison and multiple regression methods were employed. 
Regarding the multiple regression models, Singh and Davidson III (2003) employed 
and reported the results of both fixed effects and random effects models, without 
applying Hausman (1978) specification test to examine which model is more 
consistent and relevant to their data set; as a result of that, different results were 
reported for the same model. Also, Singh and Davidson III (2003) run their models 
with and without controlling for the industry memberships, this yields almost the 
same results for asset utilisation models and different results for the SG&A models. 
However, the Adjusted R square for the industry controlled models are much higher 
compared to the unadjusted counterparts; which confirms the importance of 
considering the differences between different industries while studying corporate 
governance issues. 
Singh and Davidson III (2003) find evidence in line with Ang, Cole and Lin 
(2000) findings for the role of managerial ownership in reducing agency costs. In 
terms of asset utilisation as an agency costs proxy, they find that high managerial 
ownership increases asset utilisation, and hence lower agency costs. This reflects the 
alignment of managers’ interests with those of shareholders. Their finding supports 
the convergence of interest hypothesis; however, the results show that this relation is 
statistically insignificant for the discretionary expenses to sales ratio as an agency 
costs proxy. Furthermore, their findings suggest that outside block holding and board 
composition don’t have any influence over the two agency costs measures; large 
board is associated with lower asset utilisation ratio, and has no impact on the SG&A 
to sales ratio; leverage ratio is negatively related to asset utilisation ratio while 
unrelated to SG&A ratio. These results reveal that both large boards and high 
leverage level increase agency costs in the U.S. context. These results stand against 
the notion that debt reduces agency costs and supports the arguments that small 
boards are more efficient than large boards for the U.S. corporations.  
In a study by Chen and Yur-Austin (2007), the role of blockholders in mitigating 
agency problems and reducing agency costs was examined using a large sample 
(almost 5543 firm-year observations) of U.S. large firms over the period 1996-2001. 
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Besides, they investigate the role of the blockholder's identity in reducing agency 
costs. In doing so, Chen and Yur-Austin (2007) split block holding ratio into outsider 
blockholder and inside blockholder; moreover, they split inside block holding into 
managerial and non-managerial block holding. Chen and Yur-Austin (2007) utilise 
different agency costs proxies which are selling, general and administrative expenses 
to sales, asset utilisation and adjusted short term ratio. The fixed effect model was 
utilised in this study, but without applying Hausman (1978) specification test to 
choose between fixed and random effects model. 
Chen and Yur-Austin (2007) control for firm size, leverage and industry 
affiliation; however, they did not consider the fact that corporate governance 
mechanisms can act as complements and substitutes, thus they did not control for 
other governance mechanisms like board size, board independence and other 
variables that might have a direct impact on the magnitude of the agency problems as 
mentioned in the prior literature. This point is clearly obvious in their low R2 (the 
highest R2 in their study was 0.095) suggesting that there are other variables that 
have an impact on the different agency costs proxies employed in their study. 
In general, Chen and Yur-Austin (2007) find that block holding plays an 
important role in mitigating agency problems. They find that block holding is 
negatively associated with SG&A and positively associated with asset utilisation; 
suggesting that block holding control over managers’ expenses discretion and 
enhances management efficiency in utilising firm’s resources. Moreover, Chen and 
Yur-Austin (2007) find that the identity of blockholders has an impact on the 
relationship between block holding and agency costs. Chen and Yur-Austin (2007) 
find that outside blockholders are more effective in reducing the managerial 
discretionary expenses, whereas, inside blockholders are more anxious about 
improving the asset utilisation. Furthermore, Chen and Yur-Austin (2007) find that 
only managerial blockholders can help in constraining the underinvestment problem. 
Overall, their evidence suggests that ownership structure plays a critical role in 
mitigating different agency problems. However, other governance mechanisms 
should be considered as well.   
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Florackis (2008) investigates the impact of different board characteristics, 
managerial ownership and ownership concentration on agency costs using a sample 
of 897 firm-year observations of non–financial UK firms. Besides, Florackis (2008) 
introduces managerial compensation, bank debt and debt maturity (short term debt) as 
alternative governance mechanisms and controls for the potential influence of size, 
growth opportunities and industry membership. In his study, he employed a different 
technique which is the cross sectional average regression method. According to this 
method, the dependent variable (agency costs proxies) is measured at a certain time 
point (year 2003), whereas the average score of the independent variables for a past 
period (1999–2002) was employed, with an exception to firm size as he used the total 
assets value of year 1999. Florackis (2008) argues that this method alleviates the 
impact of fluctuations over the study period and the presence of extreme value.  
Florackis (2008) employed two agency costs proxies used in the prior literature 
which are asset utilisation and SG&A to sales ratio. Florackis (2008) argues that 
managerial compensation, bank debt and debt maturity have an impact on reducing 
the agency costs and hence can be considered as effective alternatives and 
complements of governance mechanisms. His findings, to some extent, support that 
argument; he finds evidence that short term debt, the use of cash compensation, 
executive ownership and ownership concentration reduce agency costs; however, the 
results do not show any evidence for the nonlinear relationship between managerial 
ownership and agency costs. The results, also, show that large boards are significantly 
associated with high agency costs, whereas, duality and the number of non–executive 
directors have no significant impact on agency costs in the UK context.  
However, A number of comments can be made with regard to this study; first, 
Florackis (2008) utilised Pearson’s correlation matrix to check for correlations 
between the continuous variables only; however, the correlation matrix did not show 
any abnormal coefficients; based on the fact that the correlation matrix might not 
capture the presence of perfect multicollinearity among the employed variables, 
further check using VIF could be more appropriate. Second, although the utilised 
regression method mitigates the fluctuations over the study period, he excluded the 
top and lower 1% values for all variables employed in this study, which contradicts 
with the rationale of using this method. Third, Florackis (2008) utilised the average 
score of the independent variables over the period 1999-2002, with an exception to 
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the size as it was measured for the year 1999, there is a possibility that there are 
changes that occurred over the study period with regard to the firm size, and these 
changes could have a significant implication over the other governance mechanisms 
employed in this study e.g., board size, independence, managerial compensation and 
the capital structure; moreover, the dependent variable was measured for 2003; which 
is one year after the period used to compute the independents average; this could 
imply inconsistency among the utilised variables. 
Using a sample of 534 firm–year observations for the period 1996–2000 
inclusive, McKnight and Weir (2009) examine the role of compliance with the 
Combine Code recommendations on reducing agency costs. McKnight and Weir 
(2009) argue that adopting these recommendations should reduce or at least have no 
impact on agency costs. If this not the case, this means that firms are not only forced 
to adopt a value destroying governance structure, but also they incur extra costs. 
 In this study, McKnight and Weir (2009) examine the influence of the endorsed 
characteristics of board of directors in the Combined Code of practices, specifically 
the percentage of non–executive directors in the board, CEO Duality, the presence of 
the nomination committee, the presence of executive directors in the nomination 
committee on the agency costs measured by the industry adjusted assets turnover, 
number of acquisition and the interaction of growth prospects and free cash flows. 
McKnight and Weir (2009) considered the potential influence of firm size and 
leverage on agency costs; nonetheless, they did not control for the influence of other 
variables that might affect agency costs like other governance mechanisms (e.g., 
board size and block ownership) and industry membership. 
McKnight and Weir (2009) find very interesting evidence that the combine code 
recommendations seem to have minor or no effect on agency costs, more 
remarkable, McKnight and Weir (2009) find that the presence of the nomination 
committee and its recommended composition leads to more agency costs. Likewise, 
institutional ownership is associated with high agency costs. However, their finding 
suggests that the increase of the managerial ownership and leverage reduces agency 
costs. 
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Compared to the earlier studies mentioned throughout this section, McKnight and 
Weir (2009) applied the Hausman (1978) specification test to choose between the 
fixed and random effects models; furthermore, McKnight and Weir (2009) 
considered the endogeneity issue by applying corporate governance variables as 
instrumental variables to check the robustness of their results, and reported both 
results, which were –with the exception to two variables– somewhat consistent; 
however, it would be better to check for endogeneity before employing the 
instrumental variables. 
Henry (2010) investigates the impact of the corporate governance 
recommendations mentioned in the ASX (Australian Securities Exchange) corporate 
governance council code on agency costs from a voluntary compliance perspective. 
In doing so, he utilises a sample of 1124 firm–year observations non-financial firms 
from the largest ASX-listed companies – based on market capitalization value – over 
the period 1992–2002 inclusive, a period that covers 10 years before the introduction 
of the Australian corporate governance code in 2003. Henry (2010) argues that 
investigating such relation from a voluntary perspective will provide a clear view of 
the relationship between the introduced code, the compliance with the code and 
agency costs in accordance with the firm agency environment. 
Henry (2010) mentions that not all mentioned recommendations at the governance 
code can be measured in an ex–ante basis; hence, only the role of measurable 
attributes represented in board size, board independence, duality, the presence of 
different subcommittees and board remuneration was examined. Moreover, Henry 
(2010) considers the potential influence of other governance and monitoring 
attributes (director’s ownership, institutional ownership, external ownership, 
leverage, dividend pay–out, firm risk, and firm size) that can influence the 
magnitude of agency costs. Four different proxies of agency costs were employed, 
which are asset utilisation ratio, discretionary expenditure ratio (SG&A to sales 
ratio), Tobin’s Q and Interaction of free cash flow and growth prospects. 
Before employing the fixed effects regression and Tobit regression models, Henry 
(2010) checked for the possible endogeneity between the employed variables and 
uses instrumental variables for the endogenous variables. The empirical results 
reveal that the implementation of individual corporate governance recommended 
Chapter 4: Corporate Governance and Agency Costs 
-107- 
 
attributes have no impact on agency costs; however, the overall conformity with the 
code recommendations significantly reduces agency cost. 
This investigation provides a new insight towards the role of corporate 
governance mechanisms as an integrated structure in reducing agency costs. 
However, this study is not without limitation. First, Henry (2010) investigates the 
impact of having the recommended committees rather than the compliance with the 
recommended committee’s composition. Second, Henry (2010) did not consider the 
variations across the industries; third, Henry (2010) utilised the fixed effects 
regression model without applying Hausman (1978) specification test to choose 
between the fixed effects and random effects models. Fourth, the reported correlation 
coefficients were below the critical value; however, he should utilise the VIF to 
check for the presence of perfect multicollinearity among the employed variables. 
Ibrahim and Samad (2011) investigate the impact of three characteristics of the 
board of directors (board size, the fraction of independent non-executive directors 
sitting on the board and duality) on the agency costs measured by asset utilisation 
and expense to sales ratio. Ibrahim and Samad (2011) investigate that relation from a 
different perspective, as they comparatively investigate the impact of the examined 
mechanisms in the context of family and non-family control of the Malaysian public 
listed firms; the potential influence of various firm characteristics such as leverage 
level, firm size and firm age that might influence their investigated relationship was 
considered in their analysis. 
In doing their analysis, Ibrahim and Samad (2011) utilised a sample of 2030 firm–
year observations (875 family firms and 1155 non family firms) over the period 
1999–2006 inclusive. In order to classify firms to be family or non-family 
controlled, Ibrahim and Samad (2011) set two criteria at which firms should fulfil at 
least one if not both. First, at least one of the board members should be a member of 
the controlling family; second, the family should have a control over at least 20 
percent of the outstanding shares. They first start their analysis by testing differences 
in means for both family and non-family for all variables; they find that only board 
independence significantly differs in family and non-family firms. 
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Given that their data set is a panel data set, Ibrahim and Samad (2011) utilised the 
Hausman (1978) specification test to check the appropriate model for the employed 
data set; the test result was in favour of the fixed effects model. However, Ibrahim 
and Samad (2011) did not consider the possible endogeneity among their model’s 
variables; moreover, VIF diagnostic test to check for perfect multicollinearity among 
the employed variables could be a required robust check even if the correlation 
matrix does not show any abnormal or extreme correlation coefficients. 
Ibrahim and Samad (2011) find evidence that the ownership structure affects the 
role of other governance mechanisms in mitigating agency conflicts and hence 
agency costs. Their findings assert Jensen and Meckling (1976) predictions that 
agency costs arise as a result of the separation of ownership and control and there is 
a need for monitoring and controlling mechanisms. Their results for the full sample 
show that large board and independent board members significantly efficient in 
reducing agency costs measured by asset utilisation. Interestingly, the results show 
that duality increases (reduces) asset utilisation (operating to sales ratio). 
Ibrahim and Samad (2011) report the same results for family and non-family 
controlled firms with the following exceptions: their reported results show that the 
proportion of independent non-executive board members does not affect agency 
costs for family controlled firms; however, their findings also provides significant 
evidence that independent directors are an important tool to monitor and advise the 
management and hence reduce agency problems and its related costs. Their evidence 
also suggests that duality helps in reducing agency costs for family controlled firm, 
whereas it increases agency costs of non-family controlled firms. 
In a very recent study, Van Essen, Engelen and Carney (2013) investigated the 
influence of corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance for a sample of 
1197 firms from 26 different European countries before and during the financial 
crisis. Their main objective is to examine the robustness of both firm and country-
level corporate governance mechanisms, and to what extent these mechanisms are 
able to mitigate the crisis impact. Their main assumption is that during crisis, firms 
need more flexibility, decisive management and fast respond reaction to the new 
circumstance and changes in the external environment. Van Essen, Engelen and 
Carney (2013) claim that corporate governance mechanisms that are assumed to 
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enhance and boost performance during the steady state could be harmful during the 
crisis conditions. Van Essen, Engelen and Carney (2013) based their argument on the 
idea that the different corporate governance mechanisms restrict and limit 
management initiatives to deal with the crisis. 
Van Essen, Engelen and Carney (2013) used a wide range of governance 
mechanisms to capture board characteristics (e.g., board size, board independence 
among other variables). Van Essen, Engelen and Carney (2013) construct a number 
of dummy variables that capture the identity of the largest blockholder owning 10% 
or more; however, these utilised dummy variables capture the ownership 
concentration and identity of the largest blockholder rather than investigating the 
impact of ownership structure on performance. Besides, Van Essen, Engelen and 
Carney (2013) utilised other variables to capture the CEO characterises and 
compensation. In addition to these variables, a number of variables to capture the 
country-level governance mechanisms that reduce the principal–principal conflict 
and shape the legal environment were utilised. 
Hierarchical Linear Modelling (HLM) technique was employed to run 2 levels 
(firm and country) regression equations. Their study provides striking results. For the 
pre–crisis period, Van Essen, Engelen and Carney (2013) find that almost none of the 
corporate governance mechanisms –used in their study – have a significant impact 
on the firm’s performance measured by industry adjusted abnormal return. Only 
audit and remuneration committees’ independence are significant but with different 
signs negative and positive respectively; and leverage is significantly positive in one 
model out of three different models. However, during the crisis, Van Essen, Engelen 
and Carney (2013) find that board size, number of board meetings, CEO duality, 
nomination committee independence, institutional and governmental block holding 
influence performance positively. The results also show that the number of board 
committees and the use of stock options, variable pay as compensations tools and 
leverage are negatively associated with performance. As a robustness check, Van 
Essen, Engelen and Carney (2013) re-estimate the analysis using OLS, which 
confirmed the HLM results.  
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From the previous discussed literature review, the researcher can conclude the 
following points, which raise the importance of the current study and have been 
considered during the empirical analyses: 
First, The purpose of the previous studies, e.g., Ang, Cole and Lin (2000), 
Fleming, Heaney and McCosker (2005), Singh and Davidson III (2003) was to 
investigate how ownership structure affects managerial effectiveness and agency 
costs. Other studies aimed at investigating the impact of compliance with governance 
codes on agency costs. McKnight and Weir (2009) examine how the compliance 
with the combined code affects agency costs of the UK firms using a limited number 
of board characteristics and did not consider the fact that the unmeasured variables 
do affect the investigated relationship; while Henry (2010) examines the impact of 
voluntary application of the governance rules mentioned in the ASX governance 
code on the agency cost for a sample of Australian firm pre the introduction of the 
code. Second, most of the studies have been applied in different contexts than the 
UK context. Third, none of the UK studies have employed a comprehensive set of 
corporate governance mechanisms as this study. Fourth, studies employed in the UK 
context used old data set, and smaller sample compared to this study; thus, this study 
provides the most recent investigation of the role of corporate governance 
mechanisms in mitigating agency costs; the time span of this study covers the period 
2005-2011 inclusive utilising a large sample of non-financial firms (1431 firm-year 
observations). And finally, this study adds to the literature by comparing between the 
role of a large set of governance mechanisms before and after the financial crisis, 
limited number of studies have investigated the impact of the financial crisis on 
governance mechanisms, even these studies were limited by examining the role of 
governance mechanisms before and during the crisis and the dependent variables 
were firm performance proxies rather than agency costs proxies. This study lends the 
support to such studies and reveals that the role of the governance mechanisms is 
affected by the business and economic conditions surrounding the firm. 
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4.3 SUMMARY 
This chapter has reviewed the prior studies that have, directly, investigated the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and agency costs. During 
this review, the researcher highlighted the main limitations of these studies and based 
on these limitations the researcher developed the study research strategy. 
As mentioned in the previous section, most of these studies were applied in 
different contexts, and even the UK studies utilised a limited number of governance 
mechanisms using old data sets. In this study, the researcher utilises more 
comprehensive set of governance mechanisms in terms of board characteristics, 
ownership structure and ownership identity; besides, the researcher considers 
different firm characteristics that have been claimed as having a direct impact on the 
firm’s governance structure. 
One of the common limitations of the discussed studies throughout this chapter 
relates to the analyses techniques of these studies. Thus, the researcher claims that 
using panel data regression models instead of OLS could overcome this limitation. 
Moreover, considering the possibility of multicollinearity, employing Hausman 
(1978) specification to identify which panel regression fits with the data set and 
examining for endogeneity, identify the endogenous variables before employing 
instrumental variable regression 2SLS methods, all of these points together could 
provide more accurate and unbiased results. 
In the following chapter, the researcher provides the operationalization of the 
utilised variables, the rationale and the advantages of using panel regression 
compared to OLS, the empirical models and ends with the study sample and data 
collection procedures. 
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Table 2 Summary of empirical studies on the impact of corporate governance mechanisms and agency costs. 
 Study 
  
Variables Sample Size, & 
Time 
Context  
Analysis 
Technique  
Main Finding(s) 
Agency costs Independent  Control  
A
n
g
, 
C
o
le
 a
n
d
 L
in
 (
2
0
0
0
) 
 
Operating costs to 
sales ratio 
 
  
Owner manager: 
a dummy variable 
with the value of 1 
if the manager is 
one of the owners, 0 
otherwise 
Firm size  1708 small 
firms 
U.S. 
  
  
  
  
Mean and 
median tests 
of 
comparison 
t-test and 
Mann-
Whitney U-
test 
  
  
  
  
An inverse relationship between 
managerial ownership and agency 
costs. 
  
Asset utilisation 
ratio 
 
  
Number of non-
managing 
shareholders  
Firm age 
  
  
  
1992 
  
  
  
Agency costs increase by the 
increase of the number of non-
managing shareholders.   
Primary blockholder 
ownership 
percentage  
Agency costs increase when the 
manager has no ownership stake. 
  
Family control 
A dummy variable 
= 1 if one family 
controls over 50% 
of the equity, 0 
otherwise   
Number of banks 
the firm deals with 
Debt to assets ratio 
 
Longest banking 
relationship 
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 Study 
Variables Sample Size, & 
time  
Context 
Analysis 
technique 
Main Finding(s) 
Agency costs Independent  Control  
S
in
g
h
 a
n
d
 D
a
v
id
so
n
 I
II
 
(2
0
0
3
) 
 
 
Asset utilisation Managerial 
ownership  
Firm size 
  
118 large 
corporations 
U.S. 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Univariate 
median 
comparison  
High managerial ownership 
increases asset utilisation. 
Selling, General 
and Administrative 
expenses to sales 
(SG&A) 
  
  
  
Non–managing 
blockholders 
holding 5% or more  
Leverage 
 
Two years 
1992 and 1994 
  
Outside block holding and board 
composition have no significant 
impact on agency costs. 
Board size  Pooled 
OLS 
regression 
  
 
Large board increases agency costs 
(low asset utilisation ratio). 
Board independence Leverage ratio is negatively related 
to asset utilisation ratio.  
  
Percentage of 
executive board 
members 
F
le
m
in
g
, 
H
ea
n
ey
 a
n
d
 M
cC
o
sk
er
 
(2
0
0
5
) 
Operating cost to 
sales ratio  
  
Dummy variable 
that takes the value 
of 1 if the manager 
is one of the owners 
percentage of 
ownership  
Percentage of 
equity 
provided 
venture 
capital 
provider 
7613 small and 
medium size 
firms 
  
 Mean and 
median test 
of 
comparison 
  
Significant association between 
managerial ownership and lower 
agency costs. 
Asset utilisation 
ratio 
Percentage of equity 
hold by main 
blockholder 
Bank debt to 
total assets 
 
Ownership concentration helps in 
reducing agency costs. 
Percentage of equity 
by non-managing 
owner, but part of 
controlling family 
 
 
ROA As the main blockholder (individual 
or family) ownership stake falls 
below 50% the agency costs start to 
increase significantly. 
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 Study 
  
  
Variables 
 
 
Sample Size, & 
time  
  
Context 
  
Analysis 
technique 
  
Main Finding(s) 
Agency costs  Independent  Control  
F
le
m
in
g
, 
H
ea
n
ey
 a
n
d
 M
cC
o
sk
er
 (
2
0
0
5
) 
  
  
  
  
  
  
Percentage of equity 
holding by non-
managing owner, 
but not part of 
controlling family 
R&D 
expenditures 
to sales 
2 years 
96-97;97-98 
  
  
  
  
Australia 
  
  
  
 OLS 
  
  
  
  
  
No evidence that debt helps in 
reducing agency costs. 
  
  
  
  Dummy variable 
that takes the value 
of 1 if the manager 
holding 100% of the 
firm equity 
Firm size  
Dummy variable 
that takes the value 
of 1 if the manager 
holding more than 
50% of the firm 
equity 
Industry 
Dummy variable 
that takes the value 
of 1 if the 
controlling family 
holds more than 
50% of the firm 
equity 
Firm age 
  
Percentage of equity 
hold by parent 
company 
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 Study 
Variables Sample Size, & 
time 
Context 
Analysis 
technique 
Main Finding(s) 
Agency costs Independent  Control  
C
h
en
 a
n
d
 Y
u
r-
A
u
st
in
 (
2
0
0
7
) 
SG&A to sales 
ratio 
Outsider 
blockholder  
Firm size 5543 large 
firms 
 U.S. 
  
  
  
Fixed 
effects 
regression 
  
  
  
The identity of blockholders has a 
significant impact on the 
relationship between block holding 
and agency costs. 
Asset utilisation Inside blockholder 
  
  
Leverage 1996-2001 
  
  
Outside blockholders are more 
effective in reducing the managerial 
discretionary expenses 
Adjusted short-
term debt ratio (for 
likelihood of 
involving in 
underinvestment  
Industry  
  
Inside blockholders are more 
concerned with improving the asset 
utilisation 
Managerial blockholders can help in 
restraining the underinvestment 
problem 
F
lo
ra
ck
is
 (
2
0
0
8
) 
 
SG&A to sales 
ratio 
 
Board size Size 897 non–
financial firms 
 UK 
  
  
  
Cross 
sectional 
average 
regression 
method 
  
  
  
Non–executive directors have no 
impact on agency costs. Percentage non-
executive directors 
Growth 
opportunities 
Asset utilisation 
 
Duality Bank debt 1999–2002 for 
the dependent 
variables 
 Large boards are associated with 
high agency costs 
Block holding ratio Size 
Executive directors 
ownership 
Short term 
debt 
 
Short term debt, the use of cash 
compensation, executive ownership 
and ownership concentration 
significantly reduce agency costs 
 
Non-executive 
directors ownership 
Leverage 2003 for the 
independent 
variables Executive directors 
salary 
Growth 
prospects 
The use of options Industry  
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 Study 
Variables Sample Size, & 
time 
Context 
Analysis 
technique 
Main Finding(s) 
Agency costs Independent Control 
M
cK
n
ig
h
t 
a
n
d
 W
ei
r 
(2
0
0
9
) 
 
Industry adjusted 
asset utilisation 
ratio 
The percentage of 
non–executive 
directors  
Firm size  534 firm year 
observations 
UK. 
  
  
  
  
  
Fixed-
effects 
panel 
regressions 
  
  
Presence of the nomination 
committee and its recommended 
composition increase agency costs 
Interaction of 
growth prospects 
and free cash flows 
CEO duality 
Leverage 
  
  
  
  
1996-2000 
  
  
  
  
Institutional ownership is associated 
with higher agency costs 
Presence of 
nomination 
committee 
Fixed 
effects 
instrumental 
variables 
regressions  
The managerial ownership and 
leverage reduce agency costs 
  
  
  
Number of 
acquisition  
  
  
Presence of 
executive directors 
in the nomination 
committee  
Institutional 
ownership  
Panel Tobit 
regressions 
 
Managerial 
ownership  
H
en
ry
 (
2
0
1
0
) 
Asset utilisation Board size 
Managerial 
ownership 
A random 
sample of 1124 
non-financial 
firm-year 
observations 
listed in the 
(ASX) 1992-
2002 
Australia Fixed 
effects 
instrumental 
variables 
regressions 
The overall compliance with the 
ASX governance code helps in 
reducing agency costs 
Interaction of free 
cash flows with 
growth prospects 
The use of options Institutional 
ownership 
SG&A to sales 
ratio 
Duality 
External 
ownership 
 
Tobit 
regressions 
None of the individual governance 
mechanisms has a significant 
impact on agency costs 
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 Study 
Variables Sample Size, & 
time 
Context 
Analysis 
technique 
Main Finding(s) 
Dependent Independent Control 
H
en
ry
 (
2
0
1
0
) 
Tobin's Q 
  
  
  
Board independence Dividend 
yield 
 1992-2002 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Board remuneration Leverage 
Compliance index Firm risk 
Existence of board 
subcommittees 
namely audit, 
remuneration and 
nomination 
Firm size  
  
  
Ib
ra
h
im
 a
n
d
 S
a
m
a
d
 (
2
0
1
1
) 
Asset utilisation 
ratio 
 
Board size Leverage 2030 firm-year 
observations 
 
Malaysia 
  
 
Pooled OLS Large board and independent board 
members significantly reduce 
agency costs  
Operating costs to 
sales ratio   
Board independence Firm age  1999-2005 Fixed 
effects 
instrumental 
variables 
regressions 
 
Duality increases (reduces) asset 
utilisation (operating to sales ratio) 
Duality 
 
Firm size  Independent non-executive board 
members have no significant impact 
on agency costs for family 
controlled firm. 
Random 
effects 
Block holding reduces agency costs 
 
Duality helps in reducing agency 
costs for family controlled firm, 
whereas it increases agency costs of 
non-family controlled firms 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The process of conducting empirical research starts with choosing the research 
topic followed by reviewing the related theories and previous literature to identify a 
researchable gap, this identified gap is then transformed to research question(s); 
based on the research question, researchers decide which methodology is proper to 
conduct this specific research, which should be reflected on the data collection, the 
time horizon, and the appropriate analyses techniques, finally the researcher reports 
their findings and conclusions. Despite most researchers go through these stages; 
Laughlin (1995, p.65) mention that “Empirical research is partial and incomplete 
and that theoretical and methodological choices are inevitably made whether 
appreciated or not."  
There are two main approaches that lead to the development of knowledge and 
theories, and shape the research approaches which are the epistemological and the 
ontological schools of thought; both refer to Greek philosophers (Lancaster, 2005). 
The epistemological approach develops and explains knowledge in the form of 
theories which are acquired from the real world (Lancaster, 2005) or in other words, 
the constitution of valid knowledge in a certain field of study (Hussey and Hussey, 
1997; Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009); Novikov and Novikov (2013, p.14) 
present epistemology as “the theory of scientific cognition; it studies the laws and 
capabilities of cognition, as well as analyses the stages, forms, methods, and means 
of cognition process, the conditions and criteria of scientific knowledge validity." On 
the other hand, the ontological approach concerns the nature of reality (Saunders, 
Lewis and Thornhill, 2009); or developing theories grounding in the suggestions of 
the nature of certain phenomena with or without relating those suggestions or views 
to a certain knowledge base (Lancaster, 2005); it reflects the researcher’s 
assumptions regarding the operation of the real world (Saunders, Lewis and 
Thornhill, 2009). 
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As mentioned earlier, conducting research requires the researchers to go through 
many stages, choose and decide between the different alternatives for each stage that 
should help them to appropriately answer their research question(s). Saunders, Lewis 
and Thornhill (2009) ably portray the stages of conducting research as an onion –
illustrated in Figure 2- with many layers that researchers should go through to 
correctly find the answer(s) of their research question(s). Based on the research 
question, the researcher has, first, to choose the appropriate philosophy. Saunders, 
Lewis and Thornhill (2009) argue that the selected philosophy reflects the 
researcher’s view of the real world. Then, the researcher has to choose the research 
approach that matches with the selected philosophy; for instance, the deductive 
approach is appropriate with the positivist philosophy. After deciding the research 
philosophy, researchers choose their strategy, method, time horizon, and finally the 
data collection and analysis techniques.  
In the same way, Hussey and Hussey (1997) mention that by applying the three 
levels of the word paradigm to the research; the philosophical level reflects how the 
researcher beliefs about the world; the social level provides the guidelines for the 
researcher to conduct the research; and finally, the technical view represents the 
methods and techniques utilised to conduct research. In the following sections, the 
researcher briefly reviews the different research philosophies and approaches; then 
states the employed philosophy, approach and strategy in this study. 
Figure 2 Research Onion 
Source: Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2009, p.108) 
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5.2 RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY 
Research philosophy describes the development and the nature of the knowledge; 
and it implicitly reflects how the researcher views the world (Saunders, Lewis and 
Thornhill, 2009). For Hussey and Hussey (1997), philosophical perspectives are 
classified into two main perspectives represent the two ends of a continuum which 
are the positivism and interpretivism; Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2009) add that 
philosophical perspectives could be positivism, interpretivism, pragmatism and 
realism; they mention that pragmatic approach is a possible alternative if the research 
question(s) do(es) not clearly suggest the positivism or the interpretivism approaches. 
The positive approach supports the use of objective methods, as this approach from 
an ontological view, it assumes that reality is external and objective; and based on 
the epistemological approach knowledge is only significant if it is based on real 
observations (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe, 2002). Likewise, Hussey and 
Hussey (1997) mention that positivism is concerned with the interrelation between 
the studied variables, and it considers that only observable and measurable 
phenomena could be considered as knowledge. The interpretivism approach 
emphasis that conducting research among people is different from conducting 
research among objects (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009); thus, researchers 
should understand and respect the differences between people on social research and 
objects on natural sciences research and understand the subjective necessity on social 
science research (Bryman, 2012).  
 Grounded in this study questions and objectives, the positive approach is the 
appropriate philosophy for this study. Identifying a research problem is the starting 
point for the traditional positivist approach, followed the establishment of acceptable 
hypotheses derived from theory and prior literature (Smith, 2003a); these hypotheses 
and variables should be accurately identified and measured (House, 1970). After that, 
the researcher identifies the suitable methods to examine the research hypotheses and 
report the results and the findings of this research (Smith, 2003a); it may be worth 
mentioning that the accuracy in measuring the hypotheses and identifying the 
variables correctly will enhance the researchers’ ability in evaluating the reported 
results, stating and comparing results more precisely (House, 1970). 
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5.3 RESEARCH APPROACHES 
Deductive approach is the common view of the relationship between theory and 
social research (Bryman, 2012); in simple terms, the deductive approach moves from 
the general to the particular (Hussey and Hussey, 1997), more clearly, deductive 
approach is concerned with examining a certain theory within a specific organisation 
or context. The deductive research develops theories or hypotheses and then tests out 
these theories or hypotheses through empirical observation (Lancaster, 2005; 
Neuman, 2014); this approach is appropriate to empirically test theoretical models 
(Smith, 2003a); and based on the interpretation of the data analyses, the researcher 
could end up with either accepting the theory, or confirming the need to revise or 
modify the tested theory (Sekaran, 2003; Lancaster, 2005).  
Figure 3 The Deductive Approach 
 
Figure 3 summarises the deduction process; it starts with deducing empirically 
testable hypotheses from the theory, then collecting the required data, then analysing 
these data, and based on the results, there are two expected outcome, either the 
hypotheses are accepted and the theory is confirmed or the hypotheses are rejected 
Theory 
Developing testable hypotheses about the theory 
Collecting data 
Analysing the collected data, and reporting the results 
Results support the examined 
hypotheses and the theory 
Theory confirmed 
Results failed to support the 
examined hypotheses and the 
theory 
Theory needs to be revised 
Induction process starts 
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and thus the theory requires revising. In the case of revising the theory, Bryman 
(2012) argues that this step involves the induction approach which is the reverse of 
the deduction process. Thus, theory is developed based on the observed reality 
(Hussey and Hussey, 1997; Sekaran, 2003). Inductive research is related to building 
a new theory rather than testing a current theory. This approach starts with empirical 
observations form the real world, then analysing these observations trying to find an 
explanation of these observations that can lead to a concrete theory (Lancaster, 2005; 
Neuman, 2014). 
To sum up, this research follows the positivism philosophy and the deductive 
approach using the archival research strategy; in the following sections, the 
researcher illustrates the operationalization of the dependent and independent 
variables, then the control variables, after that, the analytical procedures are 
introduced, then, empirical models, and ends with the sampling and data collection 
procedures. 
5.4 RESTATING THE STUDY HYPOTHESES  
In this study, the researcher aims at investigating the impact of a comprehensive 
set of corporate governance mechanisms on agency costs; then investigate the impact 
of these mechanisms during two different economic circumstances to find which of 
these mechanisms help in reducing the agency costs during the steady economic 
conditions (pre–crisis period) and during a period that follows an abnormal event like 
the 2008 financial crisis (post crisis recession period).  
Based on the review of theoretical arguments around each mechanism and the 
mixed results of the empirical literature, as mentioned in the previous chapters, the 
researcher has developed the following hypotheses: 
H1: There is a negative association between board size and agency costs. 
Board size (BRD) is measured as the number of board members served in the board 
during the fiscal year. The number of board members was manually collected from 
firms’ annual reports. Same measure was employed by many studies, e.g., Henry 
(2010); Ibrahim and Samad (2011); Andreou, Louca and Panayides (2014); Belghitar 
and Clark (2014) and Yang and Zhao (2014). 
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H2: There is a negative association between the percentage of independent board 
members and agency costs. 
Board composition (IND) is measured as the number of the independent board 
members as defined by the UK corporate governance code divided by board size; 
same measure was utilised by Henry (2010) and Ibrahim and Samad (2011), among 
others. 
H3: There is a positive association between duality and agency costs. 
Duality (DUL) is measured by generating a dummy variable that takes the value of 0 
if there is a separation between the CEO and chairman posts 1 otherwise. Prior 
studies utilised similar measure e.g., Florackis (2008), Henry (2010) and Ibrahim and 
Samad (2011). 
H4: Board subcommittees are negatively associated with agency costs. 
H4a: An effective audit committee is positively associated with lower agency costs. 
Building on the recommendations of the UK corporate governance code, that require 
all firms to have audit committee with at least three members, all are independent, 
one of them should have a recent financial expertise, and this committee should have 
three meetings during the year as a minimum; a composite measure was developed 
for to assess the audit committee effectiveness. ACE variable is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 if the audit committee is composed of three members, all of 
them are independent, at least one of the has financial expertise and the committee 
meets three times at least during the year. This composite variable was introduced by 
Zaman, Hudaib and Haniffa (2011).  
H4b: An effective remuneration committee is positively associated with lower 
agency costs. 
The UK corporate governance code recommends that firms should have a 
remuneration committee with three members with a majority of independent 
members. REMU-COM is a composite measure (dummy variable) takes the value of 
1 if the remuneration committee comprise of at least three members, and the majority 
of those members are independent directors.  
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H4c: An effective nomination committee is positively associated with lower agency 
costs. 
The UK corporate governance code recommends that firms should have a 
nomination committee with a majority of independent directors to assure the 
independence of the committee from the management. The UK corporate governance 
code does not mention the minimum number of the nomination committee; thus in 
this study, the researcher applies the minimum of three members similar to the audit 
and nomination committees. NOMINI-COM is a composite measure with the value 
of 1 if the nomination committee comprises of three members at least with a majority 
of independent members.  
H5: There is a negative association between board ownership percentage and 
agency costs 
Board ownership (BRDOWN) is measured as the total percentage of the board 
directors’ shares to the total outstanding shares. Similar measure was utilised by 
Florackis (2008); Ibrahim and Samad (2011) and Chen, Hou and Lee (2012), among 
others.  
H6: The identity of is the owner director has a significant impact on agency costs 
H6a: There is a negative association between CEO ownership percentage and 
agency costs. 
CEO ownership percentage (CEOOWN) is the CEO’s shares divided by the total 
outstanding shares; similar measure has been utilised in prior literature, e.g., 
Anderson et al. (2000), Klein (2002a).  
H6b: There is a negative association between executive directors’ ownership 
percentage and agency costs. 
Executive directors’ ownership percentage (EXECOWN) is measured by dividing 
the executive directors’ shares by the total outstanding shares (Florackis, 2008).  
H6c: There is a negative association between non-executive directors’ ownership 
percentage and agency costs. 
Non-executive directors’ ownership percentage (NEDOWN) is measured as the non-
executive directors’ shares divided by the total outstanding shares (Florackis, 2008).  
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H7: There is a negative association between block holding percentage and agency 
costs. 
Following the prior literature (e.g., Daily et al. (1998); Eng and Mak (2003); 
Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2004); Thomsen, Pedersen and Kvist (2006); Grove et al. 
(2011); Jallow et al. (2012), among others), the block holding ratio (BLK) is the total 
ownership percentage of blockholders holding 5% or more of the firm’s outstanding 
shares. 
H8: The identity of the blockholders has a significant impact on agency costs. 
H8a: There is a negative association between institutional block holding 
percentage and agency costs. 
Institutional block holding ratio (INSTBLK) is the total ownership percentage of 
institutions holding 5% or more of the firm’s outstanding shares. 
H8b: There is a negative association between individual block holding percentage 
and agency costs. 
Individual block holding ratio (INDVBLK) is the total ownership percentage of 
individual investors holding 5% or more of the firm’s outstanding shares. Similar 
measure was utilised by Khan (2006). 
In the following sections, the researcher reviews the different agency costs utilised 
in this study, in addition to firm characteristics variables that should be considered 
while examining the above-mentioned hypotheses; as these characteristics could 
affect the investigated relationship, the researcher represents the analytical 
procedures, before consolidating all the utilised variables in the study’s econometric 
models, and presenting the sample selection and data sources.  
5.5 AGENCY COSTS UTILISED IN THIS STUDY 
In this study, the researcher utilises two agency cost proxies, which are asset 
utilisation and the interaction between the growth prospects and the free cash flow. 
5.5.1 The industry adjusted asset utilisation ratio (adjTRN).  
Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) have introduced the assets turnover ratio as a 
convenient proxy of the agency costs, and it has been used in the previous literature, 
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e.g., Singh and Davidson III (2003), Florackis (2008), McKnight and Weir (2009), 
Henry (2010) and Ibrahim and Samad (2011), among others. 
This ratio is used to measure the effectiveness of the management in generating 
sales using the firm’s assets, testing that the management has exerted the required 
efforts to generate these sales, and assessing the quality of investment decisions 
taken by the management. Ibrahim and Samad (2011) mention that the high turnover 
rate implies that firm has generated large sales volume, and definitely cash flows 
using a given level of assets; which reflects the management efficacy in using firm’s 
asset portfolios to generate value for shareholders. 
Asset utilisation is considered as an inverse measure of agency costs; high asset 
utilisation ratio means the management is involved in utilising firm’s assets in 
creating value for shareholders, and hence lower agency costs. While low asset 
utilisation means that the management does not exert the sufficient effort, makes 
poor investment decisions (Ang, Cole and Lin, 2000) or the firm has unproductive 
assets (Ertugrul, 2005; Florackis, 2008; Henry, 2010), or mismanaging firm’s assets. 
Considering the variation across industries in their asset intensity, and this 
measure is mainly tied to the assets employed and sales generated from this 
employment, in this study, the researcher will adjust this measure to the industry for 
the sake of controlling the variations across industries. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick 
(2003), Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008), McKnight and Weir (2009) and Van 
Essen, Engelen and Carney (2013) reported that using the industry adjusted measures 
provide considerably strong results. 
This measure is the natural log of one plus the industry assets turnover ratio. Asset 
turnover is the ratio of sale to total assets; this ratio was obtained from Datastream; 
then, the researcher calculated the industry median of asset turnover for each year, 
then subtract it from the from the company’s figure. 
5.5.2 The interaction of free cash flow and growth prospects (QFCF).  
Jensen (1986) argues that firms that generate large free cash flow, but having low 
growth prospects are more prone to agency problems than other firms, as managers 
can waste this money on unprofitable projects. Griffin, Lont and Sun (2010) 
demonstrate that prior studies provide evidence that supports this hypothesis. In 
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addition to that, as the free cash flows are retained, the capital market cannot assess 
or monitor management’s decision which could suggest more managerial discretion 
and more agency costs (McKnight and Weir, 2009). High free cash flows with little 
growth opportunities mean that the firm is suffering from high agency problems 
which indicates high agency costs. 
Free cash flow variable in this study is the sum of operating income before 
depreciation less the sum of total income taxes, interest expenses and dividends paid 
(Lehn and Poulsen, 1989) expressed as percentage to total assets (Doukas, Kim and 
Pantzalis, 2000; Doukas, McKnight and Pantzalis, 2005; McKnight and Weir, 2009; 
Henry, 2010). 
 Following the prior literature (e.g., Doukas, Kim and Pantzalis (2000); Doukas, 
McKnight and Pantzalis (2005); Florackis (2005); McKnight and Weir (2009); 
Belghitar and Clark (2014), among others) growth prospect is measured by Tobin’s 
Q. Tobin’s Q ratio is simply the firm market value divided by assets replacement 
value (Lindenberg and Ross, 1981; Chung and Pruitt, 1994). In this study, an 
approximation of Lindenberg and Ross (1981) Q ratio will be employed. Q ratio is 
the sum of the market value of outstanding common shares plus the value of 
preferred stocks plus total debt (short term debt + long term debt) divided by total 
assets. McConnell and Servaes (1995); McKnight and Weir (2009) and (Chen, Hou 
and Lee, 2012), among others, have employed this formula in estimating the Q ratio. 
 Based on the assumption that firms with free cash flow and low growth prospects 
are subject to more agency problems between owners and managers, and hence more 
agency costs, a dummy variable was constructed that takes the value of 1 if the 
firm’s growth prospect is less than the industry median and 0 otherwise. The firm is 
identified to have low growth prospects if the annual Q ratio is lower than the 
industry median, but if the firm’s Q ratio is greater than the industry median this 
indicates that this firm has high growth prospects. The interaction between the 
growth opportunities and free cash flows (QFCF) is calculated by multiplying the Q 
dummy variable by the free cash flows. The raw values of all of the variables utilised 
to compute the free cash flow and the Q ratio were obtained from DataStream. 
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Based on this calculation, the researcher argues that this variable captures firms 
with potential agency problems represented in the interaction of free cash flows and 
low growth prospects. The potential agency costs are represented in the amount of 
free cash flow standardized by assets that are subject to be invested in unproductive 
projects. Other firms that free cash flow and high growth prospects take the value of 
zero. 
5.6 FIRM CHARACTERISTICS (CONTROL VARIABLES) 
Examining the above-mentioned hypotheses requires considering a number of 
firm characteristics that could affect the impact of governance mechanisms on 
agency costs, besides, these characteristics have been argued in the prior literature 
that they could shape firm’s governance structure, and the magnitude of the firm’s 
agency costs. Thus, in this section the researcher explores firm characteristics that 
have been controlled in this study. 
5.6.1 Industry 
A common practice in the prior literature (e.g., Singh and Davidson III (2003); 
Florackis (2008); Wellalage and Locke (2011); Belghitar and Clark (2014), among 
others) is to control for the industry in their analysis. Bathala and Rao (1995) 
demonstrate that firms adopt different agency conflict controlling mechanisms 
according to firm specific and industry characteristics. Singh and Davidson III 
(2003) mention that leverage varies by industry. Jensen (1986) mentions that some 
industries are subject to generating more free cash flows, while they have limited 
growth prospects. Thus, their industry affiliation affects their agency costs and the 
mechanisms utilised to control these costs. Chancharat, Krishnamurti and Tian (2012) 
find that industry context affects the firm’s governance structure; and hence they 
recommend that industry should be considered in corporate governance studies. 
Lending a support for this argument, Pfeffer (1972) argues that board size is affected 
by the industry at which the firm is affiliated with. Likewise, Zahra and Pearce (1989) 
argue that industry affiliation affects board attributes and roles. Linck, Netter and 
Yang (2008) and other studies as well, show evidence that board structure tends to 
reflect the firm’s industry, the need for monitoring of activities given the available 
growth opportunities and the transparency of the firm’s earnings. Thus, Fleming, 
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Heaney and McCosker (2005) suggest that industry should be controlled in agency 
costs studies. However, a number of the prior studies (e.g., McKnight and Weir 
(2009); Henry (2010); Ibrahim and Samad (2011)) that investigate the relationship 
between governance mechanisms and agency costs did not control for the industrial 
variations across their sample; and hence, the industry affiliation should be 
considered as a control variable in this study.  
The most common way to control for the variations across industries is to include 
a dummy variable as an indicator for each industry in the regression model. However, 
using this approach hinders the researcher’s ability of utilising the panel regression 
models as for the fixed effects models all time invariant variables will be dropped 
from the regression equation. Thus, in this study, the research considers the industry 
affiliation by utilising the industry adjusted values for the control variables. The use 
of industry adjusted figures helps in controlling for the variations across different 
industries and yields comparable results. Such method has been used in prior 
literature, e.g., McKnight and Weir (2009), Fahlenbrach, Low and Stulz (2010) and 
Larmou and Vafeas (2010), among others. To calculate the industry adjusted values, 
the researcher follows the prior literature e.g., (Lang, Ofek and Stulz, 1996) by 
calculating the industry median of each variable for each year, then subtracts the 
median value from the company’s figure. 
5.6.2 Debt Finance 
Debt financing has a critical role, and it is considered as one on the internal 
governance mechanisms that disciplines and aligns the managers’ interest with those 
of shareholders; however, it might force the management to take more risky projects 
in order to achieve the required return by investors and cover the debt service 
expenses; also, it might cause a conflict of interests between debt holders and 
shareholders. 
 In the corporate governance literature, it is argued that leverage could lead to 
lower agency costs. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that debt holders can control 
managers’ irrational behaviours by setting some provisions and constraints that 
prevent value destroying behaviours and decisions. Titman and Wessels (1988) 
argues that the agency costs of high leveraged firms is expected to be low, as 
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managers are not able to exploit firm’s resources and consume excessive perquisites 
because of the rigorous monitor of debtholders. Moreover, debt agreement affects the 
free cash under the control of the managers, and protects it from expropriation or 
investing in non–optimal investments. McConnell and Servaes (1995) argues that 
debt could help in reducing the probability that managers will waste the free cash 
under their control in poor projects as they have to ensure that they have the 
sufficient fund to cover the debt service.  
Jensen (1986) considers debt as an effective substitute of dividends. He argues 
that managers can decide either to pay dividends or to reinvest this cash in new 
projects; while by issuing debt, managers are committed to pay the interest and the 
principal amount at certain dates, and if they fail to do so, they will face the risk of 
bankruptcy, so debt is more effective than dividends in ensuring the alignment 
between managers’ interests with those of shareholders.  
Firms can benefit from debt financing in many ways. First, debt allows the market 
to evaluate the performance of the firm (Jensen, 1986; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996) 
from different aspects. Grossman and Hart (1982) mention that in order to issue debt 
the market has to evaluate management’s performance. So managers have to 
maximize the firm’s value to get high evaluation that enables them to get high 
salaries, secure their jobs (the takeover bids will at high prices) and get the required 
capital from the market. Easterbrook (1984) argues that by issuing new debt, the 
firm’s affairs are review by the external market; this proposes debt as an effective 
mechanism for both monitoring and adjusting the management’s risk preferences. 
Second, debt financing limits the free cash flows under the control of the 
management, that might be expropriated by the management or invested in low or 
negative present value projects (Jensen, 1986), debt as an alternative for issuing new 
equity keeps the shareholder’s proportion to the total equity constant compared to 
issuing new equity and adding new shareholders. And finally, debt puts pressures 
over the management, as they have to pay the interests and other debt servicing costs. 
Grossman and Hart (1982) argue that debt creates the threat of bankruptcy, such 
threat can align managers’ interests with those of shareholders by inducing managers 
to seek more profitable projects and work for maximizing shareholders’ wealth; 
otherwise, they will lose their jobs and all the benefits they gain from the firm. The 
expected bankruptcy costs were found as one of the important factors that direct the 
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management’s decisions regarding new projects and make them more inclined to 
safer projects (Parrino, Poteshman and Weisbach, 2005; Pathan, 2009). 
 Because of debt, firms are subject to an external monitoring by debt providers, 
moreover, the negative consequences of the failure to pay the debt service 
obligations, like losing their jobs and their market reputation, can inspire managers to 
reduce agency costs (Henry, 2010). However, during crisis highly leveraged firms are 
more vulnerable to low profitability results from the high interest rates and costs of 
debt (Van Essen, Engelen and Carney, 2013). 
Prior literature, promotes leverage as an effective mechanism to reduce agency 
costs. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Fleming, Heaney and McCosker (2005) 
among others, mention that debt finance is an effective control mechanism that can 
be considered as alternative or complement for other control mechanisms like family 
and managerial ownership. Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) assert this argument, as they 
mention that debt financing grant creditors the right to monitor the management, 
especially for small and medium sized firms. Thus, leverage as bonding mechanism 
should reduce agency costs (Singh and Davidson III, 2003). Similarly, McKnight and 
Weir (2009) argue that the increase of debt founds the incentives for debt holders to 
monitor firm’s management which should lead to lower agency costs. Doukas, 
McKnight and Pantzalis (2005) mention that the role of debt could not be effective 
till the debt ratio reaches a certain point. Doukas, Kim and Pantzalis (2000) report 
evidence that debt has no significant role in reducing agency costs and controlling 
managers’ behaviour; however, they find evidence that the role of debt starts to 
appear after reaching a certain debt level. Ferrero-Ferrero, Fernández-Izquierdo and 
Muñoz-Torres (2012) find evidence that debt controls the managerial discretion 
during the financial crisis.  
McConnell and Servaes (1995) find that firm value and debt are negatively 
associated for high growth firms and positive for low growth firms; moreover, debt 
has a significant influence over the firm’s investment decisions. These results can 
suggest that debt holders are effective monitors for low growth firms and detrimental 
for high growth firms, as they can constrain firm’s future projects and prevent firms 
from taking the advantages of the growth opportunities they have. Lang, Ofek and 
Stulz (1996) report similar results as they find evidence of a negative association 
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between leverage level and growth for firms with low growth opportunities. This 
could confirm that disciplinary role of debt as suggested by Jensen (1986).  
However, debt could lead to different form of conflicts and agency problems; 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) argue that debt could lead to conflict of interests between 
debt holders and shareholders. Stulz (1990) argues that debt can reduce the agency 
costs related to the overinvestment problem, but at the same time, debt could lead to 
an underinvestment problem. This means that in some cases, debt can affect firm 
performance positively and negatively in other cases; thus, firms need to reach the 
optimal leverage level that leads to balance between the positive and negative impact 
of debt to enhance firm value. Thus, in this study the researcher controls for the debt 
level using the industry adjusted debt to asset ratio (adjDBT), total debt to total 
assets ratio was obtained from DataStream; then, the researcher applied the industry 
adjustment formula.  
5.6.3 Growth prospects 
Denis (2001) mentions that growth opportunity is an important variable that must 
be considered while investigating the relationship between corporate governance and 
performance. Growth prospects could have a direct impact on firm’s agency costs 
and governance structure. Jensen (1986) argues that the extent of agency problems 
depends on the firm’s growth opportunities. He mentions that firms with high growth 
opportunities are less susceptible to agency problems result from the divergence of 
interests between managers and shareholders towards the free cash flows compared 
to firms with low growth prospects and excess cash flows. Agency costs are expected 
to be higher for high growth firms; these firms have a broad spectrum of 
opportunities to choose among (Titman and Wessels, 1988); thus managers can 
choose the investment opportunity that matches with their motives. Consistent with 
this argument, Florackis (2008) mentions that the magnitude of agency problems and 
hence the costs associated with these problems vary according to the growth 
opportunities the firm has; moreover, governance mechanism role and effectiveness 
are reliant on the interaction between the type of agency problem and firm’s growth 
opportunities. For example, underinvestment and asset substitution problems are 
more severe for high growth firms, while the free cash flow agency conflict is more 
serious for low growth firms (Florackis, 2008). Lehn, Patro and Zhao (2009) mention 
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that agency costs are expected to be directly related to growth opportunities, for high 
growth firm, managers have the discretion to choose investments projects that could 
transfer shareholders’ wealth to inside owners.  
In a similar vein, Doukas, Kim and Pantzalis (2000) and Doukas, McKnight and 
Pantzalis (2005) show that for a given level of free cash flows, firms with low 
growth opportunities are expected to waste these cash flows in negative present value 
projects and hence incurring more agency costs, whereas, firms with high growth 
opportunities are expected to invest these flows in proper projects. This problem is 
aggravated if the firm has substantial free cash flows and limited profitable 
opportunities to invest this cash; such findings are consistent with Jensen (1986)’s 
argument. 
In terms of the impact of growth prospects on governance structure and other firm 
characteristics. Denis (2001) argues that firm can benefit more from outside directors 
when it has few growth opportunities, while firms with high growth opportunities 
need the insiders’ expertise. Bathala and Rao (1995) assert the argument that board 
composition is affected by firm’s growth prospects. They mention that high growth 
firms work in uncertain environment, which requires a more innovative management 
to take strategic decision that should retain the firm’s competitiveness; in such a 
situation, insiders are more required because of their firm specific knowledge about 
the firm compared to outsiders, hence, for high growth firms, insiders are more 
required and more valuable than outside directors. They find evidence that supports 
their argument in the U.S. context. Similarly, the impact of managerial ownership 
and debt differs in accordance to firm’s growth prospects (McConnell and Servaes, 
1995). Easterbrook (1984) argues that dividends pay-out is related to the firm’s 
growth prospects. He states that paying low dividends could be an indication that the 
firm’s growth status is high; high growth firms tend to pay dividends as soon as their 
growth rate starts to decline. Rozeff (1982) finds evidence that firm’s past and future 
growth prospects have an impact on shaping firms’ dividends policy. Lehn, Patro and 
Zhao (2009) strengthen this argument by mentioning that high growth firms require 
an agile governance structure that fits their specific characteristics. Thus, based on 
the above-mentioned discussion, firm’s growth prospects should be considered in this 
study. Following the prior literature (e.g., Doukas, Kim and Pantzalis (2000); 
Doukas, McKnight and Pantzalis (2005); Florackis (2005); McKnight and Weir 
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(2009); Belghitar and Clark (2014), among others), growth prospects are measured 
by Tobin’s Q ratio. Q ratio is the sum of the market value of outstanding common 
shares plus the value of preferred stocks plus total debt (short term debt + long term 
debt) divided by total assets. All variables required to estimate this ratio were 
obtained from DataStream; then, the researcher applied the industry adjustment 
formula to compute the industry adjusted growth prospects (adjQ). 
5.6.4 Dividend pay-out 
According to Goergen (2012), Rozeff (1982) and Easterbrook (1984) are the first 
researchers to mention the role of dividends as a governance mechanism. Bathala and 
Rao (1995) argue that dividend pay-out is one of the mechanisms that could have a 
role in mitigating the agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. 
Dividends help in reducing the cash flows under the management control; and hence, 
it reduces agency conflicts and conflicts towards the use of these cash flows (Rozeff, 
1982), Easterbrook (1984) argues that regular payment of dividends directs the firm 
towards the capital market to raise the required funds for new projects; however, this 
increases the costs of obtaining the required funds from the capital market (Rozeff, 
1982). Raising these funds from the market requires the disclosure of more 
information to the market (Bathala and Rao, 1995); such exposure to the capital 
market coupled with more information disclosure make firm’s performance reviewed 
by many parties like banks, institutional investors, new investors, financial analyst. 
This review definitely severs the interests of shareholders as the new capital 
providers can be good monitors and assessors of the firm’s position. Farinha (2003b) 
provides empirical evidence that dividend payments help in reducing the agency 
problems for the UK firms either as a result of external monitoring by capital 
markets, or reducing the amount of excess cash under the control of managers. 
Similar to debt, Henry (2010) argues that default risk increases by paying high 
dividends to shareholders because of reducing the firm’s liquidity level this could 
reduce firm level agency costs. Moreover, he argues that the need to maintain that 
high level of dividends will encourage firms to manage their future earning properly 
and this also, will lead to lower agency costs. 
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Prior literature provides evidence that dividend payment affects and affected by 
the governance structure and firm characteristics. The dividend pay-out ratio could 
be affected by firms growth position; Easterbrook (1984) argues that there is an 
inverse relation between the firm’s dividend pay-out ratio and firm’s growth 
prospects; firms tend not to pay or pay less dividends during the flourish of their 
growth once their growth rate starts to decline the pay-out ratio starts to increase. 
Rozeff (1982) finds evidence that dividend policy is negatively associated with 
firm’s past and future growth prospects. Bathala and Rao (1995) argue that dividends 
pay-out influences board composition, Rozeff (1982) also finds evidence that 
managerial ownership plays a role in shaping firm’s dividend policy. Accordingly, 
there is an interdependence relationship between dividends pay out and other 
governance and firm characteristics; such interdependent relation should be 
considered in this study. Belghitar and Clark (2014) report evidence that dividend 
pay-out reduce the agency costs of the free cash flow of large firms. Accordingly, in 
this study the researcher controls for the dividend pay-out ratio; this ratio was 
obtained from DataStream; then, the researcher applied the industry adjustment 
formula to calculate the industry adjusted pay-out ratio (adjDIVD). 
5.6.5 Firm size  
It has been argued in the prior literature that firm size is one is the controlling 
factors of agency costs and firm’s governance structure. Henry (2010) mentions that 
large firms are more diversified, more complex and more subject to agency problems, 
thus large firms are expected to incur more agency costs compared to small firms. 
Likewise, Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) and Wellalage and Locke (2011) argue that 
agency costs are associated with firm size. Their findings support this argument. 
Belghitar and Clark (2014) argue that the actions of the managers of small firms are 
easily observable compared to large firms. This suggests that small firms are easy to 
be monitored; thus agency costs are expected to increase with the increase of firm 
size.  
Singh and Davidson III (2003) mention that asset utilisation may be improved 
with the increase of size, which implies a decrease in agency costs. They refer the 
increase in asset utilisation to the economies of scale and cost reduction advantage. 
However, other researchers (e.g., Doukas, Kim and Pantzalis (2000); Doukas, 
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McKnight and Pantzalis (2005), among others) argue that agency conflicts increase 
as the firm size increases, thus, large firms are expected to incur more agency costs 
and hence this would be reflected in a low asset utilisation ratio.  
Pfeffer (1972) mentions that board size is affected by firm characteristics like firm 
size. Similarly, Zahra and Pearce (1989); Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells (1998) and 
Linck, Netter and Yang (2008) argue that the factors affect the choice of board size 
and composition differs from large and small firms. Consistent with this, Yermack 
(1996) argues that as firms grow in size and become more diversified, they seek 
more expertise from different industries resulting in large boards. Belghitar and 
Clark (2014) provide evidence that the impact of governance mechanisms differs 
between large and small firms; large boards and board composition have a significant 
role in reducing agency costs of large firms. Dalton et al. (1999) report evidence that 
firm size affects the relationship between board size and firm performance, with 
greater impact for small firms. Thus, the impact of firm size should be considered 
while investigating the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and 
agency costs. Titman and Wessels (1988) demonstrate that firm’s capital structure is 
affected by firm size, small firms tend to depend on debt finance rather than issuing 
equity, as the cost of the latter is less than issuing new equity.  
In this study, the researcher uses the natural log of total assets as a proxy of firm 
size. This measure has been used in many studies (e.g., Eisenberg, Sundgren and 
Wells (1998); Florackis (2008); Ibrahim and Samad (2011); Belghitar and Clark 
(2014), among others). Total assets (ASSTS) value was obtained from DataStream. 
5.6.6 Profitability 
In the corporate governance literature, it is argued that firm performance has a 
direct influence on the firm’s governance structure like board size, composition, 
leadership structure and ownership structure as well. Firms with high profits generate 
more cash flows, thus they are susceptible for more agency costs related to free cash 
flow, and attract more institutional investors (Crutchley et al., 1999). Wintoki, Linck 
and Netter (2012) report that board structure is shaped according to firm past 
performance. Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) find evidence that board composition 
changes in response to firm performance; more outside directors replace the inside 
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directors after the poor performance. Likewise, Boone et al. (2007) report evidence 
that board size and composition are affected by firm performance; they find that, 
usually, there is an increase in the proportion of outside directors following poor 
performance. Guest (2008) find evidence that for well performing firms CEOs gain 
more negotiation power and they can negotiate for smaller and less independent 
boards. However, Ghosh and Sirmans (2003) report opposite results, they find that 
the ratio of outside directors increases with the improvements of firm performance. 
In this study, the researcher utilises the return on assets (ROA) as a proxy of firm 
profitability; this ratio was obtained from DataStream; then, the researcher applied 
the industry adjustment formula.  
5.7 ANALYTICAL PROCEDURES 
In this section, the researcher will explore the analytical procedures for this study. 
Renders, Gaeremynck and Sercu (2010) mention that a common issue with prior 
studies is that they suffer from econometric problems like endogeneity and/or the 
lack of the statistical power; besides each firm could design their governance 
structure that maximizes shareholders’ wealth and fits with firm’s specific 
characteristics. Similarly Brown, Beekesc and Verhoeven (2011) mention that the 
endogeneity problem was ignored in prior studies and the estimated parameters from 
the ordinary least squares (OLS) were used to provide evidence that better corporate 
governance practices should lead to better performance or/and value; ignoring that 
the examined models could suffer from unobserved heterogeneity which means that 
the identified relations result from unobserved factors. In other words, the problem 
with the OLS regression is that it treats every firm-year observation as an 
independent observation neglecting the fact that each firm could be repeated for a 
number of years; such treatment ignores firm specific characteristics which could 
result in misleading estimations (Di Pietra et al., 2008). 
In this study, the researcher considerers the model statistical power by considering 
a comprehensive set of governance mechanisms. Also, the researcher considers the 
fact that each firm has its own characteristics by employing the panel data regression 
models; the rationale for using panel data, its characteristics, and the employed 
regression models are presented in this section; moreover, the endogeneity issue is 
considered by applying Durbin–Wu–Hausman endogeneity diagnostic test as a 
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robustness check to ensure that the employed models do not suffer from the 
endogeneity problems. 
5.7.1 Panel data 
Panel data (or longitudinal data) “are data [gathered] for multiple entities in 
which each entity is observed at two or more time periods” (Stock and Waston, 2011, 
p.11). This indicates that the same entities should be observed at least two times over 
the study period. Hence, the researcher can conclude from this definition that panel 
dataset is a cross section time series data set; this implies that panel data can combine 
the advantages of the cross section and times series all together. Cameron and 
Trivedi (2009) assert this by stating that panel data regressions can capture and count 
for variations across entities and variations over time similar to the basic cross 
section and the basic time series regressions. 
Wooldridge (2013) states the difference between panel data and independently 
pooled cross section; panel data the same observed unit should be followed through a 
certain time period (the study period), whereas, the pooled cross section could be two 
or more independent samples combined together, and if these samples include some 
observed units in common, this might happen by coincidence. 
Baltagi (2008) and Gujarati (2011) list the main advantages of using panel data. 
1. Given that panel data deals with the same sample units over a certain time 
horizon, heterogeneity across these observed units could be unobservable and 
could bring biased results. Contrary to time series and cross-sectional data, panel 
data control for individual heterogeneity by considering subject specific 
characteristics that could affect the results and result in biased estimates if ignored. 
2.  Panel data -as a combination of time series and cross sectional data- 
overcomes the multicollinearity that occurs in time series data. Cross section 
dimension adds more informative data and variability; this leads to less 
collinearity between variables. Moreover, it gives more degrees of freedom and 
enhances efficiency. 
3. Panel data is more appropriate in capturing and studying the dynamics of 
changes.  
‎Chapter 5:  Research Methodology 
-139- 
 
4. Panel data is able to capture the unobservable effects in time series and 
cross section data. 
5. Panel data models surpass time series and cross section models in terms of 
model construction and complication of the model. Cameron and Trivedi (2009) 
mention that panel data requires employing powerful estimation models and 
methods to tackle the consequences of adding more time periods which are not 
independent from the preceding periods; however, panel data methods consider 
this by adjusting the estimators’ standard errors.  
In addition to the above-mentioned advantages, Wooldridge (2013) mentions that 
panel data allows researchers to apply lags and investigate the impact of decisions or 
applying new policies, which is significant in studying the consequences of such 
decisions or policies that are expected to have an influence after some time. 
However, panel data has its own limitations. Panel data set is a problem in itself. 
To construct a panel data set, this means that the same units should be observed at 
two or more time points and this makes it more difficult to obtain such data (Baltagi, 
2008 ; Stock and Waston, 2011 ; Wooldridge, 2013). In addition to this limitation, 
Baltagi (2008) mentions other limitations, i.e., distortions of measurement errors 
which means that the respondent provides faulty responses for many reasons, panel 
data models require long time span, cross section dependence which is related to 
macro level panels, as neglecting the dependence across countries leads to 
misleading interpretations, and finally, selectivity problems including a) nonresponse 
and missing data and b) attrition and exclusion from the sample for many reasons 
like the delisting and merging as the case of this study. However, most of these 
limitations do not apply with the variables employed in this study.
6
 Moreover, 
Wooldridge (2013) mentions another disadvantage of the panel data that it controls 
for the occurred changes that take place over time, but it can’t control for the changes 
across the sample units. 
Based on the above discussion about the advantages of using panel data, the 
researcher can conclude that employing panel data regression models through this 
study will provide more accurate and efficient results. 
                                                          
6
 See Baltagi, B. (2008) Econometric analysis of panel data, John Wiley & Sons. for more details 
regarding these limitations 
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5.7.2 Panel data regression models 
Baltagi (2008) shows that compared to the time series and cross section regression 
models, panel data regression varies in having double subscript for its variables to 
express the identity of the observed unit and the time of observation. Moreover, the 
error term in the regression model captures the unobservable specific effect of the 
sample units and normal error term. 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝑋𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 
Where,  𝑖 = 1, . , N 
              𝑡 = 1, . . , T 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝜇𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
    Where,  μit = unobserved individual-specific effect 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 = remainder disturbance 
The above-mentioned regression equation could be the same as the Pooled 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) if the unobserved individual-specific effect μit = 0. So, 
in that case, pooled OLS regression will provide efficient estimations, whereas, if the 
μit ≠ 0, panel data regression models will be more appropriate and will provide more 
efficient estimations.  
The basic linear panel data models are fixed effects and random effects models. 
Fixed effects allows the independent variables to be correlated with the subject level 
effects tolerating a limited form of endogeneity, whereas, random effects model 
assumes that the independent variables are fully exogenous, and not correlated to 
subject level effects (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009; Stock and Waston, 2011). 
Moreover, the fixed effect model allows each observed unit to have its own dummy 
intercept, and also, fixed effects model assumes that the subject specific intercept is 
fixed and time invariant to account for the heterogeneity across the observed units, 
whereas, the random effects model assumes that these intercepts are random and time 
variant (Gujarati, 2011). This point differentiates between the pooled OLS and panel 
data regression models. 
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However, panel data regression models have the same assumptions as the ordinary 
least square (OLS) (Stock and Waston, 2011). Greene (2012, p.16) states a set of 
assumptions for the OLS regression model which are:  
1. Linearity assumption states that the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables should be linear. 
2. Full rank assumption means that no perfect multicollinearity should present 
among the independent variable. Perfect multicollinearity means that there is 
a perfect linear relationship between two or more independent variables. 
However, Stock and Waston (2011) underscore that the imperfect 
multicollinearity – highly but imperfect correlation between independent 
variables- does not affect the estimation results. 
3. Exogeneity of the independent variables which means that the mean value 
of the error term is zero, and not a function of the independent variables. 
4. Homoscedasticity and non-autocorrelation. This assumption means that 
the error terms should have the same variance and not interrelated. 
5. Data generation. Independent variables are assumed to be non-stochastic. 
The values of the independent variables are fixed in repeated samples without 
measurement errors. 
6. Normality of the error term. The error term should be normally distributed 
with zero mean and constant variance. 
As cited before, Stock and Waston (2011) state that the assumptions of the OLS 
stand for the fixed effects regression models. However, Greene (2012, p.63) 
mentions that the sixth assumption becomes inessential for large samples. Park 
(2011) and Greene (2012) demonstrates that employing panel data set will require to 
relax some of the above-mentioned assumptions. Given that in panel data the same 
unit observed at different time points, heterogeneity across the observed units and the 
observed variables will be present, this violates the third and the fourth assumptions, 
which implies that the OLS becomes biased linear estimator; however, panel data 
regression models are designed to tackle and deal with these problems (Park, 2011). 
To deal with these assumptions, the researcher employed both the correlation matrix 
and Variance Inflation Factor to check that there is no perfect multicollienarity 
between the independent variables.  
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Park (2011) and Wooldridge (2013) mention that a common practice of many 
researchers to employ both fixed and random effects models whenever they have 
panel data. However, this practice neglects the fact that both models have their own 
assumptions, and the characteristics of the dataset control of the model employed. 
Thus, these models should not be used as substitutes.  
To avoid this common incorrect practice, Hausman (1978) specification test 
should be applied to decide between the fixed effects and random effects (Baltagi, 
2008; Gujarati, 2011; Greene, 2012; Wooldridge, 2013). This test based on 
examining a null hypothesis that the individual effects are not correlated with the 
independent variables, thus, fixed effects, random effects and OLS are consistent, but 
the OLS is inefficient against an alternative hypothesis that fixed effects is consistent 
but random effect is biased and inconsistent (Park, 2011; Greene, 2012). 
In other words, Hausman (1978) specification test examines the correlation 
between the subject-level effects and the independent variables in the model. The 
null hypothesis is that the subject effects are uncorrelated with the employed 
independent variables. Hence, if the null hypothesis is not rejected, this implies that 
the random effects model is better than the fixed effects, whereas, if the null 
hypothesis is rejected, this means that there is a correlation between subject effects 
and the independent variables, and hence, fixed effects model is appropriate than the 
random effects model. 
Although -As aforementioned that- the panel data regression models consider the 
heterogeneity across the sample units. However, in this study, the researcher 
considered the heteroscedasticity issue following the suggestion of White (1980) that 
for large sample heteroscedasticity-correlated standard error can be obtained by 
correcting the standard errors to allow for heteroscedasticity which is known as 
robust standard error (Gujarati, 2011) which will yield up a heteroscedasticity –
robust estimator (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). This procedure can be done in Stata 
using the vce (robust) option of the panel regression command. However, the 
researcher also controlled for standard errors clustering within the firm, 
Heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation between variables by employing the 
command vce (cluster firm) in STATA. 
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Finally, Considering that the QFCF variable has many observations with a zero 
value; this variable is considered as censored variable and thus normal linear 
regression (OLS) or normal panel regression models might yield inconsistent and 
biased results. Tobit regression which is the common and appropriate regression 
model can be used for censored and truncated dependent variables (Brooks, 2014); 
especially, when the variable has the value of zero for nontrivial fraction of the 
population (Wooldridge, 2013, p. 596). The advantage of the Tobit regression is that 
it uses all the data set observations; but the same time it can consider the grouping 
limit of the data set (Jizi et al., 2014). In this study, panel based Tobit regression is 
used to investigate the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the 
interaction of the free cash flow with growth prospects as a proxy of the agency costs 
associated with free cash flow and investment decisions. This regression method has 
been utilised in prior studies, (e.g., McKnight and Weir (2009); Henry (2010); 
Belghitar and Clark (2014), among others). 
5.8 EMPIRICAL MODELS 
The basic empirical model for investigating the impact of corporate governance 
mechanisms on agency costs is as follows: 
𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽𝐺(𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡)
𝑛
𝐺=1
+ ∑ 𝛽𝐶(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡)
𝑛
𝐶=1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where: 
Governanceit is the set of governance variables for firm i in year t 
Controlit is the set of control variables for firm i in year t 
εit is the normal error term. 
The baseline model illustrates in more details the main variables have been 
employed in this study. 
Baseline model: 
𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑈𝐿𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑈 − 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑡 + +𝛽6𝑁𝑂𝑀𝐼𝑁𝐼 − 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐿𝐾𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝐵𝑅𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽11𝑎𝑑𝑗𝐷𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑎𝑑𝑗𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
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To investigate further the role of different ownership structures on agency costs 
the following sub models were derived from the baseline model. 
Sub model (1) 
𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝐷𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑈𝐿𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑈 − 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑡 + +𝛽6𝑁𝑂𝑀𝐼𝑁𝐼 − 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇_𝐵𝐿𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑁𝐷_𝐵𝐿𝐾 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐵𝑅𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽10𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑙𝑛𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑎𝑑𝑗𝐷𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑄𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽14𝑎𝑑𝑗𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
In this model the researcher splits the block holding variable into institutional block 
holding and block holding by individual investors. 
Sub model (2) 
𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑈𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑈𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑡
+ +𝛽6𝑁𝑂𝑀𝐼𝑁𝐼𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐵𝐿𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑂𝑊𝑁 𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽9𝐸𝑋𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑊𝑁 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑁𝐸𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽13𝑎𝑑𝑗𝐷𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑄𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽15𝑎𝑑𝑗𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
In this model the researcher splits the board ownership ratio into CEO ownership, 
non-executive board members ownership and executive board members ownership 
ratios. 
Sub model (3) 
𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑅𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐷𝑈𝐿𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝑅𝐸𝑀𝑈 − 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑡 + +𝛽6𝑁𝑂𝑀𝐼𝑁𝐼 − 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽5𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇_𝐵𝐿𝐾𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑁𝐷_𝐵𝐿𝐾 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑂𝑊𝑁 𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽8𝐸𝑋𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑊𝑁 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑁𝐸𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑁 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽11𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽12𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽13𝑎𝑑𝑗𝐷𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽14𝑎𝑑𝑗𝑄𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽15𝑎𝑑𝑗𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
In this model the researcher splits the block holding variable into institutional block 
holding and block holding by individual investors; moreover, the researcher splits the 
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board ownership ratio into CEO ownership, non-executive board members' 
ownership and executive board members ownership ratios. 
Table 3 Variables employed in this study 
Agency costs 
lnadjTRN Natural log of the industry adjusted asset utilisation ratio. 
QFCF The interaction of free cash flow with growth prospects. 
Board Characteristics 
BRD Total number of board members.  
IND  Percentage of the independent board members (excluding the 
chairman) to total board size.  
ACE Audit Committee Effectiveness according to Smith Report (2003) 
recommendations 
DUL  A dummy variable that takes the value of 0 if there is a separation 
between the CEO and chairman posts 1 otherwise.  
ACE Comprehensive measure for audit committee effectiveness. A 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the audit committee 
fully complies with the requirements mentioned in Smith Report 
(2003), 0 otherwise. 
REMU-COM A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the remuneration 
committee comprises of 3 members at least with a majority of 
independent members. 
NOMINI-COM A dummy variable that take the value of 1 if the nomination 
committee comprises of 3 members at least with a majority of 
independent members. 
Ownership Structure 
BLK  Total ownership percentage of blockholders owning 5% or more. 
N_BLK  The number of blockholders owning 5% or more. 
INST_BLK  Total ownership percentage of institutions owning 5% or more.  
N_INST  The number of institutions owning 5% or more. 
INDV_BLK  The total ownership percentage of individuals holding 5% or more.  
N_INDV_BLK The number of individuals owning 5% or more. 
BRDOWN The percentage of the board directors’ shares to the total 
outstanding shares. 
CEOOWN  The percentage of CEO’s shares to the total outstanding shares.  
EXECOWN The percentage of the executive directors’ shares to the total 
outstanding shares. 
NEDOWN The percentage of the non-executive directors’ shares to the total 
outstanding shares.  
Control Variables 
adjDBT  Industry adjusted total debt to total assets. 
adjROA  Industry adjusted return on assets ratio. 
adjQ  Industry adjusted Tobin’s Q. 
adjDIVD  Industry adjusted dividend pay-out ratio. 
ASSTS Total assets. 
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5.9 SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA SOURCES 
5.9.1 Sample 
The initial sample for this study is The Financial Times Stock Exchange (FTSE) 
All-Share Index for each year of the study period. This starting point was chosen for 
two reasons; first, FTSE All-Share Index is an assembly of the FTSE 100, FTSE 250 
and FTSE Small Cap Indices. Thus, this index represents 98%-99% of the UK 
market capitalization (FTSE, 2012). The All-Share Index can be considered as a 
comprehensive index that includes all industries in the UK market, and it fully 
reflects the market performance. This index reflects the performance of all 
companies that are eligible to be listed on the London Stock Exchange's (LSE) main 
market (FTSE, 2012). Second, the UK system requires all listed firms to either 
comply with the UK corporate governance code, or to explain the reasons behind 
their noncompliance. Thus, it is expected to find that all firms are complying with the 
code recommendations, and this compliance could be reflected in lower agency 
conflict and lower agency costs. 
Two samples are utilised in this study; a full sample and pre and post the financial 
crisis analysis samples.  The full sample of this study covers the fiscal years for the 
period 2005–2011 inclusive. This sample has been used for the primary investigation 
of the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on agency cost. However, given 
that one of the aims of this study is to provide the corporate governance literature 
with a recent investigation of the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the 
different proxies of agency costs before and after the financial crisis, and examine 
whether the impact of the investigated mechanisms changes across the two period, 
the researcher has excluded year 2008 because of the financial crisis, and split the 
primary sample into two independent samples representing the pre–crisis period 
before 2008 and post crisis recession period after 2008; that have been utilised in the 
comparative analysis before and after the crisis. Hence, the pre–crisis data set covers 
the period 2005–2007 inclusive and the post-crisis data set covers the period 2009–
2011 inclusive. Another methodology could be used which is creating dummy 
variables to reflect the pre, during and post periods; however, this methodology helps 
in controlling for the impact of the financial crisis rather than investigating the effect 
of the financial crisis on the corporate governance mechanisms on reducing the 
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agency costs. The methodology of constituting two samples representing two 
different periods with the exclusion of a specific year has been utilised by prior 
studies; e.g., Holderness, Kroszner and Sheehan (1999) examined the association 
between managerial ownership and performance during two different period 1935 
and 1995 using two different sample of the U.S. firms to capture the changes in this 
association for these two different periods. DeFond et al. (2011) investigate the 
impact of applying the 2005 mandatory International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) on mutual funds ownership structure by constituting two samples to represent 
the pre–IFRS period (2003-2004) and post-IFRS (2006-2007); likewise, Jiao et al. 
(2012) examine the impact of the 2005 IFRS on the financial analysts' ability to 
transform accounting information into forward looking information using data of the 
period 2004-2006 after excluding 2005, both studies used this method to avoid the 
any potential confounding effects.  
 The employed samples in this study include only those companies that were 
listed in the FTSE-All Share index during the study period. The researcher has 
excluded all delisted firms from the FTSE-ALL Share Index during the study period 
2005–2011 inclusive. This exclusion relates to data availability; annual reports for 
most of the delisted firms were not available during the data collection period. 
Moreover, All firms that belong to the financial industry like, banks, insurance 
companies (life and nonlife insurance companies), real estate investments companies 
(Real Estate Investment & Services and Real Estate Investment Trusts) and financial 
services companies (Financial Services, Equity Investment Instruments and Non-
equity Investment Instruments) have been excluded from the sample because of their 
special characteristics as they have their own regulations, corporate governance 
practices. Above this, companies belong to this sector are subject to external 
inspections from supervisory bodies like the Financial Services Authority (FSA). 
Furthermore, firms with missing data, either missing on DataStream or missing 
annual reports were also excluded. Moreover, as a result of using industry adjusted 
variables, all industry groups with less than two observations per group have been 
excluded. And finally, to fit with the requirements of panel data regression models; 
firms with less than two years of data observations were excluded (Stock and 
Waston, 2011). 
‎Chapter 5:  Research Methodology 
-148- 
 
 These selection criteria result in a full sample of 1431 non-financial firm–year 
observations that conform to the sampling criteria and have all the required data for 
the study period 2005–2011 inclusive; spilt into 562 for the pre–crisis period and 684 
for the post–crisis period after excluding year 2008. Hence, 2 years is the minimum 
observations number of each firm and the maximum is 7 years with average 6 years; 
this denotes that the full sample data set is an unbalanced panel data set. Similarly, 
the pre–crisis and post crisis samples, minimum 2 years observations per firm, the 
maximum 3 and average 2.9 observations, which means that the data sets for the pre 
and post crisis analysis are unbalanced as well. 
5.9.2 Data (sources and collection procedures) 
The data required for this study were gathered from a number of sources. A list of 
the companies that were incorporated in the FTSE ALL-Share index for each year of 
the study period was downloaded from the DataStream. Corporate governance 
variables, which include board characteristics represented in board size, number of 
independent non-executive directors, leadership structure, the composition of board 
subcommittees, and the characteristics of audit committee effectiveness as 
recommended by Smith Report (2003), all these variables were collected from 
annual reports for each company for the fiscal years 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2010 and 2011, as well as, the board ownership variables. Electronic versions of the 
required annual reports were downloaded from the companies’ website; missing 
reports on the company website were downloaded from either Northcote Internet Ltd 
website or AnnualReportsforplcs.co.uk. 
 The data collection process involves examining the board structure, identify the 
number of directors, check the directors’ profiles at the appointment dates, the 
compliance with the independence criteria as described by the UK corporate 
governance code, the number of board subcommittees and their composition, and 
checking either the CEO and chairman posts are separated or not. In regard to audit 
committee effectiveness criteria, the data collection process involved a number of 
procedures, first, check that the firm has audited committee, then check the number 
of members to ensure that the committee met the minimum number, after that, check 
the identity of the committee members to ensure they all independent directors, 
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afterward, check that at least one of the members has recent financial experience, and 
finally, check the number of meetings during the fiscal year. 
Ownership structure data was manually collected as well. With regard to board 
ownership variables, these variables were manually picked up from the annual 
reports. This process involves categorising the board members into three different 
groups CEO, executive members group and non-executive member group; then 
finding the total number of ordinary shares held by each member and the total 
number of firms’ ordinary shares. In relation to the total percentage of block holding 
and other ownership variables, this data was manually picked up from Thomson One 
Banker database, and likewise, the board ownership variables, block holding 
variables were categorised into institutional block holding, individual block holding 
and total block holding variables. As a final point, financial figures of the total assets, 
total debt, short and long term debt, performance ratios, and variables needed for 
computing Tobin’s Q and free cash flow variables, all were downloaded from 
DataStream. 
It worth mentioning that the employed sample in this study represents the 
following industries: Aerospace & Defence, Beverages, Chemicals, Construction & 
Materials, Electricity, Electronic & Electrical Equipment, Telecommunications, Food 
& Drug Retailers, Food Producers, Gas, Water & Multi-utilities, General Industrials, 
General Retailers, Health Care Equipment & Services, Household Goods & Home 
Construction, Industrial Engineering, Industrial Metals & Mining, Industrial 
Transportation, Media, Oil & Gas Producers, Oil Equipment & Services, Personal 
Goods, Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology, Software & Computer Services, Support 
Services, Technology Hardware & Equipment, Tobacco, Travel & Leisure. This 
indicates that the study sample is a comprehensive sample as it incorporates most of 
the industries in the UK market. Figure 4 represents a pie chart of the industrial 
representation over the full sample. 
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5.10 SUMMARY 
This chapter presents the methodology applied in this study based on the study 
aims and objectives. This study follows the positivism philosophy, and applies the 
deductive approach using an archival research strategy. Throughout this chapter, the 
researcher explored the study hypotheses, the measurement of the agency costs 
proxies, the measurement of the independent as well as the control variables; the 
analytical procedures of this study and finally, the sampling and data collection 
processes. 
To avoid the limitations of the prior studies, as mentions in the previous chapter, a 
comprehensive set of corporate governance mechanisms was employed, data 
required for board characteristics variables were collected manually from firms’ 
annual reports, ownership variables were manually collected from Thomson One 
Banker, and control variables data were downloaded from DataStream.  
These variables were utilised to construct a baseline line model and three different 
sub models. Furthermore, to avoid the limitations of the OLS, panel data regression 
models were utilised using the data collected for 1431 firm-year observations over 
the period 2005-2011. This first empirical analysis utilises the full sample to identify 
the overall impact of corporate governance on agency costs. Given that this study 
aims at investigating the role of corporate governance mechanisms before and after 
the financial crisis, the researcher constructed two sub samples, the pre–crisis sample 
covers the period 2005-2007 and the post crisis sample covers the period 2009-2011. 
The following chapter presents the results of the empirical analysis of the full sample 
analysis as well as the comparative analysis of the pre and post the financial crisis, in 
addition to the robustness checks and the further analyses employed.  
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CHAPTER 6 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS, RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, the researcher reports the results of the empirical analyses 
conducted in this study. In section  6.2, the researcher shows the descriptive statistics 
of the study sample; then report the correlation matrices and the results of the 
variance inflation factor (VIF) as checks of multicollinearity in section  6.3. 
Section  6.4 reports the results of the regression analyses for the full sample, then the 
comparative analysis of the pre and post the financial crisis. In section  6.5, the results 
of the endogeneity check as well as the results of the further analyses are reported. 
6.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Descriptive statistics provide information about the study’s data in a form that 
helps the researcher to understand the characteristics of the sample, and the variables 
utilised in this study and choosing the appropriate analyses methods. The represented 
tables in this section present the descriptive statistics, particularly mean, median, 
standard deviation, minimum, maximum, skewness and kurtosis for both the 
dependent and independent variables employed in this study. Table 4 reports the 
descriptive statistics of the full sample period 2005 – 2011 inclusive. Table 5 shows 
the movements and the changes happened in both dependent and independent 
variables during the study period and finally, Tables (5 and 6) present the descriptive 
statistics for the pre–crisis period (2005 – 2007) and post-crisis period (2009 – 2011). 
6.2.1 Descriptive statistics of the full sample 
As shown in Table 4, the net observations for the overall period are 1431 firm–year 
observations; the researcher has noticed the following: 
It was found that the average (median) assets turnover rate (TRN) was 1.054 
(0.92) turn(s), this average is lower than the average of 1.24 reported by Florackis 
(2008) for UK sample over the period 1999–2003. 45.6% of firms in the study 
sample have free cash flows, but don’t have the proper growth opportunities to invest 
these cash amounts based on the interaction between the free cash flow and growth 
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opportunity (QFCF) variable; this implies that almost half of the study sample has 
the potential to be subject to agency problems and costs of the free cash flow and the 
investment decisions. 
Table 4 Descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables for the FTSE All-Share Index 
companies over the period 2005-2011 inclusive 
 N Mean Median SD Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
BRD 1431 9.12 9 2.3785 5 19 0.98 3.99 
IND 1431 0.498 0.5 0.1066 0 0.917 -0.15 3.91 
ACE 1431 0.827 1 0.3786 0 1 -1.73 3.98 
REMU-IND 1431 0.897 1 0.1522 0 1 -1.83 8.61 
NOMINI-IND 1431 0.684 0.667 0.1318 0 1 -1.30 8.16 
REMU-COM 1431 0.955 1 0.2068 0 1 -4.41 20.41 
NOMINI-COM 1431 0.901 1 0.2981 0 1 -2.69 8.26 
DUL 1431 0.036 0 0.1872 0 1 4.96 25.56 
BLK 1431 0.311 0.28 0.2053 0 0.999 0.62 2.82 
N_BLK 1431 3.23 3 1.9809 0 10 0.59 2.87 
INST_BLK 1431 0.267 0.237 0.1870 0 0.999 0.75 3.19 
N_INST 1431 3 3 1.9534 0 10 0.70 3.08 
INDV_BLK 1431 0.043 0 0.1198 0 0.771 3.45 15.62 
N_INDV 1431 .262 0 0.617 0 4 2.57 9.6 
BRDOWN 1431 0.042 0.0026 0.1137 0 0.934 3.87 19.07 
CEOOWN 1431 0.016 0.0008 0.0673 0 0.712 6.74 55.46 
EXECOWN 1431 0.014 0.0005 0.0642 0 0.593 6.61 49.98 
NEDOWN 1431 0.011 0.0003 0.0538 0 0.771 7.94 82.30 
DBT 1431 0.240 0.217 0.1841 0 1.331 1.04 5.17 
ROA 1431 0.092 0.077 0.1106 -0.544 1.341 3.23 34.20 
DIVD 1431 0.414 0.347 2.2203 -53.8 31.5 -8.74 293.73 
TRN 1431 1.054 0.92 0.6647 0.0039 4.22 1.26 4.96 
Q 1431 1.579 1.198 1.8035 0.2196 31.470 8.83 114.08 
ASSTS
*
 1431 7360 1400 23000 20.811 220000 6.13 44.69 
BRD number of board members. IND is the percentage of the independent board members to total board size. ACE audit committee 
effectiveness. DULT is a dummy variable that takes the value of 0 if there is a separation between the CEO and chairman posts 1 otherwise. 
REMU-IND The percentage of independent non-executive members to the total number of the remuneration committee. NOMINI-IND The 
percentage of independent non-executive members to the total number of the nomination committee. REMU-COM A dummy variable that 
take the value of 1 if remuneration committee comprise of 3 members at least with majority of independent members. NOMINI-COM A 
dummy variable that take the value of 1 if nomination committee comprise of 3 members at least with majority of independent members. BLK 
is the total ownership percentage of blockholders owning 5% or more. N_BLK is the number of blockholders owning 5% or more. INSTBLK 
is the total ownership percentage of institutions owning 5% or more. N_INST is the number of institutions owning more than 5%. INDVBLK 
is the total ownership percentage of individuals holding 5% or more. N_INDVBLK is the number of individuals owning more than 5%. 
CEOOWN is percentage of CEO’s shares to the total outstanding shares. EXECOWN is percentage of the executive directors’ shares to the 
total outstanding shares. NEDOWN is percentage of the non-executive directors’ shares to the total outstanding shares. BRDOWN is 
percentage of the board directors’ shares to the total outstanding shares. ASSTS total assets. DBT is the total debt to total assets ratio. ROA is 
the Return on assets ratio, DIVD dividend pay-out ratio. Q Tobin’s 
In regard to the board characteristics across the overall analysis period: the 
average (median) board size is 9.12 (9), the smallest board was 5 board members and 
the largest was 19 members. This reported average is consistent with the effective 
board size proposed by Lipton and Lorsch (1992) as they suggest that the board size 
should not exceed ten members, however, a board of 8 or 9 members would be 
preferred.  
                                                          
*
 Numbers in millions 
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The average (median) percentage of independent non-executive directors is 49.8% 
(50%) this indicates that, for this sample, almost half of the board members are 
independent non-executive directors; this percentage reflects firms’ compliance with 
the UK Corporate Governance code that recommends firms to have at least half of 
the board member excluding the chairman to be independent members. The 
descriptive statistics also reveal that the degree of board independence for this 
sample varies from totally non-independent board (no independent members) to an 
almost totally independent board (91.7% independent members).  
Around 82.7% of the audit committees of this sample can be classified as an 
effective committee according to Smith Report (2003) recommendations. On 
average, 89.7% of the remuneration committee members are independent non-
executive, while the average percentage of the independent non-executive members 
of the nomination committee is about 68.4%. However, the statistics show that on 
average 95.5% and 90% of the study sample have remuneration and nomination 
committees, respectively, that are in compliance with the corporate governance code 
recommendation which requires firms to have remuneration and nomination 
committees constituted of at least three members with a majority of independent 
members. Finally, the incidence of duality is only 3.6%. Given that, McKnight and 
Weir (2009) reported an average of 6% of CEOs having a dual role in UK sample for 
the year 2000; Florackis (2008) reported an average of 8.1% for UK sample over the 
period 1999–2002. This gives an indication that firms tend to comply more with the 
recommendation of separating between the CEO and chairman roles.  
In regard to the Ownership characteristics across the overall analysis period: The 
average (median) percentage of block holding (shareholders holding more than 5%) 
is 31.1% (28%) with an average (median) 3.23 (3) main blockholders, the average 
(median) percentage of institutional block holding (institutions holding more than 
5%) is 26.7% (23.7%) with an average (median) 3 (3) institutions, the mean 
percentage of individual block holding is 4.3%. The average board ownership was 
4.2%, split into average CEO ownership of 1.6%, average executive board members’ 
ownership ratio was 1.4 % and average non-executive ownership was 1.1%.  
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In terms of the control variables: the average (median) debt to assets ratio was 
24% (21.7%); the average (median) of ROA was 9.21% (7.7%), and the average 
(median) of the dividend pay-out ratio was 41.4% (34.7%), the average (median) Q 
ratio is 1.579 (1.198) and the average (median) firm size measured by assets book 
value is 7360 (1400) million pounds. 
Table 5 provides descriptive statistics of the movements in the dependent and 
independent variables for the FTSE All-Share Index companies over the period 
2005-2011; movements related to board characteristics and the ownership structure 
are presented graphically in Figures (5-9). The researcher has noticed the following: 
In regard to board characteristics: it was found that the average board size was 
taking an overall decreasing trend, the average board size was 9.38 members in 2005 
and went down to touch its lowest point in 2010 with 8.82 board members before it 
starts to increase. However, the board median remained stable at 9 members across 
the study period. Such observation is consistent with arguments that firms tend to 
decrease their board size after crises (Yermack, 1996; Dalton et al., 1999; Lehn, 
Patro and Zhao, 2009). The average percentage of independent non-executive 
directors shows a gradual increase; it increased from 46.8% (50%) 2005 to 51.5% 
(50%) 2011; likewise, the median of the board size, the median of independent non-
executive directors percentage remained constant at 50%. 
By combining the decrease in board size with the increase of board independence 
ratio, this combination can suggest that firms tend to keep the number of independent 
board members constant and decrease the board size by reducing the number of 
executive members. This could affect the board performance because independent 
board members might lack the required firm specific knowledge. Moreover, this 
could facilitate the CEO domination over the board, given that with the limited 
number of insiders on the board, the CEO is the main source of inside information 
for the board. In addition, this limited number of executive members limits the CEO 
succession alternatives in front of the independent directors. 
Starting with a mean of 2.9% of firms having one person acts as CEO and board 
chairman in 2005, the statistics show that duality has fluctuated between a peak of 
4.9% in 2008 and a low of 2.6% in 2010 before ending at 3.46% in 2011. 
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Table 5 Yearly descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables for the FTSE All-Share Index companies over the period 2005-2011 inclusive 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median 
BRD 175 9.377 9 193 9.394 9 194 9.294 9 185 9.266 9 223 8.874 9 230 8.822 9 231 8.939 9 
IND 175 0.468 0.5 193 0.477 0.5 194 0.493 0.5 185 0.512 0.5 223 0.506 0.5 230 0.507 0.5 231 0.515 0.5 
ACE 175 0.703 1 193 0.798 1 194 0.851 1 185 0.838 1 223 0.839 1 230 0.852 1 231 0.879 1 
REMU-IND 175 0.928 1 193 0.924 1 194 0.903 1 185 0.892 1 223 0.881 1 230 0.881 1 231 0.879 1 
NOMINI-IND 175 0.666 0.667 193 0.673 0.667 194 0.658 0.667 185 0.686 0.667 223 0.692 0.667 230 0.697 0.667 231 0.70 0.714 
REMU-COM 175 0.931 1 193 0.948 1 194 0.954 1 185 0.968 1 223 0.955 1 230 0.957 1 231 0.97 1 
NOMINI-COM 175 0.857 1 193 0.891 1 194 0.897 1 185 0.919 1 223 0.906 1 230 0.913 1 231 0.918 1 
DUL 175 0.029 0 193 0.041 0 194 0.036 0 185 0.049 0 223 0.040 0 230 0.026 0 231 0.035 0 
BLK 175 0.281 0.24 193 0.276 0.23 194 0.297 0.27 185 0.296 0.27 223 0.331 0.32 230 0.335 0.31 231 0.342 0.32 
N_BLK 175 2.9 3 193 2.8 3 194 3.3 3 185 3.1 3 223 3.4 3 230 3.5 3 231 3.489 3 
INST_BLK 175 0.242 0.203 193 0.240 0.206 194 0.263 0.234 185 0.258 0.219 223 0.276 0.252 230 0.285 0.259 231 0.295 0.265 
N_INST 175 2.63 2 193 2.52 2 194 3.06 3 185 2.88 3 223 3.13 3 230 3.18 3 231 3.24 3 
INDV_BLK 175 0.039 0 193 0.036 0 194 0.033 0 185 0.039 0 223 0.055 0 230 0.050 0 231 0.047 0 
N_ INDV 175 0.268 0 193 0.248 0 194 0.247 0 185 0.254 0 223 0.286 0 230 0.273 0 231 0.251 0 
BRDOWN 175 0.039 0.003 193 0.030 0.0023 194 0.035 0.002 185 0.035 0 223 0.049 0.003 230 0.051 0.003 231 0.048 0.003 
CEOOWN 175 0.011 0.001 193 0.014 0.001 194 0.013 0.001 185 0.013 0.001 223 0.019 0.001 230 0.021 0.001 231 0.019 0.001 
EXECOWN 175 0.015 0 193 0.009 0.001 194 0.012 0 185 0.010 0.001 223 0.020 0.001 230 0.016 0.001 231 0.017 0.001 
NEDOWN 175 0.013 0 193 0.008 0 194 0.009 0 185 0.012 0 223 0.010 0 230 0.014 0 231 0.013 0 
DBT 175 0.237 0.219 193 0.250 0.213 194 0.261 0.233 185 0.273 0.260 223 0.240 0.225 230 0.217 0.187 231 0.213 0.192 
ROA 175 0.098 0.081 193 0.106 0.088 194 0.122 0.093 185 0.084 0.076 223 0.063 0.052 230 0.088 0.068 231 0.089 0.076 
DIVD 175 0.371 0.362 193 0.449 0.341 194 0.279 0.346 185 0.595 0.388 223 0.458 0.332 230 0.384 0.329 231 0.372 0.340 
TRN 175 1.104 0.96 193 1.130 0.97 194 1.059 0.93 185 1.018 0.92 223 1.021 0.91 230 1.022 0.895 231 1.043 0.88 
Q 175 1.773 1.321 193 1.955 1.462 194 1.817 1.463 185 1.268 0.920 223 1.307 0.997 230 1.514 1.128 231 1.494 1.042 
ASSTS

 175 6282 1300 193 5931 1300 194 6504 1550 185 8442 1700 223 7445 1300 230 7939 1400 231 8562 1500 
BRD number of board members. IND is the percentage of the independent board members to total board size. ACE audit committee effectiveness. DULT is a dummy variable that takes the value of 0 if there is a separation between the CEO 
and chairman posts 1 otherwise. REMU-IND The percentage of independent non-executive members to the total number of the remuneration committee. NOMINI-IND The percentage of independent non-executive members to the total 
number of the nomination committee. REMU-COM A dummy variable that take the value of 1 if remuneration committee comprise of 3 members at least with majority of independent members. NOMINI-COM A dummy variable that take 
the value of 1 if nomination committee comprise of 3 members at least with majority of independent members. BLK is the total ownership percentage of blockholders owning 5% or more. N_BLK is the number of blockholders owning 5% or 
more. INSTBLK is the total ownership percentage of institutions owning 5% or more. N_INST is the number of institutions owning more than 5%. INDVBLK is the total ownership percentage of individuals holding 5% or more. 
N_INDVBLK is the number of individuals owning more than 5%. CEOOWN is percentage of CEO’s shares to the total outstanding shares. EXECOWN is percentage of the executive directors’ shares to the total outstanding shares. 
NEDOWN is percentage of the non-executive directors’ shares to the total outstanding shares. BRDOWN is percentage of the board directors’ shares to the total outstanding shares. ASSTS total assets. DBT is the total debt to total assets 
ratio. ROA is the Return on assets ratio, DIVD dividend pay-out ratio. Q Tobin’s 
                                                          

 Numbers in millions 
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Figure 5 Variation in board size during the study period 2005-2011 inclusive 
 
Figure 6 Variation in board composition during the study period 2005-2011 inclusive 
 
The descriptive statistics show a gradual increase in the number of firms 
complying with Smith Report (2003) recommendations of the effective audit 
committee. On average, 70.3 percent of firms had effective audit committees 
according to Smith Report (2003) recommendations in 2005; this figure increased to 
reach 87.9 percent in 2011. This implies that more firms tend to have effective audit 
committees complying with Smith Report (2003) recommendations. Likewise, the 
statistics of the study sample show an overall increase in the percentage of firms 
complying with the recommendations of the corporate governance code in regard to 
the composition of the nomination and remuneration committees. The average 
percentage of firms having nomination and remuneration committees complying with 
the code recommendations increased from 85.7%, 93.1% in 2005 to reach 91.8% and 
97% in 2011 respectively.  
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The above-mentioned statistics show an overall compliance with the UK corporate 
governance recommendations with respect to the nomination and remuneration 
committees; however, the statistics also show that, on the one hand, the percentage of 
independent members of the remuneration committee decreased from 93% in 2005 to be 
88% in 2011; but on the other hand, the percentage of the independent members of the 
nomination committee increased from 66.6% in 2005 to be 70% in 2011. 
Figure 7 Variation in compliance with the board’s committees during the study period 2005-2011 
inclusive 
 
With respect to ownership characteristics: The average (median) percentage of 
block holding was constantly increasing from 28.1% (24%) in 2005 to reach 34.2% 
(32.2%) in 2011, whereas, the average number of blockholders slightly increased 
from 2.9 blockholder in 2005 to be 3.5 blockholders in 2011; while the median 
number of blockholders remained constant at 3 blockholders. Similarly, the average 
percentage of institutional block holding increased gradually during the study period, 
it increased from 24.2% (20.3%) in 2005 to 29.5% (26.5%) in 2011; the average 
(median) number on institutional blockholders slightly increased from 2.63 (2) in 
2005 to 3.24 (3) in 2011. The average percentage of individual blockholders was 
fluctuating during the study period; it recorded 3.9% in 2005, then it fell down to 
3.3% in 2007, then it started to increase gradually till it reached its highest point in 
2009 with an average of 5.5% before it started to fall down again steadily till it 
reached 4.7% in 2011. 
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Figure 8 Variation in block holding ratio during the study period 2005-2011 inclusive 
 
The statistics show an overall increasing trend for the board ownership 
percentage; it started with an average of 3.9% in 2005 and ended with an average 
board ownership percentage of 4.8% in 2011; this increasing trend was reflected on 
the other board ownership variables. 
Figure 9 Variation in board ownership ratio during the study period 2005-2011 inclusive 
 
With respect to agency cost variables: the average (median) turnover ratio started 
to decline from 1.1 (0.96) in 2005 till it reached its lowest point in 2008 with 1.01 
(0.92) turn, then it starts to recover till reach 1.04 (0.88) in 2011. Besides, the 
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statistics show that around 45% of the study sample in 2005 have free cash flow 
without appropriate investment prospects, then it drops to be 40% in 2007 before it 
starts to increase and remains constant around almost  47%  for the period 
2008:2011. 
With respect to the control variables, the average (median) debt to assets ratio was 
taking an increasing trend and peaked in 2008 with 27.3% (22%) before it started to 
fall down to reach 21.3% (19.16%) in 2011; such decrease on the average debt ratio 
is consistent with Spiegel (2011)’s conclusion that after the financial crisis, getting 
loans becomes costly and harder. ROA was taking an increasing trend for the period 
2005 - 2007; it was 9.8% in 2005 and increased to 12.2% in 2007, then it starts to 
decline in 2008 and fell down to 6.3% in 2009 before it started to recover and stay 
stable at an average of 8.85% for the years 2010 and 2011. The average dividend 
pay-out was also fluctuating during the study period; it started with 37% in 2005, 
then increased to 45% in 2006 before it suddenly falls down to its lowest point of 
27.9% in 2007, then it peaked again at 59.5% in 2009 before it falls and ends at 
37.2% in 2011. Tobin’s Q increased from 1.77 in 2005 to an approx. of 1.96 in 2006 
before it started to fall down to hit its lowest level of approx. of 1.27 in 2008, then it 
starts to increase dramatically and reach approx. of 1.5 in 2011. 
6.2.2 Descriptive statistics of the pre and post crisis samples 
Table 6 and Table 7 demonstrate the descriptive statistics for both the dependent 
and independent variables for the FTSE All-Share Index companies over the pre–
crisis period 2005 - 2007 and the post crisis recession period 2009 – 2011 
respectively. The net observations are 562 and 684 firm–year observations for the 
pre–crisis period and the post crisis period respectively. The researcher has noticed 
the following: 
With respect to the board characteristics: the average (median) board size 
decreased from 9.35 (9) for the pre–crisis period to be 8.88 (9) for the post crisis 
period. The smallest board was 5 board members for both periods, whereas, the 
largest board decreased from 19 members during the pre–crisis period to be 18 
members for the post crisis sample. Alagla (2012) reported an average board size of 
9.17 members for a sample of UK firms during the period 2004 – 2008 and Habbash 
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(2010) reported an average of 9 members for a UK sample covering the period 2003–
2006 which is almost the same as the reported averages. 
Table 6 Descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables for the FTSE All-Share 
Index companies over the period 2005-2007 inclusive 
 N    Mean Median SD Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
BRD 562 9.354 9 2.4930 5 19 0.92 3.69 
IND 562 0.480 0.5 0.1066 0 0.800 -0.40 4.01 
ACE 562 0.786 1 0.4102 0 1 -1.40 2.95 
REMU-IND 562 0.918 1 0.1556 0 1 -2.52 11.82 
NOMINI-IND 562 0.669 0.667 0.1383 0 1 -1.42 8.16 
REMU-COM 562 0.945 1 0.2285 0 1 -3.90 16.19 
NOMINI-COM 562 0.883 1 0.3222 0 1 -2.38 6.65 
DUL 562 0.036 0 0.1854 0 1 5.01 26.14 
BLK 562 0.285 0.24 0.2056 0 0.999 0.75 3.13 
N_BLK 562 2.97 3 2.0155 0 9 0.67 3.09 
INST_BLK 562 0.249 0.214 0.1925 0 0.999 0.89 3.57 
N_INST 562 2.74 2 1.9960 0 9 0.80 3.35 
INDV_BLK 562 0.036 0 0.1095 0 0.717 3.98 20.11 
N_INDV 562 0.254 0 0.666 0 4 2.93 11.62 
BRDOWN 562 0.034 0.0022 0.0995 0 0.677 4.35 22.96 
CEOOWN 562 0.013 0.0006 0.0554 0 0.646 7.31 66.25 
EXECOWN 562 0.012 0.0004 0.0551 0 0.548 7.45 63.83 
NEDOWN 562 0.010 0.0003 0.0427 0 0.490 7.05 63.13 
DBT 562 0.250 0.226 0.1907 0 1.331 1.34 6.86 
ROA 562 0.109 0.087 0.0969 -0.32 0.905 2.47 17.55 
DIVD 562 0.366 0.348 2.8692 -53.8 31.5 -10.02 253.69 
TRN 562 1.097 0.955 0.6808 0.12 4.21 1.22 4.83 
Q 562 1.851 1.430 1.8592 0.2915 25.259 7.81 87.14 
ASSTS

 562 6238 1400 18400 20.811 130000 5.65 36.15 
BRD number of board members. IND is the percentage of the independent board members to total board size. ACE audit 
committee effectiveness. DULT is a dummy variable that takes the value of 0 if there is a separation between the CEO and 
chairman posts 1 otherwise. REMU-IND The percentage of independent non-executive members to the total number of the 
remuneration committee. NOMINI-IND The percentage of independent non-executive members to the total number of the 
nomination committee. REMU-COM A dummy variable that take the value of 1 if remuneration committee comprise of 3 
members at least with a majority of independent members. NOMINI-COM A dummy variable that take the value of 1 if 
nomination committee comprise of 3 members at least with majority of independent members. BLK is the total ownership 
percentage of blockholders owning 5% or more. N_BLK is the number of blockholders owning 5% or more. INSTBLK is the 
total ownership percentage of institutions owning 5% or more. N_INST is the number of institutions owning more than 5%. 
INDVBLK is the total ownership percentage of individuals holding 5% or more. N_INDVBLK is the number of individuals 
owning more than 5%. CEOOWN is percentage of CEO’s shares to the total outstanding shares. EXECOWN is percentage of the 
executive directors’ shares to the total outstanding shares. NEDOWN is percentage of the non-executive directors’ shares to the 
total outstanding shares. BRDOWN is percentage of the board directors’ shares to the total outstanding shares. ASSTS total 
assets. DBT is the total debt to total assets ratio. ROA is the Return on assets ratio, DIVD dividend pay-out ratio. Q Tobin’s 
The statistics show an indication of increasing the board independence after the 
crisis. The average percentage of independent non-executive directors increased 
from 48% in the pre–crisis period to be 51% for the post crisis period, while, the 
median remained constant at 50%. Consistent with pre–crisis average, Aburaya 
(2012) reported an average of 46.7% for a sample of UK firms during the period 
2004–2007. There are two possible explanations for the increase of the average 
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percentage of independent non-executive directors after the crisis; the first is that, 
after the crisis, more firms tend to comply with the corporate governance 
recommendations; the second explanation is that firm tend to increase the number of 
independent directors to enhance the board’s ability in performing their monitoring 
role, and to build more connections with the external environment to secure their 
resources.  
The proportion of firms that can be classified as having an audit committee 
reflecting total compliance with Smith Report (2003) effectiveness recommendations 
increased from only 78.6% during the pre–crisis period to be 85.7% for the post 
crisis period. This implies that more firms tend to comply with Smith Report (2003) 
recommendations for the post crisis period compared to the pre–crisis period. The 
statistics reveal that the average percentage of remuneration committee 
independence decreased from an approx. of 92% to 88%; whereas, the average 
percentage of nomination committee independence increased from 67% to 70%. 
Nonetheless, The average percentage of firms having nomination and remuneration 
committees in compliance with the UK governance code increased from 88.3% and 
94.5% in the pre–crisis period to be 91.2% and 96.1% respectively for the post–crisis 
period. 
Finally, the instance of duality slightly decreased from 3.6% of the study sample 
during the period 2005–2007 to 3.4% for the period 2009 – 2011; This implies that 
approximately 96.5% of the firms incorporated in FTSE ALL-Share index comply 
with the UK corporate governance code and separate between the CEO and chairman 
roles for the study periods. In her study, Aburaya (2012) reported that the instance of 
duality in the UK firms during the period 2004 – 2007 was around 4%. 
In regard to the ownership characteristics: The average (median) block holding 
percentage increased from 28.5% (24.3%) for the pre–crisis period to be 33.6% 
(31.6%) for the post crisis period, this increase was reflected in the increase of the 
average number of blockholders from 2.97 main blockholders to be 3.45 
blockholders for the post crisis period. Likewise, the average (median) percentage of 
institutional block holding increased from is 24.9% (21.4%) for the pre–crisis period 
to be 28.5% (26%) for the post crisis period. In the same way the average (median) 
number of block holding institutions was 2.74 (2) institutions for the pre–crisis 
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period became 3.18 (3) institutions for the post crisis period. The average percentage 
of block holding by individual investors for the study periods jumped from 3.6% for 
the pre–crisis period to be 5.1% for the period 2009 – 2011. 
Table 7 Descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables for the FTSE All-Share 
Index companies over the period 2009-2011 inclusive 
 N    Mean Median SD Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
BRD 684 8.879 9 2.2504 5 18 0.99 4.14 
IND 684 0.51 0.5 0.1047 0.111 0.846 0.00 3.50 
ACE 684 0.857 1 0.3506 0 1 -2.04 5.15 
REMU-IND 684 0.88 1 0.1483 0 1 -1.32 6.42 
NOMINI-IND 684 0.696 0.667 0.1269 0 1 -1.13 7.74 
REMU-COM 684 0.961 1 0.1949 0 1 -4.73 23.37 
NOMINI-COM 684 0.912 1 0.2831 0 1 -2.91 9.50 
DUL 684 0.034 0 0.1804 0 1 5.17 27.77 
BLK 684 0.336 0.31 0.2051 0 0.941 0.54 2.67 
N_BLK 684 3.452 3 1.9244 0 9 0.52 2.55 
INST_BLK 684 0.285 0.260 0.1820 0 0.941 0.68 3.00 
N_INST 684 3.18 3 1.8891 0 9 0.60 2.70 
INDV_BLK 684 0.051 0 0.1302 0 0.771 3.09 12.87 
N_INDV 684 0.270 0 0.5865 0 3 2.17 6.97 
BRDOWN 684 0.050 0.0030 0.1270 0 0.934 3.51 16.23 
CEOOWN 684 0.020 0.0010 0.0777 0 0.712 6.14 45.60 
EXECOWN 684 0.018 0.0007 0.0741 0 0.593 5.80 38.24 
NEDOWN 684 0.012 0.0004 0.0619 0 0.771 8.01 80.50 
DBT 684 0.223 0.200 0.1750 0 0.854 0.74 3.17 
ROA 684 0.080 0.067 0.1201 -0.519 1.341 4.37 44.23 
DIVD 684 0.404 0.332 1.7251 -22.96 16.2222 -1.86 85.27 
TRN 684 1.029 0.9 0.6547 0.0039 4.22 1.27 5.07 
Q 684 1.440 1.047 1.7338 0.2196 31.470 10.01 150.62 
ASSTS

 684 7988 1400 25400 40.865 220000 6.06 42.89 
BRD number of board members. IND is the percentage of the independent board members to total board size. ACE audit 
committee effectiveness. DULT is a dummy variable that takes the value of 0 if there is a separation between the CEO and 
chairman posts 1 otherwise. REMU-IND The percentage of independent non-executive members to the total number of the 
remuneration committee. NOMINI-IND The percentage of independent non-executive members to the total number of the 
nomination committee. REMU-COM A dummy variable that take the value of 1 if remuneration committee comprise of 3 
members at least with majority of independent members. NOMINI-COM A dummy variable that take the value of 1 if nomination 
committee comprise of 3 members at least with majority of independent members. BLK is the total ownership percentage of 
blockholders owning 5% or more. N_BLK is the number of blockholders owning 5% or more. INSTBLK is the total ownership 
percentage of institutions owning 5% or more. N_INST is the number of institutions owning more than 5%. INDVBLK is the total 
ownership percentage of individuals holding 5% or more. N_INDVBLK is the number of individuals owning more than 5%. 
CEOOWN is percentage of CEO’s shares to the total outstanding shares. EXECOWN is percentage of the executive directors’ 
shares to the total outstanding shares. NEDOWN is percentage of the non-executive directors’ shares to the total outstanding 
shares. BRDOWN is percentage of the board directors’ shares to the total outstanding shares. ASSTS total assets. DBT is the total 
debt to total assets ratio. ROA is the Return on assets ratio, DIVD dividend pay-out ratio. Q Tobin’s 
The statistics show that the average of board ownership percentage roughly 
increased by 45%, the board ownership percentage jumped from 3.4% for the pre–
crisis period to be 5% for the period 2009- 2011. An equivalent average for the pre–
crisis period for was reported by Habbash (2010) for a UK sample, he reported an 
average of 3.3% for the period 2003–2006. This increase was obviously reflected on 
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the other board ownership variables. The average CEO ownership increased from 
1.3% to 2%; Alagla (2012) reported an average of 1.8% in his study. The average 
executive board members ownership ratio was 1.2% during the pre–crisis period 
turns to be 1.8% for the post crisis period; likewise, the average ownership 
percentage of non-executive members increased from 1% to be 1.2% for the post 
crisis period. 
With respect to agency costs proxy: the reported statistics reveal that the average 
assets turnover rate decreased from 1.097 turn(s) for the period (2005:2007) to 1.029 
turn(s) for the post crisis period. In terms of the of interaction between the free cash 
flow and growth opportunity (QFCF) as an agency costs proxy; the statistics show 
that the number of firms that have free cash flows, but don’t have the proper growth 
opportunities to invest these cash amounts based increased from 44.3% pre–crisis to 
be 46.8% for the post crisis period. 
In regard to the control variables: by comparing the post crisis averages with the 
pre–crisis ones; it was found that the average debt to assets ratio decreased from 25% 
to 22.3%; likewise, the average ROA decreased from 10.9% to 8%. Habbash (2010) 
reported an average debt to assets ratio of 24.8% in his study. However, the dividend 
pay-out ratio increased from 36.6% to 40.4%; and the average growth opportunities 
measured by Tobin’s Q decreased from 1.85 to 1.44; This implies that firms tend to 
become less dependent on debt or banks start to be more conservative in providing 
loans after the crisis; firms paid more dividends to the shareholders after the crisis 
compared to the post crisis period. The consequences of the financial crisis are 
unambiguously reflected on both the ROA and the Q ratio; firms attained less returns 
standardized by their assets after the crisis; above this, the growth opportunities 
measured by Q ratio became limited after the crisis.  
After stating the descriptive statistics many comments can be drawn from these 
statistics: first, the descriptive statistics show that there is a trend to decrease the 
board size, increase the percentage of the independent board members and to comply 
with the recommendations described in corporate governance code, Smith Report 
(2003) and the other reports published by the Financial Reporting Council for an 
effective audit committee. Second, Regarding the duality variable, by checking the 
dataset, the researcher found that the number of firms that do not separate between 
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the CEO and Chairman positions is almost constant during the study period, so the 
decrease in the incidence of duality in the post crisis period could be attributed to the 
change in the sample size as the post crisis sample is larger than the pre–crisis one. 
Third, there is a trend to increase the board ownership ratio. Fourth, the impact of the 
financial crisis clearly reflected in the financial figures like ROA, Tobin’s Q ratio 
and less loans. 
The descriptive statistics - shown in the previous Tables (3 to 6) – show that some 
of the employed variables are skewed and with high kurtosis values. According to 
Cameron and Trivedi (2009), Wooldridge (2010), Gujarati (2011), Stock and Waston 
(2011), Greene (2012) and Wooldridge (2013) to describe any variable as normally 
distributed, it should have skewness equal to 0 and kurtosis ± 3. However, other 
studies in the accounting literature (e.g., Haniffa and Hudaib (2006)) relaxed this 
criterion, as they mention variables could be considered to be normally distributed if 
their skewness value is within the range ± 1.96 and kurtosis value is between ± 3. 
However, it worth mentioning that it is difficult for some variables because of their 
nature to be normally distributed. For example, ACE, REMU-COM, NOMNI-COM 
and DUL are dummy variables; with values of either 0 or 1, therefore, it is normal to 
find the values of skweness and kurtosis for these variables out of the mentioned 
range.  
Given that the violation of the normality assumptions might affect the regression 
results, a special treatment for non-normal distributed variables should be employed 
as an attempt to normalise these variables. Data transformation is a common practice 
to deal with non-normally distributed variables with the purpose of improving their 
normality (Osborne, 2002; Hair et al., 2014). Osborne (2010b) demonstrates that 
square root, natural logarithm and inverse are the most common transformations 
applied in the social science studies. It is worth mention that researchers should 
consider the direction of the skewness (positively skewed or negatively skewed) 
before transforming the variable. Osborne (2010b) states that for a positive skewed 
variable, all transformations can work effectively as long as the lowest value is equal 
to or greater than 1, if not, a constant should be added to bring the minimum value to 
1; for negative skewed variables, the variable distribution must be reflected before 
transformation. Given that there are many transformation forms that can be used, 
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Hair et al. (2014) suggest that researchers should try all possible transformations and 
choose the transformation form that best adjusts the variable distribution to normality.  
Based on the above discussion and following the previous literature, e.g., Farinha 
(2003b), Singh and Davidson III (2003), Fleming, Heaney and McCosker (2005), 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), Zaman, Hudaib and Haniffa (2011) and Andreou, Louca 
and Panayides (2014), among others, variables that are not normally distributed were 
transformed in an attempt of making them normally distributed. Different 
transformation methods could be employed to transform non-normally distributed 
variables in a trail to improve their normality. The researcher has applied different 
transformation techniques (i.e., like natural logarithmic, square root and the inverse) 
and chosen the transformed form that improves the variables’ normality, in this study 
natural logarithmic and square root transformations were the most appropriate 
transformation forms for the variables utilised in this study
7
.  
The descriptive statistics also show that some variables have extreme values that 
might affect the regression estimates. These extreme values are very common when 
dealing with financial and market performance data collected over long time 
horizons for a diverse range of companies affiliated to different industries. However, 
the presence of extreme values (outliers) could have a significant impact over the 
estimated coefficients (Anderson, 2011; Hair et al., 2014) and hence, the validity and 
the possibility of generalizing the conclusions drawn from the analysis are 
questionable (Osborne, 2010a). 
The problem with the presence of outliers that it causes many statistical problems; 
first, outliers increase the standard error of the estimation, and decrease the statistical 
test power (Osborne, 2010a; Hair et al., 2014); second, non-random outliers could 
lead to overestimation or underestimation errors and finally, yield biased estimations 
(Osborne, 2010a).  
In the literature, there are many ways to deal with outlying observations. The first 
is to retain and consider them as normal data points, the second way is to exclude the 
outlying observations, and finally to winsorize them. Gujarati (2004) states that the 
                                                          
7
 Starting from the next section and so forth, variables donated with the prefix ln indicate that natural 
log transformation was applied to this variable, whereas the prefix sq refers to square root 
transformation. 
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decision about keeping or removing the outlying observation could change the 
regression results. Anderson (2011) suggests that before deciding on which way to 
deal with outliers; outliers should be examined to check either they are valid or 
invalid observations. In other words, to check either these outliers occurred because 
of a data entry error, or they are abnormal observations. For data entry error, simply, 
these erroneous entries will be corrected; whereas, for valid and correct observations, 
Anderson (2011) and Hair et al. (2014) recommend retaining them because of their 
contribution for better estimation and deep understanding of the examined 
phenomena as they represent a segment of the population that should not be excluded. 
Hair et al. (2014) state that by excluding outlying observations, researchers could 
improve their empirical results, however; they face the risk of limiting the 
generalizability of their results. Conversely, Osborne (2002) and Judd, MacClelland 
and Ryan (2009) argue that outlier should be eliminated from the analysis because of 
their negative impacts on the analysis results, and hence the inferences drawn from 
these influenced results could be misleading. 
The third option to deal with an outlier is to winsorize it instead of removing it. 
By winsorizing, the highest and the lowest values are replaced with certain values 
from the dataset itself (Osborne, 2010a). Garson (2012) mentions that winsorizing 
drags the values of the extreme points towards the mean by resetting extreme values 
to certain limits; which helps in improving the statistical power without leading to 
overestimation error; however, in some circumstances it could bring in biased 
estimations. In the accounting literature, prior studies cope with outliers by either 
exclusion or winsorization. For example, Fleming, Heaney and McCosker (2005) 
truncated the 5
th
 and the 95
th
 percentiles of their data set; likewise, Florackis (2008) 
excluded the 1
st
 and the 99
th
 percentiles for each variable in their study. Other studies 
in the prior literature (e.g., Larcker, Richardson and Tuna (2007); Ertugrul and 
Hegde (2008); Guest (2008); Ravina and Sapienza (2010)) used the other opinion 
and winsorized the employed variables in their studies. Leone, Minutti-Meza and 
Wasley (2013) mention that among the different methods utilised in the accounting 
literature, winsorizing has the modest impact on the estimated parameters compared 
to excluding or keeping the outlying observations and don not deal with them. In this 
study, in favour of keeping all data points and to ensure that these extreme values 
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had no impact on the regression results, and following the prior literature ownership 
variables and control variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles values. 
6.3 CORRELATION ANALYSIS 
Correlation analysis helps researchers to identify simple and primary associations 
between the utilised variables. Moreover, building on the assumptions of the OLS 
regression –mentioned in the previous chapter– the correlation between the 
independent variables should be investigated to ensure that there is no perfect 
multicollienarity among the utilised independent variables, which could affect the 
regression results. To do so, many tools can be utilised viz. correlation matrices and 
the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test. 
Examining the correlation matrix is the first and easiest way to detect 
multicollinearity among independent variables. Correlation matrix shows the 
direction, strength and the significance of the relations between variables (Sekaran, 
2003). Gujarati (2004, p.359) states that if the correlation coefficient between two 
independent variables exceeds 0.8, this indicates that the problem of multicollinearity 
is present. Likewise, Hair et al. (2014) mention that the presence of a high 
correlation coefficient (0.9 or more) between the independent variables gives a 
strong indication for the presence of collinearity between the correlated variables. 
However, Hair et al. (2014) also mention that the absence of any high correlation 
coefficients does not imply that there is no perfect multicollinearity between 
independent variables.  
To avoid any possibility of multicollinearity that might be present and not 
detected by the correlation matrix, additional investigation of the multicollinearity 
using the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) was applied. According to Gujarati (2004, 
p.362), Hair et al. (2014, p.200) the VIF (Tolerance 1/VIF) cut-off value is equal to 
10 (0.1), variables exceed this cut-off value are considered highly collinear and 
should not be included in the same model. 
6.3.1 Correlation analysis of the full sample 
As observed from the descriptive statistics section (previous section), some of the 
employed variables in the full sample analysis are not normally distributed. This 
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implies that parametric tests are not appropriate for analysing relationships between 
the study variables. Dewhurst (2006) and Brooks (2014) mention that utilising non-
parametric tests could be one of the possible solutions to deal with non-normally 
distributed variables and small samples; such tests are robust for non-normal 
distributed data, even though these tests are not with the same power of their 
equivalent parametric tests; as they do not require any distributional assumptions 
(Brooks, 2014), as they are known as distribution-free methods (Anderson, 2011); 
thus, to assess the association between the study’s variables, non-parametric test 
should be used. Pfeffer (1972) and Sekaran (2003) mention that Spearman’s rank 
correlation is one of the non-parametric tests that could be used for data that do not 
fulfil the parametric assumptions for Pearson’s correlation. 
Building on that, Spearman (non-parametric) correlation coefficient measure is 
employed as the primary tool to ensure that there is no perfect multicollienarity 
among the utilised independent variables. Besides, the Pearson’s (parametric) 
correlation coefficient measure is also employed as a robustness check.  
Table 8 presents the correlation matrices for the variables employed in the full 
sample analysis. Coefficients which are significant at the 1 % level are reported in 
bold, whereas, significant coefficients at the 5% level are shown in italic. 
None of the reported coefficients exceed the maximum accepted value of 0.8 with 
exception of the coefficient of correlation between the total percentage of block 
holding and the total percentage of institutional block holding (ρ = 0.833). This high 
correlation is logical and expected; considering that, normally the major blockholders 
are expected to be institutions not individuals, so any increase in the block holding 
ratio should be related to an increase in the institutional block holding and vice versa. 
However, this correlation is not expected to affect the study analysis as these 
correlated variables are employed in different models. Similarly, the correlation 
coefficients show high significant correlations between the total board ownership 
percentage and the ownership percentage of CEO (ρ = 0.746); between the total 
board ownership percentage and total ownership of executive board members (ρ = 
0.685) and finally, between the total board ownership percentage and total ownership 
of non-executive board members (ρ = 0.681); such correlations are expected and 
normal between a variable presents the total percentage of board ownership and the 
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total board ownership percentage components (CEO, executive and non-executive 
ownership percentages); also, it implies that firms that adopt the orientation of 
increasing managerial ownership apply it to all board members without 
differentiating between being affiliated or non-affiliated to the firm. Nonetheless, 
these correlations do not affect the study analysis, because these correlated variables 
are utilised in different models. 
The reported coefficients show that the assets turnover is negatively correlated 
with the debt ratio, whereas, it is positively correlated with the ROA ratio; suggesting 
that leverage lessens the management ability in utilising firm’s assets base; whereas, 
the more returns achieved, the more resources that become available to reinvest and 
utilise the firm’s assets base; such relationship is expected and logical. The reported 
correlation coefficients show that there is a positive significant correlation between 
board size and each of audit committee effectiveness, and firm size; indicating that 
large firms tend to be managed by large boards because of the need of more efforts, 
more expertise and more connections to secure the required resources. Board size is 
negatively correlated with the different variables of block holding; this gives rise to 
more than one interpretation; the first is that blockholders tend to reduce the board 
size; or large board is a negative sign which alienates investors from investing large 
amounts in such firms with large boards.  
Board composition is positively correlated with board size, suggesting that as the 
board size increases, firms tend to recruit more independent directors to enhance 
board independence; another possible interpretation is that large boards are more 
independent compared to small boards.  Moreover, board composition is positively 
correlated with firm compliance with different subcommittees recommendations, 
hinting that independent board members enhance firm’s compliance with the code 
recommendations; also, board composition  is positively correlated with firm size 
which could imply that large firms need more independent directors to control over 
the board. Conversely, board composition is negatively correlated with the different 
board ownership variables and different block holding variables as well; such 
correlations suggest that block holding and board ownership tend to be low with the 
increase of the number of independent board members; another possible 
interpretation is that blockholders and managers entrench themselves by controlling 
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board composition. Such correlations are consistent with Bhagat and Black (1996) 
and Lasfer (2006) predictions that the more managerial ownership, the less 
independent board memebers the firm will have; Bathala and Rao (1995) argue the 
negative association between insiders ownership and board independence results 
from the less need for the monitoring role of outside directors for firms with high 
managerial ownership. 
The correlation matrix also reveals a positive correlation between duality on one 
side and the total block holding percentage, the total individual block holding ratio, 
board ownership variables (CEO and non-executives ownership) and growth 
prospects on the other side. These correlations suggest that the duality increases in 
the firms with dominating blockholders, also, suggest that the board ownership 
increases with the duality which can imply that dual CEOs use board ownership as a 
tool to entrench themselves. Also, there is a significant positive correlation between 
the CEO ownership ratio and each of the executive and non-executive board 
members’ ownership ratios. The correlation matrix shows a significant negative 
association between board ownership variables and board size, such correlations 
could indicate that with the increase of board ownership, owner managers tend to 
decrease the board size in an attempt of controlling over the board; such relationship 
could be consistent with the managerial entrenchment assumptions.  
As a final comment, firm size is negatively correlated with each of duality, return 
on assets, different ownership variables (block holding as well as board ownership 
variables) and firm’s growth opportunities. These correlations indicate that as the 
firm size increases the block holding decreases; with the increase in firm size, the 
ability of profit generation becomes limited; and the increase in firm size dilutes the 
board ownership ratio, Lehn, Patro and Zhao (2009) report that management 
ownership is expected to be negatively associated with firm size; and that duality is 
most probably present in small firms rather than large firms. The coefficients show 
that large firms tend to have large boards with more independent directors and 
subcommittees in compliance with the code recommendations and to be highly 
leveraged. However, the matrix shows that leverage is negatively associated with the 
return on assets, implying that debt diminishes the profitability of the study sample; 
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another interpretation could be drawn from that negative correlation is that profitable 
firms tend to decrease their leverage ratio. 
It is worth mentioning that Pearson correlation coefficients do not report any 
correlations that are above the accepted critical value of 0.8 apart from the previously 
mentioned correlations; which endorse the results of spearman’s coefficients of the 
absence of multicollinearity between the independent variables utilised in this study. 
However, in this study, VIF test was utilised as a robustness check of 
multicollinearity. As a final point, the correlation coefficient represents either there is 
a linear association between two variables or not. It indicates the strength and the 
type of that relation (positive or negative relationship) as well; however, it neither 
shows the direction of causality, nor confirms a causal relationship between the 
related variables; consequently, more than one interpretation can be drawn from the 
same coefficient. 
Table 9 reports the VIF and the tolerance values of the employed variables in the 
four models of the full sample analyses. The mean VIF values for the employed 
models (the baseline and sub models) are 1.32, 1.5, 1.3 and 1.43 respectively. None 
of the reported VIF coefficients exceeded the critical value of 10 as suggested by 
Gujarati (2004) and Hair et al. (2014). This indicates that there is no perfect 
multicollinearity between the models’ variables. Together these results with the 
reported correlation coefficients, the researcher can claim that there is no perfect 
multicollinearity between the utilised independent variables. 
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Table 8 Correlation coefficients for the employed variables over the period 2005-2011 inclusive 
 
 lnadj 
TRN 
QFCF lnBRD lnIND ACE REMU
-COM 
NOMINI
-COM 
DUL BLK lnINST_
BLK 
lnINDV_
BLK 
lnBRDO
WN 
lnCEO 
OWN 
lnEXE
COW
N 
lnNED
OWN 
lnadj 
DBT 
sqadjD
IVD 
lnadj 
ROA 
lnadjQ ln 
ASSTS 
lnadjTRN 1  0.049 -0.003 -0.011 -0.041 0.028 -0.021 0.025 -0.011 0.056 0.018 -0.020 0.034 0.030 -0.311 -0.023 0.190 0.094 -0.060 
QFCF  1 0.013 -0.004 0.027 0.027 0.049 0.065 0.032 0.054 0.024 0.024 0.038 0.001 -0.008 0.055 0.033 -0.136 -0.362 0.125 
lnBRD 0.037 0.017 
 
1 0.172 0.163 0.043 0.079 0.041 -0.259 -0.237 -0.101 -0.083 -0.105 0.003 -0.051 -0.003 0.013 -0.020 -0.052 0.475 
lnIND 0.002 -0.038 
 
0.184 1 0.353 0.298 0.217 -0.026 -0.164 -0.098 -0.139 -0.172 -0.086 -0.142 -0.098 0.004 0.011 -0.054 -0.078 0.376 
ACE -0.035 0.033 
 
0.175 0.342 1 0.401 0.363 -0.049 -0.164 -0.075 -0.167 -0.140 -0.082 -0.118 -0.049 0.037 -0.007 -0.044 -0.066 0.204 
REMU-COM -0.060 0.041 
 
0.063 0.242 0.401 1 0.405 -0.048 -0.034 -0.017 -0.043 -0.036 0.001 -0.044 -0.043 -0.026 -0.018 -0.031 -0.042 0.084 
NOMINI-COM 0.010 0.043 
 
0.088 0.180 0.363 0.405 1 -0.036 -0.047 -0.024 -0.051 -0.026 -0.028 0.000 -0.038 -0.007 -0.042 -0.006 -0.038 0.111 
DUL -0.026 -0.097 
 
0.024 -0.013 -0.049 -0.048 -0.036 1 0.123 0.015 0.182 0.224 0.351 0.084 0.010 0.001 -0.028 0.024 0.079 -0.114 
BLK 0.010 0.023 
 
-0.297 -0.151 -0.157 -0.034 -0.038 0.126 1 0.811 0.436 0.375 0.258 0.241 0.176 -0.044 -0.033 0.048 0.060 -0.329 
lnINST_BLK -0.025 0.071 
 
-0.268 -0.074 -0.072 -0.010 -0.019 0.010 0.833 1 -0.160 -0.088 -0.077 -0.059 -0.014 0.011 0.015 -0.007 -0.019 -0.290 
lnINDV_BLK 0.057 -0.056 
 
-0.081 -0.166 -0.159 -0.114 -0.085 0.137 0.366 -0.105 1 0.775 0.552 0.516 0.338 -0.080 -0.073 0.076 0.111 -0.135 
lnBRDOWN -0.048 -0.065 
 
-0.183 -0.395 -0.219 -0.135 -0.076 0.140 0.315 0.093 0.446 1 0.683 0.664 0.500 -0.041 -0.080 0.083 0.069 -0.136 
lnCEOOWN -0.063 -0.076 
 
-0.225 -0.273 -0.097 -0.080 -0.021 0.138 0.214 0.126 0.213 0.746 1 0.193 0.092 -0.086 -0.069 0.055 0.069 -0.111 
lnEXECOWN -0.001 -0.081 
 
-0.058 -0.443 -0.172 -0.071 -0.037 0.162 0.134 0.024 0.230 0.685 0.530 1 -0.015 -0.021 -0.066 0.043 0.035 -0.104 
lnNEDOWN -0.040 0.002 
 
-0.197 -0.237 -0.182 -0.138 -0.126 0.010 0.255 0.172 0.250 0.681 0.403 0.336 1 0.034 0.016 0.065 0.009 -0.054 
lnadjDBT -0.275 0.058 
 
0.000 -0.001 0.042 -0.019 0.002 0.003 -0.059 -0.005 -0.055 -0.043 -0.066 -0.012 0.053 1 -0.020 -0.112 -0.075 0.081 
sqadjDIVD 0.087 0.119 
 
0.018 -0.008 0.033 0.005 0.051 0.044 -0.061 -0.086 0.008 -0.019 -0.037 -0.001 -0.061 0.040 1 0.031 0.041 -0.019 
lnadjROA 0.181 -0.359 
 
-0.025 -0.059 -0.055 -0.065 -0.025 0.049 0.000 -0.048 0.057 0.053 0.061 0.083 -0.019 -0.127 -0.079 1 0.527 -0.153 
lnadjQ 0.070 -0.739 
 
-0.042 -0.084 -0.065 -0.055 -0.051 0.109 0.018 -0.047 0.095 0.105 0.104 0.087 0.025 -0.049 -0.097 0.563 1 -0.318 
lnASSTS -0.095 0.199 
 
0.437 0.364 0.217 0.085 0.100 -0.125 -0.354 -0.289 -0.176 -0.359 -0.293 -0.324 -0.315 0.134 -0.004 -0.165 -0.316 1 
 Spearman (Pearson) correlations are below (above) the diagonal 
 Correlations in bold and italic are significant at the 1% and 5% levels respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
BRD number of board members. IND is the percentage of the independent board members to total board size. ACE audit committee effectiveness. DULT is a dummy variable that takes the value of 0 if there is a separation between the CEO and 
chairman posts 1 otherwise. REMU-COM A dummy variable that take the value of 1 if remuneration committee comprise of 3 members at least with majority of independent members. NOMINI-COM A dummy variable that take the value of 1 if 
nomination committee comprise of 3 members at least with majority of independent members. BLK is the total ownership percentage of blockholders owning 5% or more. N_BLK is the number of blockholders owning 5% or more. INSTBLK is the 
total ownership percentage of institutions owning 5% or more. INDVBLK is the total ownership percentage of individuals holding 5% or more. CEOOWN is percentage of CEO’s shares to the total outstanding shares. EXECOWN is percentage of 
the executive directors’ shares to the total outstanding shares. NEDOWN is percentage of the non-executive directors’ shares to the total outstanding shares. BRDOWN is percentage of the board directors’ shares to the total outstanding shares. 
ASSTS total assets. DBT is the total debt to total assets ratio. ROA is the Return on assets ratio, DIVD dividend pay-out ratio. Q Tobin’s. ln is the natural logarithm transformation sq is the square root transformation  
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Table 9 Variance Inflation Factor test results for the full sample 2005-2011 inclusive 
Baseline model Sub model 1 Sub model 2 Sub model 3 
Variable VIF 1/VIF Variable VIF 1/VIF Variable VIF 1/VIF Variable VIF 1/VIF 
lnASSTS 1.76 0.569 lnINDV_BLK 2.65 0.377 lnASSTS 1.8 0.554 lnINDV_BLK 2.46 0.406 
lnadjQ 1.53 0.652 lnBRDOWN 2.61 0.383 lnadjQ 1.53 0.652 lnASSTS 1.78 0.561 
lnadjROA 1.4 0.713 lnASSTS 1.78 0.563 lnadjROA 1.41 0.711 lnCEOOWN 1.67 0.598 
ACE 1.39 0.720 lnadjQ 1.55 0.644 lnBRD 1.4 0.715 lnadjQ 1.56 0.641 
lnIND 1.36 0.733 lnadjROA 1.4 0.712 ACE 1.39 0.721 lnEXECOWN 1.53 0.655 
REMU-COM 1.36 0.734 ACE 1.39 0.718 REMU-COM 1.37 0.731 lnadjROA 1.41 0.710 
lnBRD 1.36 0.735 lnIND 1.37 0.732 lnIND 1.37 0.732 ACE 1.4 0.716 
BLK 1.31 0.762 lnBRD 1.36 0.733 BLK 1.29 0.776 lnBRD 1.39 0.721 
NOMINI-COM 1.28 0.783 REMU-COM 1.36 0.734 NOMINI-COM 1.28 0.781 lnIND 1.37 0.733 
lnBRDOWN 1.25 0.801 NOMINI-COM 1.28 0.782 lnCEOOWN 1.26 0.792 REMU-COM 1.36 0.733 
DUL 1.08 0.922 lnINST_BLK 1.18 0.849 DUL 1.19 0.844 NOMINI-COM 1.28 0.781 
lnadjDBT 1.02 0.976 DUL 1.08 0.922 lnEXECOWN 1.12 0.895 lnNEDOWN 1.26 0.797 
sqadjDIVD 1.01 0.989 lnadjDBT 1.03 0.971 lnNEDOWN 1.06 0.947 DUL 1.18 0.845 
   sqadjDIVD 1.01 0.989 lnadjDBT 1.03 0.967 lnINST_BLK 1.18 0.847 
      sqadjDIVD 1.01 0.987 lnadjDBT 1.04 0.963 
         sqadjDIVD 1.01 0.987 
Mean VIF 1.32 
 
Mean VIF 1.5  Mean VIF 1.3  Mean VIF 1.43  
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6.3.2 Correlation analysis of the pre and post crisis periods 
In this section the correlation analyses of the employed variables in the pre and 
post crisis analyses are reported, given that the direction and the strength of the 
correlation coefficients for the pre and post crisis samples are different and opposite 
for some variables, suggesting that the associations between the variables could 
change in response to the change in the surrounding economic conditions; thus, the 
researcher will provide a brief summary about the reported coefficients for each 
sample independently. 
Table 10 and Table 11 present the correlation matrices for the variables employed 
in the pre and post crisis analysis. As reported in the descriptive section, some of the 
employed variables are not normally distributed, thus, Spearman (non-parametric) 
correlation coefficients are reported below the diagonal as the primary investigative 
tool for multicollinearity, whereas, Pearson’s (parametric) correlation coefficients are 
reported above the diagonal as a robustness check. Coefficients which are significant 
at 1% level are reported in bold, while, significant coefficients at the 5% level are 
shown in italic. 
 Along the lines of the full sample coefficients; none of the reported coefficients 
for both samples exceed the maximum accepted value of 0.8 with exception to the 
correlation coefficient of the total percentage of block holding and the total 
percentage of institutional block holding. This high correlation is logical and 
expected as mentioned in the previous section. Also, the correlation matrices show 
high significant correlations between the total board ownership percentage on the one 
side and the ownership percentage of CEO, total ownership of executive board 
members, and total ownership of non-executive board members on the other; 
however, as these correlated variables are employed in different models, thus these 
high correlations do not affect the regression results. 
With respect to the pre–crisis sample, the reported coefficients –shown in Table 
10– show that the asset utilisation as a proxy of agency costs is negatively correlated 
with the debt ratio, whereas, it is positively correlated with each of the ROA ratio 
and the Q ratio; suggesting that leverage increases agency costs, while the increase of 
returns enhances the utilisation of the assets base; besides, the more growth prospects 
the firm has the lower agency costs. The reported correlation coefficients show that, 
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consistent with the full sample coefficients, board size is negative and significantly 
correlated with the different variables of block holding as well as the different 
measures of board ownership with exception to the executive ownership variable. 
Consistent with the full sample coefficients, board composition is positively 
correlated with board size; moreover, board composition is positively correlated with 
firm compliance with different subcommittees recommendations, hinting that 
independent board members can be an influential factor of the compliance with the 
code recommendations; likewise, board composition is positively correlated with 
firm size which could imply that firm size could be a determinant of the board 
composition. Conversely, board composition is negatively correlated with all board 
ownership variables and different block holding variables. 
The correlation matrix also reveals a positive correlation between duality on the 
one side and the total block holding percentage, total individual block holding ratio, 
board ownership variables (CEO and non-executives ownership) and growth 
prospects on the other side. The correlation matrix shows a significant negative 
association between board ownership and board size, and a positive and significant 
association between the CEO ownership ratio and each of ownership ratios of other 
board members. The coefficients also disclose a negative correlation between firm 
size and each of duality, return on assets, different ownership variables (block 
holding as well as board ownership variables) and firm’s growth opportunities.  
 The coefficients show that large firms tend to have large boards with more 
independent members and board subcommittees in compliance with the governance 
code recommendations; also, large firms tend to rely more in debt. Such correlations 
are in line with the full sample correlations, and hence same interpretations could 
apply. There is also a positive association between individual block holding and each 
of ROA and Q ratios, this can imply that individual blockholders are good monitors, 
and their presence enhances firm performance. 
Table 11 presents the correlation coefficients between the study variables for the 
post crisis analysis. Assets turnover is negatively correlated with the debt ratio and 
positively correlated with each of the ROA ratio and dividend pay-out ratio, which 
can suggest that the increase in dividends paid to shareholders enhances the 
utilisation of the assets base and hence reduces agency costs; or the more utilisation 
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of firm’s asset base the more dividends paid to the shareholders. Consistent with the 
full and pre–crisis samples, the reported correlation coefficients show that there is a 
positive significant correlation between board size and each of board composition, 
audit committee effectiveness. Moreover, board size is negatively correlated with the 
different ownership variables (block holding as well as board ownership). 
In line with the full and pre–crisis samples, board composition is positively 
associated with having board subcommittees that are compliant with governance 
code recommendations; suggesting that for the post crisis period, board composition 
enhances firm’s compliance with the governance code. Also, board composition is 
negatively correlated with different board ownership variables as well as the different 
block holding variables. 
The correlation matrix also shows that duality, from the one side, is positively and 
significantly correlated with total block holding percentage, total individual block 
holding ratio, various board ownership variables and growth prospects from the other 
side. The correlation matrix displays a significant negative association between board 
ownership and board size, which is consistent with the coefficients of the full and 
pre–crisis samples. Compared to the pre–crisis sample, the correlation matrix shows 
that after the crisis individual block holding ratio becomes weakly correlated with 
ROA and Q ratios, moreover, the matrix also shows that institutional block holding 
becomes negatively correlated with ROA and Q. This negative association could 
imply that institutional block holding has a negative impact on firm performance, or 
poor performance influences institutional blockholders to change their investment 
portfolio. 
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Table 10 Correlation coefficients for the employed variables over the period 2005:2007 inclusive 
  lnadj 
TRN 
QFCF lnBRD IND ACE 
REMU
-COM 
NOMIN
I-COM 
DUL BLK 
lnINST_
BLK 
lnINDV_
BLK 
lnBRD
OWN 
lnCEO 
OWN 
lnEXEC
OWN 
lnNED
OWN 
lnadj 
DBT 
sqadj 
DIVD 
lnadj 
ROA 
lnadjQ 
ln 
ASSTS 
lnadjTRN 1   0.054 -0.018 -0.069 -0.047 0.042 -0.05 0.052 0.024 0.046 -0.035 -0.013 0.021 -0.013 -0.334 0.031 0.257 0.199 -0.058 
QFCF 
 
1 -0.005 -0.024 -0.014 -0.013 -0.015 -0.07 0.015 0.068 -0.097 -0.061 -0.089 -0.058 0.024 0.06 -0.05 -0.215 -0.424 0.146 
lnBRD 0.041 0.016 1 0.164 0.186 0.051 0.082 -0.01 -0.246 -0.2 -0.114 -0.091 -0.082 -0.031 -0.05 -0.012 -0.03 -0.038 -0.102 0.579 
lnIND -0.02 0.06 0.185 1 0.379 0.297 0.231 0.02
2 
-0.165 -0.118 -0.105 -0.15 -0.062 -0.156 -0.085 -0.001 0.036 -0.077 -0.178 0.47 
ACE -0.09 0.003 0.195 0.373 1 0.35 0.322 -0.04 -0.126 -0.077 -0.101 -0.089 -0.061 -0.141 0.018 0.09 -0.008 -0.067 -0.13 0.261 
REMU-COM -0.08 0.037 0.074 0.23 0.35 1 0.323 0.00
4 
-0.011 0.006 -0.034 -0.052 -0.024 -0.06 -0.055 -0.015 0.031 -0.033 -0.059 0.104 
NOMINI-COM 0.011 0.007 0.093 0.191 0.322 0.323 1 -0.02 0.022 0.03 -0.009 -0.011 0.011 -0.004 -0.068 -0.043 0.022 0.017 -0.054 0.145 
DUL -0.06 -0.097 -0.016 0.019 -0.041 0.004 -0.019 1 0.152 -0.014 0.305 0.347 0.518 0.162 -0.045 0.003 0.003 0.04 0.104 -0.138 
BLK 0.01 0.05 -0.279 -0.152 -0.128 -0.01 0.016 0.15
2 
1 0.854 0.366 0.297 0.198 0.218 0.137 -0.087 0.044 0.172 0.154 -0.395 
lnINST_BLK -0.03 0.022 -0.241 -0.099 -0.082 0.013 0.028 -0.01 0.858 1 -0.167 -0.075 -0.092 -0.066 -0.007 0.006 0.037 0.089 0.05 -0.299 
lnINDV_BLK 0.059 -0.156 -0.099 -0.146 -0.069 -0.103 -0.012 0.22
7 
0.305 -0.127 1 0.708 0.536 0.53 0.304 -0.167 0.014 0.16 0.195 -0.213 
lnBRDOWN -0.01 -0.122 -0.123 -0.381 -0.2 -0.142 -0.053 0.20
3 
0.192 0.006 0.414 1 0.731 0.713 0.512 -0.098 -0.016 0.119 0.098 -0.186 
lnCEOOWN -0.05 -0.146 -0.181 -0.251 -0.038 -0.064 0.008 0.22 0.115 0.029 0.175 0.709 1 0.347 0.166 -0.138 -0.009 0.104 0.127 -0.172 
lnEXECOWN 0.017 -0.178 0.001 -0.402 -0.207 -0.057 -0.023 0.22
6 
0.088 -0.023 0.202 0.686 0.54 1 0.005 -0.081 -0.017 0.15 0.087 -0.125 
lnNEDOWN -0.03 -0.016 -0.105 -0.21 -0.124 -0.122 -0.067 0.00
4 
0.109 0.06 0.199 0.68 0.347 0.323 1 -0.013 -0.046 -0.008 -0.036 -0.064 
lnadjDBT -0.3 0.068 -0.024 0.008 0.095 -0.014 -0.032 0.00
8 
-0.1 -0.007 -0.111 -0.059 -0.091 0.004 0.068 1 0.069 -0.001 -0.031 0.093 
sqadjDIVD 0.065 0.108 0.013 0.092 0.042 0.049 0.053 0.08 -0.017 -0.049 0.041 -0.063 -0.062 -0.012 -0.067 0.065 1 0.009 0.042 -0.043 
lnadjROA 0.196 -0.434 -0.054 -0.077 -0.06 -0.07 0.004 0.04
9 
0.097 0.021 0.122 0.088 0.081 0.114 0.041 -0.035 -0.02 1 0.62 -0.23 
lnadjQ 0.116 -0.723 -0.092 -0.169 -0.106 -0.088 -0.073 0.14
1 
0.118 0.028 0.204 0.177 0.171 0.184 0.08 -0.038 0.063 0.64 1 -0.439 
lnASSTS -0.09 0.221 0.54 0.462 0.263 0.101 0.132 -0.15 -0.393 -0.292 -0.252 -0.407 -0.327 -0.343 -0.313 0.144 0.002 -0.21 -0.406 1 
Spearman (Pearson) correlations are below (above) the diagonal 
Correlations in bold and italic are significant at the 1% and 5% levels respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
BRD number of board members. IND is the percentage of the independent board members to total board size. ACE audit committee effectiveness. DULT is a dummy variable that takes the value of 0 if there is a separation between the CEO and 
chairman posts 1 otherwise. REMU-COM A dummy variable that take the value of 1 if remuneration committee comprise of 3 members at least with majority of independent members. NOMINI-COM A dummy variable that take the value of 1 if 
nomination committee comprise of 3 members at least with majority of independent members. BLK is the total ownership percentage of blockholders owning 5% or more. N_BLK is the number of blockholders owning 5% or more. INSTBLK is 
the total ownership percentage of institutions owning 5% or more. INDVBLK is the total ownership percentage of individuals holding 5% or more. CEOOWN is percentage of CEO’s shares to the total outstanding shares. EXECOWN is 
percentage of the executive directors’ shares to the total outstanding shares. NEDOWN is percentage of the non-executive directors’ shares to the total outstanding shares. BRDOWN is percentage of the board directors’ shares to the total 
outstanding shares. ASSTS total assets. DBT is the total debt to total assets ratio. ROA is the Return on assets ratio, DIVD dividend pay-out ratio. Q Tobin’s. ln is the natural logarithm transformation sq is the square root transformation  
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Table 11 Correlation coefficients for the employed variables over the period 2009:2011 inclusive 
 lnadj 
TRN 
QFCF lnBRD IND ACE REMU-
COM 
NOMIN
I-COM 
DUL BLK lnINST
_BLK 
lnINDV_
BLK 
lnBRD 
OWN 
lnCEO 
OWN 
lnEXEC 
OWN 
lnNED
OWN 
lnadj 
DBT 
adj 
DIVD 
lnadj 
ROA 
Lnadj 
Q 
ln 
ASSTS 
lnadjTRN 1  0.064 -0.022 0.040 -0.023 0.029 -0.001 -0.001 -0.045 0.070 0.063 -0.022 0.057 0.081 -0.292 0.005 0.146 -0.013 -0.052 
QFCF  1 0.021 0.006 0.036 0.051 0.094 -0.55 0.016 0.033 -0.005 -0.021 -0.016 0.018 -0.035 0.054 -0.030 -0.082 -0.351 0.115 
lnBRD 0.061 0.014 1 0.152 0.190 0.078 0.106 0.052 -0.291 -0.282 -0.083 -0.064 -0.109 0.026 -0.033 -0.010 0.004 -0.003 -0.015 0.368 
lnIND 0.003 0.016 0.232 1 0.378 0.407 0.249 -0.154 -0.200 -0.102 -0.179 -0.214 -0.118 -0.147 -0.116 0.002 -0.036 -0.053 -0.027 0.255 
ACE 0.011 0.015 0.202 0.310 1 0.453 0.434 -0.086 -0.273 -0.130 -0.252 -0.225 -0.153 -0.143 -0.096 -0.007 0.021 0.004 0.026 0.160 
REMU-COM -0.041 0.037 0.092 0.264 0.453 1 0.521 -0.087 -0.080 -0.062 -0.058 -0.032 0.008 -0.029 -0.045 -0.051 0.015 -0.008 -0.016 0.077 
NOMINI-COM 0.021 0.075 0.099 0.156 0.434 0.521 1 -0.057 -0.145 -0.097 -0.104 -0.053 -0.078 0.006 -0.023 -0.003 0.059 0.002 -0.009 0.075 
DUL -0.011 -0.081 0.024 -0.049 -0.086 -0.087 -0.057 1 0.115 0.039 0.127 0.143 0.198 0.050 0.021 0.003 0.061 -0.015 0.036 -0.096 
BLK 0.008 0.050 -0.318 -0.187 -0.262 -0.083 -0.124 0.120 1 0.773 0.486 0.414 0.284 0.262 0.171 -0.007 0.023 -0.032 -0.007 -0.293 
lnINST_BLK -0.034 0.097 -0.302 -0.082 -0.122 -0.061 -0.086 0.033 0.803 1 -0.165 -0.132 -0.086 -0.087 -0.050 0.020 -0.058 -0.072 -0.074 -0.287 
lnINDV_BLK 0.064 -0.021 -0.069 -0.196 -0.266 -0.141 -0.170 0.101 0.423 -0.094 1 0.828 0.554 0.556 0.331 -0.029 0.107 0.037 0.063 -0.081 
lnBRDOWN -0.052 -0.048 -0.219 -0.432 -0.298 -0.157 -0.122 0.113 0.406 0.142 0.491 1 0.648 0.652 0.469 -0.027 0.132 0.067 0.065 -0.086 
lnCEOOWN -0.056 -0.036 -0.255 -0.341 -0.217 -0.120 -0.086 0.092 0.265 0.179 0.245 0.752 1 0.106 0.023 -0.058 0.110 0.026 0.018 -0.042 
lnEXECOWN -0.004 -0.030 -0.096 -0.483 -0.209 -0.107 -0.061 0.118 0.171 0.060 0.253 0.687 0.502 1 -0.024 -0.011 0.104 -0.009 0.019 -0.094 
lnNEDOWN -0.039 0.021 -0.251 -0.262 -0.266 -0.179 -0.210 0.034 0.370 0.258 0.304 0.672 0.442 0.332 1 0.042 -0.005 0.110 0.057 -0.028 
lnadjDBT -0.237 0.062 0.002 0.008 -0.005 -0.038 0.004 0.000 -0.026 0.006 -0.020 -0.043 -0.065 -0.044 0.037 1 -0.002 -0.185 -0.132 0.069 
adjDIVD 0.100 -0.133 0.019 -0.054 0.039 -0.030 0.062 0.017 -0.082 -0.111 -0.001 0.026 -0.018 0.022 -0.055 0.017 1 0.018 0.039 -0.012 
lnadjROA 0.181 -0.290 0.003 -0.054 -0.018 -0.048 -0.018 0.028 -0.073 -0.105 0.017 0.013 0.011 0.063 -0.065 -0.174 0.168 1 0.418 -0.073 
lnadjQ 0.008 -0.763 0.001 -0.037 0.005 -0.022 -0.030 0.066 -0.058 -0.110 0.026 0.054 0.037 0.025 -0.019 -0.073 0.140 0.486 1 -0.213 
lnASSTS -0.087 0.183 0.331 0.272 0.188 0.076 0.061 -0.111 -0.327 -0.290 -0.129 -0.295 -0.254 -0.294 -0.287 0.127 -0.006 -0.109 -0.240 1 
Spearman (Pearson) correlations are below (above) the diagonal 
Correlations in bold and italic are significant at the 1% and 5% levels respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
BRD number of board members. IND is the percentage of the independent board members to total board size. ACE audit committee effectiveness. DULT is a dummy variable that takes the value of 0 if there is a separation between the 
CEO and chairman posts 1 otherwise. REMU-COM A dummy variable that take the value of 1 if remuneration committee comprise of 3 members at least with majority of independent members. NOMINI-COM A dummy variable that 
take the value of 1 if nomination committee comprise of 3 members at least with majority of independent members. BLK is the total ownership percentage of blockholders owning 5% or more. N_BLK is the number of blockholders 
owning 5% or more. INSTBLK is the total ownership percentage of institutions owning 5% or more. INDVBLK is the total ownership percentage of individuals holding 5% or more. CEOOWN is percentage of CEO’s shares to the total 
outstanding shares. EXECOWN is percentage of the executive directors’ shares to the total outstanding shares. NEDOWN is percentage of the non-executive directors’ shares to the total outstanding shares. BRDOWN is percentage of the 
board directors’ shares to the total outstanding shares. ASSTS total assets. DBT is the total debt to total assets ratio. ROA is the Return on assets ratio, DIVD dividend pay-out ratio. Q Tobin’s. ln is the natural logarithm transformation 
sq is the square root transformation  
 
‎Chapter 6: Empirical Analysis, Results and Discussion 
-180- 
 
 
Table 12 Variance Inflation Factor test results for the pre–crisis period 2005 – 2007 inclusive 
Baseline model Sub model 1 Sub model 2 Sub model 3 
Variable VIF 1/VIF Variable VIF 1/VIF Variable VIF 1/VIF Variable VIF 1/VIF 
lnASSTS 2.72 0.367 lnASSTS 2.73 0.367 lnASSTS 2.81 0.356 lnASSTS 2.73 0.367 
lnadjQ 2 0.500 lnINDV_BLK 2.23 0.448 lnadjQ 2.01 0.498 lnINDV_BLK 2.14 0.468 
lnadjROA 1.68 0.596 lnBRDOWN 2.15 0.465 lnBRD 1.71 0.586 lnadjQ 2.06 0.486 
lnBRD 1.67 0.599 lnadjQ 2.04 0.490 lnadjROA 1.69 0.591 lnCEOOWN 1.81 0.552 
lnIND 1.59 0.627 lnadjROA 1.68 0.597 lnCEOOWN 1.66 0.603 lnadjROA 1.69 0.591 
ACE 1.37 0.732 lnBRD 1.67 0.597 lnIND 1.6 0.624 lnBRD 1.68 0.595 
lnBLK 1.3 0.771 lnIND 1.6 0.627 DUL 1.48 0.678 lnIND 1.6 0.627 
lnBRDOWN 1.26 0.792 ACE 1.37 0.731 ACE 1.38 0.726 lnEXECOWN 1.53 0.652 
REMU-COM 1.25 0.798 REMU-COM 1.25 0.798 lnBLK 1.29 0.774 DUL 1.49 0.673 
NOMINI-COM 1.21 0.825 NOMINI-COM 1.21 0.825 REMU-COM 1.26 0.796 ACE 1.38 0.722 
DUL 1.19 0.839 lnINST_BLK 1.21 0.830 lnEXECOWN 1.22 0.818 REMU-COM 1.25 0.797 
lnadjDBT 1.06 0.945 DUL 1.2 0.834 NOMINI-COM 1.22 0.819 lnNEDOWN 1.24 0.810 
sqadjDIVD 1.02 0.984 lnadjDBT 1.08 0.928 lnNEDOWN 1.1 0.907 NOMINI-COM 1.22 0.818 
   sqadjDIVD 1.02 0.983 lnadjDBT 1.08 0.929 lnINST_BLK 1.21 0.825 
      sqadjDIVD 1.02 0.982 lnadjDBT 1.09 0.916 
         sqadjDIVD 1.02 0.981 
Mean VIF 1.49 
 
Mean VIF 1.6 
 
Mean VIF 1.5 
 
Mean VIF 1.57 
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Table 13 Variance Inflation Factor test results for the post-crisis period 2009 – 2011 inclusive 
Baseline model Sub model 1 Sub model 2 Sub model 3 
Variable VIF 1/VIF Variable VIF 1/VIF Variable VIF 1/VIF Variable VIF 1/VIF 
REMU-COM 1.66 0.602 lnINDV_BLK 3.32 0.301 REMU-COM 1.67 0.599 lnNDV_BLK 3.15 0.317 
ACE 1.54 0.650 lnBRDOWN 3.29 0.304 ACE 1.53 0.653 lnEXECOWN 1.87 0.536 
NOMINI-COM 1.49 0.673 REMU-COM 1.66 0.603 NOMINI-COM 1.5 0.668 lnCEOOWN 1.82 0.549 
BLK 1.43 0.700 ACE 1.54 0.649 BLK 1.4 0.713 REMU-COM 1.67 0.600 
lnIND 1.39 0.719 NOMINI-COM 1.49 0.671 lnIND 1.39 0.720 ACE 1.54 0.649 
lnASSTS 1.35 0.742 lnIND 1.39 0.718 lnASSTS 1.38 0.726 NOMINI-COM 1.5 0.666 
lnBRDOWN 1.32 0.759 lnASSTS 1.36 0.733 lnadjQ 1.28 0.778 lnIND 1.39 0.719 
lnadjQ 1.29 0.777 lnadjQ 1.3 0.772 lnBRD 1.27 0.790 lnASSTS 1.37 0.727 
lnadjROA 1.25 0.800 lnBRD 1.25 0.799 lnadjROA 1.26 0.793 lnNEDOWN 1.37 0.731 
lnBRD 1.25 0.802 lnadjROA 1.25 0.800 lnCEOOWN 1.17 0.852 lnadjQ 1.3 0.771 
DUL 1.06 0.942 lnINST_BLK 1.23 0.811 lnEXECOWN 1.13 0.885 lnBRD 1.28 0.783 
lnadjDBT 1.05 0.955 DUL 1.06 0.941 DUL 1.09 0.918 lnadjROA 1.26 0.793 
adjDIVD 1.03 0.973 lnadjDBT 1.05 0.955 lnNEDOWN 1.07 0.934 lnINST_BLK 1.23 0.810 
   adjDIVD 1.03 0.972 lnadjDBT 1.05 0.949 DUL 1.09 0.918 
      adjDIVD 1.03 0.970 lnadjDBT 1.05 0.948 
         adjDIVD 1.03 0.969 
Mean VIF 1.31 
 
Mean VIF 1.59 
 
Mean VIF 1.28 
 
Mean VIF 1.5 
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As a final point, firm size is negatively correlated with each of duality, return on 
assets, different ownership variables (block holding as well as board ownership 
variables) and firm’s growth opportunities. These correlations indicate that as the 
firm size increases the block holding decreases; with the increase in firm size, the 
ability of profit generation becomes limited; and the increase in firm size dilutes 
board ownership. The coefficients show that large firms have large independent 
boards with subcommittees that are in compliance with the code recommendations 
and to be more debt reliant. However, the matrix shows that leverage is negatively 
associated with the return on assets, implying that debt diminishes the profitability of 
this sample; another interpretation could be drawn from that negative correlation is 
that profitable firms tend to decrease their leverage ratio. 
Likewise the full sample matrix, the Pearson’s correlation coefficients for the pre 
and post crisis samples are consistent with Spearman’s coefficients, in terms of not 
exceeding the maximum accepted value of 0.8. However, VIF test is employed as a 
robustness test for checking multicollinearity.  
Table 12 and Table 13 report the results of VIF tests for the pre and post crisis 
analyses. The reported results endorse the inferred results from the correlation 
matrices that there is no multicollinearity between the independent variables. The 
mean VIF values of the models employed in the pre–crisis samples are 1.49, 1.6, 1.5, 
and 1.57 respectively, with a maximum value of 2.81, and 1.31, 1.59, 1.28 and 1.5 
respectively for the post crisis sample with a maximum value of 3.32. The reported 
VIF values are very far from the maximum accepted value of 10 as suggested by 
Gujarati (2004) and Hair et al. (2014), and hence, the researcher can argue that there 
is no multicollinearity between the employed variables. Taken together, the 
correlation matrices and the VIF results confirm that the employed models in this 
study do not suffer from a harmful collinearity between the independent variables. 
6.4 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
In this section, the researcher reports and discusses the results of the regression 
analysis of the impact of a comprehensive set of corporate governance mechanisms 
on agency costs measured by asset utilisation and the interaction of free cash flows 
and growth prospects.  
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6.4.1 Asset utilisation as an agency costs measure 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, grounded in both the research objectives 
and the characteristics of the employed data set, the researcher is applying the panel 
data regression methods instead of the pooled OLS. The study sample has several 
years for a large number of cross sectional observation units. Moreover, the pooled 
OLS regression analysis treats every firm-year observation as an independent 
observation neglecting the fact that each firm is repeated for a number of years, thus 
they are related, such treatment, causes a loss of valuable information about the firm 
specific characteristics which could change the results of the analysis (Di Pietra et 
al., 2008). Two regression models can be employed using panel data, which are 
fixed effects model and random effects model, in order to choose between these two 
models; Hausman (1978) specification test should be applied, and based on the test’s 
result; the researcher has to apply the appropriate method that fits with data set 
characteristics. Briefly, Hausman (1978) specification test, tests a null hypothesis 
that there is no correlation between the subject effects and the utilised independent 
variables. Therefore, the failure to reject this null hypothesis implies that the random 
effects model is better than the fixed effects, whereas, the rejection of the null 
hypothesis indicates that there is a correlation between subject effects and the 
independent variables, and hence fixed effect is appropriate that the random effects 
model. 
Table 14 Results of Hausman specification test to decide between fixed and random 
effects regression models for the whole sample 
 Baseline model Sub model 1 Sub model 2 Sub model 3 
χ2 19.73 21.23 22.52 18.44 
p-value 0.1021 0.1697 0.0948 0.1873 
Table 14 shows the results of the Hausman specification test for the full sample 
2005:2011 inclusive; the reported results indicate that the null hypotheses cannot be 
rejected as there is no correlation between the independent variables and the subject 
effects; therefore, random effects regression model is appropriate for the whole 
sample data set. 
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6.4.1.1  Full sample results 
Table 15 reports the results of the random effects panel data regression model for 
the study full sample covering the period 2005-2011 inclusive. The reported χ2 
values of the four models are significant (p-value < 1 percent) for the different 
combinations of corporate governance mechanisms and employed control variables 
indicating that random effects models regression model is appropriate for both the 
study data set and employed variables. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, asset 
utilisation is an inverse measure of agency costs, which means that high asset 
utilisation ratio reflects efficient management practices and hence lower agency 
conflicts and costs by assuming that efficient management works for the best interest 
of shareholders. 
For the baseline model, the coefficient of board size is positive (0.044) and 
significant (p-value < 10 percent), indicating that large boards enhance firm 
performance by increasing the asset utilisation ratio and reducing agency costs for 
this study sample; whereas, Duality was found to be negatively and significantly 
associated with asset utilisation, (coefficient -0.06, p-value < 10 percent) implying 
assigning the roles of CEO and the chairman to the same person increases agency 
costs in terms of lower asset utilisation ratio; which is consistent with the agency 
theory perspective. The results also reveal that blockholders can act as good 
monitors. The coefficient of the block holding variable (shareholders owning 5% of 
the firm’s outstanding shares) is positive (0.073) and significant at the 0.05 
significance level, indicating that there is a significant association between the 
percentage of block holding and lower agency costs. 
In sub model 1, the researcher investigates either the identity of blockholders has 
an impact on agency costs or not. In doing so, the researcher splits the block holding 
ratio, based on the identity of the blockholder, into institutional block holding and 
individual block holding. In the governance literature, it is argued that institutional 
blockholders could be efficient mechanism to monitor and control the self-interested 
behaviour of the management; however, there is limited research that investigates 
whether individual block holding can be an effective monitoring mechanism or not. 
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Table 15 Results of the random effects panel data regression model with robust 
standard error for the study sample covering the period 2005-2011 inclusive 
 Baseline 
model 
Sub 
model 1 
Sub 
model 2 
Sub model 
3 
Intercept 1.45 1.44 1.45 1.45 
 (3.34)
***
 (3.33)
***
 (3.34)
***
 (3.33)
***
 
lnBRD 0.044 0.045 0.041 0.041 
 (1.74)
†
 (1.77)
†
 (1.59) (1.63) 
lnIND -0.031 -0.031 -0.026 -0.025 
 (-0.42) (-0.42) (-0.35) (-0.34) 
ACE 0.0094 0.0099 0.0097 0.01 
 (0.69) (0.73) (0.71) (0.73) 
REMU-COM -0.0087 -0.0082 -0.0098 -0.0093 
 (-0.44) (-0.41) (-0.50) (-0.47) 
NOMINI-COM 0.0096 0.01 0.0092 0.01 
 (0.52) (0.56) (0.50) (0.54) 
DUL -0.06 -0.061 -0.05 -0.05 
 (-1.74)
†
 (-1.76)
†
 (-1.44) (-1.45) 
BLK 0.073  0.074  
 (2.34)
*
  (2.39)
*
  
lnINST_BLK  0.074  0.075 
  (1.73)
†
  (1.74)
†
 
lnINDV_BLK  0.18  0.18 
  (2.04)
*
  (1.98)
*
 
lnBRDOWN -0.035 -0.082   
 (-0.44) (-0.98)   
lnCEOOWN   -0.23 -0.28 
   (-2.22)
*
 (-2.50)
*
 
lnEXECOWN   0.1 0.051 
   (0.95) (0.45) 
lnNEDOWN   -0.039 -0.069 
   (-0.20) (-0.37) 
lnadjDBT -0.53 -0.53 -0.53 -0.53 
 (-5.93)
***
 (-5.95)
***
 (-5.90)
***
 (-5.91)
***
 
sqadjDIVD 0.097 0.096 0.095 0.094 
 (1.35) (1.34) (1.32) (1.30) 
lnadjROA 0.42 0.42 0.41 0.41 
 (3.07)
**
 (3.07)
**
 (3.06)
**
 (3.05)
**
 
lnadjQ -0.0027 -0.0045 -0.0033 -0.0053 
 (-0.089) (-0.15) (-0.11) (-0.17) 
lnASSTS -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 
 (-1.79)
†
 (-1.81)
†
 (-1.79)
†
 (-1.82)
†
 
N 1431 1431 1431 1431 
groups 239 239 239 239 
wald χ2 70.47
***
 71.6
***
 78.04
***
 80.16
***
 
z-statistics in parentheses 
†
p < 0.10, 
*
p < 0.05, 
**
p < 0.01, 
***
p < 0.001 
All variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile values 
Dependent variable: Industry adjusted asset utilisation ratio  
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The results reported in Table 15 for sub model 1 show consistent results with the 
baseline model in both the significance level and the direction of the association. The 
results show that large boards reduce agency costs. The coefficient is positive (0.045) 
and significant at the 10% significance level. The results also show that duality has a 
negative impact on agency costs; the coefficient is negative and significant at the 10% 
significance level. With respect to the identity of blockholders, the results reveal that 
institutional block holding has a positive and significant role in mitigating agency 
problems and reducing agency costs. The coefficient is positive (0.074) and 
significant (p-value<10 percent). Likewise, individual blockholders are significantly 
associated with high asset utilisation and lower agency costs. Both results endorse 
the argument that blockholders are key players in monitoring and controlling 
management’s behaviour, such control was positively reflected in less conflicts and 
lower agency costs. However, the coefficients and the significance levels reveal that 
individual blockholders are more efficient in performing their monitoring role; such 
results show that, regardless of the identity of the blockholder; large ownership stake 
can influence the monitoring role of the blockholder. 
With respect to sub model 2, the researcher investigates the role of board 
ownership measured by the CEO ownership percentage, the non-executive directors’ 
ownership ratio and the executive members’ ownership ratio in mitigating agency 
problems and reducing agency costs. The results of baseline and sub model 1 
indicate that the total board ownership ratio is negatively associated with asset 
utilisation; however, this negative association is not significant. After categorizing 
the total board ownership ratio according to the affiliation of the director, the results 
indicate that among the different board ownership ratios, only the CEO ownership 
ratio has a significant association with agency costs, the coefficient is negative and 
significant at the 5% significance level, indicating that the increase of the CEO 
ownership increases agency conflicts and reduces management efficiency. 
Consistent with baseline model’s results, the reported results reveal that block 
holding is positively associated with lower agency costs at the significant level 5%. 
In sub model 3, the researcher utilises a large and comprehensive set of 
governance variables to investigate the role of these governance mechanisms in 
reducing agency costs, and to control for the interactions among the different 
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governance mechanisms. In this model, the researcher investigates the impact of the 
blockholder identity (individual and institutional block holding) and board 
ownership after split it into three different categories which are CEO, executive and 
non-executive directors’ ownership percentages in addition to other board and firm 
characteristics on asset utilisation as a proxy of agency costs. The reported results for 
blockholders identity variables in sub model 3 are consistent with the results 
reported in sub model 1. Institutional block holding is positively associated 
(coefficient 0.075) with asset utilisation at the 10% significance level; likewise, the 
individual block holding is positively (coefficient 0.18) and significantly (p-value < 
5 percent) associated with lower agency costs. Additionally, the results are 
consistent with sub model 2 results, the CEO ownership percentage still negatively 
associated with agency costs (coefficient -0.28) at the 5% significance level. 
Regarding the other board characteristics employed in the four models; the 
reported results show that effective audit committee, and effective nomination 
committee are positively associated with asset utilisation; whereas, independent 
board members and an effective remuneration committee are associated with high 
agency costs; however, all of these associations are insignificant. 
With regard to control variables, the reported results, for all models, as shown in 
Table 15, are consistent. The results show that the industry adjusted debt ratio is 
negative and significantly associated with the asset turnover rate (p-value <0.001). 
Tobin’s Q as a proxy for growth opportunities are negatively associated with asset 
utilisation, whereas, dividend pay-out ratio is positively associated with asset 
utilisation; however, these associations are insignificant. The industry adjusted ROA 
is positively associated with lower agency costs at the significant level 1%; while 
firm size measured by the asset value is negative and significantly associated with 
asset utilisation at the significance level 10%. 
‎Chapter 6: Empirical Analysis, Results and Discussion 
-188- 
 
6.4.1.2  Results discussion 
6.4.1.2.1 Board size 
The reported results of the baseline and sub model 1 reveal that there is a positive 
association between board size and asset utilisation, this association is significant at 
the 10% level and supports the study hypothesis that large boards are associated with 
higher asset utilisation ratio. This result indicates that large boards help in reducing 
agency costs for the study sample. The reported result supports the stewardship 
theory, resource dependence theory as well as the agency theory. Bearing in mind 
that the asset utilisation is an efficiency measure as it is agency costs proxy, this 
significant positive association could imply that managers are good stewards for the 
firm’s asset, and the diversity of experiences, knowledge and business background 
enhances the board’s performance.  
Furthermore, this result supports Cheng (2008)’s argument that, on the one hand, 
large boards are subject to communication and coordination problems, but on the 
other hand, that large size allows for more in-depth and critical discussions to reach 
consensus among the board members and hence less extreme and more compromised 
decisions, which reduces variability in firm performance. Moreover, this result could 
indicate that large boards increase the number of monitors over the CEO and the 
executive management; furthermore, it is difficult for the CEO to dominate over 
large boards, leading to more board independence from the CEO and management 
which is consistent with the monitoring role proposed by the agency theory. Another 
possible explanation for this positive association, which is based on resource 
dependence theory, is that large boards are boundary spanners, and they help in 
enhancing the firm’s ability for securing the needed resources using their 
connections and networks, and hence, more opportunities for better utilisation for the 
firm’s asset base.  
By comparing the study results with the results of other studies; the researcher 
found that this result consistent with the results reported by Ibrahim and Samad 
(2011), they find that large boards are positively associated with asset utilisation 
ratio in the Malaysian context. However, the study findings contradict with the 
results of such prior studies, like Singh and Davidson III (2003) for the U.S. context, 
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and Florackis (2008) in the UK context; both studies find that small boards are 
significantly associated with high asset utilisation ratio implying that small boards 
are more efficient in reducing agency costs. Nonetheless, the use of different 
regression analyses, different sample sizes and different time period could explain 
this difference between the reported results and the results of other studies.  
6.4.1.2.2 Board independence 
6.4.1.2.2.1 Board composition 
This study hypothesized a positive association between the percentage of 
independent directors and asset utilisation. The reported results in Table 15 for the 
ratio of independent directors to total board members indicate that board 
composition is negatively associated with asset utilisation, and thus higher agency 
costs, but this association is insignificant. The study results failed to support this 
hypothesis and any of the theoretical arguments around the role of independent board 
members in mitigating the consequences of agency problems; which can imply that 
balanced boards are more helpful in mitigating agency problems. 
The reported results are consistent with the results of prior studies like Singh and 
Davidson III (2003), Florackis (2008) and McKnight and Weir (2009). Singh and 
Davidson III (2003) find that board composition does not appear to have a 
significant impact on agency costs for a sample of U.S. firms. Likewise, Florackis 
(2008) and McKnight and Weir (2009) find that non-executive directors have no 
significant impact on agency costs for the UK firms; McKnight and Weir (2009) 
conclude that non-executive directors neither increase nor reduce agency costs, and 
thus, calling for more independent boards does not benefit shareholders' wealth. 
However, the studies of Henry (2010) and Ibrahim and Samad (2011) provide 
opposite results; as they find a positive and significant association between board 
independence and asset utilisation suggesting that board independence enhances 
shareholders’ wealth in the Australian and Malaysian contexts respectively.  
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6.4.1.2.2.2 Duality 
With regard to the second component of board independence, the results of the 
baseline and sub model 1 reveal that there is a negative association between board 
size and asset utilisation, this association is significant at the 10% level; however, the 
results show a negative but insignificant association for the sub models 2 and 3; 
which provides a partial support to the third hypothesis of this study. 
This reported results stand against the stewardship theory which claims that 
working under single leader and vision is advantageous for the firm performance. 
However, this positive association between duality and high agency costs is in line 
with the arguments grounded in agency theory that the separation between the roles 
of CEO and chairman is required for maintaining board independence. Otherwise, 
the CEO could be able to dominate and control over the board and hinder the board’s 
ability to perform their monitoring role. 
Prior literature provides mixed results with respect to the relationship between 
duality and agency costs. Henry (2010) report evidence that duality is not 
detrimental to the performance of Australian firms; interestingly, he finds that 
duality reduces agency costs. Similarly, Ibrahim and Samad (2011) find that duality 
is positively associated with asset utilisation of Malaysian companies. With respect 
to the UK context, Florackis (2008) and McKnight and Weir (2009) find that duality 
is not significantly associated with agency costs.  
6.4.1.2.3 Board subcommittees 
According to the agency theory, board of directors is responsible to monitor the 
performance of the CEO and the executive management and to set the compensation 
packages that correspond with their performance (Jensen, 1993); Daily et al. (1998) 
mention that, as a part of their monitoring role, the board is responsible to protecting 
the shareholders from the excessive CEO compensation. Besides, as a part of the 
board monitoring responsibility, they are responsible to reduce the information 
asymmetry between the management and the shareholders to the minimum by 
ensuring the correctness of the disclosed information through the financial reports. 
Moreover, the board is responsible for nominating the right directors to shareholders 
as potential directors considering the firm’s need and the qualifications of the 
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nominated directors. Thus, the board should establish a number of subcommittees 
that assist in performing these specific tasks. 
The reported results in Table 15 show that both audit committee effectiveness, 
and compliant nomination committees are positively associated with asset utilisation; 
conversely, an effective remuneration committee is negatively associated with asset 
utilisation. However, these associations are not significant; thus, none of the board 
subcommittees hypotheses are not supported. These reported results suggest that 
board subcommittees have no direct impact on shareholders’ wealth, which is 
inconsistent with the agency theory predictions and the underscoring on the 
independence of the different committees. Consistent with the study’s results, 
McKnight and Weir (2009) mention that nomination committee is not a critical 
control mechanism that helps in reducing agency costs; they find evidence that the 
presence and composition of the nomination committee increase agency costs of the 
UK firms.  
6.4.1.2.4  Ownership structure 
6.4.1.2.4.1 Board ownership 
In this study, the researcher investigates the role of board ownership on agency 
costs by utilising different measures. The first measure is the board ownership 
percentage, a popular measure employed in the prior literature; this measure was 
utilised in baseline and sub model 1; the other measures are based on splitting the 
board ownership into three different measures based on the identity and affiliation of 
the director. In doing so, three measures were employed which are the CEO 
ownership percentage, executive ownership percentage and non-executive ownership 
percentage; these measures are employed in the sub models 2 and 3.  
With regard to total board ownership percentage, the results of baseline and sub 
model 1, as reported in Table 15, indicate that board ownership has a negative 
impact on agency cost; however, these reported associations are not significant; and 
hence, don’t support the fifth hypothesis that predicts a positive association between 
total board ownership and asset utilisation. For sub models 2 and 3, the reported 
results show that CEO ownership is significantly associated with high agency costs; 
the executive ownership ratio is associated with lower agency costs, whereas, non-
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executive ownership is associated with high agency costs, nonetheless, both 
associations are not significant; thus, the hypotheses of the identity of owner 
directors are not supported. 
These reported results lend the support to the entrenchment hypothesis against the 
convergence of interest hypothesis. For the study sample, The results also indicate 
that, unlike to agency theory predictions; CEO’s ownership is detrimental to 
shareholders’ wealth; it leads to more conflict of interests rather than aligning 
management’s interests with those of shareholders; it was found that CEOs use their 
ownership stakes to entrench themselves and work for their own interests at the 
expense of other shareholders. Henry (2010) finds that managerial ownership has no 
role in reducing agency costs of Australian firms, while, Fleming, Heaney and 
McCosker (2005) find that managerial ownership reduces agency costs of Australian 
SMEs. Opposing to these results, Wellalage and Locke (2011) find evidence 
supports the entrenchment hypothesis and the non-monotonic relationship between 
managerial ownership and agency costs for the New Zealand firms. For the U.S. 
context, prior studies like Ang, Cole and Lin (2000), Doukas, Kim and Pantzalis 
(2000), Singh and Davidson III (2003) and Chen and Yur-Austin (2007) find 
evidence supports the convergence of interest hypothesis. In the UK context, the 
results are mixed; Florackis (2008) find that managerial ownership helps in aligning 
the interests of management with those of shareholders, and hence reduces agency 
cost. While, McKnight and Weir (2009) find that managerial ownership neither 
benefits nor harm shareholders’ wealth; their results show that managerial ownership 
has no significant impact on agency costs. 
6.4.1.2.4.2 Blockholders ownership 
This study hypothesizes that the total block holding ratio is positively associated 
with asset utilisation. Consistent with this hypothesis, the results, shown in Table 15, 
show a positive association between the block holding ratio and asset utilisation ratio, 
suggesting that block holding, regardless of the identity of blockholders, leads to 
lower agency costs. These results are in support of the monitoring hypothesis rather 
than the expropriation hypothesis. The monitoring hypothesis suggests that 
blockholders have the incentive and the power to perform their monitoring role as 
shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Denis and McConnell, 2003; Romano, 
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Bhagat and Bolton, 2008). Florackis (2008) finds evidence that blockholders are 
good monitors of the UK firms; similar evidence was reported by Chen and Yur-
Austin (2007) for the U.S. firms. However, some of the prior studies find no 
evidence that support either of the two hypotheses. Doukas, Kim and Pantzalis (2000) 
and Singh and Davidson III (2003) find that block holding has no significant impact 
on agency costs of the U.S. corporations, likewise, Doukas, McKnight and Pantzalis 
(2005) and McKnight and Weir (2009) report that blockholders have no impact in 
reducing the agency costs of the UK firms.  
In sub model 1 and sub model 3, the researcher splits the block holding ratio into 
two subcategories based on the identity of the blockholders. Hypotheses (8, 8a, 8b) 
predict that the identity of the blockholder has an impact on agency costs and could 
influence the monitoring role of the blockholder. Consistent with these hypotheses, 
the results for both models are consistent and in support of the results of the block 
holding total ratio and the monitoring hypothesis. The reported results, for the study 
full sample, support the notion that regardless of the identity of the blockholder, 
block holding is an effective monitoring mechanism; both institutional and 
individual blockholders are effective monitors; they control management’s behaviour 
and thus they help in reducing the agency costs. These results, also, support the 
argument that the presence of large shareholders influences board performance, large 
ownership stake provides the incentive for the blockholders to perform their 
monitoring role, lead to more alignment between the shareholders and management 
interests and hence lower agency costs (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988; Ozkan 
and Ozkan, 2004).  
Numerous studies have investigated the role of institutional block holding on 
agency costs and various performance studies; however, the role of individual 
blockholders has not received that attention. McKnight and Weir (2009) find 
evidence that institutional block holding has no role in reducing agency costs of the 
UK firms, Doukas, McKnight and Pantzalis (2005) find that institutional ownership 
increase agency costs of the UK firms; however, in the Australian context, Henry 
(2010) finds that institutional block holding has a negative impact on asset utilisation, 
while individual block holding has no impact on agency costs. 
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6.4.1.2.5 Control variables (firm characteristics) 
6.4.1.2.5.1 Debt ratio 
The results, shown in Table 15, suggest that there is a negative association 
between the industry adjusted debt to assets ratio and agency costs. This implies that 
the more debt the firms get –beyond the industry median value- the more agency 
costs incurred by the shareholders; another possible explanation is that debt reduces 
and constrains firm’s ability in utilising these assets. Crutchley and Hansen (1989) 
mention that leverage can help in reducing the conflicts between managers and 
shareholders, and hence, it is a relevant tool which can be used to reduce the costs of 
agency conflicts. Jensen (1986) argues that debt can be used as an effective 
replacement of dividends; which commits managers to pay-out the future cash flows 
to debt holders; as if they fail to do so, the firm will face the risk of bankruptcy; 
however, Crutchley and Hansen (1989) mention that both tools can be used to 
mitigate the agency conflicts, they do serve the same aim, and both can be used at 
the same time. 
 The study results contradict with the finding of some of the prior studies. Ang, 
Cole and Lin (2000) findings, as they find a positive association between debt ratio 
and asset utilisation ratio for a sample of 1708 U.S. small businesses; which implies 
that the increase in debt reduces agency costs. However, this contradiction in the 
results might result from the differences in sample. In the small business context, 
banks play an important role in providing the needed funds for small businesses. 
Given that the business scale for the small businesses compared to large corporations, 
banks can trace, monitor and control small businesses operations, while in large 
corporations this could be a very difficult if not impossible task for banks. Doukas, 
Kim and Pantzalis (2000) find evidence that debt has a significant role in reducing 
agency costs of the U.S. firms; and McKnight and Weir (2009) support that finding 
in the UK context. 
 Other studies like Doukas, McKnight and Pantzalis (2005) in the UK context and 
Henry (2010), in the Australian context, finds no significant association between 
debt ratio and agency costs. Similar to the study results, Singh and Davidson III 
(2003) find that debt increases agency costs for firms in the U.S. context; likewise, 
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Chen and Yur-Austin (2007) report a negative association between leverage and 
asset utilisation ratio for a sample of large U.S. companies; and Ibrahim and Samad 
(2011) report the same results for the Malaysian companies.  
6.4.1.2.5.2 Dividend pay-out ratio 
The reported results in Table 15 show that dividends pay-out ratio is positively 
associated with asset utilisation for the four models; however, these associations are 
not significant; suggesting that dividends have no observable impact on agency cost 
of the study sample. Eisenhardt (1989) argues that paying dividend is one of the 
tools that can reduce agency costs, and provide external monitoring by the external 
market with lower costs. Similarly, Jensen (1986) argues that paying dividends helps 
in reducing the agency costs of free cash flows; retaining the cash flows under the 
control of a manager put the firm on the risk that the manager may waste these 
resources in unprofitable projects. Likewise, Crutchley and Hansen (1989) find that 
dividends payment is an effective mechanism in mitigating the conflicts between 
managers and shareholders. While, Bathala and Rao (1995) find evidence that 
dividend pay-out has an impact on shaping board structure. Consistent with these 
arguments, Farinha (2003b) concludes that, for the UK firms, dividends help in 
reducing agency cost. Henry (2010) finds a positive significant association between 
dividends pay-out and asset utilisation, implying that for the Australian companies, 
dividends can help in reducing agency costs; however, the results for the full sample 
failed to support these arguments. 
6.4.1.2.5.3 Growth prospects 
The results, shown in Table 15, suggest that there is a negative association 
between growth opportunities measured by industry adjusted Tobin’s Q ratio and 
agency costs. The coefficients are negative and not significant for all models; 
indicating that for the study sample, growth opportunities have no significant impact 
of agency costs. Fleming, Heaney and McCosker (2005) argue that firms with high 
growth opportunities generate lower utilisation of their asset as they are developing 
new products and developing new processes, such argument can explain the reported 
results of the negative association between asset utilisation and growth prospects. 
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Prior literature suggests that growth prospects has a significant role in shaping the 
governance structure of the firm. Florackis (2008) argues that the agency problem 
and its associated costs vary according to the firm’s growth opportunities; this makes 
the role of governance mechanisms and the effectiveness of such mechanisms in 
reducing agency costs is subject to the firm’s growth opportunities; they find 
evidence that the role of governance mechanisms varies with the firm’s growth 
prospects. Easterbrook (1984) states that growth prospects are inversely related to 
the dividends pay-out ratio. Firms with high growth prospects tend to retain and 
reinvest their profits and take the advantage of available opportunities in the market. 
Jensen (1986) mentions that firm’s growth prospects have a direct impact on the 
magnitude of agency problems, especially for firm that has high free cash flow and 
limited growth opportunities. In the same vein, Doukas, Kim and Pantzalis (2000) 
and Doukas, McKnight and Pantzalis (2005) argue that firms that have large free 
cash flow are expected to waste these cash flows in unprofitable projects leading to 
more agency costs. Other researches e.g., Lasfer (2004), Guest (2008) and Lehn, 
Patro and Zhao (2009), among others, argue that firm’s growth opportunity has a 
direct impact on board structure. Lasfer (2004) reports that for high growth firms, 
boards tend to be more independent, while in low growth firms, boards are less 
independent. Boone et al. (2007) argue that board size and independence are shaped 
in the way that suits with the firm’s growth. Guest (2008) finds that there is an 
inverse association between board size and growth prospects. Lehn, Patro and Zhao 
(2009) provide evidence that board structure (size and composition) is affected with 
firm’s growth prospects. For high growth firm, boards tend to be smaller in size with 
more insiders while for low growth firms, the board tends to be larger with more 
outsiders. Interestingly, Klein (2002b) finds evidence that audit committee 
independence is negatively associated with firm’s growth prospects. 
6.4.1.2.5.4 Return on assets 
The reported results in Table 15, show that the return on assets as a proxy of firm 
performance is significant and positively associated with asset utilisation for the 
baseline model as well as the sub models, suggesting that high financial performance 
is associated with higher asset utilisation. In the corporate governance literature, it is 
argued that firm performance has a direct impact on shaping the governance 
structure. Firms with high profits are susceptible for agency costs related to free cash 
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flow, and they are more attractive for institutional investors (Crutchley et al., 1999). 
Boone et al. (2007) report evidence that board size and composition are affected by 
firm performance; they find that, usually, there is an increase in the proportion of 
outside directors following poor performance; similar results were reported by other 
studies like Hermalin and Weisbach (1988); Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) and 
Linck, Netter and Yang (2008). Wintoki, Linck and Netter (2012) report that board 
structure is shaped according to firm past performance. Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1988) mention that this change in board structure can be attributed to the need of 
new management perspectives to be added to the board or the need of more 
monitoring. Consistent with the above mentioned findings, Guest (2008) finds 
evidence that for well performing firms CEOs gain more negotiation power and they 
can negotiate for smaller and less independent boards. However, Ghosh and Sirmans 
(2003) report opposite results, they find that the ratio of outside directors increases 
with the improvements of firm performance. Whereas, Eisenberg, Sundgren and 
Wells (1998) find no evidence that changes in board size are related to poor past 
performance. These reported results are coherent with the argument that well 
performing firms have high asset utilisation. This result supports the findings of 
Fleming, Heaney and McCosker (2005), their findings reveal that profitable firms 
are more successful in utilising their assets.  
6.4.1.2.5.5 Firm size 
The results reported in Table 15, show that there is a negative association between 
firm size measured by total asset and asset utilisation ratio. These associations are 
significant at the 10% significance level for all of the study models. In the prior 
literature, it is argued that agency costs are affected by firm size. Large firms can 
benefit from their large scale to generate more sales using the available asset base in 
different business lines (Singh and Davidson III, 2003); thus, large firms are 
expected to utilise their asset base more efficiently compared to small firms.  
However, other researchers, e.g., Doukas, Kim and Pantzalis (2000); McKnight 
and Weir (2009) and Henry (2010), among others, argue that large firms are more 
complex, and work in diversified business, thus, they are subject to more agency 
problems, and as a result incur more agency costs compared to small firms. The 
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reported results in this study lend the support to the argument that large firms are 
more subject to agency problems and incur higher agency costs. 
The study results contradict with the findings of Singh and Davidson III (2003) 
and Chen and Yur-Austin (2007) for the U.S. firms; Fleming, Heaney and McCosker 
(2005) in the Australian context and McKnight and Weir (2009) for the UK firms, as 
they find that firm is positively associated with asset utilisation; nonetheless, the 
study findings are consistent with the findings of Florackis (2008) for a sample of 
UK firms and Ibrahim and Samad (2011) for a Malaysian sample, as they find that 
large firms are subject to more agency relations and conflicts and hence incur more 
agency costs. The researcher can refer the difference between results to the use of 
different measures to capture firm size, the studies of Singh and Davidson III (2003); 
Fleming, Heaney and McCosker (2005); Chen and Yur-Austin (2007) and McKnight 
and Weir (2009) employed sales amount as a measure of firm size, whereas, 
Florackis (2008) and Ibrahim and Samad (2011) use total assets as a proxy for firm 
size as this study does.  
6.4.1.3  Comparative analysis of the pre and post crisis periods 
In this section, the researcher reports and compares between the results of the 
regression analyses for the impact of different corporate governance mechanisms on 
asset utilisation as a proxy of agency costs before and after the 2008 financial crisis. 
Table 16 Results of Hausman specification test to decide between fixed and random 
effects regression models for both pre and post crisis samples 
  Baseline 
models 
Sub 
model 1 
Sub 
model 2 
Sub 
model 3 
Pre–crisis sample 
χ2 31.46 41.39 35.11 14.12 
p-value 0.0029 0.0002 0.0024 0.59 
Post-crisis sample 
χ2 19.06 17.95 22.03 20.28 
p-value 0.1212 0.2091 0.1071 0.2079 
Table 16 shows the results of Hausman (1978) specification test for the two 
samples; the results reported in this table are mixed, the results show that for the pre–
crisis period, the null hypothesis is rejected for the baseline and sub models (1 and 2); 
thus, fixed effects model is appropriate for these models; whereas, random effects 
regression model is favoured over fixed effects regression model for sub model 3. 
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 In regard to the post crisis period, Hausman specification test results indicate that 
random effects model is more appropriate for all models. 
 The results of the regression analysis of the pre–crisis period (2005–2007 
inclusive) are reported in Table 17. The reported F-test values of the baseline and 
sub models (1 and 2) are significant at the 0.01 level, implying that the fixed effects 
regression model is appropriate for both the pre–crisis data set and the different 
combinations of corporate governance mechanisms and employed control variables; 
likewise, the reported value of χ2 for sub model 3 indicates that the random effects 
regression model is more appropriate for such model. Table 18 reports the results of 
the random effects panel data regression model for the post crisis sample covering 
the period 2009–2011 inclusive. The reported χ2 values of the baseline and sub 
models are significant (p-value < 1 percent) indicating that there is no statistical 
problem with the model variables and confirming the random effects model is 
appropriate for this sample. 
With respect to the results of the baseline model, the reported coefficients of the 
board size are positive (pre 0.065; post 0.072), indicating that large boards are more 
efficient than small boards in utilising firm’s assets, nevertheless, this association is 
significant for the post crisis period only (p-value < 10 percent). Moving to board 
composition, the results show that the significance of the board composition changes 
before and after the financial crisis, it changes from being negative (coefficient -0.16) 
and significant at the 10% level before the crisis to be insignificant (coefficient -
0.019) after the crisis, such results could indicate that firm specific knowledge of 
insiders is more important than the independence of the board.  
In terms of CEO duality, the results reveal negative but insignificant association 
between duality and asset utilisation. The results illustrate that an effective audit 
committee is an efficient monitoring tool that helps in enhancing the firm’s asset 
utilisation. The coefficients are positive (pre 0.025; post 0.045) and significant at the 
5% for the pre–crisis period while it is significant at the 10% for the post crisis 
period; however, the coefficients reveal that the impact of the effective audit 
committee is greater for the post crisis period. There is also a change in the impact of 
blockholders in mitigating the agency conflicts, the coefficients for both periods are 
positive (pre 0.1; post 0.0016), but it is only significant for the pre–crisis period. 
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For sub model 1 the researcher splits the block holding ratio, based on the identity 
of the blockholder, into institutional block holding and individual block holding. The 
results, as shown in Table 17 and Table 18, are consistent with the results of the 
baseline model. Board size is positive for the two periods of analysis (pre 0.065; post 
0.073) and significant only for the post crisis period at the 10% level. Board 
composition still has a negative (coefficient -0.16) and significant (at the 10% level) 
role in increasing agency costs during the pre–crisis period; however, this role 
(coefficient -0.022) turns out to be  insignificant for the post crisis period. An 
effective audit committee has a significant role in reducing agency costs for the 
study samples; however, consistent with the results of the baseline model, the results 
show that effective audit committees have more impact after the crisis. The 
coefficients are positive (0.025; 0.048) and significant at the 5% and 10% levels for 
the pre–crisis and post crisis periods respectively.  
Consistent with the researcher’s hypothesis (H8) that the identity of the 
blockholder could have an impact on agency costs; the reported results support this 
hypothesis. The results reveal that institutions as blockholders have a positive 
(coefficient 0.096) and significant (at the 10% level) role in reducing agency costs 
for the pre–crisis period, whereas, individuals as blockholders have a positive 
(coefficient 0.093) but insignificant role. For the post crisis period, institutional 
blockholders have a negative impact (coefficient -0.018); while, individual 
blockholders have a positive impact (coefficient 0.019) on agency costs, nonetheless, 
both impacts are insignificant.  
In sub model 2 the researcher investigates the impact of board ownership as 
measured by the CEO ownership percentage, the non-executive directors’ ownership 
ratio and the executive members’ ownership ratio in mitigating agency problems and 
reducing agency costs. The reported results are consistent with baseline model and 
sub model 1 results with respect to board size, board composition and audit 
committee effectiveness. Board size is positive (coefficient 0.062) but not 
significantly associated with asset utilisation ratio for the pre–crisis sample, but for 
the post crisis period, large boards are positively (coefficient 0.066) and significantly 
(at the 10% significance level) associated with asset utilisation; whereas, board 
composition still negative (coefficient -0.15) and significant at the 10% significance 
level for the pre–crisis period; and negative (coefficient -0.017)  but insignificant for 
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the post crisis period.  Effective audit committees are positively (pre 0.025; post 
0.044) associated with asset utilisation at the 10% significance level; consistent with 
the results of the baseline model and sub model 1, the coefficients reveal that 
effective audit committees have more impact on reducing agency costs for the post 
crisis period than the pre–crisis period.  
With regards to board ownership ratios, the results of baseline and sub model 2 
for both the pre and post crisis samples provide mixed results for the association 
between board ownership and asset utilisation. The results show that board 
ownership is positively but insignificantly associated with asset utilisation for 
baseline model of the pre and post crises samples. However, for sub model 2 after 
categorizing the total board ownership ratio according to board members affiliation, 
the results indicate that none of the board ownership variables are significantly 
associated with asset utilisation for the pre–crisis period, but provide different 
directions of these associations. While, for the post crisis sample, the results, also, 
reveal mixed associations but only the percentage of executive board ownership is 
positively (coefficient 0.2) associated with asset utilisation at the 5% significance 
level.  
In terms of the block holding ownership, the results also reveal that blockholders 
play a significant role in mitigating the agency problem during the pre–crisis period, 
the coefficient is positive (0.11) and significant at the 10% level; nonetheless, for the 
post crisis period, the results show that blockholders have no significant role in 
reducing agency costs, the coefficient is positive (0.0043) but insignificant; such 
results are consistent with the results of the baseline model. 
In sub model 3, the researcher integrates a comprehensive set of governance 
mechanisms, as earlier in this study, this model incorporates board characteristic 
variables, the block holding ratios based on the identity of the blockholder, the board 
ownership ratios after splitting it into three different categories based on the board 
member affiliation; and firm characteristics that have been identified in the prior 
literature as a potential stimulus of firm’s governance structure and performance. 
The reported results reveal that board size is positively (pre 0.076; post 0.067) 
associated with asset utilisation at the 10% significant level for the pre and post crisis 
samples.
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Table 17 Results of the fixed effect (for the baseline and sub models 1&2) and 
random effects (for sub model 3) panel data regression models with robust standard 
error for the study sample covering the pre–crisis period 2005 –2007 inclusive 
 Baseline 
model 
Sub 
model 1 
Sub 
model 2 
Sub 
model 3 
Intercept 1.83 1.84 1.83 1.203 
 (3.42)
***
 (3.43)
***
 (3.37)
***
 (2.79)
***
 
lnBRD 0.065 0.065 0.062 0.076 
 (1.31) (1.32) (1.31) (1.79)
 †
 
lnIND -0.16 -0.16 -0.15 -0.100 
 (-1.77)
†
 (-1.75)
†
 (-1.73)
†
 (-1.18) 
ACE 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.012 
 (1.97)
*
 (1.97)
*
 (1.90)
†
 (0.90) 
REMU-COM -0.0062 -0.0065 -0.007 -0.008 
 (-0.33) (-0.35) (-0.37) (-0.41) 
NOMINI-COM 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.014 
 (0.81) (0.80) (0.82) (0.75) 
DUL -0.02 -0.019 -0.018 -0.027 
 (-0.81) (-0.79) (-0.76) (-1.21) 
lnBLK 0.1  0.11  
 (1.93)
†
  (1.96)
†
  
lnINST_BLK  0.096  0.070 
  (1.83)
†
  (1.46) 
lnINDV_BLK  0.093  0.051 
  (0.83)  (0.53) 
lnBRDOWN 0.046 0.046   
 (0.59) (0.57)   
lnCEOOWN   -0.054 -0.098 
   (-0.23) (-0.44) 
lnEXECOWN   0.087 0.018 
   (0.45) (0.10) 
lnNEDOWN   0.17 0.144 
   (0.60) (0.53) 
lnadjDBT -0.24 -0.24 -0.24 -0.322 
 (-1.65) (-1.64) (-1.64) (-2.71)
**
 
sqadjDIVD 0.043 0.044 0.041 0.072 
 (0.65) (0.67) (0.61) (1.08) 
lnadjROA 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.254 
 (1.11) (1.11) (1.11) (1.87)
 †
 
lnadjQ 0.067 0.066 0.067 0.091 
 (1.88)
†
 (1.84)
†
 (1.84)
†
 (2.75)
†
 
lnASSTS -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 
 (-2.96)
**
 (-2.95)
**
 (-2.96)
**
 (-2.00)
*
 
N 562 562 562 562 
groups 196 196 196 196 
adj. R
2
 18.7% 18.4% 18.6%   
F-test 4.81
***
 4.50
***
 4.55
***
  
wald χ2    62.26
***
 
t(z)-statistics in parentheses 
†
p < 0.10, 
*
p < 0.05, 
**
p < 0.01, 
***
p < 0.001 
All variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile values 
Dependent variable: Industry adjusted asset utilisation ratio 
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Table 18 Results of the random effects panel data regression model with 
robust standard error for the study sample covering the post crisis period 
2009–2011 inclusive 
 Baseline 
model 
Sub 
model 1 
Sub 
model 2 
Sub 
model 3 
Intercept 1.05 1.05 1.06 1.07 
 (6.35)
***
 (6.20)
***
 (6.40)
***
 (6.24)
***
 
lnBRD 0.072 0.073 0.066 0.067 
 (1.84)
†
 (1.86)
†
 (1.68)
†
 (1.70)
†
 
lnIND -0.019 -0.022 -0.017 -0.02 
 (-0.48) (-0.57) (-0.43) (-0.51) 
ACE 0.045 0.048 0.044 0.048 
 (1.80)
†
 (1.90)
†
 (1.71)
†
 (1.84)
†
 
REMU-COM -0.03 -0.032 -0.024 -0.026 
 (-0.57) (-0.60) (-0.45) (-0.49) 
NOMINI-COM -0.011 -0.008 -0.014 -0.011 
 (-0.36) (-0.27) (-0.47) (-0.37) 
DUL -0.014 -0.015 -0.0042 -0.0046 
 (-0.25) (-0.28) (-0.076) (-0.085) 
BLK 0.0016  0.0043  
 (0.034)  (0.10)  
lnINST_BLK  -0.018  -0.02 
  (-0.28)  (-0.31) 
lnINDV_BLK  0.19  0.22 
  (1.48)  (1.89)
†
 
lnBRDOWN 0.11 -0.046   
 (0.98) (-0.30)   
lnCEOOWN   -0.12 -0.3 
   (-0.87) (-2.01)
*
 
lnEXECOWN   0.2 0.018 
   (2.29)
*
 (0.14) 
lnNEDOWN   0.3 0.15 
   (0.85) (0.40) 
lnadjDBT -0.57 -0.57 -0.57 -0.58 
 (-5.67)
***
 (-5.73)
***
 (-5.70)
***
 (-5.76)
***
 
adjDIVD 0.004 0.004 0.0044 0.0043 
 (0.49) (0.48) (0.54) (0.53) 
lnadjROA 0.39 0.4 0.38 0.39 
 (2.15)
*
 (2.16)
*
 (2.07)
*
 (2.08)
*
 
lnadjQ -0.087 -0.088 -0.088 -0.09 
 (-2.52)
*
 (-2.52)
*
 (-2.53)
*
 (-2.55)
*
 
lnASSTS -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 
 (-2.05)
*
 (-2.06)
*
 (-1.95)
†
 (-2.00)
*
 
N 684 684 684 684 
groups 235 235 235 235 
wald χ2 55.5
***
 57.5
***
 63
***
 65.7
***
 
z-statistics in parentheses 
†
 p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
All variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th 
percentile values 
Dependent variable: Industry adjusted asset utilisation ratio 
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Board composition is negative (pre -0.1; post -0.02) and insignificantly associated 
with asset utilisation.  Effective audit committee is positively (pre 0.076; post 0.067) 
associated with lower agency cost for both samples; however, this result is only 
significant for the post crisis sample at the 10% level. None of the ownership 
variables (block holding as well as board ownership) are significantly associated 
with asset utilisation for the pre–crisis period; however, for the post crisis period the 
results reveal that CEO ownership ratio is negatively (coefficient -0.3) associated 
with asset utilisation at the 5% significance level; while the individual block holding 
ratio is positively (coefficient 0.22) and significantly associated with asset utilisation 
at the 10% level.  
Regarding the other board characteristics employed in the four models; the 
reported results show that compliant remuneration committee and CEO duality are 
negatively associated with asset utilisation for the pre and post samples; compliant 
nomination committee is associated with lower agency costs for the pre–crisis period; 
and associated with high agency costs for the post crisis period; nonetheless, all of 
these associations are statistically insignificant. 
With respect to control variables, the reported results, as shown in Table 17 and 
Table 18, reveal that the industry adjusted debt ratio is negatively, but insignificantly 
associated with asset utilisation ratio for baseline and sub models 1 & 2 of the pre–
crisis period; however, for sub model 3 this association still negative but turns out to 
be significant at the 1% level. With respect to the post crisis period the results show 
that debt is negatively and significantly associated with the asset turnover rate (p-
value <0.001). The dividend pay-out ratio is negatively associated with asset 
utilisation for the pre–crisis sample and positively associated with asset utilisation 
for the post crisis sample; however, these associations are insignificant. Tobin’s Q as 
a proxy for growth opportunities is significantly associated with lower agency costs 
at the 10% level for all models of the pre–crisis period; however, this association 
turns out to be negative and significant at the 5% level for the post crisis sample. The 
industry adjusted ROA is positively associated with asset utilisation ratio for all 
models of the pre and post crisis sample; however, these associations are 
insignificant for the baseline and the sub models 1 & 2 of the pre–crisis sample, 
whereas, this association is significant at the 10% level for sub model 3 and 
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significant at the 5% level for all models of the post crisis sample. Finally, firm size 
as measured by the value of total assets is negative and significantly associated with 
asset utilisation at the significance level 1% for the pre–crisis sample and the 
significance level 5% for the pre–crisis sample 
6.4.1.4  Results Discussion 
Just to remind the reader that, in this study, the researcher starts the analysis using 
a baseline model incorporates a comprehensive set of corporate governance 
mechanisms have been argued, in the prior literature, that they help in mitigating the 
consequences of the agency problem which are known as agency costs. Then, the 
researcher starts to expand this model by splitting this baseline model into three 
different sub models. In doing so, two ownership variables, namely the board 
ownership ratio, and the block holding ratio, were split into sub variables according 
to the identity of the owner (CEO, executive, and non-executive directors; and 
institutional or individual blockholder). In sub model 3, the researcher incorporates 
all the split variables with other governance and control variables to investigate the 
role of this comprehensive set of variables and control for the interaction between 
different governance mechanisms as it has been argued in the governance literature 
that different governance mechanism can act as complements and substitutes in some 
cases. 
The reported results in Table 17 and Table 18 support the researcher’s argument 
that the impact of the different corporate governance mechanisms is affected by the 
surrounding economic conditions of the environment surrounding the firm. Thus, as 
the researcher expected, splitting the full sample into two subsamples presenting the 
pre and the post crisis periods enabled the researcher to capture the changes in roles 
and identify which mechanisms were efficient (or inefficient) in enhancing 
managerial efficiency and reducing agency costs before the crisis, which 
mechanisms become efficient (or inefficient) after the crisis, and which mechanisms 
had the same role before and after the crisis.  
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6.4.1.4.1 Board size 
The reported results reveal that large board is an effective governance mechanism 
for the UK firms. Board size was found to enhance management efficiency and 
reduce agency costs for the pre and post crisis periods. Such results are consistent 
with the results of the full sample which covers the period 2005–2011 inclusive. 
Nonetheless, this positive association is significant for the pre–crisis sub model three, 
and all the post crisis models. This finding supports the argument that large board are 
more beneficial to the firm. From an agency perspective, the reported results show 
that large boards can perform their monitoring role effectively; it becomes more 
difficult for the CEO to control over as it takes more time and effort to reach 
consensus and leads to less extreme decisions. From a resource dependence side, the 
reported results reveal that, large board enhance management effectiveness by 
recruiting more experts to the boards, building more connections with the external 
environment, securing the required resources, providing the firm with the essential 
information about the competition and external markets and that board size is 
affected by the external environment surrounding the firm.  
Similar to the full sample results, the results reported in Table 17 and Table 18 
contradict with the results of Singh and Davidson III (2003) for the U.S. context, and 
Florackis (2008) in the UK context, and consistent with the results reported by 
Ibrahim and Samad (2011) for the Malaysian context. 
6.4.1.4.2 Board independence 
6.4.1.4.2.1 Board composition 
Based on the agency theory, the board of directors should be dominated by a 
majority of independent directors to ensure that the board will be independent from 
the CEO and the executive management, and hence, the board is able to perform 
their monitoring role. The reported results failed to support this argument. The 
coefficients are negative and significant at the 10% significance level for the pre–
crisis period (insignificant for the sub model 3); also, the coefficients of the post 
crisis period remain negative but turn out to be insignificant for the post crisis 
sample; suggesting that for the pre–crisis period independent board members 
increase the agency costs of the UK firms; while for the post crisis period, 
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independent board member neither increase or reduce firm’s agency costs. The 
negative association between independent board members and agency costs is 
supported after utilising different measure of board composition that reflects firm’s 
compliance with the suggested board composition as suggested by the UK 
governance code (full results are reported in the robustness check section). 
For the steady economic condition (pre–crisis period), the negative and significant 
association between board composition and agency costs contradicts with the 
benefits of the outside and independent directors proposed by the agency and 
resource dependence theories. According to the agency perspective, more 
independent directors are required to monitor and control management’s decision, 
thus, the management’s interests could be aligned with those of shareholders, 
resulting in efficient management practices, and lower conflicts. From the resource 
dependence theory, more outside directors are required for expanding and building 
more connections with the external environment to acquire the required resources, 
information about potential opportunities, providing the advice and counsel for the 
board and secure a steady flow of resources to the firm. However; these reported 
results could support the stewardship theory in terms of the importance of the role of 
the executive directors, and support the argument that directors can work as stewards 
rather than agents. The reported results contradict with the empirical evidence 
provided by Henry (2010) for the Australian context and Ibrahim and Samad (2011) 
for the Malaysian context as they find that board independence is positive and 
significantly associated with higher asset utilisation and lower agency costs. 
For the unstable economic conditions (the post crisis recession period), the 
coefficients of the independent directors are negative but insignificant. These results 
could indicate the independent directors are not important mechanisms during and 
after unstable economic conditions; moreover, the negative coefficient indicates that 
independent directors could increase the agency costs of the post crisis period rather 
than reducing them. Also, these results could indicate that inside directors could be 
more important for the firm; the firm specific information they have in addition to 
the need for speed communication between the board and the management are 
critical for unstable conditions. This insignificant relationship between independent 
directors and asset utilisation is consistent with the results of prior studies like Singh 
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and Davidson III (2003) for the U.S. firms, Florackis (2008) and McKnight and Weir 
(2009) in the UK context. 
6.4.1.4.2.2 Duality 
It has been argued in the corporate governance literature that duality is the second 
element of board independence; advocates of the agency theory argue that duality is 
detrimental for board independence; the CEO can easily dominate over the board and 
it curtails insiders’ ability to criticize the CEO and perform their monitoring role. 
Conversely, the advocates of the stewardship theory argue that duality brings some 
benefits to the firm among these benefits working under the same vision, linking the 
stage of the formulation of firm’s strategy with the implementation stage, easy and 
fast communication and the firm specific knowledge; moreover, Van Essen, Engelen 
and Carney (2013) argue that duality is required during the crisis and unstable 
conditions. However, the reported results in Table 17 and Table 18 do not provide 
any evidence that support either view for the UK business context. 
6.4.1.4.2.3 Board subcommittees 
The UK corporate governance code recommends a number of committees under 
the board to help the board in performing their agency role effectively. Each 
committee has certain responsibilities that help in controlling the opportunistic 
behaviour of managers and ensure that managers are working for the best interests of 
shareholders. Among the different committees that are suggested with the UK 
corporate governance code and have been investigated in this study, only the audit 
committee seems to have a positive and significant impact on management 
efficiency and lower agency costs for the pre and post the financial crisis periods; 
which differ with the full sample results as the coefficients are positive but 
insignificant. The coefficients of the remuneration committee are negative and 
insignificant for both periods; whereas, the coefficients of the nomination committee 
are positive for the pre–crisis period and negative for the post crisis period, 
nonetheless, they are not significant at any level.  
These reported results suggest that only the audit committee has a significant role 
in reducing agency costs and enhancing management effectiveness; while the 
insignificant relationship between the composition of the remuneration and 
nomination committees from one side -as suggested by the UK corporate governance 
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code and for both periods- and asset utilisation from the other side suggest that the 
recommended composition criteria are not effective in terms of reducing agency 
costs; suggesting the need for revising these recommendations. Consistent with this 
argument, McKnight and Weir (2009) find that the presence and the composition of 
the nomination committee increase agency costs of a sample of UK firms covering 
the period 1996–2000 inclusive; they conclude that it is not a critical control 
mechanism that helps in reducing agency costs; they find evidence that the presence 
and composition of the nomination committee increase agency costs rather than 
reducing it. Daily et al. (1998) find that composition of the remuneration committee 
is not related to the CEO’s compensation; which contradicts with the agency theory 
assumptions about the necessity of the committee independence. Likewise, Adams, 
Almeida and Ferreira (2005) could not find empirical evidence that the CEO 
involvement in nominating and selecting new directors affect firm performance. 
6.4.1.4.3 Ownership structure 
6.4.1.4.3.1 Board ownership 
In this study, the role of board ownership in reducing agency cost was 
investigated using different proxies. For the base model and sub model 1, the total 
board ownership variable was utilised, while for the sub models 2 and 3, the board 
ownership was split into three sub proxies according to the identity of the director. In 
regard to the pre–crisis period, the reported results do not show any significant 
impact of the different board ownership variables on asset utilisation. The 
coefficients of all variables are positive, except for the CEO ownership which is 
negative; however, these all coefficients are not significant. 
 With respect to the post crisis period, the results reveal that board ownership 
variable is positive but insignificant for the baseline model; then it turns to be 
negative but also insignificant for the sub model 1 after splitting the block holding 
variable into institutional and individual ownership. Such results support the results 
of Henry (2010) in Australian business context and McKnight and Weir (2009) in 
the UK context. 
In sub model 2, only the executive ownership ratio is positive and significant at 
the 5 % significance level; this result lends the support for the convergence of 
interest hypothesis that argues that managerial ownership helps in aligning the 
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interest of managers with those of the shareholders. The empirical studies of the U.S. 
context, like Ang, Cole and Lin (2000), Doukas, Kim and Pantzalis (2000), Singh 
and Davidson III (2003) and Chen and Yur-Austin (2007) provide evidence that 
supports the convergence of interest hypothesis; similar evidence was found in the 
Australian SMEs context by Fleming, Heaney and McCosker (2005), and in the UK 
context, Florackis (2008) provide evidence that managerial ownership helps in 
reducing agency costs. 
The results of sub model 3 reveal that CEO ownership ratio has a negative and 
significant association at the 5% significance level, suggesting that increase of the 
CEO ownership increases the agency costs, which is consistent with the 
entrenchment hypothesis which predicts a negative association between the 
management ownership and agency costs; Wellalage and Locke (2011) find evidence 
that supports the non-monotonic relationship between managerial ownership and 
agency costs for the New Zealand firms, suggesting that managers entrench 
themselves at low and high ownership levels. The possibility of the nonlinear 
association between managerial ownership and agency cost is investigated in the 
robustness check section. 
6.4.1.4.3.2 Blockholders ownership 
In the prior corporate governance literature, it has been argued that large 
shareholders have a significant role in controlling management’s behaviour, and 
hence reducing the negative consequences of the agency relationship. In this study, 
the researcher investigates the role of blockholders in reducing agency costs, 
examine whether their role changes by the change of the economic conditions at 
which the firm operates, moreover, whether the identity of the blockholders has an 
impact on the blockholders role in monitoring the management. Similar to the full 
sample investigation, in the baseline model and sub model 2 the researcher 
investigates the role of total block holding ratio on agency costs, while in sub models 
(1 and 3), the researcher investigates the role of blockholders according to their 
identity on agency costs. 
With respect to the pre–crisis period, the reported results show that blockholders 
have a significant role in enhancing management effectiveness, mitigating the 
agency problem and agency costs, the coefficients of the baseline and sub model 2 
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are positive and significant at the 10% significance level; indicating that 
blockholders are good monitors and hence they enhance the firm’s ability in 
reducing agency costs. Similar results were reported by Florackis (2008) in the UK 
firms, and Chen and Yur-Austin (2007) for the U.S. firms. 
 After splitting the block holding ratio based on the identity of the blockholders, 
the results show that institutional and individual blockholders have a positive role in 
reducing the agency costs, nonetheless, only the institutional blockers are significant 
at the 10% significance level on the sub model 1 only. The prior literature provides 
mixed results in regard to the role of blockholders in mitigating the agency problem. 
For the U.S. context, Doukas, Kim and Pantzalis (2000) and Singh and Davidson III 
(2003) provide evidence shows that blockholders have no significant impact on 
agency costs, similar results were reported in the UK context by Doukas, McKnight 
and Pantzalis (2005) and McKnight and Weir (2009). Overall, consistent with the 
full sample results, these positive associations lend the support to the monitoring 
hypothesis, which argues that blockholders have the incentives and the abilities to 
monitor the management; they don’t either free ride their monitoring role, or 
expropriate the minority of shareholders. 
In regard to the post crisis period, the results show that the total block holding 
ratio still positive, but it turns to be insignificant, conversely, the institutional block 
holding turns from positive in sub models (1 and 3) and significant on sub model 1 
to be negative in the post crisis sample; however, these negative associations are 
insignificant. A significant negative association between institutional block holding 
and agency costs was reported by Henry (2010) in the Australian context. Similar to 
the pre–crisis period, the individual block holding ratio coefficients still positive, and 
turn to be significant in sub model 3 after including the different governance 
mechanisms all together, contrary to this result in the Australian context, as Henry 
(2010) finds that individual blockholders have no impact on reducing agency costs. 
The results of the post crisis period provide mixed results; the positive associations 
could indicate that block holding in general and individual blockholders in particular, 
are good monitors, and these results can partially support the monitoring hypothesis; 
nonetheless, the negative association between the institutional blockholders and asset 
utilisation, could lend a partial support to the expropriation hypothesis which claims 
that blockholders expropriate the wealth of the minority of shareholders, and they 
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might use the firm’s resources to extract private benefits. Thus, the reported results 
show that the identity of the blockholders matters and has a significant impact on 
firm’s agency costs. 
6.4.1.4.4 Control variables 
In this study, the researcher considers a number of firm characteristics that the 
prior has argued they might affect the governance structure and firm’s agency costs. 
These variables reflect firm’s leverage level, the amount of dividends paid to 
shareholders, growth prospects, profitability and firm size. 
6.4.1.4.4.1 Debt ratio 
In the prior literature, debt was proposed as one of the tools that can be used as to 
mitigate the consequences of the agency conflicts and transfer part of the monitoring 
activities to the external market. The reported results for the pre–crisis period show a 
negative but insignificant association for the baseline and sub models 1 and 2; while 
for the sub model 3 the negative association is significant at the 1% level. In regard 
to the post crisis period, the results show a negative and significant association (p-
value < 0.001 percent) between industry adjusted leverage ratio and asset utilisation; 
such results are consistent with the negative association reported for the full sample. 
These reported results show that as the firm increases its leverage level beyond the 
industry median, it starts to incur more agency cost represented in lower asset 
utilisation. These reported results support McConnell and Servaes (1995) that debt 
forces management to forego good investment opportunities with positive net 
present value; and consistent with the argument that leveraged firms are subject to 
lower performance as a result of the high interest rates (Van Essen, Engelen and 
Carney, 2013).  
The evidence from the prior literature is mixed. Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) find 
evidence that debt helps in mitigating the agency conflict for small businesses in the 
U.S. context; similar results were reported for large U.S. companies by Doukas, Kim 
and Pantzalis (2000); and McKnight and Weir (2009) support that finding in the UK 
context. However, Doukas, McKnight and Pantzalis (2005) in the UK context and 
Henry (2010) in the Australian context find no evidence for the role of debt in 
mitigating the agency conflicts. Similar to this study results, Singh and Davidson III 
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(2003) and Chen and Yur-Austin (2007) in the U.S. context; and Ibrahim and Samad 
(2011) for the Malaysian context find negative association between debt and asset 
utilisation.  
6.4.1.4.4.2 Dividend pay-out ratio 
Similar to debt, dividend was proposed as a controlling mechanism over the 
management’s opportunistic behaviour as it transfers part of the monitoring job to 
the external market; thus, dividend can reduce the agency conflicts and the agency 
costs. The reported results of the pre and post crisis are consistent, for the pre–crisis 
period the coefficients are positve but insignificant, similarly, for the post crisis 
period, the coefficients are positive and still insignificant. Such results indicate that 
dividend pay-out ratio has no impact on the agency cost for the study sample; or the 
dividend level for the pre and post crisis period is the optimal, thus, no significant 
impact was found. Contrary to this study results, Farinha (2003b) finds evidence that 
dividends help in reducing agency cost for the UK firms; similar results were 
reported for the Australian companies by Henry (2010). 
6.4.1.4.4.3 Growth prospects 
In the prior literature, it has been argued that firm’s growth prospects is one of the 
factors that could affect the type of agency problems which the firm faces and the 
amount of costs related to such problems; besides it could influence the firm’s 
governance structure. The reported results, as shown in Table 17 and Table 18, 
provide a mixed result, or in other words, show a transformation in the impact of 
growth opportunities on asset utilisation. In regard to the pre–crisis period, growth 
prospects has a positive and significant (at the 10% significance level) role on 
increasing the asset utilisation ratio, indicating that before the 2008 financial crisis, 
for this study sample, firms were able to reap the benefits of these growth 
opportunities, by increasing the utilisation of firm’s assets base, to generate more 
sales, and hence, this could lead to a maximization of the shareholders’ wealth.  
With respect to the post crisis period, the reported results show a negative and 
significant, (at the 5% significance level), impact of the growth opportunities on the 
asset utilisation ratio. This reported result is consistent with results of Florackis 
(2008); he finds a negative association between firm prospects and asset utilisation 
ratio for a sample of UK firms. Many explanations could be proposed for this 
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transformed impact; after the financial crisis, although there might be growth 
opportunities which the firms can benefit from, but firms still have their assets base 
and by considering the drop on sales because of the global recession this could 
explain the drop on the asset utilisation ratio, another explanation is that, in order to 
get the benefits of the growth opportunities available in the market, firms need to 
expand their assets portfolio (the yearly descriptive statistics show that there an 
increase the average firm size after the financial crisis), thus, firms still need more 
time to develop new products and processes that match with the available 
opportunities in the market, and to gain the full benefits of the new added assets. 
Such argument is consistent with what was mentioned by Fleming, Heaney and 
McCosker (2005); they argue that, although firms could have high growth 
opportunities, but they might generate lower utilisation of their asset base as they 
customise their product and processes with these opportunities. 
6.4.1.4.4.4 Return on assets 
The reported results, as shown in Table 17 and Table 18, show that there is a 
positive association between firm profitability and asset utilisation. With respect to 
the pre–crisis period, the association is insignificant for the baseline and the sub 
models 1 and 2, whereas, it is significant for the sub model 3 at the 10% significance 
level. For the post crisis period, the results still positive and become significant at the 
5% significance for all models. These results imply that profitable firms are more 
successful in utilising their assets base. The prior literature claims that profitable 
firms are more subject to agency problems related to the cash flows generated from 
their sales. Moreover, as mentioned before, profitability could have an impact on 
firm’s governance structure. The reported results are consistent with the full sample 
results, and the findings of Fleming, Heaney and McCosker (2005), as they find that 
profitable firms are able to increase their asset utilisation ratio. 
6.4.1.4.4.5 Firm size 
The results reported in Table 17 and Table 18, show that there is a negative and 
significant association between firm size as measured by total asset and asset 
utilisation ratio. These associations are significant at the 1% and 5% significance 
level for the base line and sub models of the pre–crisis period and the post crisis 
period respectively. In the prior literature, it has been argued that firm size has a 
direct influence on agency costs. Prior literature provides two arguments in respect 
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to the expected relation between firm size and agency costs. The first perspective 
claims that the increase in firm size makes firms more complex and diversified; thus, 
large firms are subject to more agency problems and hence, incur more agency costs.  
The other perspective argues that large firms are more able to utilise their assets base 
in different business lines, and thus they can generate more sales without the need of 
new investments. The reported results of the pre and post crisis samples are 
consistent with the first perceptive that large firms are more vulnerable to agency 
problems and incur higher agency costs. Such results are consistent with the results 
of Florackis (2008) in the UK context and Ibrahim and Samad (2011) in the 
Malaysian context. 
6.4.2 Using the interaction between the free cash flows and growth prospects 
as agency costs measure 
In this section, the researcher utilises the interaction between free cash flow and 
growth prospects as a proxy of agency costs. Tobit regression is utilised in this 
section rather than the normal regression models as the dependent variable (QFCF) is 
a censored variable; with many observations having the value of zero; such 
characteristics should be considered while choosing the regression model. Similar to 
the asset utilisation analysis, the researcher employs a baseline model includes the 
main corporate governance mechanism along with firm characteristics variables. In 
the sub models 2 and 3, the researcher splits the board ownership into three variables 
based on the identity of the director into CEO ownership percentage, the non-
executive directors’ ownership ratio and the executive members’ ownership ratio; 
likewise, the researcher splits the block holding ratio into institutional and individual 
block holding ratios in sub models 1 and 3. By doing so, the researcher considers the 
argument of the interaction between the different board and ownership variables in 
sub model 3. 
6.4.2.1  Full sample results 
Table 19 provides the results of the Tobit regression of the interaction between 
free cash flows and growth prospects as a proxy of agency costs and corporate 
governance mechanisms for the full sample. In terms of board characteristics, only 
duality was found to be negatively associated with agency costs at the 10% 
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significance level; suggesting that for a firm with high free cash flows and lower 
growth prospects, combining the CEO role with the chairman reduces agency costs, 
such result clearly contradicts with the agency perspective.  
With regard to the ownership structure, the reported results show that block 
holding ratio is positively associated with agency costs at the 1% significance level, 
likewise, the institutional ownership block holding ratio is positively associated with 
agency costs at a significance level less than 1%; whereas, the CEO ownership ratio 
is negatively associated with agency costs at the 10% significance level for the sub 
model 2. These reported results suggest that for firms with high free cash flows, 
block holding in general, and institutional block holding in particular, are detrimental 
and lead to more agency costs related to the free cash flow and investment decisions; 
whereas, CEO ownership reduces these costs. These reported results add to the 
mixed results in the prior literature. McKnight and Weir (2009) report that 
institutional ownership increases the agency costs of the free cash flows in the UK 
context, similar results were reported by Doukas, Kim and Pantzalis (2000) in the 
U.S. context. Doukas, McKnight and Pantzalis (2005) and Henry (2010) find that 
institutional block holding has no impact on QFCF for the UK and Austrilian 
contexts respectively. In terms of board ownership, McKnight and Weir (2009) find 
that board ownership reduces FCF agency costs; whereas, Doukas, Kim and 
Pantzalis (2000), Doukas, McKnight and Pantzalis (2005) and Henry (2010) could 
not find significant association between QFCF and board ownership. 
With regard to the control variables, the reported results lend the support to the 
asset utilisation results. Firm profitability is negatively associated with agency costs, 
and large firms incur more agency costs, both at a significance level less than 1%. 
Such results are consistent with the reported results for asset utilisation models. 
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Table 19 Results of the random effects panel based Tobit regression model 
for the study sample covering the period 2005-2011 inclusive 
 Baseline 
model 
Sub 
model 1 
Sub 
model 2 
Sub model 
3 
Intercept -0.18 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 
 (-0.78) (-0.76) (-0.74) (-0.73) 
lnBRD -0.017 -0.017 -0.018 -0.018 
 (-1.24) (-1.24) (-1.30) (-1.28) 
lnIND -0.024 -0.02 -0.021 -0.019 
 (-0.520) (-0.440) (-0.460) (-0.420) 
ACE -0.0037 -0.0046 -0.0038 -0.0047 
 (-0.44) (-0.55) (-0.46) (-0.56) 
REMU-COM 0.00077 0.00059 0.0011 0.00098 
 (0.050) (0.039) (0.072) (0.064) 
NOMINI-COM 0.0084 0.0077 0.0081 0.0076 
 (0.840) (0.770) (0.810) (0.760) 
DUL -0.031 -0.03 -0.028 -0.028 
 (-1.76)
†
 (-1.71)
†
 (-1.56) (-1.58) 
BLK 0.051  0.051  
 (3.19)
**
  (3.18)
**
  
lnINST_BLK 0.079  0.079 
  (3.68)
***
  (3.66)
***
 
lnINDV_BLK  -0.025  -0.019 
  (-0.50)  (-0.38) 
lnBRDOWN -0.071 -0.0035   
 (-1.73)
†
 (-0.066)   
lnCEOOWN   -0.13 -0.054 
    (-1.72)
†
 (-0.62) 
lnEXECOWN   -0.061 -0.0025 
    (-0.98) (-0.035) 
lnNEDOWN   -0.018 0.034 
    (-0.20) (0.36) 
lnadjDBT 0.024 0.023 0.023 0.022 
 (0.840) (0.790) (0.790) (0.760) 
sqadjDIVD -0.023 -0.021 -0.022 -0.021 
 (-0.580) (-0.550) (-0.570) (-0.540) 
lnadjROA -0.31 -0.31 -0.32 -0.31 
 (-5.18)
***
 (-5.16)
***
 (-5.21)
***
 (-5.18)
***
 
lnASSTS 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 
 (5.91)
***
 (5.98)
***
 (5.89)
***
 (5.98)
***
 
N 1431 1431 1431 1431 
groups 239 239 239 239 
wald χ2 79.3
***
 83.5
***
 79.9
***
 83.8
***
 
z statistics in parentheses 
†
 p < 0.10, 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
All variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile values
 
Dependent variable: QFCF
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6.4.2.2  Pre and post crisis analysis 
Table 20 shows the results of the Tobit regression of the interaction between free 
cash flows and growth prospects as a proxy of agency costs and corporate 
governance mechanisms. Panel A reports the results for the pre–crisis sample, and 
panel B reports the post crisis results. In regard to board characteristics, the results 
show that large boards are negatively associated with agency costs at the 5% 
significance level for the baseline and sub models; implying that large boards are 
more effective in reducing agency costs for firms with high free cash flows and less 
growth prospects. Such results complements the reported results of the asset 
utilisation. Similar result was reported by Belghitar and Clark (2014) for the UK 
context. In terms of ownership structure, the results show that institutional block 
holding increases agency costs, while individual block holding reduces agency costs, 
both, at the 5% significance level. Consistent with the full sample results, CEO 
ownership helps in reducing agency costs at the 10% significance level. However, 
the results show that the non-executive directors’ ownership ratio increases agency 
costs at the 10% significance level. 
Panel B (Table 20) provides the results of the Tobit regression for the post crisis 
period. With regard to board characteristics, the results reveal that for the  
nomination committee, the compliance with the UK corporate governance code 
recommendations is associated with higher agency costs at the 10% significance 
level for the baseline and the sub models; which is consistent with the findings of 
McKnight and Weir (2009); they find that the presence and the composition of the 
nomination committee as suggested by the combined code increase rather than 
reducing the agency costs of the UK firms. Regarding the ownership structure, the 
results show that for the post crisis period, total block holding and institutional block 
holding ratio are associated with higher agency costs at the 1% significance level; 
similar results were reported by McKnight and Weir (2009) and Doukas, Kim and 
Pantzalis (2000). Total board ownership ratio is associated with lower agency costs 
at the 5% significance level for the baseline model only.  
In terms of the control variables, the reported results of the pre and post crisis 
samples are consistent with full sample results. Firm profitability is negatively 
associated with agency costs at a significance level less than 1% for the pre–crisis 
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sample and the 5% significance level for the pre–crisis sample; and large firms incur 
more agency costs at a significance level less than 1%. Other firm’s characteristics 
have no significant impact on agency costs. 
Table 20 Results of the random effects panel based Tobit regression model for the association between QFCF and corporate 
governance mechanisms; panel A covers the pre–crisis period (2005-2007) and panel B covers the post crisis period (2009-2011) 
 
Panel A Pre–crisis sample Panel B post crisis sample 
  
Baseline 
model 
Sub 
model 1 
Sub 
model 2 
Sub 
model 3 
Baseline 
model 
Sub 
model 1 
Sub 
model 2 
Sub 
model 3 
Intercept -0.21 -0.2 -0.21 -0.2 -0.16 -0.17 -0.15 -0.17 
 (-0.66) (-0.64) (-0.68) (-0.64) (-1.99)
*
 (-2.12)
*
 (-1.94)
†
 (-2.08)
*
 
lnBRD -0.053 -0.054 -0.054 -0.054 -0.005 -0.004 -0.007 -0.005 
 (-2.54)
*
 (-2.55)
*
 (-2.56)
*
 (-2.57)
*
 (-0.26) (-0.19) (-0.35) (-0.27) 
lnIND -0.094 -0.094 -0.087 -0.088 -0.013 -0.012 -0.012 -0.011 
 (-1.49) (-1.48) (-1.37) (-1.38) (-0.57) (-0.55) (-0.52) (-0.49) 
ACE -0.0055 -0.006 -0.0075 -0.0076 -0.012 -0.012 -0.011 -0.012 
 (-0.50) (-0.54) (-0.68) (-0.69) (-0.86) (-0.86) (-0.79) (-0.82) 
REMU-COM 0.0045 0.0022 0.0046 0.0027 0.001 0.001 0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.25) (0.12) (0.25) (0.15) (0.029) (0.051) (0.006) (0.015) 
NOMINI-
COM 
-0.0033 -0.0044 -0.0018 -0.0027 0.032 0.032 0.031 0.031 
 (-0.26) (-0.34) (-0.14) (-0.21) (1.80)
†
 (1.80)
†
 (1.75)
†
 (1.73)
†
 
DUL -0.024 -0.017 -0.011 -0.0058 -0.039 -0.039 -0.037 -0.038 
 (-0.87) (-0.61) (-0.37) (-0.19) (-1.44) (-1.46) (-1.39) (-1.41) 
lnBLK 0.047   0.045   0.072   0.069   
 (1.59)  (1.53)  (2.82)
**
  (2.71)
**
  
lnINST_BLK 0.06   0.058   0.11   0.11 
  (2.03)
*
  (1.97)
*
  (3.01)
**
  (3.01)
**
 
lnINDV_BLK   -0.17   -0.17   0.076   0.044 
  (-2.19)
*
  (-2.15)
*
  (0.98)  (0.59) 
lnBRDOWN -0.058 0.063     -0.11 -0.099     
 (-0.92) (0.83)   (-2.11)
*
 (-1.23)   
lnCEOOWN     -0.31 -0.23     -0.11 -0.072 
   (-1.67)
†
 (-1.16)   (-1.31) (-0.70) 
lnEXECOWN     -0.091 0.06     -0.053 -0.018 
   (-0.67) -0.42   (-0.67) (-0.18) 
lnNEDOWN     0.14 0.27     -0.17 -0.14 
   (0.99) (1.85)
†
   (-1.48) (-1.11) 
lnadjDBT 0.022 0.013 0.016 0.0094 0.047 0.047 0.048 0.048 
 (0.48) (0.29) (0.35) (0.2) (1.17) (1.15) (1.19) (1.17) 
sqadjDIVD -0.032 -0.03 -0.033 -0.031 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (-0.58) (-0.55) (-0.61) (-0.57) (-0.65) (-0.62) (-0.73) (-0.69) 
lnadjROA -0.53 -0.51 -0.52 -0.5 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 
 (-5.18)
***
 (-4.98)
***
 (-5.13)
***
 (-4.91)
***
 (-2.42)
*
 (-2.40)
*
 (-2.37)
*
 (-2.36)
*
 
lnASSTS 0.02 0.02 0.019 0.019 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 
  (4.57)
***
 (4.52)
***
 (4.52)
***
 (4.46)
***
 (4.49)
***
 (4.55)
***
 (4.49)
***
 (4.58)
***
 
N 562 562 562 562 684 684 684 684 
groups 196 196 196 196 235 235 235 235 
wald χ
2
 57
***
 62.4
***
 59.3
***
 63.1
***
 41.9
***
 43.2
***
 41.7
***
 43.4
***
 
z statistics in parentheses 
†
 p < 0.10, 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
All variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile values 
Dependent variable: QFCF  
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6.5 ROBUSTNESS CHECK AND FURTHER ANALYSES 
In this section, the researcher preforms some robustness checks to check the 
validity of the reported results in the previous sections. The researcher starts with 
testing a common problem in the econometric and governance literature which is the 
endogeneity problem. Then, the researcher utilises an alternative measure for board 
composition which reflects the recommended composition by the UK governance 
code; the researcher examines the proposed argument that the relationship between 
ownership variables and agency problem could be non-monotonic rather than linear 
relation, and the argument that the increase of the number of blockholders could be 
help in reducing the entrenchment effect of blockholders. 
6.5.1 The endogeneity problem 
In the main analyses, the researcher employed both fixed effects and random 
effects regression models. The fixed effects model control for the endogeneity issue 
by assuming that the effect of the omitted variables are fixed over time; in this 
section, the researcher applies a different method to control for the endogeneity by 
employing the Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) method using instrumental variables 
for the endogenous variables. In the following section, the researcher starts with 
addressing the endogeneity issue, detecting endogeneity and the possible solutions to 
deal with it. 
Endogeneity means that one or more independent variable is correlated to the 
error term (Baltagi, 2008); and hence, this correlated variable(s) becomes 
interdependent with other variables. This correlation between the independent 
variables and the error term violates a fundamental assumption of the OLS 
regression and hence the OLS estimators could be consistent but still inefficient 
(Greene, 2012). The presence of this correlation between independent variable(s), or 
in other words, the presence of endogenous variable(s) makes the regression 
estimates capture the magnitude of the association rather than the magnitude and 
direction (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). Endogeneity could arise because of different 
factors that could be sample sensitivity, simultaneous causality, unobserved 
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variables
8
, error in measuring variables, omission of relevant variables or other 
reasons (Baltagi, 2008; Stock and Waston, 2011; Greene, 2012).  
 Taking into consideration that in this study, both fixed effects and random effects 
panel regression models were employed –based on the results of Hausman (1978) 
specification tests; and that, panel data regression models considering some of the 
endogeneity reasons (i.e., the unobserved specific characteristics of the sample units) 
but not all the causes of endogeneity; moreover, the fixed effects model can tolerate 
limited form of endogeneity while the random effects model does not, a further 
investigation of the endogeneity issue for the employed models should be considered.  
The econometric literature, as well the accounting literature, provides many 
possible solutions for the endogeneity problem. One possible solution is to use the 
lagged value of the endogenous independent variables as instruments (Gujarati, 2004) 
and apply, for example, one of the instrumental variable (IV) methods (e.g., two-
stage least squares (2SLS)) to estimate consistent and efficient estimators (Baltagi, 
2008). These instruments should have the property to change with the changes of (in 
other words, highly correlated with) the endogenous independent variables without 
leading to any change in the dependent variable and without being correlated to the 
error term (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009; Brooks, 2014). Another solution is to use 
the system simultaneous equation modelling. 
Such methods have been applied in the prior governance and accounting literature 
as possible alternatives to deal with the endogeneity problem. Prior studies, e.g., 
McKnight and Weir (2009), Henry (2010), among others, employed the instrumental 
variables estimation methods to deal with the endogeneity problem; whereas, Bhagat 
and Bolton (2008), Ferrero-Ferrero, Fernández-Izquierdo and Muñoz-Torres (2012), 
among others, utilised the simultaneous equations model in dealing with the 
endogeneity issue; other researcher for example, Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008), 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) employed both methods and consistent results were 
reported; which can imply that these different approaches could be used as 
substitutes. However, Cameron and Trivedi (2009) describe the instrumental variable 
                                                          
8
  Endogenous treatment effects: unobserved factors (sample unit specific characteristics) that have 
strong impact on the independent variables, and do affect the estimated relationship, but it is 
impossible to be considered in estimation model. 
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estimation methods as the foremost approach that can be used to estimate models 
with endogenous variables. 
Building on the previous discussion, investigating the endogeneity issue is a very 
important and critical step. Researchers should check for endogeneity and ensure that 
the employed model comprises endogenous variables before proceeding to use 
instrumental variables models. If the use of OLS regression with endogenous 
independent variables will provide inefficient estimations, the same will happen by 
utilising instrumental variables regression techniques with exogenous independent 
variables (Gujarati, 2004; Cameron and Trivedi, 2009; Brooks, 2014) as the 
estimators will be consistent but not efficient as the OLS estimator (Gujarati, 2004; 
Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). 
Hausman (1978) specification error test is one of the specification tests that can 
be used to examine the exogeneity of the employed independent variables and to 
decide either OLS estimators are efficient or there is a need to utilise other OLS 
alternatives like simultaneous equations model or 2SLS and other instrumental 
variables models (Gujarati, 2004). It worth mentioning that Hausman (1978) 
specification test yields consistent results with the earlier work of Durbin (1954) and 
Wu (1973) for endogeneity testing (Greene, 2012).  
The idea of this test is to compare the estimators of OLS and 2SLS, if the 
estimators are consistent and there is no substantial difference between the OLS and 
the IV estimations, this is an indication that there is no need to utilise OLS 
alternatives; whereas, if the difference is considerably big, so the variable can be 
deemed endogenous, and an instrument variable should be used (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2009; Greene, 2012) or other OLS alternative. Baltagi (2008) mentions that 
Monte Carlo experiments were performed to test the goodness of Hausman (1978) 
test shows that this test is effective in detecting the endogeneity problem and the 
endogenous variables.  
Durbin–Wu–Hausman endogeneity diagnostic test is another specification test 
that can be used to investigate the exogeneity of the independent variables. This test 
is based on examining a null hypothesis that the examined variables are exogenous. 
The failure to reject the null hypothesis implies that the examined variables are 
exogenous; and hence, the OLS provides efficient estimators; while, rejecting the 
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null hypothesis of the exogeneity of variables indicates that variables are endogenous, 
and this requires utilising different regression techniques (e.g., 2SLS method using 
instrumental variables for the endogenous variables) otherwise, the regression results 
will be inefficient.  
Cameron and Trivedi (2009) argue that Durbin–Wu–Hausman test is equivalent 
to the Hausman (1978) test of endogeneity; however, it can be done in robust form to 
consider the heteroskedastic errors and auto correlation cases. For the case of having 
the multiple endogenous variables, Cameron and Trivedi (2009, p.190) suggest to 
test for the endogeneity for the suspected variables separately using robust Durbin–
Wu–Hausman test, in order to correlate between each variable and the error term.  
In this study, the endogeneity issue among the governance and other variables 
employed in this study is examined by using robust Durbin–Wu–Hausman (DWH) 
endogeneity diagnostic test; such test has be utilised in prior studies (e.g., Beiner et 
al. (2006); Park and Jang (2010); Ferrero-Ferrero, Fernández-Izquierdo and Muñoz-
Torres (2012), among others). The reported results, as shown in Table 21, show that 
the researcher failed to reject the null hypothesis at the 5% significance level for the 
pre and post crisis samples, thus, none of the models’ variables are endogenous. 
While for the full sample, the tests results are consistent for two models (baseline 
and sub model 3), and indicate that both models have endogenous variables, whereas, 
for the two other models (sub models 1 and 2) the results are mixed, one test 
supports the null hypothesis, and the other does not support it. Thus, 2SLS 
regression model using instrumental variables for the endogenous ones should be 
employed for all models. 
In order to identify the endogenous variables in the full sample models, the 
researcher follows Cameron and Trivedi (2009)’s suggestion of examining the 
endogeneity of the independent variables separately. In doing so, the researcher 
separately applied the robust Durbin–Wu–Hausman test for the independent 
variables utilised variables in this study. The results of the DWH test show that, only, 
the nomination committee and return on assets are the endogenous independent 
variables in the employed models. 
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Table 21 Robust Durbin–Wu–Hausman endogeneity diagnostic test 
 Baseline model Sub model 1 Sub model 2 Sub model 3 
Full sample 
Ho: variables are exogenous 
Durbin (score) χ2  16.398
*
 16.249 19.453
*
 19.377 
Wu-Hausman F 2.215
*
 1.929
*
 2.278
*
 2.022
*
 
Pre–crisis 
Ho: variables are exogenous 
Durbin (score) χ2 9.731 10.892 10.004 11.404 
Wu-Hausman F 1.277 1.291 1.048 1.073 
Post-crisis 
Ho: variables are exogenous 
Durbin (score) χ2 11.248 10.690 10.387 10.128 
Wu-Hausman F 1.734 1.449 1.247 1.086 
*p < 0.05     
Building on the results of the Durbin–Wu–Hausman endogeneity test, the 
researcher has to re-estimate the employed models by utilising instrumental variables 
for the endogenous variables. These instruments should be highly correlated with the 
endogenous variables, but not correlated to the error term. Cameron and Trivedi 
(2009) mentions that the choice of the instruments should be based on norms 
established in prior empirical literature. Thus, based on the corporate governance 
prior literature (e.g., Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008); McKnight and Weir (2009); 
Henry (2010), among others) the lagged value of the endogenous variables was 
employed in the 2SLS regression model. 
Table 22 reports the results of the 2SLS regression using the lagged values of 
nomination committee compliance and the industry adjusted ROA as instruments for 
the full sample. Overall, the reported results in this table are not only lending the 
support to the full sample results reported in the full sample analysis section (Table 
15), but also bring new evidence. Large boards are positively associated with asset 
utilisation at the 5% significance level for the baseline and the sub models; 
supporting the argument that large boards are more efficient for the UK firms. The 
coefficients of the percentage of the independent board members turn out to be 
positive, but also insignificant compared to random effects regression results. 
Likewise, the modest evidence of the CEO duality reported earlier stays negative, 
but turns out to be insignificant. Unlike the results of the random effect regression 
model of the full sample, that do not provide any evidence that board subcommittees 
have any significant impact on agency costs; the 2SLS regression results provide 
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new evidence, for the baseline and sub models, that the compliance with the UK 
corporate governance code recommendations for the remuneration committee is 
associated with higher agency costs at the 5% significance level; while the 
compliance with the recommendations for the nomination committee is associated 
with low agency costs at the 1% significance level. The block holding percentage 
also, turns out to be insignificant compared to the significant evidence provided by 
the random effects regression. Moreover, the reported results provide modest 
evidence that individual block holding has a positive impact on asset utilisation at 
the 5% significance level and institutional block holding has no significant impact. 
The percentage of board ownership is negatively associated with the asset utilisation 
ratio at the 5% significance level. The CEO ownership percentage is associated with 
high agency costs at the 1% significance level, while the executive and non-
executive directors ownership percentages remain insignificant, which is consistent 
with the earliest reported results in Table 15. 
In terms of control variable, the reported results confirm the negative impact of 
debt on asset utilisation, the positive association between firm’s profit and asset 
utilisation and that agency costs increase as firms become larger in size. This 
analysis adds that growth prospects are negatively associated with asset utilisation; 
and support the argument that high growth firms might have a lower asset utilisation 
ratio as it requires more time to customise their products and operations with these 
new opportunities.  
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Table 22 Results of the 2SLS instrumental regression with robust standard error for the study 
sample covering the period 2005-2011 inclusive 
 Baseline model Sub model 1 Sub model 2 Sub model 3 
Intercept -0.049 -0.076 -0.12 -0.12 
  (-0.071) (-0.11) (-0.18) (-0.17) 
lnBRD 0.064 0.067 0.057 0.06 
  (2.24)
*
 (2.33)
*
 (1.96)
*
 (2.06)
*
 
lnIND 0.097 0.094 0.11 0.11 
  (1.11) (1.08) (1.19) (1.27) 
ACE -0.016 -0.014 -0.015 -0.011 
  (-0.69) (-0.60) (-0.62) (-0.48) 
REMU-COM -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 
  (-2.27)
*
 (-2.28)
*
 (-2.24)
*
 (-2.28)
*
 
NOMINI-COM 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
  (2.89)
**
 (2.93)
**
 (2.84)
**
 (2.91)
**
 
DUL -0.018 -0.019 0.0042 0.0054 
  (-0.61) (-0.67) (0.13) (0.17) 
BLK 0.015  0.011  
  (0.45)  (0.33)  
lnINST_BLK .00004  -0.012 
   (0.001)  (-0.26) 
lnINDV_BLK  0.27  0.17 
   (2.17)
*
  (1.34) 
lnBRDOWN -0.12 -0.32   
  (-1.29) (-2.22)
*
   
lnCEOOWN   -0.41 -0.56 
    (-2.76)
**
 (-3.02)
**
 
lnEXECOWN   0.082 -0.041 
    (0.69) (-0.27) 
lnNEDOWN   -0.065 0.068 
    (-0.22) (0.16) 
lnadjDBT -0.51 -0.5 -0.52 -0.52 
  (-7.04)
***
 (-6.88)
***
 (-7.10)
***
 (-7.07)
***
 
sqadjDIVD -0.025 -0.031 -0.036 -0.038 
  (-0.25) (-0.3) (-0.35) (-0.38) 
lnadjROA 2.77 2.78 2.87 2.86 
  (3.16)
**
 (3.20)
**
 (3.21)
**
 (3.21)
**
 
lnadjQ -0.25 -0.26 -0.26 -0.26 
  (-2.76)
**
 (-2.82)
**
 (-2.79)
**
 (-2.81)
**
 
lnASSTS -0.013 -0.014 -0.013 -0.014 
 (-2.36)
*
 (-2.47)
*
 (-2.33)
*
 (-2.46)
*
 
N 1167 1167 1167 1167 
wald χ2 118.9
***
 123.8
***
 123.5
***
 129.2
***
 
z-statistics in parentheses 
†
p < 0.10, 
*
p < 0.05, 
**
p < 0.01, 
***
p < 0.001 
All variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile values 
Dependent variable: Industry adjusted asset utilisation ratio  
Instruments: one year lagged value fornomination committee and industry adjusted 
ROA 
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As mentioned earlier, considering the characteristics of the QFCF as a censored 
variable, Tobit regression was utilised. In this section the researcher aims at 
examining for the endogeneity issue for the QFCF models. For these models, the 
Smith-Blundell test for endogeneity will be utilised instead of the Durbin–Wu–
Hausman (DWH) endogeneity diagnostic test. Similar to the (DHW) test, Smith-
Blundell test is a specification test that examines a null hypothesis that the examined 
variables are exogenous (Baum, 1999). The results, shown in Table 23 show that for 
the full sample, sub models (1, 2 and 3) suffer from the endogeneity problem, with 
regard to the pre–crisis period, only submodules (1 and 3) have the endogeneity 
problem; and finally none of the post crisis period models have the problem of 
endogeneity. Thus, further analyses to identify the endogenous variables, should be 
done. 
Table 23 Smith-Blundell endogeneity test for QFCF models 
  Baseline model Sub model 1 Sub model 2 Sub model 3 
Full sample 
Ho: variables are exogenous 
P-value 1.883 2.258
*
 2.350
*
 1.912
*
 
Pre–crisis 
Ho: variables are exogenous 
P-value 1.013 5.480
*
 1.202 6.441
*
 
Post-crisis 
Ho: variables are exogenous 
P-value 0.581 1.051 0.597 0.99 
*p < 0.05         
Following Cameron and Trivedi (2009)’s suggestion, the researcher examines the 
endogeneity of the independent variables separately to identify the endogenous 
variables. The results of this examination reveal that remuneration committee 
compliance, institutional and individual block holding and firm profitability are the 
endogenous variables for the full sample models; whereas, individual and ROA are 
endogenous for the pre–crisis period.  
Table 24 provides the results of the instrumental based Tobit regression. The 
reported results lend the support and add to the reported results in Table 18. With 
regards to sub models (1, 2 and 3) of the full sample, the results add a significant 
association at the 10% level between large boards and lower agency costs in terms of 
QFCF; moreover, there is a negative and significant association between board 
composition and QFCF, suggesting that independent board members reduce agency 
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costs of the free cash flows and investment decisions. A positive association was 
found between REMU_COM and QFCF, suggesting that the compliance with the 
UK governance code with regard to the remuneration committee increases agency 
costs. With regard to the pre–crisis, the reported results in Table 24 are consistent 
with the reported results in Table 19, with exception that individual block holding 
turns out to be positive and significantly associated with QFCF; and the non-
executive ownership ratio turns out to be insignificant.  
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Table 24 Results of the instrumental Tobit regression  
 full sample (2005-2011) pre–crisis (2005-2007) 
  sub model 
1 
sub model 
2 
sub model 
3 
sub model 
1 
sub model 
3 
Intercept 0.298 0.311 0.343 -0.0803 -0.0895 
  (0.910) (0.950) (1.040) (-0.19) (-0.21) 
lnBRD -0.0262 -0.028 -0.0304 -0.0821 -0.0804 
  (-1.81)
†
 (-1.91)
†
 (-2.05)
*
 (-3.05)
**
 (-2.98)
**
 
lnIND -0.0876 -0.0879 -0.0839 -0.043 -0.0414 
  (-1.83)
†
 (-1.84)
†
 (-1.75)
†
 (-0.540) (-0.520) 
ACE -0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0017 0.0095 0.00728 
  (-0.092) (-0.11) (-0.15) (0.590) (0.450) 
REMU-COM 0.086 0.086 0.0887 0.00908 0.00939 
  (2.20)
*
 (2.20)
*
 (2.25)
*
 (0.340) (0.350) 
NOMINI-COM -0.0118 -0.012 -0.0124 -0.0149 -0.0147 
  (-0.87) (-0.89) (-0.91) (-0.81) (-0.79) 
DUL -0.0482 -0.0463 -0.0452 -0.0501 -0.0559 
  (-2.48)
*
 (-2.32)
*
 (-2.26)
*
 (-1.36) (-1.43) 
BLK  0.0403    
   (2.31)
*
    
lnINST_BLK 0.0696  0.0235 0.123 0.123 
  (2.93)
**
  (0.710) (3.17)
**
 (3.12)
**
 
lnINDV_BLK 0.0562  0.0294 0.195 0.194 
  (0.800)  (0.440) (1.74)
†
 (1.69)
†
 
lnBRDOWN -0.0148   -0.119  
  (-0.21)   (-1.10)  
lnCEOOWN  -0.0477 -0.0393  -0.192 
   (-0.57) (-0.39)  (-0.76) 
lnEXECOWN  0.0085 0.0163  -0.172 
   (0.130) (0.190)  (-0.91) 
lnNEDOWN  0.0343 0.0489  -0.128 
   (0.350) (0.430)  (-0.63) 
lnadjDBT -0.0002 -0.0016 -0.0028 0.0926 0.095 
  (-0.0048) (-0.048) (-0.085) (1.620) (1.65)
†
 
sqadjDIVD -0.0002 -0.0002 - 0.000 0.0451 0.0458 
  (-0.0035) (-0.0049) (-0.000) (0.610) (0.620) 
lnadjROA -1.173 -1.169 -1.192 -1.19 -1.182 
  (-5.61)
***
 (-5.55)
***
 (-5.61)
***
 (-5.32)
***
 (-5.22)
***
 
lnASSTS 0.0126 0.0123 0.0115 0.0234 0.0234 
 (4.46)
***
 (4.33)
***
 (3.93)
***
 (4.17)
***
 (4.17)
***
 
N 1167 1167 1167 363 363 
wald χ2 114.1 109.8 104.7 66.86 66.39 
z-statistics in parentheses 
†
p < 0.10, 
*
p < 0.05, 
**
p < 0.01, 
***
p < 0.001 
All variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile values 
Dependent variable: Industry adjusted asset utilisation ratio 
Instruments: one 
year lagged value 
for: 
nomination committee, individual block 
holding and industry adjusted ROA 
individual block holding, 
and industry adjusted 
ROA 
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6.5.2 Re-estimating the full sample analysis after controlling for the financial 
crisis period and using relatively balanced data set. 
Table 25 reports the results of the regression analysis of the full sample after 
adding dummy variables to control for pre, during and post crisis periods and using a 
relatively balanced data set (the average number of observations for each firm is 6.8). 
First, the results show that pre–crisis and during variables are significant for the asset 
utilisation measure; and the pre–crisis is significant for the QFCF models; suggesting 
that there is a significant difference between the impact of the corporate governance 
mechanisms on agency costs before, during and after the financial crisis. 
 In terms of asset utilisation as an agency cost proxy; the reported results enhance 
and add to the reported results in Table 15. Large boards enhance firm’s utilisation 
ratio; whereas, duality is negatively associated with asset utilisation for the baseline 
and all sub models. Confirming that large boards help in reducing the agency cost, 
and duality increases agency costs for the period 2005-2011 inclusive. The results of 
the block holding and CEO ownership are consistent with previously reported results 
in Table 15; blockholders help in reducing the agency costs, whereas, CEO 
ownership increases agency costs at the 10% significance level. However, the results 
show that after controlling for the periods before and during the financial crisis, 
institutional and individual block holding turn to be insignificant. 
In terms of QFCF as an agency costs proxy, the reported results in Table 25 are 
consistent with the previously reported results in Table 19. Block holding and 
institutional blockholders are positively associated with QFCF, which implies that 
block holding and institutional blockholders increase the agency costs related to 
investment decisions; whereas, there is modest evidence that board ownership is 
negatively associated with QFCF; which means board ownership help in reducing 
agency costs of the free cash flow. Inconsistent with the previously mentioned 
results in Table 19, duality turns to have no significant impact on QFCF. 
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Table 25 Results of the random effects panel data regression model with robust standard error for the study sample 
covering the period 2005-2011 inclusive after adding financial crisis dummies 
 Panel A Panel B 
 Baseline 
model 
Sub 
model 1 
Sub 
model 2 
Sub 
model 3 
Baseline 
model 
Sub 
model 1 
Sub 
model 2 
Sub 
model 3 
Intercept 0.857 0.857 0.87 0.872 -0.0684 -0.06 -0.0691 -0.0609 
  (5.41)
***
 (5.38)
***
 (5.53)
***
 (5.51)
***
 (-1.13) (-0.99) (-1.14) (-1.01) 
lnBRD 0.0584 0.0601 0.0553 0.0564 -0.0131 -0.0142 -0.0126 -0.0139 
  (2.09)
*
 (2.13)
*
 (1.99)
*
 (2.01)
*
 (-0.87) (-0.94) (-0.83) (-0.92) 
lnIND -0.0274 -0.0287 -0.0189 -0.0192 -0.0281 -0.0217 -0.0276 -0.0222 
  (-0.38) (-0.40) (-0.26) (-0.26) (-0.59) (-0.45) (-0.58) (-0.46) 
ACE 0.00242 0.00275 0.003 0.00324 -0.0016 -0.002 -0.0016 -0.0019 
  (0.16) (0.18) (0.20) (0.21) (-0.17) (-0.22) (-0.17) (-0.21) 
REMU-COM -0.0056 -0.0049 -0.007 -0.0065 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 
  (-0.27) (-0.23) (-0.35) (-0.32) (0.34) (0.28) (0.32) (0.27) 
NOMINI-
COM 
0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.003 
  (0.34) (0.34) (0.34) (0.33) (0.47) (0.31) (0.47) (0.32) 
DUL -0.0749 -0.0759 -0.0671 -0.0682 -0.03 -0.0282 -0.029 -0.027 
  (-2.68)
**
 (-2.69)
**
 (-2.34)
*
 (-2.36)
*
 (-1.55) (-1.46) (-1.47) (-1.37) 
BLK 0.0777  0.0764  0.053  0.053  
  (1.96)
*
  (1.92)
†
  (2.79)
**
  (2.79)
**
  
lnINST_BLK 0.0779  0.0781  0.0697  0.0695 
   (1.57)  (1.58)  (3.05)
**
  (3.04)
**
 
lnINDV_BLK  0.169  0.132  -0.0684  -0.062 
   (1.39)  (1.02)  (-1.12)  (-1.05) 
lnBRDOWN -0.049 -0.0887   -0.0991 -0.0198   
  (-0.59) (-1.18)   (-1.91)
†
 (-0.31)   
lnCEOOWN   -0.207 -0.222   -0.133 -0.0596 
    (-1.81)
†
 (-1.87)
†
   (-1.24) (-0.53) 
lnEXECOWN   0.114 0.0894   -0.125 -0.0499 
    (0.93) (0.71)   (-1.62) (-0.59) 
lnNEDOWN   0.0655 0.0525   -0.0484 0.0254 
    (0.46) (0.35)   (-0.46) (0.23) 
lnadjDBT -0.537 -0.536 -0.534 -0.533 0.0109 0.00962 0.0096 0.00879 
  (-5.48)
***
 (-5.49)
***
 (-5.44)
***
 (-5.44)
***
 (0.35) (0.31) (0.31) (0.29) 
sqadjDIVD -0.0073 -0.0074 -0.0067 -0.0068 -0.0017 -0.0016 -0.0017 -0.0016 
  (-0.90) (-0.92) (-0.83) (-0.84) (-0.44) (-0.41) (-0.44) (-0.41) 
lnadjROA 0.483 0.478 0.474 0.47 -0.263 -0.264 -0.262 -0.262 
  (3.32)
***
 (3.30)
***
 (3.32)
***
 (3.29)
***
 (-4.28)
***
 (-4.30)
***
 (-4.26)
***
 (-4.27)
***
 
lnadjQ 0.0133 0.0113 0.0138 0.0124     
  (0.42) (0.36) (0.44) (0.40)     
lnASSTS -0.0086 -0.0086 -0.0087 -0.0087 0.0124 0.0123 0.0124 0.0123 
  (-1.16) (-1.16) (-1.17) (-1.17) (5.18)
***
 (5.16)
***
 (5.18)
***
 (5.15)
***
 
Pre–crisis -0.204 -0.209 -0.201 -0.205 -0.0464 -0.0477 -0.0467 -0.0478 
 (-4.12)
***
 (-4.23)
***
 (-4.05)
***
 (-4.14)
***
 (-1.96)
†
 (-2.02)
*
 (-1.97)
*
 (-2.02)
*
 
During -0.117 -0.117 -0.113 -0.113 -0.023 -0.0214 -0.0235 -0.0218 
 (-2.53)
*
 (-2.55)
*
 (-2.44)
*
 (-2.45)
*
 (-1.01) (-0.94) (-1.03) (-0.96) 
N 1298 1298 1298 1298 1298 1298 1298 1298 
groups 192 192 192 192 192 192 192 192 
wald χ2 524.9
***
 518
***
 656.5
***
 651.4
***
 69.93
***
 73.58
***
 70.68
***
 73.95
***
 
z -statistics in parentheses  
†
p < 0.10, 
*
p < 0.05, 
**
p < 0.01, 
***
p < 0.001 
All variables are winsorized at the 1
st 
and 99
th
 percentile values 
Dependent 
variable: 
Industry adjusted asset utilisation ratio QFCF 
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6.5.3 The nonlinear impact of ownership structure 
As mentioned earlier in chapter 3, there are two hypotheses that explain the 
relationship between managerial ownership and block holding ownership on the one 
side and agency costs and firm performance on the other side. In terms of managerial 
ownership, the convergence of interest hypothesis assumes that the increase on the 
managerial ownership will align the interests of managers with those of shareholders; 
whereas, the entrenchment hypothesis predicts that managers will use their 
ownership stake to entrench themselves. Likewise, prior literature provides the 
control and the expropriation hypotheses to explain the relationship between block 
holding and agency costs as well as firm performance. Prior literature (e.g., Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1988); McConnell and Servaes (1990); (1995); Park and Jang 
(2010); Wellalage and Locke (2011), among others) provides empirical evidence that 
the relationship between the managerial ownership and the block holding on the one 
side, and the firm performance, value on the other side is not linear relationship. 
Thus, in this section the researcher investigates this proposed argument. In doing so, 
following the prior literature, the researcher adds the square of the ownership ratios 
to the regression models. Tables (25, 26 and 27) report the results of the regression 
models after adding the square of the ownership ratios. In terms of asset utilisation as 
an agency cost proxy, the results reported failed to provide any evidence that the 
relationship between the different ownership ratios and asset utilisation is nonlinear. 
However, in terms of QFCF as an agency proxy, for the pre–crisis period, the results 
provide modest evidence that the relationship between the CEO ownership ratio and 
QFCF is an inverted U shaped relationship, which implies that the increase in the 
CEO ownership increases agency costs till it reaches a certain point (5.4%) 
9,
 after 
that the increase in CEO ownership reduces agency costs. For the post crisis period, 
the results reveal an inverted U shaped relationship between the total percentage of 
individual block holding and QFCF; indicating that the increase in individual block 
holding increases agency costs of the free cash flow till it reaches a certain point 
(19.97%) 
10;
 after that point, the impact turns out to be positive as it starts to reduce 
investment agency costs.  
                                                          
9
 This optimal point is obtained by using the derivative of the QFCF with respect to CEO ownership 
ratio. 
10
 This optimal point is obtained by using the derivative of the QFCF with respect to the total 
individual block holding ratio. 
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Table 26 Regression results of the nonlinear effects of ownership on agency costs over the preiod 2005-2011 inclusive 
 Panel A Panel B 
 Baseline 
model 
Sub 
model 1 
Sub 
model 2 
Sub 
model 3 
Baseline 
model 
Sub 
model 1 
Sub 
model 2 
Sub 
model 3 
Intercept 1.448 1.449 1.465 1.468 -0.177 -0.179 -0.167 -0.178 
  (3.33)
***
 (3.34)
***
 (3.37)
***
 (3.38)
***
 (-0.78) (-0.79) (-0.73) (-0.78) 
lnBRD 0.0432 0.043 0.0399 0.0396 -0.0185 -0.0181 -0.0194 -0.0188 
  (1.70)
†
 (1.68)
†
 (1.57) (1.55) (-1.30) (-1.28) (-1.36) (-1.32) 
lnIND -0.03 -0.028 -0.026 -0.022 -0.021 -0.019 -0.019 -0.02 
  (-0.41) (-0.38) (-0.35) (-0.30) (-0.460) (-0.420) (-0.420) (-0.430) 
ACE 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 
  (0.70) (0.75) (0.71) (0.75) (-0.46) (-0.60) (-0.49) (-0.62) 
REMU-COM -0.008 -0.009 -0.01 -0.011 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 
  (-0.42) (-0.43) (-0.52) (-0.53) (0.110) (0.150) (0.130) (0.190) 
NOMINI-COM 0.01 0.01 0.009 0.01 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.009 
  (0.53) (0.54) (0.51) (0.52) (0.890) (0.870) (0.850) (0.860) 
DUL -0.06 -0.062 -0.052 -0.054 -0.031 -0.031 -0.028 -0.028 
  (-1.74)
†
 (-1.81)
†
 (-1.51) (-1.59) (-1.76)
†
 (-1.72)
†
 (-1.58) (-1.57) 
BLK 0.062  0.055  0.05  0.053  
  (0.70)  (0.61)  (1.110)  (1.160)  
BLK
2
 0.016  0.027  0.001  -0.002  
  (0.15)  (0.25)  (0.021)  (-0.034)  
lnINST_BLK -0.025  -0.034 
 
0.078 
 
0.076 
   (-0.22)  (-0.29) 
 
(1.230) 
 
(1.190) 
INST_BLK
2
 0.202  0.217 
 
0 
 
0.005 
   (1.01)  (1.07) 
 
(-0.0022) 
 
(0.043) 
lnINDV_BLK  0.102  0.104 
 
0.079 
 
0.098 
   (0.35)  (0.36) 
 
(0.660) 
 
(0.830) 
INDV_BLK
2
  0.247  0.253 
 
-0.31 
 
-0.348 
   (0.32)  (0.34) 
 
(-0.93) 
 
(-1.06) 
lnBRDOWN 0.066 0.051   0.058 0.041   
  (0.33) (0.23)   (0.500) (0.310)   
BRDOWN
2
 -0.294 -0.396   -0.367 -0.112   
  (-0.61) (-0.73)   (-1.16) (-0.31)   
lnCEOOWN   0.138 0.142   -0.11 -0.138 
    (0.35) (0.37)   (-0.45) (-0.55) 
CEOOWN
2
   -1.472 -1.765   -0.147 0.348 
    (-1.11) (-1.35)   (-0.17) (0.370) 
lnEXECOWN   0.168 0.163   0.074 0.04 
    (0.44) (0.39)   (0.360) (0.190) 
EXECOWN
2
   -0.22 -0.378   -0.407 -0.098 
    (-0.23) (-0.36)   (-0.71) (-0.16) 
lnNEDOWN   -0.268 -0.314   0.077 0.052 
    (-0.51) (-0.60)   (0.240) (0.160) 
NEDOWN
2
   1.055 1.114   -0.488 -0.14 
    (0.41) (0.43)   (-0.31) (-0.090) 
lnadjDBT -0.534 -0.533 -0.533 -0.53 0.025 0.023 0.023 0.021 
  (-5.93)
***
 (-5.88)
***
 (-5.89)
***
 (-5.83)
***
 (0.840) (0.780) (0.780) (0.730) 
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sqadjDIVD 0.097 0.095 0.097 0.095 -0.022 -0.022 -0.022 -0.022 
  (1.35) (1.33) (1.34) (1.32) (-0.580) (-0.560) (-0.560) (-0.570) 
lnadjROA 0.42 0.416 0.411 0.406 -0.314 -0.311 -0.318 -0.312 
  (3.07)
**
 (3.09)
**
 (3.04)
**
 (3.03)
**
 (-5.18)
***
 (-5.14)
***
 (-5.22)
***
 (-5.14)
***
 
lnadjQ -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005     
  (-0.070) (-0.13) (-0.10) (-0.17)     
lnASSTS -0.011 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 
  (-1.78)
†
 (-1.78)
†
 (-1.79)
†
 (-1.80)
†
 (5.97)
***
 (6.02)
***
 (5.93)
***
 (5.99)
***
 
N 1431 1431 1431 1431 1431 1431 1431 1431 
groups 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 
wald χ2 74.59
***
 78.324
***
 100.918
***
 114.569
***
 80.284
***
 84.526
***
 80.375
***
 84.934
***
 
z statistics in parentheses  
†
p < 0.10, 
*
p < 0.05, 
**
p < 0.01, 
***
p < 0.001 
All variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile values 
Dependent 
variable: 
Industry adjusted asset utilisation ratio 
QFCF 
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Table 27 Regression results of the nonlinear effects of ownership on agency costs over the preiod 2005-2007 inclusive 
 Panel A Panel B 
 Baseline 
model 
Sub 
model 1 
Sub 
model 2 
Sub 
model 3 
Baseline 
model 
Sub 
model 1 
Sub 
model 2 
Sub 
model 3 
Intercept 1.81 1.82 1.86 1.87 -0.208 -0.201 -0.206 -0.195 
  (3.39)
***
 (3.41)
***
 (3.49)
***
 (3.51)
***
 (-0.65) (-0.64) (-0.65) (-0.63) 
lnBRD 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 -0.0541 -0.0543 -0.0501 -0.0515 
  (1.30) (1.32) (1.18) (1.19) (-2.54)
*
 (-2.54)
*
 (-2.36)
*
 (-2.43)
*
 
lnIND -0.16 -0.15 -0.15 -0.14 -0.092 -0.094 -0.076 -0.081 
  (-1.78)
†
 (-1.74)
†
 (-1.69)
†
 (-1.65) (-1.450) (-1.480) (-1.190) (-1.250) 
ACE 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.006 -0.006 -0.01 -0.01 
  (1.91)
†
 (1.87)
†
 (1.95)
†
 (1.92)
†
 (-0.51) (-0.57) (-0.92) (-0.90) 
REMU-COM -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.002 
  (-0.29) (-0.36) (-0.56) (-0.65) (0.270) (0.160) (0.190) (0.100) 
NOMINI-COM 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 
  -0.86 -0.82 -0.86 -0.82 (-0.22) (-0.32) (-0.12) (-0.24) 
DUL -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.024 -0.016 -0.011 -0.009 
  (-0.85) (-0.83) (-0.72) (-0.71) (-0.85) (-0.57) (-0.37) (-0.28) 
lnBLK 0.10  0.11  0.066 
 
0.078 
 
  (1.00)  (1.06)  (0.780) 
 
(0.930) 
 
BLK
2
 0.01  0.00  -0.036 
 
-0.061 
 
  (0.03)  (0.03)  (-0.24) 
 
(-0.40) 
 
lnINST_BLK 0.05  0.05  0.049 
 
 0.05 
    (0.46)  (0.53)  (0.590)  (0.600) 
INST_BLK
2
 0.10  0.10  0.022 
 
0.014 
   (0.53)  (0.52)  (0.140) 
 
(0.088) 
lnINDV_BLK  -0.23  -0.26  -0.093 
 
-0.127 
   (-0.84)  (-0.80)  (-0.53) 
 
(-0.71) 
INDV_BLK
2
  0.77  0.81  -0.213 
 
-0.066 
   (1.10)  (1.09)  (-0.46) 
 
(-0.14) 
lnBRDOWN 0.22 0.23   0.013 0.056   
  (0.99) (1.00)   (0.072) (0.300)   
BRDOWN
2
 -0.50 -0.51   -0.193 0.015   
  (-0.99) (-1.00)   (-0.42) (0.030)   
lnCEOOWN   0.13 0.15   1.094 0.955 
    (0.26) (0.30)   (1.65)
†
 (1.420) 
CEOOWN
2
   -0.96 -1.14   -10.399 -9.197 
    (-0.35) (-0.43)   (-1.90)
†
 (-1.64) 
lnEXECOWN   -0.22 -0.18   -0.563 -0.485 
    (-0.32) (-0.26)   (-1.31) (-1.10) 
EXECOWN
2
   1.11 1.04   1.557 1.764 
    (0.55) (0.50)   (1.060) (1.170) 
lnNEDOWN   0.65 0.66   0.167 0.326 
    (1.01) (1.04)   (0.390) (0.750) 
NEDOWN
2
   -2.64 -2.66   -0.09 -0.347 
    (-0.81) (-0.81)   (-0.035) (-0.14) 
lnadjDBT -0.24 -0.24 -0.25 -0.25 0.022 0.013 0.02 0.013 
  (-1.63) (-1.62) (-1.72)
†
 (-1.70)
†
 (0.480) (0.280) (0.430) (0.280) 
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sqadjDIVD 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 -0.03 -0.029 -0.031 -0.03 
  (0.66) (0.68) (0.68) (0.70) (-0.550) (-0.540) (-0.560) (-0.560) 
lnadjROA 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 -0.529 -0.506 -0.535 -0.513 
  (1.12) (1.10) (1.11) (1.09) (-5.15)
***
 (-4.92)
***
 (-5.20)
***
 (-4.98)
***
 
lnadjQ 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07     
  (1.98)
*
 (1.91)
†
 (1.79)
†
 (1.74)
†
     
lnASSTS -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.019 
  (-2.94)
**
 (-2.90)
**
 (-2.96)
**
 (-2.92)
**
 (4.59)
***
 (4.52)
***
 (4.52)
***
 (4.43)
***
 
N 562 562 562 562 562 562 562 562 
groups 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 
adj. R
2
 19% 19% 19% 18%     
F-test 4.26
***
 3.84
***
 3.92
***
 3.63
***
     
wald χ2         57.172*** 62.18*** 58.014*** 62.031*** 
z / t -statistics in parentheses  
†
p < 0.10, 
*
p < 0.05, 
**
p < 0.01, 
***
p < 0.001 
All variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile values 
Dependent 
variable: 
Industry adjusted asset utilisation ratio 
QFCF 
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Table 28 Regression results of the nonlinear effects of ownership on agency costs over the preiod 2009-2011 inclusive 
 Panel A Panel B 
 Baseline 
model 
Sub 
model 1 
Sub 
model 2 
Sub 
model 3 
Baseline 
model 
Sub 
model 1 
Sub 
model 2 
Sub 
model 3 
Intercept 1.021 1.009 1.033 1.024 -0.158 -0.184 -0.151 -0.183 
  (6.05)
***
 (5.85)
***
 (6.04)
***
 (5.83)
***
 (-1.95)
†
 (-2.27)
*
 (-1.85)
†
 (-2.25)
*
 
lnBRD 0.0779 0.0772 0.0733 0.0726 -0.0056 -0.0035 -0.0078 -0.0059 
  (1.96)
*
 (1.96)
†
 (1.82)
†
 (1.83)
†
 (-0.28) (-0.18) (-0.39) (-0.30) 
lnIND -0.015 -0.021 -0.014 -0.02 -0.012 -0.014 -0.012 -0.015 
  (-0.39) (-0.56) (-0.35) (-0.52) (-0.55) (-0.61) (-0.53) (-0.66) 
ACE 0.043 0.044 0.044 0.046 -0.013 -0.014 -0.013 -0.014 
  (1.72)
†
 (1.75)
†
 (1.69)
†
 (1.76)
†
 (-0.86) (-0.96) (-0.90) (-0.99) 
REMU-COM -0.029 -0.026 -0.025 -0.023 0.002 0.007 0.005 0.011 
  (-0.54) (-0.49) (-0.45) (-0.40) (0.061) (0.250) (0.170) (0.380) 
NOMINI-COM -0.015 -0.006 -0.019 -0.011 0.033 0.035 0.033 0.036 
  (-0.51) (-0.20) (-0.64) (-0.35) (1.83)
†
 (1.95)
†
 (1.79)
†
 (1.98)
*
 
DUL -0.015 -0.012 -0.003 0.001 -0.039 -0.039 -0.037 -0.035 
  (-0.27) (-0.23) (-0.063) (0.02) (-1.46) (-1.48) (-1.36) (-1.32) 
BLK 0.147  0.142  0.066 
 
0.076 
 
  (1.04)  (0.99)  (0.840) 
 
(0.960) 
 
BLK
2
 -0.185  -0.176  0.006 
 
-0.009 
 
  (-1.11)  (-1.04)  (0.067) 
 
(-0.091) 
 
lnINST_BLK 0.22  0.22  0.136 
 
0.113 
   (1.02)  (1.02)  (1.160) 
 
(0.960) 
INST_BLK
2
 -0.441  -0.448  -0.06 
 
-0.016 
   (-1.18)  (-1.19)  (-0.29) 
 
(-0.079) 
lnINDV_BLK  0.525  0.486  0.287 
 
0.374 
   (1.54)  (1.43)  (1.600) 
 
(2.09)
*
 
INDV_BLK
2
  -1.005  -0.823  -0.667 
 
-1.027 
   (-1.08)  (-0.96)  (-1.32) 
 
(-2.00)
*
 
lnBRDOWN -0.017 -0.294   -0.017 -0.141   
  (-0.052) (-0.82)   (-0.10) (-0.74)   
BRDOWN
2
 0.35 0.735   -0.262 0.181   
  (0.51) (0.87)   (-0.63) (0.360)   
lnCEOOWN   -0.165 -0.43   -0.261 -0.331 
    (-0.28) (-0.75)   (-0.95) (-1.16) 
CEOOWN
2
   0.226 0.569   0.408 0.905 
    (0.15) (0.40)   (0.540) (1.150) 
lnEXECOWN   0.001 -0.175   0.024 -0.154 
    (0.00) (-0.37)   (0.086) (-0.53) 
EXECOWN
2
   0.568 0.63   -0.212 0.52 
    (0.51) (0.53)   (-0.29) (0.650) 
lnNEDOWN   -0.065 -0.26   0.179 -0.034 
    (-0.077) (-0.29)   (0.420) (-0.080) 
NEDOWN
2
   1.404 1.588   -1.341 -0.471 
    (0.35) (0.37)   (-0.84) (-0.29) 
lnadjDBT -0.568 -0.577 -0.572 -0.581 0.047 0.044 0.044 0.042 
  (-5.67)
***
 (-5.79)
***
 (-5.68)
***
 (-5.80)
***
 (1.150) (1.100) (1.080) (1.040) 
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adjDIVD 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
  (0.50) (0.56) (0.54) (0.58) (-0.66) (-0.61) (-0.71) (-0.72) 
lnadjROA 0.392 0.397 0.388 0.39 -0.193 -0.187 -0.197 -0.181 
  (2.15)
*
 (2.18)
*
 (2.09)
*
 (2.08)
*
 (-2.44)
*
 (-2.37)
*
 (-2.45)
*
 (-2.27)
*
 
lnadjQ -0.085 -0.084 -0.085 -0.085     
  (-2.41)
*
 (-2.38)
*
 (-2.40)
*
 (-2.38)
*
     
lnASSTS -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 
  (-2.00)
*
 (-2.02)
*
 (-1.89)
†
 (-1.93)
†
 (4.51)
***
 (4.60)
***
 (4.48)
***
 (4.61)
***
 
N 684 684 684 684 684 684 684 684 
groups 235 235 235 235 235 235 235 235 
wald χ2 60.548
***
 65.104
***
 66.401
***
 73.121
***
 42.154
***
 45.179
***
 42.473
***
 47.632
***
 
z -statistics in parentheses  
†
p < 0.10, 
*
p < 0.05, 
**
p < 0.01, 
***
p < 0.001 
All variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile values 
Dependent 
variable: 
Industry adjusted asset utilisation ratio QFCF 
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6.5.4 Using alternative measure of board independence 
As one of the research questions of this study is to examine the impact of the 
compliance with the UK corporate governance code on agency costs, the researcher 
in this section utilises a different measure to capture the degree of compliance with 
the recommended independent directors ratio. The UK corporate governance code 
recommends that at least half of the board directors excluding the chairman should 
be independent. To capture this recommendation a dummy variable that takes 1 if 
half of the board members excluding the chairman are independent, 0 otherwise. 
Tables (29, 30 and 31) report the results of the regression models using the 
proposed independence measure. The results reveal that for the pre–crisis and whole 
sample, the compliance with the board independence recommendation has a negative 
but insignificant impact on agency costs; however, for the post crisis sample the 
reported results show that the compliance with recommended board composition is 
negatively associated with asset utilisation at the 10% significance level for the 
baseline and sub models (2 and 3). Such results provide more evidence that the 
compliance with the UK corporate governance recommendations could hinder the 
management’s ability in utilising the firm’s assets base; and hence, this could 
negatively reflect on shareholders’ wealth. Another justification for the reported 
results is that for the post crisis period, as it is an abnormal economic period, there is 
more need for insider with firm specific knowledge to be present in the board to 
transfer more information to the board about the firm’s current situation, future 
projects and strategies. 
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Table 29 Regression results of effect of corporate governance mechanisms (using alternative board 
independence measure) on agency costs over the period 2005-2011 inclusive 
 Panel A Panel B 
 Baseline 
model 
Sub 
model 1 
Sub 
model 2 
Sub 
model 3 
Baseline 
model 
Sub 
model 1 
Sub 
model 2 
Sub 
model 3 
Intercept 1.458 1.453 1.46 1.457 -0.162 -0.161 -0.154 -0.154 
  (3.39)
***
 (3.38)
***
 (3.38)
***
 (3.38)
***
 (-0.72) (-0.71) (-0.68) (-0.68) 
lnBRD 0.0434 0.0446 0.04 0.0412 -0.017 -0.0168 -0.0178 -0.0176 
  (1.65)
†
 (1.69)
†
 (1.53) (1.57) (-1.19) (-1.18) (-1.24) (-1.23) 
IND COMP -0.0037 -0.0036 -0.0024 -0.0022 0.001 0.00137 0.0017 0.00171 
  (-0.31) (-0.31) (-0.20) (-0.19) (0.13) (0.17) (0.22) (0.22) 
ACE 0.00903 0.0095 0.00919 0.00954 -0.0048 -0.0057 -0.0051 -0.0058 
  (0.64) (0.67) (0.65) (0.67) (-0.59) (-0.69) (-0.61) (-0.70) 
REMU-COM -0.0091 -0.0087 -0.0104 -0.01 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0007 -0.0007 
  (-0.46) (-0.43) (-0.53) (-0.51) (-0.065) (-0.069) (-0.044) (-0.044) 
NOMINI-
COM 
0.0095 0.0104 0.00907 0.0099 0.00801 0.0073 0.00771 0.00719 
  (0.52) (0.56) (0.50) (0.54) (0.80) (0.73) (0.77) (0.72) 
DUL -0.0603 -0.0608 -0.05 -0.0502 -0.0314 -0.0306 -0.0284 -0.0286 
  (-1.75)
†
 (-1.77)
†
 (-1.45) (-1.46) (-1.77)
†
 (-1.73)
†
 (-1.57) (-1.59) 
BLK 0.0729  0.074  0.0507  0.0503  
  (2.34)
*
  (2.39)
*
  (3.16)
**
  (3.16)
**
  
lnINST_BLK 0.0743  0.0744  0.079  0.0785 
   (1.73)
†
  (1.74)
†
  (3.67)
***
  (3.64)
***
 
lnINDV_BLK  0.182  0.179  -0.0269  -0.0198 
   (2.04)
*
  (1.98)
*
  (-0.53)  (-0.40) 
lnBRDOWN -0.0337 -0.0806   -0.0675 0.00026   
  (-0.43) (-0.96)   (-1.65)
†
 (0.00)   
lnCEOOWN   -0.229 -0.282   -0.132 -0.0529 
    (-2.22)
*
 (-2.50)
*
   (-1.70)
†
 (-0.61) 
lnEXECOWN   0.103 0.0525   -0.0577 0.0012 
    (0.97) (0.46)   (-0.92) (0.02) 
lnNEDOWN   -0.037 -0.0664   -0.012 0.0393 
    (-0.19) (-0.36)   (-0.14) (0.42) 
lnadjDBT -0.533 -0.534 -0.533 -0.533 0.0247 0.0231 0.0232 0.0221 
  (-5.93)
***
 (-5.94)
***
 (-5.90)
***
 (-5.91)
***
 (0.85) (0.79) (0.80) (0.76) 
sqadjDIVD 0.096 0.095 0.0943 0.0932 -0.0222 -0.0209 -0.0216 -0.0202 
  (1.33) (1.32) (1.30) (1.29) (-0.57) (-0.54) (-0.56) (-0.52) 
lnadjROA 0.419 0.419 0.413 0.413 -0.312 -0.311 -0.315 -0.313 
  (3.07)
**
 (3.06)
**
 (3.06)
**
 (3.05)
**
 (-5.16)
***
 (-5.14)
***
 (-5.20)
***
 (-5.17)
***
 
lnadjQ -0.0026 -0.0044 -0.0032 -0.0052     
  (-0.085) (-0.14) (-0.11) (-0.17)     
lnASSTS -0.0116 -0.0118 -0.0116 -0.0119 0.0128 0.013 0.0127 0.013 
  (-1.79)
†
 (-1.81)
†
 (-1.79)
†
 (-1.82)
†
 (5.83)
***
 (5.92)
***
 (5.82)
***
 (5.92)
***
 
N 1431 1431 1431 1431 1431 1431 1431 1431 
groups 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 
wald χ2 70.32
***
 71.35
***
 78.05
***
 80.09
***
 79.15
***
 83.4
***
 79.86
***
 83.79
***
 
z -statistics in parentheses  
†
p < 0.10, 
*
p < 0.05, 
**
p < 0.01, 
***
p < 0.001 
All variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile values 
Dependent 
variable: 
Industry adjusted asset utilisation ratio 
QFCF 
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Table 30 Regression results of effect of corporate governance mechanisms (using alternative board independence measure) on agency 
costs over the period 2005-2007 inclusive 
 Panel A Panel B 
 
Baseline 
model 
Sub 
model 1 
Sub 
model 2 
Sub 
model 3 
Baseline 
model 
Sub 
model 1 
Sub 
model 2 
Sub 
model 3 
Intercept 1.916 1.923 1.909 1.259 -0.165 -0.152 -0.169 -0.154 
  (3.63)
***
 (3.64)
***
 (3.57)
***
 (2.98)
**
 (-0.52) (-0.49) (-0.54) (-0.50) 
lnBRD 0.0587 0.0589 0.0561 0.0721 -0.0484 -0.0485 -0.0484 -0.0489 
  (1.19) (1.20) (1.18) (1.68)
†
 (-2.27)
*
 (-2.28)
*
 (-2.28)
*
 (-2.30)
*
 
IND COMP -0.0179 -0.0179 -0.0172 -0.0131 0.00327 0.00402 0.00488 0.00515 
  (-1.32) (-1.31) (-1.28) (-0.94) (0.31) (0.38) (0.46) (0.49) 
ACE 0.024 0.0242 0.0238 0.0116 -0.0105 -0.0113 -0.0127 -0.0131 
  (1.82)
†
 (1.82)
†
 (1.77)
†
 (0.84) (-0.96) (-1.03) (-1.15) (-1.19) 
REMU-COM -0.0073 -0.0075 -0.008 -0.0084 -0.0006 -0.0028 -0.0005 -0.0023 
  (-0.39) (-0.40) (-0.41) (-0.43) (-0.031) (-0.16) (-0.027) (-0.13) 
NOMINI-COM 0.0128 0.0127 0.013 0.013 -0.0054 -0.0065 -0.0038 -0.0047 
  (0.72) (0.71) (0.74) (0.71) (-0.41) (-0.50) (-0.29) (-0.37) 
DUL -0.0217 -0.0214 -0.0196 -0.0282 -0.0319 -0.0252 -0.0178 -0.013 
  (-0.99) (-0.96) (-0.92) (-1.35) (-1.14) (-0.89) (-0.60) (-0.43) 
lnBLK 0.1  0.101  0.0452  0.0435  
  (1.85)
†
  (1.89)
†
  (1.54)  (1.49)  
lnINST_BLK 0.0907  0.0672  0.0586  0.0566 
   (1.74)
†
  (1.41)  (1.99)
*
  (1.93)
†
 
lnINDV_BLK  0.104  0.0559  -0.168  -0.167 
   (0.99)  (0.58)  (-2.22)
*
  (-2.16)
*
 
lnBRDOWN 0.046 0.0453   -0.0449 0.0784   
  (0.59) (0.57)   (-0.71) (1.04)   
lnCEOOWN   -0.0591 -0.0987   -0.319 -0.241 
    (-0.24) (-0.45)   (-1.74)
†
 (-1.24) 
lnEXECOWN   0.0727 0.00689   -0.0679 0.085 
    (0.39) (0.04)   (-0.50) (0.60) 
lnNEDOWN   0.195 0.154   0.158 0.296 
    (0.66) (0.56)   (1.16) (2.01)
*
 
lnadjDBT -0.241 -0.243 -0.24 -0.323 0.029 0.0198 0.0223 0.015 
  (-1.64) (-1.64) (-1.63) (-2.70)
**
 (0.63) (0.43) (0.48) (0.32) 
sqadjDIVD 0.0437 0.0448 0.0411 0.0713 -0.0337 -0.0314 -0.0348 -0.032 
  (0.67) (0.69) (0.62) (1.08) (-0.62) (-0.58) (-0.64) (-0.59) 
lnadjROA 0.151 0.153 0.147 0.25 -0.531 -0.509 -0.523 -0.498 
  (1.08) (1.09) (1.08) (1.85)
†
 (-5.21)
***
 (-5.01)
***
 (-5.15)
***
 (-4.93)
***
 
lnadjQ 0.0681 0.0673 0.0676 0.092     
  (1.87)
†
 (1.83)
†
 (1.84)
†
 (2.75)
**
     
lnASSTS -0.0805 -0.0804 -0.0806 -0.0268 0.0171 0.017 0.0169 0.0167 
  (-2.95)
**
 (-2.93)
**
 (-2.94)
**
 (-2.03)
*
 (4.14)
***
 (4.09)
***
 (4.10)
***
 (4.04)
***
 
N 562 562 562 562 562 562 562 562 
groups 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 
adj. R
2
 18.5% 18.2% 18.4%      
F-test 4.499
***
 4.211
***
 4.477
***
      
wald χ2       64.49
***
 55.37
***
 60.95
***
 57.89
***
 61.85
***
 
z / t -statistics in parentheses  
†
p < 0.10, 
*
p < 0.05, 
**
p < 0.01, 
***
p < 0.001 
All variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile values 
Dependent 
variable: 
Industry adjusted asset utilisation ratio 
 
QFCF 
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Table 31 Regression results of effect of corporate governance mechanisms (using alternative board independence measure) on 
agency costs over the period 2009-2011 inclusive 
 Panel A Panel B 
 Baseline 
model 
Sub 
model 1 
Sub 
model 2 
Sub 
model 3 
Baseline 
model 
Sub 
model 1 
Sub 
model 2 
Sub 
model 3 
Intercept 1.091 1.094 1.101 1.11 -0.141 -0.154 -0.139 -0.153 
  (7.12)
***
 (6.97)
***
 (7.12)
***
 (6.95)
***
 (-1.93)
†
 (-2.09)
*
 (-1.90)
†
 (-2.07)
*
 
lnBRD 0.0642 0.0645 0.0592 0.0595 -0.0046 -0.0032 -0.0064 -0.0048 
  (1.64) (1.66)
†
 (1.51) (1.53) (-0.23) (-0.16) (-0.32) (-0.24) 
IND COMP -0.0394 -0.041 -0.0375 -0.039 0.00492 0.00496 0.00576 0.00589 
  (-1.67)
†
 (-1.74)
†
 (-1.60) (-1.68)
†
 (0.38) (0.38) (0.44) (0.45) 
ACE 0.0493 0.0526 0.0483 0.052 -0.0147 -0.0147 -0.0137 -0.0142 
  (2.01)
*
 (2.12)
*
 (1.92)
†
 (2.05)
*
 (-1.02) (-1.02) (-0.95) (-0.99) 
REMU-COM -0.0243 -0.0265 -0.0187 -0.0213 -0.0049 -0.0041 -0.0056 -0.0048 
  (-0.49) (-0.53) (-0.36) (-0.41) (-0.18) (-0.15) (-0.21) (-0.18) 
NOMINI-
COM 
-0.0096 -0.0069 -0.0126 -0.0096 0.0322 0.0322 0.0314 0.031 
  (-0.34) (-0.24) (-0.44) (-0.34) (1.79)
†
 (1.79)
†
 (1.74)
†
 (1.72)
†
 
DUL -0.0143 -0.0156 -0.0052 -0.0055 -0.0369 -0.0372 -0.0356 -0.0362 
  (-0.27) (-0.30) (-0.097) (-0.10) (-1.39) (-1.40) (-1.33) (-1.36) 
BLK 0.0111  0.0131  0.0711  0.0678  
  (0.24)  (0.28)  (2.78)
**
  (2.66)
**
  
lnINST_BLK -0.0057  -0.0089  0.105  0.105 
   (-0.087)  (-0.14)  (2.99)
**
  (2.98)
**
 
lnINDV_BLK  0.21  0.233  0.071  0.0402 
   (1.63)  (2.02)
*
  (0.92)  (0.53) 
lnBRDOWN 0.0914 -0.0662   -0.107 -0.0899   
  (0.86) (-0.44)   (-1.99)
*
 (-1.11)   
lnCEOOWN   -0.127 -0.307   -0.109 -0.0671 
    (-0.91) (-2.10)
*
   (-1.28) (-0.65) 
lnEXECOWN   0.171 -0.0132   -0.0446 -0.0069 
    (1.87)
†
 (-0.10)   (-0.56) (-0.070) 
lnNEDOWN   0.28 0.131   -0.159 -0.126 
    (0.84) (0.37)   (-1.40) (-1.03) 
lnadjDBT -0.56 -0.563 -0.566 -0.568 0.0467 0.046 0.0474 0.0465 
  (-5.66)
***
 (-5.72)
***
 (-5.69)
***
 (-5.76)
***
 (1.15) (1.13) (1.16) (1.14) 
adjDIVD 0.0031 0.00299 0.00355 0.0034 -0.0025 -0.0024 -0.0028 -0.0027 
  (0.37) (0.36) (0.43) (0.41) (-0.63) (-0.60) (-0.70) (-0.66) 
lnadjROA 0.383 0.388 0.374 0.377 -0.188 -0.187 -0.185 -0.184 
  (2.09)
*
 (2.11)
*
 (2.02)
*
 (2.02)
*
 (-2.38)
*
 (-2.36)
*
 (-2.33)
*
 (-2.32)
*
 
lnadjQ -0.0862 -0.087 -0.087 -0.0892     
  (-2.51)
*
 (-2.51)
*
 (-2.53)
*
 (-2.54)
*
     
lnASSTS -0.0113 -0.0114 -0.011 -0.0114 0.0124 0.0126 0.0124 0.0127 
  (-1.90)
†
 (-1.92)
†
 (-1.83)
†
 (-1.88)
†
 (4.36)
***
 (4.43)
***
 (4.37)
***
 (4.46)
***
 
N 684 684 684 684 684 684 684 684 
groups 235 235 235 235 235 235 235 235 
wald χ2 57.76
***
 59.3
***
 63.82
***
 65.88
***
 41.69
***
 43.02
***
 41.59
***
 43.28
***
 
z -statistics in parentheses  
†
p < 0.10, 
*
p < 0.05, 
**
p < 0.01, 
***
p < 0.001 
All variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile values 
Dependent 
variable: 
Industry adjusted asset utilisation ratio QFCF 
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6.5.5 The impact of the number of blockholders 
In the prior literature, some researchers (e.g., Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins and 
LaFond (2006); Andreou, Louca and Panayides (2014), among others) argue that the 
increase of the number of blockholders neutralises the entrenchment behaviour of the 
blockholders. In other words, as the number of blockholders increases, it becomes 
more difficult for a single block holder to expropriate minorities' wealth. Thus, in 
this section the researcher investigates this proposed argument by adding the number 
of the blockholders to the regression models. 
Tables (32, 33 and 34) report the results of the results of the different regression 
analyses after adding the number of blockholders to the regression model. Before 
mentioning the regression results, it may be worth mentioning that the number of 
individual blockholders is not included in sub models (1 and 3), because of its high 
multicollinearity (VIF value exceeded the maximum accepted value of 10). The 
reported results for the full sample show that the increase in the number of 
blockholder increases agency costs at significance level 10% for the total number of 
blockholders. In regard to the pre and post crisis analysis, the reported results for the 
pre–crisis period provide no significant evidence for the impact of blockholders 
number, both the total number of blockholders and institutional blockholders; 
whereas, the reported results for the post crisis period show that only the increase of 
institutional blockholders significantly increases agency costs at the 10% 
significance level. In terms of the QFCF, the reported results provide no evidence 
that the number of blockholders has any significant impact on the blockholders’ 
behaviour or help in reducing the agency costs. 
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Table 32 Regression results of the effect of the number of blockholders on agency costs over the period 2005-2011 inclusive 
 Panel A Panel B 
 Baseline 
model 
Sub 
model 1 
Sub 
model 2 
Sub 
model 3 
Baseline 
model 
Sub 
model 1 
Sub 
model 2 
Sub 
model 3 
Intercept 1.513 1.505 1.512 1.508 -0.171 -0.161 -0.163 -0.154 
  (3.54)
***
 (3.53)
***
 (3.53)
***
 (3.53)
***
 (-0.75) (-0.71) (-0.72) (-0.68) 
lnBRD 0.0205 0.0219 0.0188 0.02 -0.0191 -0.0204 -0.0201 -0.0214 
  (0.67) (0.70) (0.61) (0.64) (-1.35) (-1.44) (-1.41) (-1.50) 
lnIND -0.077 -0.077 -0.074 -0.075 -0.024 -0.02 -0.021 -0.019 
  (-0.90) (-0.91) (-0.87) (-0.88) (-0.54) (-0.45) (-0.47) (-0.42) 
ACE 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
  (0.83) (0.86) (0.84) (0.85) (-0.41) (-0.49) (-0.42) (-0.50) 
REMU-COM 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 
  (0.19) (0.21) (0.12) (0.15) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) 
NOMINI-COM 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 
  (0.21) (0.27) (0.23) (0.28) (0.85) (0.79) (0.82) (0.77) 
DUL -0.072 -0.071 -0.063 -0.062 -0.032 -0.033 -0.029 -0.031 
  (-1.95)
†
 (-1.92)
†
 (-1.73)
†
 (-1.70)
†
 (-1.82)
†
 (-1.84)
†
 (-1.62) (-1.70)
†
 
BLK 0.187  0.188  0.067  0.067  
  (2.71)
**
  (2.79)
**
  (2.74)
**
  (2.77)
**
  
N_BLK -0.009  -0.009  -0.002  -0.002  
  (-1.66)
†
  (-1.69)
†
  (-0.86)  (-0.90)  
lnINST_BLK 0.214  0.215  0.12  0.121 
   (2.57)
*
  (2.60)
*
  (3.43)
***
  (3.45)
***
 
N_INST_BLK -0.009  -0.009  -0.004  -0.004 
   (-1.65)  (-1.65)  (-1.48)  (-1.52) 
lnINDV_BLK  0.259  0.235  -0.021  -0.015 
   (1.97)
*
  (1.82)
†
  (-0.42)  (-0.30) 
lnBRDOWN -0.059 -0.068   -0.08 -0.008   
  (-0.54) (-0.63)   (-1.89)
†
 (-0.15)   
lnCEOOWN   -0.199 -0.187   -0.147 -0.064 
    (-1.30) (-1.21)   (-1.86)
†
 (-0.73) 
lnEXECOWN   0.126 0.107   -0.07 -0.006 
    (0.94) (0.80)   (-1.10) (-0.089) 
lnNEDOWN   -0.232 -0.23   -0.023 0.032 
    (-1.19) (-1.18)   (-0.25) (0.34) 
lnadjDBT -0.513 -0.514 -0.511 -0.513 0.025 0.024 0.024 0.023 
  (-5.30)
***
 (-5.32)
***
 (-5.27)
***
 (-5.29)
***
 (0.86) (0.82) (0.82) (0.78) 
sqadjDIVD 0.1 0.1 0.098 0.098 -0.023 -0.021 -0.022 -0.02 
  (1.42) (1.42) (1.39) (1.39) (-0.59) (-0.54) (-0.58) (-0.53) 
lnadjROA 0.387 0.384 0.378 0.377 -0.311 
 
-0.308 -0.314 -0.31 
  (2.80)
**
 (2.80)
**
 (2.78)
**
 (2.78)
**
 (-5.13)
***
 
 
(-5.09)
***
 (-5.17)
***
 (-5.12)
***
 
lnadjQ 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003    
  (0.02) (-0.048) (-0.027) (-0.082)     
lnASSTS -0.013 -0.014 -0.013 -0.014 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 
  (-1.89)
†
 (-1.91)
†
 (-1.90)
†
 (-1.92)
†
 (5.76)
***
 
 
(5.83)
***
 (5.74)
***
 (5.82)
***
 
N 1431 1431 1431 1431 1431 1431 1431 1431 
groups 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 239 
adj. R
2
 11.1% 10.9% 11.3% 11%  
   
F-test 4.517
***
 4.187
***
 4.515
***
 4.227
***
     
wald χ2         80.307
***
 86.147
***
 81.002
***
 86.613
***
 
t / z -statistics in parentheses  
†
p < 0.10, 
*
p < 0.05, 
**
p < 0.01, 
***
p < 0.001 
All variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile values 
Dependent 
variable: 
Industry adjusted asset utilisation ratio QFCF 
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Table 33 Regression results of the effect of the number of blockholders on agency costs over the period 2005-2007 inclusive 
 Panel A Panel B 
 Baseline 
model 
Sub 
model 1 
Sub 
model 2 
Sub 
model 3 
Baseline 
model 
Sub 
model 1 
Sub 
model 2 
Sub 
model 3 
Intercept 1.844 1.841 1.847 1.844 -0.189 -0.17 -0.191 -0.171 
  (3.48)
***
 (3.46)
***
 (3.44)
***
 (3.41)
***
 (-0.60) (-0.54) (-0.60) (-0.55) 
lnBRD 0.0661 0.0657 0.0632 0.0631 -0.057 -0.0586 -0.0573 -0.059 
  (1.34) (1.34) (1.34) (1.34) (-2.73)
**
 (-2.79)
**
 (-2.75)
**
 (-2.81)
**
 
lnIND -0.159 -0.157 -0.153 -0.152 -0.093 -0.093 -0.085 -0.087 
  (-1.80)
†
 (-1.76)
†
 (-1.76)
†
 (-1.73)
†
 (-1.48) (-1.47) (-1.36) (-1.38) 
ACE 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 -0.005 -0.005 -0.007 -0.006 
  (1.92)
†
 (1.95)
†
 (1.85)
†
 (1.88)
†
 (-0.43) (-0.43) (-0.61) (-0.58) 
REMU-COM -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.003 
  (-0.30) (-0.33) (-0.34) (-0.37) (0.28) (0.16) (0.29) (0.19) 
NOMINI-COM 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 -0.003 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 
  (0.81) (0.80) (0.82) (0.81) (-0.21) (-0.30) (-0.091) (-0.18) 
DUL -0.019 -0.019 -0.017 -0.017 -0.03 -0.022 -0.016 -0.01 
  (-0.77) (-0.79) (-0.72) (-0.74) (-1.05) (-0.77) (-0.55) (-0.35) 
lnBLK 0.066  0.066  0.094  0.093  
  (0.92)  (0.93)  (2.04)
*
  (2.04)
*
  
N_BLK 0.003  0.003  -0.005  -0.005  
  (0.57)  (0.60)  (-1.31)  (-1.36)  
lnINST_BLK 0.08  0.079  0.115  0.113 
   (1.21)  (1.20)  (2.46)
*
  (2.42)
*
 
N_INST_BLK 0.001  0.001  -0.005  -0.005 
   (0.26)  (0.30)  (-1.50)  (-1.50) 
lnINDV_BLK  0.083  0.072  -0.158  -0.158 
   (0.73)  (0.64)  (-2.10)
*
  (-2.06)
*
 
lnBRDOWN 0.046 0.046   -0.069 0.056   
  (0.58) (0.57)   (-1.08) (0.75)   
lnCEOOWN   -0.06 -0.054   -0.316 -0.226 
    (-0.25) (-0.23)   (-1.73)
†
 (-1.17) 
lnEXECOWN   0.089 0.092   -0.103 0.048 
    (0.46) (0.48)   (-0.76) -0.34 
lnNEDOWN   0.173 0.166   0.126 0.263 
    (0.60) (0.57)   (0.92) (1.80)
†
 
lnadjDBT -0.241 -0.241 -0.239 -0.238 0.027 0.017 0.021 0.013 
  (-1.66)
†
 (-1.64) (-1.65) (-1.63) (0.59) (0.37) (0.46) (0.28) 
sqadjDIVD 0.044 0.044 0.042 0.042 -0.031 -0.028 -0.033 -0.029 
  (0.68) (0.67) (0.63) (0.63) (-0.57) (-0.52) (-0.60) (-0.54) 
lnadjROA 0.153 0.157 0.148 0.152 -0.532 -0.509 -0.524 -0.499 
  (1.07) (1.09) (1.07) (1.09) (-5.22)
***
 (-5.02)
***
 (-5.16)
***
 (-4.95)
***
 
lnadjQ 0.068 0.067 0.067 0.067     
  (1.88)
†
 (1.84)
†
 (1.85)
†
 (1.82)
†
     
lnASSTS -0.081 -0.08 -0.081 -0.081 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 
  (-3.00)
**
 (-2.97)
**
 (-3.01)
**
 (-2.97)
**
 (4.39)
***
 (4.39)
***
 (4.33)
***
 (4.33)
***
 
N 562 562 562 562 562 562 562 562 
groups 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 196 
adj. R
2
 18.6% 18.2% 18.5% 18.1%     
F-test 4.48
***
 4.213
***
 4.28
***
 4.007
***
     
wald χ2     59.376
***
 65.022
***
 61.803
***
 65.752
***
 
z / t -statistics in parentheses  
†
p < 0.10, 
*
p < 0.05, 
**
p < 0.01, 
***
p < 0.001 
All variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile values 
Dependent 
variable: 
Industry adjusted asset utilisation ratio QFCF 
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Table 34 Regression results of the effect of the number of blockholders on agency costs over the period 2009-2011 inclusive 
 Panel A Panel B 
 Baseline 
model 
Sub 
model 1 
Sub model 
2 
Sub 
model 3 
Baseline 
model 
Sub 
model 1 
Sub 
model 2 
Sub 
model 3 
Intercept 1.07 1.01 1.05 1.03 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 
  (4.08)
***
 (5.87)
***
 (3.99)
***
 (5.91)
***
 (-1.97)
*
 (-2.02)
*
 (-1.95)
†
 (-1.99)
*
 
lnBRD 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.08 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
  (0.51) (2.15)
*
 (0.48) (1.98)
*
 (-0.23) (-0.25) (-0.30) (-0.32) 
lnIND -0.09 -0.02 -0.07 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
  (-1.18) (-0.59) (-0.94) (-0.53) (-0.57) (-0.54) (-0.53) (-0.48) 
ACE 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
  (1.51) (1.91)
†
 (1.49) (1.85)
†
 (-0.86) (-0.87) (-0.78) (-0.83) 
REMU-COM 0.10 -0.04 0.10 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (1.11) (-0.70) (1.08) (-0.58) (0.03) (0.07) (-0.01) (0.03) 
NOMINI-COM -0.06 -0.01 -0.06 -0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
  (-1.33) (-0.25) (-1.32) (-0.34) (1.80)
†
 (1.80)
†
 (1.75)
†
 (1.74)
†
 
DUL -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
  (-0.18) (-0.14) (-0.20) (0.04) (-1.43) (-1.48) (-1.37) (-1.44) 
BLK 0.04  0.09  0.07  0.06  
  (0.26)  (0.52)  (1.97)
*
  (1.78)
†
  
N_BLK 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
  (-0.043)  (-0.13)  (0.12)  (0.29)  
lnINST_BLK -0.16  -0.15  0.12  0.12 
   (-1.76)
†
  (-1.69)
†
  (2.33)
*
  (2.30)
*
 
N_INST_BLK 0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00 
   (1.90)
†
  (1.77)
†
  (-0.36)  (-0.33) 
lnINDV_BLK  0.19  0.21  0.08  0.04 
   (1.46)  (1.87)
†
  (0.98)  (0.59) 
lnBRDOWN -0.14 -0.04   -0.11 -0.10   
  (-0.58) (-0.22)   (-1.98)
*
 (-1.25)   
lnCEOOWN   -0.21 -0.28   -0.11 -0.08 
    (-0.68) (-1.86)
†
   (-1.20) (-0.72) 
lnEXECOWN   0.32 0.03   -0.05 -0.02 
    (1.27) (0.21)   (-0.60) (-0.19) 
lnNEDOWN   -0.64 0.15   -0.17 -0.14 
    (-1.96)
†
 (0.40)   (-1.46) (-1.11) 
lnadjDBT -0.62 -0.57 -0.62 -0.57 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
  (-4.64)
***
 (-5.74)
***
 (-4.72)
***
 (-5.77)
***
 (1.17) (1.16) (1.19) (1.17) 
adjDIVD 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
  (1.13) (0.47) (1.06) (0.52) (-0.65) (-0.62) (-0.72) (-0.69) 
lnadjROA 0.25 0.38 0.26 0.37 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19 
  (1.18) (2.09)
*
 (1.19) (2.01)
*
 (-2.42)
*
 (-2.38)
*
 (-2.38)
*
 (-2.34)
*
 
lnadjQ -0.08 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09     
  (-1.81)
†
 (-2.52)
*
 (-1.72)
†
 (-2.55)
*
     
lnASSTS -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  (-1.87)
†
 (-1.86)
†
 (-1.62) (-1.81)
†
 (4.43)
***
 (4.44)
***
 (4.46)
***
 (4.47)
***
 
N 684 684 684 684 684 684 684 684 
groups 235 235 235 235 235 235 235 235 
adj. R
2
 12%  12%      
F-test 2.63
***
  3.48
***
      
wald χ2   62.28
***
   70.42
***
 41.94
***
 43.38
***
 41.79
***
 43.49
***
 
z / t -statistics in parentheses  
†
p < 0.10, 
*
p < 0.05, 
**
p < 0.01, 
***
p < 0.001 
All variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile values 
Dependent 
variable:  Industry adjusted asset utilisation ratio 
 
QFCF 
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6.5.6 Re-estimating the associations between corporate governance 
mechanisms and agency costs after controlling for firms’ risk level and audit 
fees. 
It has been argued in the prior literature (e.g., Hay, Knechel and Ling (2008), 
among others) that corporate governance mechanisms and external audit service can 
complement each other; and external audit effectiveness could influence the 
managerial behaviour and reduce the agency costs. There is no direct proxy for audit 
quality (Brown, Beekesc and Verhoeven, 2011). However, a number of studies (e.g., 
Carcello et al. (2002); Krishnan and Visvanathan (2009); Zaman, Hudaib and 
Haniffa (2011), among others) utilised audit fees paid for external auditors as a proxy 
for audit services quality. Zaman, Hudaib and Haniffa (2011) argue that requiring 
high quality of audit services will require more audit activities, which mean more 
audit fees paid to the external auditors. Thus, high audit fees reflect more auditing 
services and high quality of the provided service. Such quality service could imply 
that there are external monitors watching the managerial activities, and hence, this 
should reduce the managerial opportunistic and fraudulent practices. 
As mentioned before in chapter two, managers and shareholders have different 
preferences towards risk. Shareholders can diversify their investment portfolio; while 
managers cannot diversify their employment risks; and hence, managers can be risk 
averse. This misalliance of their risk preferences can create conflicts of interest 
regarding firm’s investment policy (Denis, 2001; Ward, Brown and Rodriguez, 2009), 
leading to miss-utilisation of firms’ resources or declining profitable opportunities 
because the risk associated with these opportunities does not match with managers’ 
preferences (Belghitar and Clark, 2014). Thus, firms’ risk level could affect the 
managerial behaviour.  Belghitar and Clark (2014) mention that the increase in firm’s 
risk level could influence managers to decline positive net present value projects 
because such project will increase their personal risk. Such action negatively affects 
shareholders’ wealth. Firm’s risk level can be captured by firm’s beta value; such 
measure has been utilised in prior literature (e.g., Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2009); 
Al‐Najjar and Hussainey (2011); Collins and Huang (2011); Harada and Nguyen 
(2011); Jizi et al. (2014), among others). Thus, the researcher re-estimates the 
associations between corporate governance mechanisms and agency costs proxies 
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after controlling for audit fees 
11
 and firms’ risk level 12. The data of audit fees and 
firm’s beta were downloaded from DataStream. 
Tables 35, 36, 37 represent the results of re-estimated associations. The reported 
results show that for full sample and pre-crisis period, both audit fees and risk level 
have no significant impact on asset utilisation; however, the results show a positive 
and significant association at the 5% significance level between beta and QFCF; 
suggesting that firms with high risk levels are more vulnerable to FCF and 
investment agency problems and could incur more agency costs. 
Turning now to the post crisis recession period, the results show audit quality as 
measured by audit fees is positively and significantly associated with asset 
unitisation at the 10% significance level, suggesting that the more external 
monitoring by external auditors the higher asset utilisation. In terms of firm’s risk 
level, the reported results in Table 37 show that firm’s risk level is associated with 
higher agency costs as measured by asset utilisation and QFCF. Such results show 
that during the recession period, external auditors monitoring and risk levels 
significantly affect firm’s agency costs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
11
 Audit fees variable is equal to the total amount of audit fees paid for the auditing services. 
12
 Firms’ risk level is measured by firm’s beta value. 
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Table 35 Results of the panel data regression model with robust standard error for the study sample covering the period 2005-2011 
inclusive after controlling for firm’s risk level and audit fees 
 Panel A Panel B 
 Baseline 
model 
Sub 
model 1 
Sub 
model 2 
Sub 
model 3 
Baseline  
model 
Sub 
model 1 
Sub 
model 2 
Sub 
model 3 
Intercept 1.44 1.43 1.44 1.43 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18 -0.17 
 (3.35)
***
 (3.33)
***
 (3.32)
***
 (3.31)
***
 (-0.80) (-0.78) (-0.78) (-0.77) 
lnBRD 0.035 0.036 0.033 0.034 -0.018 -0.018 -0.019 -0.018 
 (1.41) (1.44) (1.32) (1.35) (-1.23) (-1.21) (-1.26) (-1.23) 
lnIND -0.055 -0.057 -0.051 -0.052 -0.033 -0.029 -0.031 -0.029 
 (-0.76) (-0.79) (-0.71) (-0.72) (-0.70) (-0.614) (-0.66) (-0.60) 
ACE 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.009 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.57) (0.61) (0.59) (0.62) (-0.57) (-0.65) (-0.57) (-0.65) 
REMU-COM -0.006 -0.005 -0.007 -0.006 0.001 0.0003 0.001 0.0005 
 (-0.29) (-0.22) (-0.33) (-0.27) (0.05) (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) 
NOMINI-COM 0.0095 0.01 0.0095 0.01 0.0068 0.0061 0.0067 0.006 
 (0.51) (0.55) (0.51) (0.55) (0.68) (0.61) (0.67) (0.61) 
DUL -0.052 -0.052 -0.045 -0.045 -0.037 -0.036 -0.035 -0.036 
 (-1.45) (-1.48) (-1.26) (-1.27) (-2.02)
*
 (-1.99)
*
 (-1.89)
†
 (-1.92)
†
 
AUDFee 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.001 0.0004 0.001 0.0004 
 (1.22) (1.26) (1.23) (1.27) (0.17) (0.12) (0.17) (0.13) 
BLK 0.083  0.083  0.047  0.047  
 (2.56)
*
  (2.60)
**
  (2.91)
**
  (2.87)
**
  
lnINST_BLK 0.088  0.087  0.073  0.073 
  (1.97)
*
  (1.97)
*
  (3.34)
***
  (3.33)
***
 
lnINDV_BLK 0.21  0.2  -0.022  -0.021 
  (2.26)
*
  (2.20)
*
  (-0.44)  (-0.43) 
lnBRDOWN -0.055 -0.11   -0.062 -0.0003   
 (-0.74) (-1.33)   (-1.53) (-0.01)   
lnCEOOWN  -0.2 -0.26   -0.096 -0.018 
   (-1.79)
†
 (-2.12)
*
   (-1.22) (-0.20) 
lnEXECOWN  0.038 -0.023   -0.054 0.0022 
   (0.44) (-0.24)   (-0.87) (0.03) 
lnNEDOWN  -0.041 -0.076   -0.032 0.019 
   (-0.22) (-0.40)   (-0.36) (0.20) 
lnadjDBT -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 -0.54 0.026 0.025 0.026 0.025 
 (-5.92)
***
 (-5.93)
***
 (-5.89)
***
 (-5.90)
***
 (0.90) (0.86) (0.88) (0.84) 
sqadjDIVD 0.098 0.097 0.096 0.095 -0.02 -0.019 -0.02 -0.019 
 (1.37) (1.36) (1.33) (1.32) (-0.52) (-0.50) (-0.52) (-0.49) 
lnadjROA 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 -0.31 -0.31 -0.31 -0.31 
 (3.07)
**
 (3.08)
**
 (3.05)
**
 (3.06)
**
 (-5.06)
***
 (-5.05)
***
 (-5.08)
***
 (-5.06)
***
 
lnadjQ -0.0045 -0.0064 -0.0051 -0.0073     
 (-0.15) (-0.21) (-0.17) (-0.24)     
Beta -0.0085 -0.0079 -0.0086 -0.0081 0.011 0.01 0.011 0.01 
 (-1.01) (-0.94) (-1.03) (-0.96) (2.46)
*
 (2.38)
*
 (2.45)
*
 (2.38)
*
 
lnASSTS -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 
 (-1.91)
†
 (-1.94)
†
 (-1.92)
†
 (-1.95)
†
 (5.65)
***
 (5.72)
***
 (5.63)
***
 (5.72)
***
 
N 1415 1415 1415 1415 1415 1415 1415 1415 
groups 237 237 237 237 237 237 237 237 
Hausman 24.7 24.43 26.46 25.63     
wald χ2 79.7
***
 82.2
***
 85
***
 90.5
***
 85.5
***
 89
***
 85.4
***
 89.1
***
 
z-statistics in parentheses  
†
p < 0.10, 
*
p < 0.05, 
**
p < 0.01, 
***
p < 0.001 
All variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile values   
Dependent 
variable(s) Industry adjusted asset utilisation ratio QFCF 
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Table 36 Results of the panel data regression model with robust standard error for the study sample covering the period 2005-2007 
inclusive after controlling for firm’s risk level and audit fees 
  Panel A Panel B 
  Baseline 
model 
Sub 
model 1 
Sub 
model 2 
Sub 
model 3 
Baseline 
model 
Sub 
model 1 
Sub 
model 2 
Sub 
model 3 
Intercept 2.09 2.1 1.34 2.08 -0.23 -0.24 -0.24 -0.24 
  (3.84)
***
 (3.86)
***
 (3.12)
**
 (3.86)
***
 (-0.73) (-0.75) (-0.76) (-0.768) 
lnBRD 0.052 0.052 0.066 0.05 -0.053 -0.051 -0.053 -0.052 
  (1.18) (1.18) (1.63) (1.13) (-2.50)
*
 (-2.41)
*
 (-2.48)
*
 (-2.42)
*
 
lnIND -0.12 -0.12 -0.076 -0.11 -0.085 -0.083 -0.083 -0.081 
  (-1.36) (-1.35) (-0.91) (-1.31) (-1.3) (-1.27) (-1.28) (-1.25) 
ACE 0.024 0.024 0.01 0.024 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
  (1.64) (1.66)
†
 (0.65 (1.63) (-0.71) (-0.75) (-0.83) (-0.85) 
REMU-COM -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 0.004 0.0016 0.004 0.0019 
  (-0.30) (-0.31) (-0.27) (-0.28) (0.22) (0.09) (0.22) (0.11) 
NOMINI-COM 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.011 -0.004 -0.0054 -0.0031 -0.0041 
  (0.73) (0.72) (0.72) (0.68) (-0.31) (-0.41) (-0.23) (-0.32) 
DUL -0.014 -0.014 -0.022 -0.014 -0.033 -0.028 -0.023 -0.019 
  (-0.46) (-0.45) (-0.82) (-0.44) (-1.06) (-0.88) (-0.72) (-0.57) 
AUDFee 0.003 0.002 0.007 0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 
  (0.6) (0.56) (1.5) (0.51) (-0.60) (-0.89) (-0.59) (-0.88) 
lnBLK 0.11 
 
0.075 
 
0.045 
 
0.043 
 
  (1.83)
†
 
 
(1.41) 
 
(1.46) 
 
(1.4) 
 
lnINST_BLK 0.095 
 
0.095  0.056 
 
0.055 
  
 
(1.68)
†
 
 
(1.70)
†
  (1.83)
†
 
 
(1.78)
†
 
lnINDV_BLK 
 
0.089 
 
0.09  -0.15 
 
-0.16 
  
 
(0.83) 
 
(0.8)  (-1.97)
*
 
 
(-2.02)
*
 
lnBRDOWN -0.007 -0.01 
  
-0.04 0.061 
  
  (-0.095) (-0.12) 
  
(-0.60) (0.79) 
  
lnCEOOWN 
  
-0.04 -0.012  
 
-0.23 -0.2 
  
  
(-0.17) (-0.048)  
 
(-1.18) (-0.99) 
lnEXECOWN 
  
-0.14 -0.1  
 
-0.098 0.046 
  
  
(-0.80) (-0.53)  
 
(-0.71) (0.32) 
lnNEDOWN 
  
0.14 0.17  
 
0.1 0.24 
  
  
(0.5) (0.57)  
 
(0.74) (1.63) 
lnadjDBT -0.28 -0.29 -0.36 -0.29 0.024 0.017 0.021 0.014 
  (-1.74)
†
 (-1.73)
†
 (-3.01)
**
 (-1.77)
†
 (0.52) (0.35) (0.44) (0.29) 
sqadjDIVD 0.058 0.06 0.088 0.057 -0.032 -0.031 -0.033 -0.032 
  (0.88) (0.89) (1.33) (0.86) (-0.58) (-0.58) (-0.61) (-0.6) 
lnadjROA 0.091 0.093 0.2 0.09 -0.52 -0.49 -0.51 -0.48 
  (0.69) (0.7) (1.53) (0.68) (-5.09)
***
 (-4.85)
***
 (-5.02)
***
 (-4.77)
***
 
lnadjQ 0.075 0.073 0.097 0.072  
   
  (2.10)
*
 (2.04)
*
 (2.97)
**
 (2.00)
*
  
   
Beta 0.017 0.016 0.014 0.017 0.0092 0.0084 0.0092 0.0085 
  (0.9) (0.89) (0.83) (0.91) (1.48) (1.34) (1.48) (1.35) 
lnASSTS -0.089 -0.089 -0.03 -0.088 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 
  (-3.33)
**
 (-3.31)
**
 (-2.28)
*
 (-3.30)
**
 (4.43)
***
 (4.48)
***
 (4.39)
***
 (4.43)
***
 
N 547 547 547 547 547 547 547 547 
groups 192 192 192 192 192 192 192 192 
Hausman 45.3
*
 98.99
*
 25.73 34.42
*
     
adj. R
2
 20.7% 20.3% 
 
20.2% 
    
F 4.49
***
 4.16
***
 
 
3.96
***
 
    
wald χ2 
  
65.9
***
 
 
58.3
***
 61.9
***
 59.4
***
 62.4
***
 
z / t -statistics in parentheses  
†
p < 0.10, 
*
p < 0.05, 
**
p < 0.01, 
***
p < 0.001 
All variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile values    
Dependent 
variable(s) 
Industry adjusted asset utilisation ratio QFCF 
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Table 37 Results of the panel data regression model with robust standard error for the study sample covering the period 2009-2011 
inclusive after controlling for firm’s risk level and audit fees 
 panel A Panel B 
 Baseline 
model 
Sub 
model 1 
Sub 
model 2 
Sub 
model 3 
Baseline 
model 
Sub 
model 1 
Sub 
model 2 
Sub 
model 3 
Intercept 1.11 1.09 1.11 1.1 -0.21 -0.22 -0.21 -0.22 
  (6.29)
***
 (6.06)
***
 (6.28)
***
 (6.07)
***
 (-2.66)
**
 (-2.76)
**
 (-2.61)
**
 (-2.72)
**
 
lnBRD 0.034 0.035 0.027 0.027 -0.0063 -0.0058 -0.0079 -0.0069 
  (0.76) (0.78) (0.6) (0.61) (-0.29) (-0.26) (-0.36) (-0.31) 
lnIND 0.035 0.039 0.035 0.04 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.014 
  (0.83) (0.93) (0.85) (0.96) (0.68) (0.68) (0.63) (0.61) 
ACE 0.047 0.049 0.046 0.049 -0.017 -0.017 -0.016 -0.016 
  (1.78)
†
 (1.87)
†
 (1.72)
†
 (1.83)
†
 (-1.20) (-1.19) (-1.12) (-1.15) 
REMU-COM -0.038 -0.036 -0.031 -0.029 0.0028 0.0032 0.0017 0.0017 
  (-0.68) (-0.64) (-0.55) (-0.50) (0.1) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06) 
NOMINI-COM -0.015 -0.013 -0.016 -0.013 0.032 0.032 0.031 0.031 
  (-0.50) (-0.42) (-0.53) (-0.44) (1.80)
†
 (1.80)
†
 (1.75)
†
 (1.73)
†
 
DUL -0.019 -0.02 -0.0092 -0.009 -0.034 -0.034 -0.032 -0.033 
  (-0.36) (-0.38) (-0.17) (-0.17) (-1.28) (-1.29) (-1.23) (-1.26) 
AUDFee 0.018 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.0002 0.0005 0.0005 0.0003 
 (1.81)
†
 (1.85)
†
 (1.90)
†
 (1.95)
†
 (0.04) (0.10) (0.01) (0.06) 
BLK 0.03  0.034  0.055  0.052  
  (0.62)  (0.73)  (2.15)
*
  (2.04)
*
  
lnINST_BLK 0.026  0.025  0.083  0.082 
   (0.39)  (0.38)  (2.37)
*
  (2.36)
*
 
lnINDV_BLK  0.22  0.25  0.061  0.029 
   (1.57)  (2.05)
*
  (0.81)  (0.38) 
lnBRDOWN 0.14 -0.0053   -0.11 -0.099   
  (1.28) (-0.03)   (-2.06)
*
 (-1.24)   
lnCEOOWN   -0.08 -0.26   -0.1 -0.066 
    (-0.52) (-1.54)   (-1.21) (-0.63) 
lnEXECOWN   0.21 0.031   -0.05 -0.019 
    (2.58)
**
 (0.25)   (-0.66) (-0.20) 
lnNEDOWN   0.33 0.18   -0.17 -0.14 
    (0.93) (0.49)   (-1.51) (-1.16) 
lnadjDBT -0.58 -0.58 -0.58 -0.58 0.038 0.038 0.04 0.039 
  (-5.61)
***
 (-5.65)
***
 (-5.66)
***
 (-5.71)
***
 (0.96) (0.94) (0.98) (0.97) 
adjDIVD 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.29) (0.3) (0.36) (0.36) (-0.45) (-0.43) (-0.53) (-0.51) 
lnadjROA 0.43 0.44 0.42 0.42 -0.16 -0.16 -0.15 -0.15 
  (2.17)
*
 (2.22)
*
 (2.09)
*
 (2.15)
*
 (-2.00)
*
 (-1.98)
*
 (-1.95)
†
 (-1.94)
†
 
lnadjQ -0.097 -0.098 -0.097 -0.099     
  (-2.80)
**
 (-2.80)
**
 (-2.80)
**
 (-2.82)
**
     
Beta -0.098 -0.098 -0.097 -0.096 0.069 0.068 0.069 0.068 
 (-2.95)
**
 (-2.93)
**
 (-2.87)
**
 (-2.85)
**
 (4.08)
***
 (4.04)
***
 (4.09)
***
 (4.02)
***
 
lnASSTS -0.015 -0.015 -0.014 -0.015 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 
  (-2.39)
*
 (-2.40)
*
 (-2.30)
*
 (-2.34)
*
 (4.30)
***
 (4.34)
***
 (4.31)
***
 (4.37)
***
 
N 679 679 679 679 679 679 679 679 
groups 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 233 
Hausman 21.34 
 
21.71 24.3 23.91     
wald χ2 71.3
***
 73.7
***
 81.2
***
 82.4
***
 57.4
***
 58.5
***
 57.3
***
 58.7
***
 
z -statistics in parentheses  
†
p < 0.10, 
*
p < 0.05, 
**
p < 0.01, 
***
p < 0.001 
All variables are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile values 
Dependent 
variable(s) Industry adjusted asset utilisation ratio QFCF 
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6.6 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the researcher reports the empirical analyses utilised in this study; 
starting with the descriptive analyses to understand the sample characteristics in 
order to decide which regression analysis is suitable, identify whether there is a need 
to transform some variables or not, and check for multicollinearity between the study 
variables using the correlation matrix and the variance inflation factor (VIF) 
diagnostic test to ensure that there is no perfect and harmful correlation between the 
variables. Given that the study data set is a panel data set, the researcher started the 
multiple regression analyses with the Hausman (1978) specification test to decide 
between the fixed effect and random effects regression models; then, the researcher 
reports the results of each analysis. The researcher ends this chapter examining for 
the possibility of endogeneity and employing a number of further analyses to 
examine the robustness of the reported results as well as examining a number of 
issues raised in the prior literature, e.g., the nonlinear association between ownership 
structure and agency costs; applying an alternative measure for board independence 
and examining the impact of the number of blockholders on agency costs. Overall, 
the study findings show an association between corporate governance mechanisms 
and agency costs, but not all mechanisms contribute to lower agency costs. Thirteen 
different hypotheses were developed to examine the impact of a comprehensive set 
of corporate governance mechanisms and agency costs; the results are mixed and 
contingent to agency costs proxy as well as the economic conditions that surround 
the firm. For instance, large boards and effective audit committees are efficient in 
reducing agency costs; board composition as measured by the percentage of 
independent directors seem to increase agency costs; the results for duality, block 
holding and board ownership are mixed. For the full sample analysis, the same 
results were reported after controlling for the financial crisis period and using a 
relatively balanced panel data set. There is modest evidence that supports the 
nonlinear association between ownership variables and QFCF; using an alternative 
measure for board composition confirms the negative association between board 
composition and agency costs. The next chapter provides a comprehensive summary 
and conclusions that can be drawn from the study results.  
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CHAPTER 7 
STUDY SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis provides new evidence on the effectiveness of the corporate 
governance mechanisms in mitigating the consequences of the separation of 
ownership and control which is known as the agency problem, by empirically 
investigating the impact of a comprehensive set of corporate governance mechanisms 
on agency costs within the UK context. Contrary to prior literature that utilises firm 
value and performance as indirect proxies of lower agency costs; this study utilises 
two different proxies that reflect the agency costs in terms of the managerial 
effectiveness as measured by asset utilisation and investment decisions agency costs 
as measured by the interaction of firm’s free cash flow with the growth prospects. 
In this chapter, the researcher summarises the whole process of this study and 
concludes from the study findings. Section  7.2 recalls the study research problem and 
the research questions; section  7.3 explores the research methods utilised to 
investigate the research questions; section  7.4 provides a summary of the main 
findings of this study; the implications from this research are discussed in section  7.5; 
and the researcher ends up with section  7.6 which presents the limitations for this 
study in addition to future research avenues. 
7.2 REVISITING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Smith (1776) first points out that the managers of firms with dispersed ownership 
are not expected to deal with shareholders’ money with the same vigilance as if they 
are managing with their own money. Many years later, in 1932, in a support of 
Smith’s argument, Berle and Means mention that in modern corporations, there is 
almost complete separation between ownership and control. The majority of owners 
has no control over their investments, whereas, the people who control the firm have 
negligible or no ownership stake (Berle and Means, 1932). After this book, much 
research was directed towards studying how to shrink the gap between shareholders’ 
and managers interests. Compensation structures and the problems that are associated 
with these structures were the main concerns to this research interest (Jensen and 
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Smith, 1984). In 1976, Jensen and Meckling were the first to introduce the definition 
and the conceptual framework of the agency problem, and the costs associated with 
this problem. 
Based on this framework, the research on the agency theory has developed;  as 
mentioned by Jensen (1983) and Eisenhardt (1989), two main research streams (the 
positive and the principal agent approaches) were progressing and shaped the 
research in the agency theory. The positive approach is concerned with the 
development of different governance mechanisms that could be used to control the 
managerial opportunistic behaviour and mitigate the consequences of the agency 
problem. Much research has been conducted in this area, leading to the development 
of many mechanisms and regulations to reduce the negative consequences of the 
separation of ownership and control. Parallel to this theoretical research, empirical 
research was progressing, as well, to examine and provide evidence of the 
effectiveness of the proposed mechanisms. Most of these studies used the firm value 
and financial performance as a proxy of agency costs, assuming the higher firm value 
or higher performance indicates lower agency conflicts and lower agency costs. This 
trend of research could be justified as it is difficult to find a figure that reflects the 
exact agency costs incurred by the firm. In 2000, Ang, Cole and Lin propose the 
asset utilisation and operating expenses to sales ratio; and Doukas, Kim and Pantzalis 
propose the interaction of free cash flow with growth prospects; these two papers 
provide the literature with three different proxies of agency costs. 
Following these studies, the aim of this study is to empirically investigate the 
impact of corporate governance mechanisms, and the compliance with the UK 
corporate governance code on the agency costs of the UK firms, in addition to 
investigating this impact before and after the 2008 financial crisis. The following 
research question reflects these aims.  
“To what extent, do corporate governance mechanisms help in reducing the 
agency costs of the UK firms?” 
“To what extent, does the compliance with the UK corporate governance code 
help in reducing the agency costs of the UK firms?”  
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“To what extent, does the impact of the corporate governance mechanisms 
change during the recession period follow the 2008 financial crisis?” 
“Does ownership identity affect the impact of ownership on agency costs?” 
To answer the study research questions, the researcher has included a 
comprehensive set of governance mechanisms in a baseline and three sub models; 
the researcher considered the compliance in this study, in terms of following the 
proposed criteria of director independence, constructing composite measures for the 
audit committee, the remuneration and nomination committees based on the 
mentioned recommendations on the UK corporate governance code.  
The empirical investigation of these questions contributes to the governance 
literature in many ways; first, this is the first study that investigates the impact of a 
comprehensive set of corporate governance mechanisms on the agency costs in the 
UK context; to identify which mechanisms help in reducing the agency costs and the 
other mechanisms that do not reduce or increase the agency costs of the UK firms. 
Second, this study provides evidence that following all the prescribed governance 
practices not always reduces agency costs. third, it captures the changes in the impact 
of the governance mechanisms on agency costs before and after the financial crisis; 
and finally, this study provides evidence that owners’ identity affects the ownership 
impact on agency costs. 
7.3 SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This study is an archival study in terms of the nature and sources of data, 
following the deductive approach and the traditional positive philosophy; thus, 
answering the, previously mentioned, research questions required the researcher to 
set different models to include a large set of corporate governance mechanisms and 
examine the potential interactions among these governance mechanisms. In doing so, 
eight main hypotheses representing the main governance mechanisms and thirteen 
sub-hypotheses in total were examined. The examined hypotheses are as follows: 
H1: There is a negative association between board size and agency costs. 
H2: There is a negative association between the percentage of independent board 
members and agency costs. 
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H3: There is a positive association between duality and agency costs. 
H4: Board subcommittees are negatively associated with agency costs. 
 H4a: An effective audit committee is positively associated with lower agency 
costs. 
 H4b: An effective remuneration committee is positively associated with lower 
agency costs. 
 H4c: An effective nomination committee is positively associated with lower 
agency costs. 
H5: There is a negative association between board ownership percentage and 
agency costs 
H6: The identity of  the owner director has a significant impact on agency costs 
 H6a: There is a negative association between CEO ownership percentage 
and agency costs. 
 H6b: There is a negative association between executive directors’ ownership 
percentage and agency costs. 
 H6c: There is a negative association between non-executive directors’ 
ownership percentage and agency costs. 
H7: There is a negative association between block holding percentage and agency 
costs. 
H8: The identity of the blockholders has a significant impact on agency costs. 
 H8a: There is a negative association between institutional block holding 
percentage and agency costs. 
 H8b: There is a negative association between individual block holding 
percentage and agency costs.  
To examine these hypotheses empirically, the researcher utilised a sample of 1431 
firm–year observations of UK firms incorporated in the FTSE All–Share index over 
the period 2005–2011 inclusive; and two subsamples representing the pre-crisis 
(2005-2007 inclusive) and post-crisis (2009-2011 inclusive) periods were utilised to 
for the pre and post the financial crisis analyses; it may be worth mentioning that the 
utilised samples in this study represent almost all industry sectors working in the UK 
market. The required data were collected from three main sources; annual reports, 
DataStream and Thomson One Banker database.  
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Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis were employed to check the data set, 
understand the characteristics of the data set and the appropriate analysis tests; before 
employing the panel data regression models. Panel data models were employed to 
take the advantage of the cross section and time series characteristics of the study 
data set. Based on the Hausman (1978) specification test results, fixed or random 
effects models were employed. Considering that the second proxy of the agency 
costs is censored variable, Tobit regression was utilised. Furthermore, a number of 
robustness check tests were employed to ensure the robustness of the reported results; 
for example, Durbin–Wu–Hausman endogeneity diagnostic test was utilised to 
ensure that none of the independent variables are endogenous and affect the analysis 
results; another board independence measure; re-estimating the full sample analysis 
after controlling for the financial crisis, as well as other tests that investigate a 
number of issues that have been raised in the prior literature, i.e., the nonlinear 
association between ownership variables and agency costs, the number of 
blockholders . The following section summarises the main findings of this study; and 
shows which of the examined hypotheses are supported, which are not supported and 
in what economic context. 
7.4 SUMMARY AND INTERPRETATION OF THE STUDY RESULTS  
Table 38 summarises the study’s theoretical hypotheses and whether these 
hypotheses were empirically supported or not. The reported results for this study 
show that board size is positive and significantly associated with asset utilisation for 
the full sample and the post crisis sample as well. The coefficients of the pre–crisis 
sample are positive but are not significant. These reported results indicate that large 
board size is associated with lower agency conflicts reflected in better utilisation for 
firm’s assets. Consistent results were reported using QFCF as an agency costs proxy; 
a negative association between large boards and QFCF, however, it was only 
significant in the pre–crisis period only; These results are consistent and complement 
each other, besides, they lend the support to the argument that large boards are more 
effective than small boards and more appropriate for the UK context. 
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Table 38 Hypotheses and Findings 
Hypotheses 
Results 
Whole Pre–crisis post crisis 
Asset utilisation as a proxy of agency costs 
H1: There is a positive association between board size and asset utilisation. Supported
†
 Not supported Supported
†
 
H2: There is a positive association between the percentage of independent board members and 
asset utilisation. 
Not supported 
Not 
supported
†
 
Not supported 
H3: There is a negative association between duality and asset utilisation. Supported
†
 Not supported Not supported 
H4: board subcommittees are positively associated with asset utilisation. 
  
  
  
 
H4a: An effective audit committee is positively associated with asset utilisation. Not supported Supported
*
 Supported
†
 
 
H4b: An effective remuneration committee is positively associated with asset utilisation Not supported Not supported Not supported 
 
H4c: An effective nomination committee is positively associated with asset utilisation. Not supported Not supported Not supported 
H5: There is a positive association between board ownership percentage and asset utilisation. Not supported Not supported Not supported 
H6: The identity of  the owner director has a significant impact on asset utilisation 
 
 H6a: There is a positive association between CEO ownership percentage and asset utilisation. Not supported
*
 Not supported Not supported
*
 
 H6b: There is a positive association between executive directors’ ownership percentage and 
asset utilisation. 
Not supported Not supported Supported
*
 
 H6c: There is a positive association between non-executive directors’ ownership percentage 
and asset utilisation. 
Not supported Not supported Not supported 
H7: There is a positive association between block holding percentage and asset utilisation. 
 
Supported
*
 Supported
†
 Not supported 
H8: The identity of the blockholders has a significant impact on agency costs 
  
  
 
H8a: There is a positive association between institutional block holding percentage and asset 
utilisation. 
Supported† Supported
†
 Not supported 
 
H8b: There is a positive association between individual block holding percentage and asset 
utilisation. 
Supported† Not supported Supported
†
 
† p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Hypotheses 
Results 
Whole Pre–crisis post crisis 
QFCF as a proxy of agency costs 
H1: There is a negative association between board size and QFCF. Not supported Supported
*
 Not supported 
H2: There is a negative association between the percentage of independent board members 
and QFCF. 
Not supported Not supported Not supported 
H3: There is a positive association between duality and QFCF. Not supported
†
 Not supported Not supported 
H4: board subcommittees are negatively associated with QFCF. 
  
  
  
 
H4a: An effective audit committee is positively associated with lower QFCF. Not supported Not supported Not supported 
 
H4b: An effective remuneration committee is positively associated with lower QFCF. Not supported Not supported Not supported 
 
H4c: An effective nomination committee is positively associated with lower QFCF. Not supported Not supported Not supported† 
H5: There is a negative association between board ownership percentage and QFCF. Supported
†
 Not supported Not supported
*
 
H6: The identity of  the owner director has a significant impact on QFCF 
 
 H6a: There is a negative association between CEO ownership percentage and QFCF. Not supported
†
 Supported
*
 Not supported 
 H6b: There is a negative association between executive directors’ ownership percentage and 
QFCF. 
 
Not supported Not supported Not supported 
 H6c: There is a negative association between non-executive directors’ ownership percentage 
and QFCF.  
Not supported Supported
*
 Not supported 
H7: There is a negative association between block holding percentage and QFCF. 
 
Not supported
**
 Not supported Not supported
**
 
H8: The identity of the blockholders has a significant impact on agency costs. 
  
  
  
 
H8a: There is a negative association between institutional block holding percentage and 
QFCF. 
Not supported
***
 
Not 
supported
*
 
Not supported
**
 
 
H8b: There is a negative association between individual block holding percentage and 
QFCF. 
Not supported Supported
*
 Not supported 
† p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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The reported results provide mixed results in regard to the role of the board 
composition in reducing agency costs as measured by asset utilisation. On the one 
hand, the coefficients are negative, but insignificant for the whole and post crisis 
samples; but on the other hand, the coefficients of the pre–crisis sample still negative 
but turn out to be significant. These results could suggest that having a board with a 
majority of independent board members neglects the importance of the executive 
directors and their firm specific knowledge about the firm, and show that this 
domination of independent non-executive directors reduces firm’s ability in utilising 
firm’s asset base, and thus, increases agency costs; such findings contradicts with the 
agency theory perspective. By considering that for the pre–crisis period, the average 
percentage of independent board members is 48% and the negative association 
reported for this period (although it was a steady period), this could indicate that the 
50% threshold is not the efficient limit, and the assertion of a majority of 
independent directors excluding the chairman recommendation should be revised. In 
terms of QFCF as an agency costs measure, no significant relationship was reported.  
The board structure reflected in size and outsider directors representation is 
affected by both the external environment and firm specific characteristics (Pearce 
and Zahra, 1992; Hillman, Withers and Collins, 2009), as the results show the 
uncertain economic conditions during the post crisis period require large boards to 
cope with these changes. The results of board composition compliance measure 
provide evidence that independent board as suggested by the UK corporate 
governance code is detrimental management effectiveness and increase agency costs 
for the post crisis period. 
In this study, the researcher investigates the impact of the compliance with the 
recommendations of the UK corporate governance code for the three board 
subcommittees. The results reveal that only an effective audit committee has a 
significant role in enhancing managerial efficiency and reducing agency cost for the 
pre and post the financial crisis samples. However, after considering the endogeneity 
issue, the reported results reveal that complying with the recommendations of  the  
UK corporate governance code for the remuneration committee is associated with 
higher agency costs, whereas, the compliance with the recommendations of the 
nomination committee is associated with lower agency costs. The reported results 
failed to provide any evidence that these board subcommittees help in reducing the 
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agency problems associated with the free cash flows conflicts except for the 
nomination committee, for the post crisis period, the results reveal positive and 
significant association between the compliance with the UK recommendations for 
the nomination committee and agency costs as measured by the QFCF. With respect 
to duality, the results provide modest evidence that duality is detrimental to the firm 
and leads to more agency costs (lower asset utilisation). The coefficients are negative 
for the baseline and the sub models as well; but significant only for the baseline 
model and sub model 1 of the full sample. Furthermore, the coefficients are negative 
and insignificant for the pre and post crisis samples. Likewise, the reported results 
provide modest evidence of the relationship between duality and QFCF, the results 
show a negative association between duality and QFCF for the baseline and sub 
model 1 suggesting that duality helps in reducing the agency conflicts related to the 
free cash flows. 
The reported results show that blockholders help in controlling the opportunistic 
behaviour of the management, and help in mitigating the consequences of the agency 
costs. The coefficients are positively associated with the asset utilisation ratio for the 
study different samples; significant for the whole and the pre–crisis samples, but 
insignificant for the post crisis sample. This result provides evidence that the role of 
the governance mechanisms could change in accordance with the changes of the 
external environment. One possible reason behind the change from being significant 
to insignificant is that as shown in the descriptive statistics (Tables 3 and 4) the 
average percentage of the block holding increased from 28.5% for the pre–crisis 
period to 33.6% for the post crisis period; whereas, the asset utilisation ratio was 
decreasing; this could support the argument that, after a certain limit, the 
blockholders turn to become less efficient monitoring mechanism and the increase of 
the block holding could turn out to be detrimental to shareholders. Conversely, the 
results show that block holding increases the agency costs of the free cash flows for 
the full and the post crisis samples.  
Related to the identity of the blockholders, the results reveal that institutional 
blockholders have a significant role in reducing the agency costs for the full sample 
and the pre–crisis sample, this role turn out to be negative but insignificant for the 
post crisis sample. Conversely, individual blockholders have an overall positive 
impact on asset utilisation ratio; the coefficients are positive and significant for the 
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full sample models and positive and significant for the comprehensive model (sub 
model 3) of the post crisis samples. These results could suggest that individual 
blockholders could be good monitors and can help in protecting the minority of 
shareholders from the opportunistic behaviour of other blockholders and 
management as well, and their role is much important for the post crisis period. 
Moreover, these results could lend a partial support to the previously mentioned 
argument that blockholders (namely institutional blockholders) could seek their own 
interests and extract private benefits from their control. In terms of QFCF, there is a 
significant positive association between institutional block holding and QFCF for the 
full sample and the pre and post crisis samples. Such results clearly demonstrate the 
negative impact of the increase of the institutional block holding ratio for firms with 
free cash flows and low growth opportunities, as this increase leads to more agency 
costs. Conversely, the results show a negative association between individual block 
holding and agency costs, but only significant for the pre–crisis sample. Such results 
endorse the argument that the identity of the blockholder does matter. 
Turning now to board ownership, the results of this study failed to provide any 
evidence that board ownership has a significant role in aligning managerial interests 
with those of shareholders. However, after splitting this total board ownership 
percentage into three sub percentages based on the identity of the directors, the 
results show that CEO has a negative impact on asset utilisation. This negative 
association is significant for the whole sample models and comprehensive model 
(sub model 3) of the post crisis sample; suggesting that CEO ownership could help 
CEOs to entrench themselves and cause more divergence between their personal 
interests and shareholders’ interests. No significant results were found in regard to 
non-executive directors’ ownership, besides the results are mixed; negative 
coefficients for the whole sample and positive for the pre and post crisis samples. 
With respect to the executive directors’ ownership, no significant impact was 
reported, with an exception to one model for the post crisis sample.  
In terms of QFCF, the results show a negative association between QFCF and the 
total percentage board ownership; nonetheless, this association is significant only for 
the baseline model of the full and post crisis samples, indicating that board 
ownership helps in reducing the agency conflicts of free cash flows. After 
categorising the board ownership into three subcategories, the CEO ownership ratio 
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seems to have a negative impact on QFCF of the full and pre–crisis samples for the 
comprehensive model only (sub model 3), whereas, there is a modest evidence that 
non-executive ownership ratio leads to higher agency costs during the pre–crisis 
period.  
In this study, the researcher controlled for some firm characteristics that have 
been argued in the prior literature that they could have a significant impact on 
shaping firm’s corporate governance structure and affect firm’s agency costs. Based 
on the reported results, the researcher can conclude that debt has a negative impact 
on asset utilisation as it hinders the managers’ ability in utilising firm's assets and 
lead to more agency cost. Firm profitability enhances the firm’s ability to in utilising 
their assets base, and generating more sales, which should lead to more shareholders’ 
wealth. Likewise, profitability leads to lower agency costs in terms of QFCF. This 
study also provides empirical evidence that as the firm becomes more complex and 
larger in size, they incur more agency costs regardless of the utilised agency costs 
proxy. Other controlled variables don’t seem to have any significant impact on 
agency costs. 
Taken together, these results add to the mixed results provided by the prior studies 
regarding the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on reducing the agency 
costs and enhancing firm performance. Overall, the direction and the significance of 
the results, for most of the utilised mechanisms in this study, are consistent among 
the different models and the three utilised samples. However, there are slight 
differences on the significance level and some variables tend to turn from having 
positive impact to be negative and vice versa. 
These reported results show that not all governance mechanisms have a 
significant impact on reducing the agency cost; moreover, the results provide 
evidence that governance mechanisms impact could change in accordance with the 
changes in the business environments. Mechanisms which are efficient in reducing 
the agency costs during the steady economic conditions could turn out to be 
detrimental after a crisis and during the recession periods. Considering the different 
forms of agency conflicts, the reported results provide some evidence that some 
corporate governance mechanisms could help in reducing the agency costs, 
regardless of type of the conflict that causes these costs, whereas, other mechanisms 
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could help in reducing the agency costs of a certain type of conflict but the same time 
increases the agency costs result from different agency conflicts.  
Turning to the insignificant mechanisms, the lack of evidence does not mean that 
these mechanisms are not important or ineffective. Corporate governance 
mechanisms complement and can substitute each other. Besides, management 
assesses the cost and benefits of every mechanism while deciding which mechanisms 
should be utilised and to what extent, consequently, for the insignificant mechanisms, 
alternative mechanisms could be more utilised and hence, no direct association could 
be reported (Bathala and Rao, 1995). Finally, this study provides empirical evidence 
that supports the agency theory and resource dependence theory in terms of board 
characteristics, and failed to support the stewardship theory in the case of the CEO 
duality; however, this study does provide partial support for in terms of board 
composition.  
7.5 IMPLICATIONS OF THIS STUDY 
This study has a number of implications, which will be addressed in the following 
section. These implications contribute to the ongoing governance literature and 
provide some suggestions for other researchers, practitioners, regulators and policy 
makers as well. The UK governance system is a “comply or explain” system; the 
descriptive statistics of this study show that firms incorporated in the FTSE All–
Share index tend to comply more with the different aspects of board characteristics 
mentioned in the UK corporate governance code. The official reports published by 
the FRC support these statistics. The reported results in this study can guide the 
policy makers in designing future reforms and regulations. 
The UK corporate governance code (2010, p.12) states that each firm should 
establish a board with sufficient size that can incorporate are the firm’s business 
requirement. This study provides evidence that large board is more efficient in 
performing its assigned responsibilities in the UK context; especially during the 
abnormal economic conditions.  
The UK governance code over stresses on the importance of having independent 
directors sitting on the board, the code sets the criteria of director’s independence 
and state that they should be the majority in order to ensure board independence and 
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enhance the board’s ability in performing their monitoring role. However, the prior 
literature and the results of this study show that firm characteristics and the 
surrounding environment might have a significant impact on shaping the board 
composition. The coefficient of the percentage of independent board members to the 
total board mombers turns out from being negative and significant  during the pre–
crisis to be negative but insignificant for the post crisis as well as the full sample. 
Such case should be considered by regulators and, at the same time, firms should 
provide their shareholders with evidence that justifies their need to deviate from the 
stated recommendations and the necessity of having more insiders sitting on the 
board. The minimum independence level set by the UK corporate governance code is 
not the efficient level that reduces the agency conflicts between the management and 
shareholders, and the assertion of a majority of independent directors excluding the 
chairman recommendation should be revised by the policy makers in the UK. 
In terms of the second component of board independence, CEO duality, this study 
provides evidence, although it is modest, that reveals that duality is detrimental for 
shareholders’ wealth, what is interesting is that the incident of duality is very limited 
in the UK, however, the regression models show this negative impact on asset 
utilisation. Interestingly, for firms with free cash flows and limited growth 
opportunities, there is modest evidence as well that duality reduces agency costs 
result from the conflict towards the free cash flow. Such findings endorse the 
recommendations and calls of separating between the CEO and chairman 
responsibilities.  
Similar to the board independence, the UK corporate governance code mentions 
that remuneration and nomination committees should have a majority of independent 
directors. Such recommendation is valid in the sense that insider dominated 
nomination committee could customise the board in the way that services the CEO 
and top management interests and they might choose directors who are not likely to 
be good monitors. Likewise, inside dominated remuneration committee could be 
biased towards extra paying the CEO and top management. However, these 
recommendations belittle the insiders’ experience and knowledge about the firm’s 
needs and special requirements that should be present on the new appointed directors, 
and also, neglect the executive directors’ experience about the fair pay that the CEO 
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and top management should get. Before proceeding to other implications, this study 
supports the audit committee effectiveness criteria proposed by Smith Report (2003). 
In terms of ownership structure, this study provides evidence that blockholders 
and CEOs could use their ownership stake to extract private benefits and expropriate 
minority’s wealth; such results could call to the attention of regulators to enact laws 
and regulations that provide the sufficient protection for the minorities of 
shareholders. 
This study lends the support to the arguments that call for more flexible 
governance regulations and don’t force firms to follow a prescribed structure as one 
structure does not fit all. However, it is a dilemma; it is necessary to develop and 
provide a set of mechanisms that should protect the shareholders from the 
opportunistic behaviour of the management and other controlling shareholders, but at 
the same time, these developed mechanisms could curb the innovation and the 
benignant discretion of managers, besides, firm characteristics are key factors that 
could shape the governance structure in the way that enhance firm performance. 
As a final point, this study also, supports the call of considering more than one 
theoretical framework rather than adopting the agency perspective (or the 
shareholder perspective) while enacting the regulations and governance codes. 
Furthermore, this study provides evidence for the interaction between the corporate 
governance mechanisms, such result should be considered by future researchers as 
neglecting this interaction could lead to misleading results, conclusions and 
directions for the researchers, policy makers and regulators.  
7.6 LIMITATION OF THIS STUDY AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
AVENUES 
7.6.1 Study limitations 
Similar to every research done in the field of corporate governance, this study has 
a number of limitations that could affect the interpretation of the results. In this 
section, the researcher reports these potential limitations and suggests, based on these 
limitations, the future research avenues for other researchers. Research limitations 
are related to three main aspects. The first aspect is the sample size, time horizon and 
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the examined context, the second aspect relates to the utilised variables; and finally 
the regression technique employed in this study. 
 In regard to the sample size, time span and the context of this study, the 
researcher has utilised a sample of 1431 firm–observation for a time span of seven 
years from 2005 to 2011 inclusive. This sample includes only firms with all data 
required for this study. The researcher started with a sample including all firms 
incorporated in the FTSE All–Share index; and has excluded financial firms, delisted 
firms and firms with missing data. This implies that the study sample could suffer 
from survival bias, as only active firms during the study horizon were included. The 
reason behind excluding delisted firms is that to take the advantage of panel 
regression models; each firm should have a minimum of two observations; thus, any 
firm with less than this threshold should be excluded; moreover, for delisted firms 
the annual reports are not available for most cases. Finally, this study was applied to 
the UK market, thus the reported results in this study can be applied to the UK 
context only. 
As mentioned earlier, this study was limited to the equity agency costs. Three 
proxies were utilised to capture agency costs as a dependent variable. These proxies 
cannot capture exactly the amount of agency costs incurred by the firm, but can give 
indications that managers have exerted the required effort and working efficiently in 
managing firm’s assets; this was captured by the study first proxy. The second proxy 
reflects the agency costs of the free cash flow and the agency costs associated with 
investment decisions. The third proxy (SG&A) can capture the discretionary 
expenses by the management; however, the regression models of only two proxies 
(asset utilisation and interaction of free cash flow with growth prospects) were 
significant, and reported in this study.  
In this study, the researcher utilised a comprehensive set of corporate governance 
mechanisms; these mechanisms capture wide range of board characteristics and other 
ownership structure variables. Although, it was difficult to include every single 
variable utilised in the prior literature; in the next section, the researcher proposes 
other measures for agency costs and other corporate governance mechanisms which 
could be utilised in future research. 
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In this study, the researcher employed panel data regression models, and tested for 
the endogeneity to check the robustness of the findings. A more advanced regression 
model could be used; this regression model is the System Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM). This model considers and deals with the endogeneity problem, 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation within individuals (Roodman, 2009); however, 
utilising this method requires a larger data set in terms of more time observations. 
7.6.2 Opportunities for Future research 
The time span of this study can be expanded to include more years and expand the 
sample to include more firms; however, the expansion of the sample size in terms of 
the number of firms per each year could be constrained by the data availability 
problem. 
This study was limited to the internal corporate governance mechanisms; thus, 
future researchers can control for the external governance mechanisms in their future 
research projects. Although this study has included a comprehensive set of corporate 
governance mechanisms; however, other mechanisms like the CEO and top 
management compensation structures, independent directors’ fees as an indication of 
independent director’s commitment, the different characteristics of board and the 
board subcommittees as well, the presence of the CEO as a committee member in the 
remuneration and nominations committees. And finally, the last financial crisis 
shows that the remuneration structure of top management needs attention, to be 
revised and to be more controlled, in order to understand the reasons behind the 
misalignment between the top management remuneration system and the firm’s long 
term strategy and actions. Future research could be directed towards this important 
aspect. 
In terms of agency costs (dependent variable); this study was limited to equity 
agency costs proxies, other proxies that capture different aspects of the agency 
problem like overinvestment which could be a possible research avenue. 
Overinvestment is a critical problem as managers have the incentive and the prospect 
to go beyond the optimal firm size and build empires to secure their position, get 
higher compensations and expropriate shareholders’ wealth. Richardson (2006) 
proposes a proxy of the overinvestment problem which can be employed in future 
research. Furthermore, the future research could work in investigating the role of 
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corporate governance mechanisms in reducing the managerial entrenchment as one 
of the agency conflicts; and the underinvestment problem.  
Finally, this study was conducted using UK data, thus conducting a comparative 
study representing different context, or a comparative study between emerging and 
developed countries will help in the development of the global theory of corporate 
governance. Also, this study was limited to UK non-financial firms, including the 
financial firms and conducting a comparative study between financial and non-
financial firms could be a possible future research opportunity. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 39 Results of the fixed effects panel data regression model with robust 
standard error for the study sample covering the period 2005-2011 inclusive 
 Baseline 
model 
Sub model 
1 
Sub model 
2 
Sub model 
3 
Intercept 1.52 1.51 1.51 1.51 
  (3.53)
***
 (3.52)
***
 (3.53)
***
 (3.53)
***
 
lnBRD 0.022 0.023 0.020 0.021 
 (0.70) (0.74) (0.65) (0.67) 
lnIND 0.081 0.081 0.079 0.078 
  (0.97) (0.96) (0.93) (0.92) 
ACE 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.012 
 (0.74) (0.76) (0.75) (0.76) 
lnREMU-COM 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.005 
  (0.28) (0.29) (0.21) (0.23) 
lnNOMINI-COM 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 
 (0.21) (0.26) (0.23) (0.27) 
DUL -0.070 -0.070 -0.061 -0.062 
  (-1.87)
†
 (-1.88)
†
 (-1.65)
†
 (-1.67)
†
 
BLK 0.093  0.094  
 (2.62)
**
  (2.66)
**
  
lnINST_BLK  0.098  0.100 
   (2.10)
*
  (2.15)
*
 
lnINDV_BLK  0.210  0.190 
  (1.65)
†
  (1.49) 
lnBRDOWN -0.056 -0.066   
  (-0.50) (-0.60)   
lnCEOOWN   -0.190 -0.180 
   (-1.23) (-1.18) 
lnEXECOWN   0.130 0.110 
    (0.91) (0.80) 
lnNEDOWN   -0.230 -0.230 
   (-1.21) (-1.21) 
lnadjDBT -0.520 -0.520 -0.510 -0.510 
  (-5.34)
***
 (-5.34)
***
 (-5.31)
***
 (-5.31)
***
 
sqadjDIVD -0.100 -0.100 -0.099 -0.099 
 (-1.43) (-1.42) (-1.40) (-1.39) 
lnadjROA 0.380 0.370 0.370 0.370 
  (2.74)
**
 (2.74)
**
 (2.72)
**
 (2.72)
**
 
lnadjQ 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.04) (-0.0084) (0.00) (-0.043) 
lnASSTS -0.013 -0.014 -0.013 -0.014 
  (-1.89)
†
 (-1.91)
†
 (-1.90)
†
 (-1.92)
†
 
N 1431 1431 1431 1431 
adj. R
2
 11% 11% 11% 11% 
F-test 4.63
***
 4.27
***
 4.62
***
 4.34
***
 
Dependent variable Industry adjusted asset utilisation ratio 
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Table 40 Results of the fixed effects panel data 
regression model with robust standard error for 
the study sample covering the period 2005-2007 
inclusive 
 Sub model 3 
Intercept 1.84 
  (3.38)
***
 
lnBRD 0.063 
 (1.32) 
lnIND 0.150 
  (1.72)
†
 
ACE 0.025 
 (1.90)
†
 
lnREMU-COM -0.007 
  (-0.39) 
lnNOMINI-COM 0.015 
 (0.81) 
DUL -0.017 
  (-0.74) 
lnINST_BLK 0.097 
  (1.87)
†
 
lnINDV_BLK 0.083 
 (0.75) 
lnCEOOWN -0.050 
 (-0.21) 
lnEXECOWN 0.091 
  (0.47) 
lnNEDOWN 0.170 
 (0.57) 
lnadjDBT -0.240 
  (-1.62) 
sqadjDIVD -0.042 
 (-0.62) 
lnadjROA 0.150 
  (1.12) 
lnadjQ 0.066 
 (1.81)
†
 
lnASSTS -0.080 
  (-2.94)
**
 
N 562 
adj. R
2
 18% 
F-test 4.23
***
 
Dependent variable Industry adjusted 
asset utilisation 
ratio 
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Table 41 Results of the fixed effects panel data regression model with robust 
standard error for the study sample covering the period 2009-2011 inclusive 
 Baseline 
model 
Sub 
model 1 
Sub 
model 2 
Sub model 
3 
Intercept 1.07 1.05 1.05 1.04 
  (4.07)
***
 (3.92)
***
 (3.98)
***
 (3.87)
***
 
lnBRD 0.044 0.052 0.041 0.047 
 (0.51) (0.60) (0.47) (0.54) 
lnIND -0.087 -0.087 -0.069 -0.070 
  (-1.17) (-1.18) (-0.93) (-0.94) 
ACE 0.047 0.049 0.046 0.048 
 (1.52) (1.59) (1.51) (1.55) 
lnREMU-COM 0.100 0.098 0.100 0.099 
  (1.13) (1.04) (1.10) (1.04) 
lnNOMINI-COM -0.056 -0.054 -0.055 -0.054 
 (-1.33) (-1.28) (-1.32) (-1.28) 
DUL -0.017 -0.017 -0.018 -0.018 
  (-0.18) (-0.19) (-0.20) (-0.20) 
BLK 0.038   0.068   
 (0.44)  (0.77)  
lnINST_BLK   0.033   0.070 
   (0.28)  (0.58) 
lnINDV_BLK   0.290   0.260 
  (1.12)  (1.03) 
lnBRDOWN -0.140 -0.160   
  (-0.59) (-0.69)   
lnCEOOWN   -0.210 -0.210 
   (-0.69) (-0.69) 
lnEXECOWN   0.310 0.260 
    (1.28) (1.06) 
lnNEDOWN   -0.640 -0.640 
   (-1.97)
†
 (-1.92)
†
 
lnadjDBT -0.620 -0.620 -0.620 -0.630 
  (-4.64)
***
 (-4.68)
***
 (-4.71)
***
 (-4.74)
***
 
adjDIVD 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
 (1.13) (1.12) (1.07) (1.07) 
lnadjROA 0.250 0.250 0.260 0.250 
  (1.18) (1.15) (1.18) (1.16) 
lnadjQ -0.084 -0.084 -0.080 -0.081 
 (-1.82)
†
 (-1.82)
†
 (-1.74)
†
 (-1.74)
†
 
lnASSTS -0.013 -0.013 -0.012 -0.012 
  (-1.88)
†
 (-1.88)
†
 (-1.63) (-1.64) 
N 684 684 684 684 
adj. R
2
 11.9% 11.9% 12.3% 12.2% 
F-test 2.84
***
 2.65
***
 3.67
***
 3.46
***
 
Dependent variable: Industry adjusted asset utilisation ratio 
 
 
 
